Raw vector
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:HSummary
CVE-2026-32605 is a high-severity Out-of-bounds Read (CWE-125) vulnerability in Nimiq Nimiq Proof-Of-Stake. Its CVSS base score is 7.5 (High).
Operationally, exploitation aligns with the MITRE ATT&CK technique Exploitation for Privilege Escalation (T1068); ranked at the 38th percentile by exploit likelihood (below the median); it is not currently listed in the CISA KEV catalog.
The strongest mitigations our analysis identified map to SA-11 (Developer Testing and Evaluation) and SA-15 (Development Process, Standards, and Tools) — see the control section below for these in your framework.
Deeper analysis AI-assisted summary
Synthesised by an AI model from the NVD description and linked references — a reading aid, not an authoritative source.
CVE-2026-32605 is a vulnerability in nimiq/core-rs-albatross, a Rust implementation of the Nimiq Proof-of-Stake protocol based on the Albatross consensus algorithm. In versions prior to 1.3.0, the ProposalSender::send function performs an incorrect bounds check using greater-than (>) instead of greater-than-or-equal-to (>=) for the signer index in signed Tendermint proposal messages. This flaw allows a message where the signer equals validators.num_validators() to pass the check, leading to an out-of-bounds index access in validators.get_validator_by_slot_band(signer), which triggers a panic before any signature verification occurs. The vulnerability is rated 7.5 on CVSS 3.1 (AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H) and maps to CWE-125 (Out-of-bounds Read) and CWE-193 (Off-by-one Error).
An untrusted peer on the network can exploit this issue with no required privileges by publishing a crafted signed Tendermint proposal message setting the signer to exactly validators.num_validators(). This bypasses the faulty bounds check, reaches the panic-inducing get_validator_by_slot_band call, and crashes the validator node, resulting in a denial-of-service condition.
The vulnerability has been fixed in version 1.3.0 of nimiq/core-rs-albatross. Mitigation involves updating to this version or later. Key resources include the fixing commit at https://github.com/nimiq/core-rs-albatross/commit/9199364b60c7acae4219800d194bbe07d2997b8c, pull request https://github.com/nimiq/core-rs-albatross/pull/3661, release notes at https://github.com/nimiq/core-rs-albatross/releases/tag/v1.3.0, and the GitHub security advisory at https://github.com/nimiq/core-rs-albatross/security/advisories/GHSA-g99c-h7j7-rfhv.
EU & UK References
- 🇪🇺 ENISA EUVD: EUVD-2026-22061
Vulnerability Data
nimiq/core-rs-albatross is a Rust implementation of the Nimiq Proof-of-Stake protocol based on the Albatross consensus algorithm. Prior to version 1.3.0, an untrusted peer could crash a validator by publishing a signed tendermint proposal message where signer == validators.num_validators(). ProposalSender::send uses…
more
> instead of >= for the signer bounds check, so the equality case passes and reaches validators.get_validator_by_slot_band(signer), which panics with an out-of-bounds index before any signature verification runs. This issue has been fixed in version 1.3.0.
- CWE(s)
Related Threats
MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise Techniques
CVEs Like This One
Affected Assets
Mitigating Controls
Control response
—
—
—
V6.2.1
Mitigating Controls (NIST 800-53 r5) AI
Developer testing and evaluation directly finds out-of-bounds read flaws through static analysis, fuzzing, and dynamic bounds checks.
Requiring documented development standards and tools can embed bounds-checking and arithmetic-correctness rules that stop off-by-one mistakes at introduction.
Secure engineering principles require bounds checking and memory-safe constructs that stop out-of-bounds reads from being introduced.
Process isolation confines the effects of an out-of-bounds read to the compromised process.
Input validation rejects malformed indices or lengths that would otherwise cause reads outside buffer bounds.
Mitigating Controls (NIST CSF 2.0) AI
Derived directly from the weakness types (CWEs) cited in the NVD entry via our AI-authored CWE→CSF cross-walk (authority under review) — links open the control.
Secure-development practices such as bounds checking and memory-safe languages directly prevent out-of-bounds reads.
Vulnerability scanning and recording can discover instances of out-of-bounds reads after code is deployed.
Routine patching replaces vulnerable code containing out-of-bounds read flaws.
Mitigating Controls (ISO/IEC 27001:2022 Annex A) AI
Derived directly from the weakness types (CWEs) cited in the NVD entry via our AI-authored CWE→ISO cross-walk (authority under review) — links open the control.
Security testing in development and acceptance includes fuzzing and static analysis that detect out-of-bounds read defects before release.
Logging can record evidence of an out-of-bounds read but does not prevent the weakness itself.
Secure development life cycle mandates input validation and bounds checking that directly prevent out-of-bounds reads.
Application security requirements include explicit bounds and memory-safety specifications that mitigate buffer over-reads.
Secure system architecture and engineering principles require memory-safe design patterns and runtime protections against out-of-bounds access.
Secure coding standards explicitly forbid unsafe pointer arithmetic and mandate bounds-checked reads, eliminating CWE-125.