Cyber Resilience

CVE-2025-47277

RCE in Vllm 0.6.5 – 0.8.5

Published
20 May 2025
Modified
17 June 2026
Patch / advisory
CVSS Score v3.1 9.8
Click a component to see what it means
Raw vectorCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
EPSS Score 0.0095 58th percentile
Risk Priority 73 floored blend · peak EPSS

Summary

CVE-2025-47277 is a critical-severity Deserialization of Untrusted Data (CWE-502) vulnerability in Vllm Vllm. Its CVSS base score is 9.8 (Critical).

Operationally, exploitation aligns with the MITRE ATT&CK technique Exploit Public-Facing Application (T1190); ranked in the top 42% of CVEs by exploit likelihood; it is not currently listed in the CISA KEV catalog; a public proof-of-concept is referenced.

This vulnerability is AI-related — categorised as NLP and Transformers; in the Supply Chain and Deployment risk domain.

The strongest mitigations our analysis identified map to SA-11 (Developer Testing and Evaluation) and SI-10 (Information Input Validation) — see the control section below for these in your framework.

OWASP Top 10 for Web (2025)

EU & UK References

Vulnerability Data

vLLM, an inference and serving engine for large language models (LLMs), has an issue in versions 0.6.5 through 0.8.4 that ONLY impacts environments using the `PyNcclPipe` KV cache transfer integration with the V0 engine. No other configurations are affected. vLLM…

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supports the use of the `PyNcclPipe` class to establish a peer-to-peer communication domain for data transmission between distributed nodes. The GPU-side KV-Cache transmission is implemented through the `PyNcclCommunicator` class, while CPU-side control message passing is handled via the `send_obj` and `recv_obj` methods on the CPU side.​ The intention was that this interface should only be exposed to a private network using the IP address specified by the `--kv-ip` CLI parameter. The vLLM documentation covers how this must be limited to a secured network. The default and intentional behavior from PyTorch is that the `TCPStore` interface listens on ALL interfaces, regardless of what IP address is provided. The IP address given was only used as a client-side address to use. vLLM was fixed to use a workaround to force the `TCPStore` instance to bind its socket to a specified private interface. As of version 0.8.5, vLLM limits the `TCPStore` socket to the private interface as configured.

CWE(s)

AI Security AnalysisAI

AI Category
NLP and Transformers
Risk Domain
Supply Chain and Deployment
OWASP Top 10 for LLMs 2025
None mapped
Classification Reason
Matched keywords: llms, pytorch, vllm

Related Threats

MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise Techniques

T1190 Exploit Public-Facing Application Initial Access
Adversaries may attempt to exploit a weakness in an Internet-facing host or system to initially access a network.
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution Execution
Adversaries may exploit software vulnerabilities in client applications to execute code.
T1210 Exploitation of Remote Services Lateral Movement
Adversaries may exploit remote services to gain unauthorized access to internal systems once inside of a network.
Derived from this CVE’s CWE(s) via the direct CWE→ATT&CK cross-walk.

CVEs Like This One

CVE-2025-30165Same product: Vllm Vllm
CVE-2025-32444Same product: Vllm Vllm
CVE-2025-29783Same product: Vllm Vllm
CVE-2024-11041Same product: Vllm Vllm
CVE-2025-24357Same product: Vllm Vllm
CVE-2025-62164Same product: Vllm Vllm
CVE-2026-34760Same product: Vllm Vllm
CVE-2025-48944Same product: Vllm Vllm
CVE-2026-44222Same product: Vllm Vllm
CVE-2026-44223Same product: Vllm Vllm

Affected Assets

vllm
vllm
0.6.5 — 0.8.5

Mitigating Controls

Mitigating Controls (NIST 800-53 r5) AI

Developer testing and evaluation can uncover deserialization flaws before deployment.

Input validation directly stops deserialization of untrusted data by ensuring inputs are valid before processing.

Engineering principles such as safe deserialization and input sanitization structurally prevent the weakness from being introduced.

Integrity verification tools can detect malformed or tampered serialized data after the fact.

Mitigating Controls (NIST CSF 2.0) AI

Derived directly from the weakness types (CWEs) cited in the NVD entry via our AI-authored CWE→CSF cross-walk (authority under review) — links open the control.

PR.PS-02 none match
prevents

PR.PS-02 addresses only post-deployment updates/patching and cannot prevent introduction of unsafe deserialization code, yet it can remediate some instances when the flaw exists in outdated libraries or components.

Mitigating Controls (ISO/IEC 27001:2022 Annex A) AI

Derived directly from the weakness types (CWEs) cited in the NVD entry via our AI-authored CWE→ISO cross-walk (authority under review) — links open the control.

finds

Security testing includes validation of deserialization routines and the use of untrusted data, reducing the likelihood that unsafe object reconstruction will be deployed.

prevents

Requiring vetted libraries, regular updates and SAST before release reduces the likelihood that deserialization logic will accept and act on attacker-controlled serialized objects.

finds

Regular scanning of third-party libraries and timely patching reduce the likelihood that unsafe deserialization vulnerabilities remain active.

none

Mandatory malware scanning of data received over networks or storage media intercepts malicious serialized payloads before they are deserialized by the target application.

References