Raw vector
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:HCVSS and EPSS are reproduced from their sources (NVD, FIRST EPSS). Risk Priority is our own derived reading, not an NVD score.
Summary
CVE-2026-43867 is a critical-severity Deserialization of Untrusted Data (CWE-502) vulnerability in Apache Camel. Its CVSS base score is 9.8 (Critical).
Operationally, exploitation aligns with the MITRE ATT&CK technique Exploit Public-Facing Application (T1190); ranked in the top 41% of CVEs by exploit likelihood; it is not currently listed in the CISA KEV catalog.
The strongest mitigations our analysis identified map to SA-11 (Developer Testing and Evaluation) and SI-10 (Information Input Validation) — see the control section below for these in your framework.
OWASP Top 10 for Web (2025)
EU & UK References
- 🇪🇺 ENISA EUVD: EUVD-2026-41853
Vulnerability Data
Deserialization of Untrusted Data vulnerability in Apache Camel PQC Component. The camel-pqc component persists post-quantum key metadata (KeyMetadata) through pluggable KeyLifecycleManager implementations. AwsSecretsManagerKeyLifecycleManager.deserializeMetadata() reads that metadata back from the configured AWS Secrets Manager secret by Base64-decoding the stored value and…
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deserializing it with a raw java.io.ObjectInputStream.readObject() and no ObjectInputFilter or class allow-list; the cast to KeyMetadata happens only after readObject() returns, so any readObject() side effects in a crafted object run before the type check. A principal who can write to the AWS Secrets Manager secret that holds this metadata (requiring secretsmanager:PutSecretValue on that secret) could store a crafted serialized object that is deserialized during normal key-lifecycle operations, potentially leading to code execution in the context of the application that manages the keys. This is the same underlying defect, in the same code path and remediated by the same fix, as CVE-2026-46590, which was reported independently and additionally covers the HashiCorp Vault and file-based sibling managers; both are incomplete-remediation follow-ons to CVE-2026-40048 (CAMEL-23200). This issue affects Apache Camel: from 4.18.0 before 4.18.3, from 4.19.0 before 4.21.0. Users are recommended to upgrade to version 4.21.0, which fixes the issue. If users are on the 4.18.x LTS releases stream, then they are suggested to upgrade to 4.18.3. For deployments that cannot upgrade immediately, restrict write access to the AWS Secrets Manager secret that holds the camel-pqc key metadata so that only the application’s own identity holds secretsmanager:PutSecretValue on it (least-privilege IAM), and keep the PQC key material in a secret separate from any data that less-trusted principals can write.
- CWE(s)
Related Threats
MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise Techniques
CVEs Like This One
Affected Assets
Mitigating Controls
Mitigating Controls (NIST 800-53 r5) AI
Developer testing and evaluation can uncover deserialization flaws before deployment.
Input validation directly stops deserialization of untrusted data by ensuring inputs are valid before processing.
Engineering principles such as safe deserialization and input sanitization structurally prevent the weakness from being introduced.
Integrity verification tools can detect malformed or tampered serialized data after the fact.
Mitigating Controls (NIST CSF 2.0) AI
Derived directly from the weakness types (CWEs) cited in the NVD entry via our AI-authored CWE→CSF cross-walk (authority under review) — links open the control.
PR.PS-02 addresses only post-deployment updates/patching and cannot prevent introduction of unsafe deserialization code, yet it can remediate some instances when the flaw exists in outdated libraries or components.
Mitigating Controls (ISO/IEC 27001:2022 Annex A) AI
Derived directly from the weakness types (CWEs) cited in the NVD entry via our AI-authored CWE→ISO cross-walk (authority under review) — links open the control.
Requiring vetted libraries, regular updates and SAST before release reduces the likelihood that deserialization logic will accept and act on attacker-controlled serialized objects.
Security testing includes validation of deserialization routines and the use of untrusted data, reducing the likelihood that unsafe object reconstruction will be deployed.
Regular scanning of third-party libraries and timely patching reduce the likelihood that unsafe deserialization vulnerabilities remain active.