Raw vector
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:P/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:XSummary
CVE-2026-50555 is a high-severity Cross-site Scripting (CWE-79) vulnerability in Angular Angular. Its CVSS base score is 8.6 (High).
Operationally, exploitation aligns with the MITRE ATT&CK technique Browser Session Hijacking (T1185); ranked at the 6th percentile by exploit likelihood (below the median); it is not currently listed in the CISA KEV catalog.
The strongest mitigations our analysis identified map to SA-11 (Developer Testing and Evaluation) and SI-10 (Information Input Validation) — see the control section below for these in your framework.
OWASP Top 10 for Web (2025)
EU & UK References
- 🇪🇺 ENISA EUVD: EUVD-2026-38289
Vulnerability Data
Angular is a development platform for building mobile and desktop web applications using TypeScript/JavaScript and other languages. Prior to 22.0.0-rc.2, 21.2.16, 20.3.24, and 19.2.25, a Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) vulnerability exists in @angular/platform-server's DOM emulation dependency (domino) when serializing the content…
more
of raw-text elements (such as <script>, <style>, and <iframe>). domino supports escaping raw-text elements during serialization to prevent closing-tag breakout. However, a Unicode index alignment bug existed in this escaping logic. In JavaScript, string lengths and character indices are calculated based on UTF-16 code units (where astral characters—such as emojis—occupy 2 code units / 4 bytes). If the bound dynamic text contained astral Unicode characters before the closing tag (e.g. </script>, </style>, or </iframe>), the index offset calculation in domino's replacement logic shifted. This misalignment caused domino to fail to replace or escape the closing tag, leaving it raw and unescaped in the output HTML. An attacker who controls the dynamic text can supply a payload containing both an astral Unicode character and a closing tag (e.g., 😀</iframe><script>alert(1)</script>). When serialized on the server during SSR, the browser parses the unescaped closing tag, exits the raw-text context early, and executes the subsequent <script> block, leading to same-origin Cross-Site Scripting (XSS). This vulnerability is fixed in 22.0.0-rc.2, 21.2.16, 20.3.24, and 19.2.25.
- CWE(s)
Related Threats
MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise Techniques
CVEs Like This One
Affected Assets
Mitigating Controls
Control response
—
—
—
V1.1.2V1.3.2
Mitigating Controls (NIST 800-53 r5) AI
Developer testing and evaluation can discover missing or incorrect input neutralization through targeted web-application tests.
Input validation directly enforces neutralization of untrusted data before it reaches web output generation.
Output filtering can catch or sanitize unneutralized script content before it is served to users.
Mitigating Controls (NIST CSF 2.0) AI
Derived directly from the weakness types (CWEs) cited in the NVD entry via our AI-authored CWE→CSF cross-walk (authority under review) — links open the control.
Secure SDLC practices directly target introduction of XSS via coding standards/testing (mostly), yet the single broad outcome leaves many specific neutralization vectors unaddressed (partial).
Patching and EOL replacement can remediate known XSS instances in libraries or frameworks (partial) but do nothing to enforce input neutralization in application code (none).
Mitigating Controls (ISO/IEC 27001:2022 Annex A) AI
Derived directly from the weakness types (CWEs) cited in the NVD entry via our AI-authored CWE→ISO cross-walk (authority under review) — links open the control.
Secure-coding testing and automated code-analysis tools are applied to detect improper neutralization of script-related content during web-page generation.
Knowledge exchange on emerging attack techniques and patches reduces the likelihood that cross-site scripting flaws remain unaddressed in deployed applications.
Operational indicators of compromise for web-application attacks can be incorporated into WAF or input-filtering rules, lowering the likelihood that unsanitized data reaches the browser.
Requiring language-specific secure-coding standards and automated scanning during the SDLC catches missing output encoding or improper neutralization of untrusted data before the software reaches production.
Secure-coding standards, SAST scans and removal of insecure code samples together eliminate the failure to neutralize script content that produces cross-site scripting flaws.
Webpage malware scanning and block-listing of known malicious sites reduce the likelihood that reflected or stored script payloads reach a user’s browser.