CVE-2026-53712
Raw vector
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:L/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:XSummary
CVE-2026-53712 is a high-severity Failing Open (CWE-636) vulnerability. Its CVSS base score is 8.2 (High).
Operationally, exploitation aligns with the MITRE ATT&CK technique Downgrade Attack (T1689); ranked at the 6th percentile by exploit likelihood (below the median); it is not currently listed in the CISA KEV catalog.
The strongest mitigations our analysis identified map to CP-12 (Safe Mode) and SC-13 (Cryptographic Protection) — see the control section below for these in your framework.
OWASP Top 10 for Web (2025)
EU & UK References
- 🇪🇺 ENISA EUVD: EUVD-2026-45246
Vulnerability Data
SCRAM (Salted Challenge Response Authentication Mechanism) is part of the family of Simple Authentication and Security Layer (SASL, RFC 4422) authentication mechanisms. Prior to 3.3, a flaw in com.ongres.scram:scram-client and com.ongres.scram:scram-common allows an attacker capable of a TLS man-in-the-middle attack…
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to silently downgrade a connection from SCRAM-SHA-256-PLUS with channel binding to standard SCRAM-SHA-256 without channel binding when TlsServerEndpoint processes an X.509 certificate using a modern signature algorithm such as Ed25519; getChannelBindingData() can return an empty byte array after NoSuchAlgorithmException, and the ScramClient builder treats that as absent channel-binding data. This issue is fixed in version 3.3.
- CWE(s)
Related Threats
MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise Techniques
CVEs Like This One
Affected Assets
Mitigating Controls
Control response
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- 7 hardening rules · 5 OS baselines
V3.2.1V7.4.1V8.3.3V10.3.4
Mitigating Controls (NIST 800-53 r5) AI
SC-24 directly requires the system to fail to a known state that preserves security properties, structurally stopping fallback to a less-secure mode.
SI-17 mandates explicit fail-safe procedures that activate on indicated failures, preventing the insecure fallback behavior.
CP-12 forces entry into a safe mode on detected conditions, limiting exposure but not covering every failure path.
Specifying and implementing required cryptography types directly precludes negotiation or acceptance of weaker algorithms.
SA-8 requires application of engineering principles that include fail-secure design, reducing the likelihood the weakness is introduced.
Requiring protection of transmitted confidentiality and integrity forces selection of sufficiently strong negotiated algorithms rather than weaker ones.
Mitigating Controls (NIST CSF 2.0) AI
Derived directly from the weakness types (CWEs) cited in the NVD entry via our AI-authored CWE→CSF cross-walk (authority under review) — links open the control.
Secure-development practices explicitly include designing error and failure handling to remain in a secure state.
Least-privilege policy and enforcement directly counters the permissive-access fallback example in the CWE.
Hardened baselines and configuration management reduce the chance that error paths default to insecure settings.
PR.AA-04 addresses protection/verification of identity assertions in SSO/federation contexts while CWE-757 concerns protocol-level crypto algorithm negotiation, so the control neither prevents nor meaningfully mitigates the weakness.
Mitigating Controls (ISO/IEC 27001:2022 Annex A) AI
Derived directly from the weakness types (CWEs) cited in the NVD entry via our AI-authored CWE→ISO cross-walk (authority under review) — links open the control.
Security testing can detect and block algorithm downgrade vulnerabilities before deployment.
Ensures network services use secure cryptographic parameters, reducing downgrade risk.
Mandates use of strong, approved cryptographic algorithms, directly preventing downgrade to weaker ones.
Secure SDLC practices include selecting strong crypto algorithms during design and implementation.
Application security requirements can specify minimum cryptographic strength to avoid downgrades.
Secure architecture principles include enforcing strong algorithm selection in protocol design.
Hardening callouts derived
Configuration rules from DISA STIG baselines that bear on weaknesses of the type cited by this CVE. Each rule is shown with the relationship its mapping actually records, against the CWE it was authored against. Derived via CVE→CWE over `controls_xwalks` (authoritative rows only; rows rated `none` are excluded).
Windows 10 (1 rule)
- V-220938 The LanMan authentication level must be set to send NTLMv2 response only, and to refuse LM and NTLM. prevents CWE-757
Windows 11 (1 rule)
- V-253462 The LanMan authentication level must be set to send NTLMv2 response only, and to refuse LM and NTLM. prevents CWE-757
Windows Server 2016 (1 rule)
- V-225054 The LAN Manager authentication level must be set to send NTLMv2 response only and to refuse LM and NTLM. prevents CWE-757
Windows Server 2019 (1 rule)
- V-205919 Windows Server 2019 LAN Manager authentication level must be configured to send NTLMv2 response only and to refuse LM and NTLM. prevents CWE-757
Windows Server 2022 (1 rule)
- V-254475 Windows Server 2022 LAN Manager authentication level must be configured to send NTLMv2 response only and to refuse LM and NTLM. prevents CWE-757