CVE-2026-32606
Published: 18 March 2026
Summary
CVE-2026-32606 is a high-severity Insufficiently Protected Credentials (CWE-522) vulnerability. Its CVSS base score is 7.6 (High).
Operationally, exploitation aligns with the MITRE ATT&CK technique Data from Local System (T1005); ranked at the 0.6th percentile by exploit likelihood (below the median); it is not currently listed in the CISA KEV catalog.
This vulnerability is AI-related — categorised as APIs and Models.
The strongest mitigations our analysis identified are NIST 800-53 CM-6 (Configuration Settings) and PE-3 (Physical Access Control).
Threat & Defense at a Glance
Threat & Defense Details
Mitigating Controls (NIST 800-53 r5)AI
Directly mitigates the CVE by requiring identification, reporting, and timely patching of the vulnerable IncusOS configuration prior to version 202603142010.
Enforces secure configuration settings for systemd-cryptenroll to restrict TPM LUKS key unsealing to the initrd phase within the signed UKI, preventing post-boot release as exploited.
Prevents unauthorized physical access required for an attacker to substitute the encrypted root partition with a malicious one.
MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise TechniquesAI
Why these techniques?
Vulnerability directly enables physical attackers to unseal/retrieve LUKS volume keys from TPM (unsecured credential access) and perform direct volume access to read/modify/exfiltrate data from the encrypted root disk (T1005/T1006).
NVD Description
IncusOS is an immutable OS image dedicated to running Incus. Prior to 202603142010, the default configuration of systemd-cryptenroll as used by IncusOS through mkosi allows for an attacker with physical access to the machine to access the encrypted data without…
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requiring any interaction by the system's owner or any tampering of Secure Boot state or kernel (UKI) boot image. That's because in this configuration, the LUKS key is made available by the TPM so long as the system has the expected PCR7 value and the PCR11 policy matches. That default PCR11 policy importantly allows for the TPM to release the key to the booted system rather than just from the initrd part of the signed kernel image (UKI). The attack relies on the attacker being able to substitute the original encrypted root partition for one that they control. By doing so, the system will prompt for a recovery key on boot, which the attacker has defined and can provide, before booting the system using the attacker's root partition rather than the system's original one. The attacker only needs to put a systemd unit starting on system boot within their root partition to have the system run that logic on boot. That unit will then run in an environment where the TPM will allow for the retrieval of the encryption key of the real root disk, allowing the attacker to steal the LUKS volume key (immutable master key) and then use it against the real root disk, altering it or getting data out before putting the disk back the way it was and returning the system without a trace of this attack having happened. This is all possible because the system will have still booted with Secure Boot enabled, will have measured and ran the expected bootloader and kernel image (UKI). The initrd selects the root disk based on GPT partition identifiers making it possible to easily substitute the real root disk for an attacker controlled one. This doesn't lead to any change in the TPM state and therefore allows for retrieval of the LUKS key by the attacker through a boot time systemd unit on their alternative root partition. IncusOS version 202603142010 (2026/03/14 20:10 UTC) includes the new PCR15 logic and will automatically update the TPM policy on boot. Anyone suspecting that their system may have been physically accessed while shut down should perform a full system wipe and reinstallation as only that will rotate the LUKS volume key and prevent subsequent access to the encrypted data should the system have been previously compromised. There are no known workarounds other than updating to a version with corrected logic which will automatically rebind the LUKS keys to the new set of TPM registers and prevent this from being exploited.
Deeper analysisAI
CVE-2026-32606 is a vulnerability in the default configuration of systemd-cryptenroll as used by IncusOS, an immutable OS image dedicated to running Incus, affecting versions prior to 202603142010 (released 2026/03/14 20:10 UTC). The issue enables bypassing full-disk LUKS encryption via TPM unsealing without requiring owner interaction, Secure Boot tampering, or kernel (UKI) boot image modification. It stems from the TPM releasing the LUKS key based on expected PCR7 values and a PCR11 policy that permits unsealing by the fully booted system, rather than restricting it to the initrd within the signed UKI. The initrd's reliance on GPT partition identifiers for root disk selection facilitates partition substitution.
An attacker with physical access to a powered-off machine can exploit this by replacing the original encrypted root partition with a malicious one containing a custom recovery key and a systemd unit that activates on boot. Upon providing the recovery key, the system boots the attacker's root filesystem using the original bootloader and UKI, preserving PCR measurements and TPM state. The systemd unit then retrieves the LUKS volume key (immutable master key) from the TPM in this trusted boot environment, allowing the attacker to decrypt, read, modify, or exfiltrate data from the real root disk before restoring the original partition undetected. The CVSS v3.1 score is 7.6 (AV:P/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H), linked to CWE-522 (Insufficiently Protected Credentials).
Advisories recommend updating to IncusOS version 202603142010 or later, which introduces PCR15 logic to automatically update the TPM policy on boot and rebind LUKS keys to the new TPM register set, preventing exploitation. There are no other workarounds. Systems potentially compromised via physical access while shut down require a full wipe and reinstallation to rotate the LUKS volume key and block future access. Relevant resources include the IncusOS GitHub security advisory (GHSA-wj2j-qwcf-cfcc), commit e3b35f230d23443d27752eac27ebb2b22c957b75, and pull request #954.
Details
- CWE(s)
Affected Products
AI Security AnalysisAI
- AI Category
- APIs and Models
- Risk Domain
- N/A
- OWASP Top 10 for LLMs 2025
- None mapped
- Classification Reason
- Matched keywords: gpt