CVE-2025-46733
Raw vector
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:L/A:LCVSS and EPSS are reproduced from their sources (NVD, FIRST EPSS). Risk Priority is our own derived reading, not an NVD score.
Summary
CVE-2025-46733 is a high-severity Improper Handling of Exceptional Conditions (CWE-755) vulnerability. Its CVSS base score is 7.9 (High).
Operationally, exploitation aligns with the MITRE ATT&CK technique Exploitation for Client Execution (T1203); ranked at the 4th percentile by exploit likelihood (below the median); it is not currently listed in the CISA KEV catalog.
The strongest mitigations our analysis identified map to SC-24 (Fail in Known State) and SI-17 (Fail-safe Procedures) — see the control section below for these in your framework.
OWASP Top 10 for Web (2025)
EU & UK References
- 🇪🇺 ENISA EUVD: EUVD-2025-20017
Vulnerability Data
OP-TEE is a Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) designed as companion to a non-secure Linux kernel running on Arm; Cortex-A cores using the TrustZone technology. In version 4.5.0, using a specially crafted tee-supplicant binary running in REE userspace, an attacker can…
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trigger a panic in a TA that uses the libutee Secure Storage API. Many functions in libutee, specifically those which make up the Secure Storage API, will panic if a system call returns an unexpected return code. This behavior is mandated by the TEE Internal Core API specification. However, in OP-TEE’s implementation, return codes of secure storage operations are passed through unsanitized from the REE tee-supplicant, through the Linux kernel tee-driver, through the OP-TEE kernel, back to libutee. Thus, an attacker with access to REE userspace, and the ability to stop tee-supplicant and replace it with their own process (generally trivial for a root user, and depending on the way permissions are set up, potentially available even to less privileged users) can run a malicious tee-supplicant process that responds to storage requests with unexpected response codes, triggering a panic in the requesting TA. This is particularly dangerous for TAs built with `TA_FLAG_SINGLE_INSTANCE` (corresponding to `gpd.ta.singleInstance` and `TA_FLAG_INSTANCE_KEEP_ALIVE` (corresponding to `gpd.ta.keepAlive`). The behavior of these TAs may depend on memory that is preserved between sessions, and the ability of an attacker to panic the TA and reload it with a clean memory space can compromise the behavior of those TAs. A critical example of this is the optee_ftpm TA. It uses the kept alive memory to hold PCR values, which crucially must be non-resettable. An attacker who can trigger a panic in the fTPM TA can reset the PCRs, and then extend them PCRs with whatever they choose, falsifying boot measurements, accessing sealed data, and potentially more. The impact of this issue depends significantly on the behavior of affected TAs. For some, it could manifest as a denial of service, while for others, like the fTPM TA, it can result in the disclosure of sensitive data. Anyone running the fTPM TA is affected, but similar attacks may be possible on other TAs that leverage the Secure Storage API. A fix is available in commit 941a58d78c99c4754fbd4ec3079ec9e1d596af8f.
- CWE(s)
Related Threats
MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise Techniques
CVEs Like This One
Affected Assets
Mitigating Controls
Control response
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- 1 hardening rule · 1 OS baseline
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Mitigating Controls (NIST 800-53 r5) AI
Requires the system to fail to a known safe state on specified failures, limiting the impact of unhandled exceptional conditions.
Mandates explicit fail-safe procedures triggered by indicated failures, structurally preventing unhandled or mishandled exceptional conditions.
Requires generation of appropriate error messages on exceptional conditions, directly enforcing correct handling rather than silent or incorrect behavior.
Mitigating Controls (NIST CSF 2.0) AI
Derived directly from the weakness types (CWEs) cited in the NVD entry via our AI-authored CWE→CSF cross-walk (authority under review) — links open the control.
Secure SDLC practices explicitly require proper exception and error handling during design and coding.
Mitigating Controls (ISO/IEC 27001:2022 Annex A) AI
Derived directly from the weakness types (CWEs) cited in the NVD entry via our AI-authored CWE→ISO cross-walk (authority under review) — links open the control.
Security testing in development and acceptance verifies correct handling of exceptional conditions.
Documented operating procedures may specify exception handling but do not guarantee implementation.
Logging captures unhandled exceptions, aiding detection but not preventing the weakness.
Monitoring can surface unhandled exceptions but does not enforce proper handling.
Secure SDLC mandates exception-handling requirements and testing that directly prevent improper handling of exceptional conditions.
Application security requirements explicitly include handling of error and exceptional conditions.