Raw vector
CVSS:4.0/AV:A/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:H/VA:H/SC:L/SI:H/SA:H/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:XCVSS and EPSS are reproduced from their sources (NVD, FIRST EPSS). EPSS, Forum of Incident Response and Security Teams (FIRST), epss.first.org. Risk Priority is our own derived reading, not an NVD score.
Summary
CVE-2026-125273 is a high-severity Authentication Bypass by Capture-replay (CWE-294) vulnerability in Cisa (inferred from references). Its CVSS base score is 8.5 (High).
Operationally, exploitation aligns with the MITRE ATT&CK technique Valid Accounts (T1078); it is not currently listed in the CISA KEV catalog.
The strongest mitigations our analysis identified map to SC-23 (Session Authenticity) and SC-8 (Transmission Confidentiality and Integrity) — see the control section below for these in your framework.
EU & UK References
No EU or UK CSIRT advisories indexed for this CVE.
Vulnerability Data
No replay or command-integrity protection. Commands lack sequence numbers, nonces, or session tokens; captured commands can be replayed, and the last command persists across sessions.
- CWE(s)
Related Threats
MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise Techniques
MITRE ATT&CK v20.0
Affected Assets
Mitigating Controls
Control response
—
—
—
V10.4.16V10.5.1
Mitigating Controls (NIST 800-53 r5)
Our mappings, made for this CVE.
Session authenticity mechanisms directly stop replay of captured authentication traffic by enforcing freshness or cryptographic binding.
Transmission integrity (with anti-replay) stops captured messages from being accepted as valid later.
Mitigating Controls (NIST CSF 2.0)
Our mappings, derived directly from the weakness types (CWEs) cited in the NVD entry via our CWE→CSF cross-walk — links open the control.
Protecting and verifying identity assertions prevents replay of captured authentication material.
Encryption and integrity protections for data-in-transit directly block capture-replay of credentials or tokens.
Network monitoring may detect anomalous replays after the fact but does not prevent the design flaw.
Strong authentication methods can reduce replay risk but do not inherently address captured messages.
Mitigating Controls (ISO/IEC 27001:2022 Annex A)
Our mappings, derived directly from the weakness types (CWEs) cited in the NVD entry via our CWE→ISO cross-walk — links open the control.
Cryptographic protections (e.g., nonces, timestamps, message authentication codes) make captured authentication messages unusable for replay.
A.8.29's combined programme of code review, vulnerability scanning, and penetration testing reaches CWE-294 from both SOURCE (code review can spot authentication designs lacking nonces/timestamps/replay protection) and RUNTIME (pentesting routinely attempts capture-replay of credentials and session tokens, and the weakness is observable from outside); the bounded remainder is subtle protocol-design issues that neither static review nor standard pentest reliably surfaces.
Training raises developer awareness of capture-replay risks and can influence the choice of authentication protocols that include replay protection (nonces, challenge-response), but the weakness is fundamentally an architectural/design defect that training alone does not prevent—developers remain fallible, and the strongest controls (cryptography, secure architecture) carry the primary effect.
A.8.20 item (e) mandates confidentiality controls on data passing over public, third-party and wireless networks, which prevents capture of authentication traffic over those segments and so blocks the replay attack there; the underlying design weakness (no replay protection in the protocol) remains, and capture on segments the clause does not reach (local networks, application-layer paths) is unaffected, mirroring the A.8.20 vs CWE-523 partial reading.
A.8.21 requires security features for network services including authentication and encryption, which can block capture-replay during network transit, but the clause does not specifically mandate replay-resistant authentication protocols and the actual protocol design lives in other controls (A.8.24 cryptography, A.8.28 secure coding); encryption alone does not stop replay of an encrypted message, so the weakness remains exploitable where the authentication protocol lacks nonces/timestamps.
A.8.28's secure design/architecture and threat modelling guidance (planning item g) and its prohibition on insecure design techniques can catch capture-replay during design, but the clause mandates a fallible practice whose effect depends on developer rigour, so only a minority of instances are prevented.