CVE-2026-5446
Raw vector
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:XSummary
CVE-2026-5446 is a medium-severity Reusing a Nonce, Key Pair in Encryption (CWE-323) vulnerability. Its CVSS base score is 6.0 (Medium).
Operationally, ranked at the 18th percentile by exploit likelihood (below the median); it is not currently listed in the CISA KEV catalog.
The strongest mitigations our analysis identified map to SA-11 (Developer Testing and Evaluation) and SA-8 (Security and Privacy Engineering Principles) — see the control section below for these in your framework.
Deeper analysis AI-assisted summary
Synthesised by an AI model from the NVD description and linked references — a reading aid, not an authoritative source.
CVE-2026-5446 affects the wolfSSL cryptographic library, specifically ARIA-GCM cipher suites used in TLS 1.2 and DTLS 1.2. The vulnerability stems from reusing an identical 12-byte GCM nonce for every application-data record, as wc_AriaEncrypt is stateless and passes the caller-supplied IV verbatim to the proprietary MagicCrypto SDK without an internal counter. The explicit IV is zero-initialized at session setup and never incremented in non-FIPS builds. This issue is limited to wolfSSL builds configured with the non-default --enable-aria option and the MagicCrypto SDK, an opt-in setup required for Korean regulatory deployments. AES-GCM cipher suites are unaffected, as wc_AesGcmEncrypt_ex maintains an independent internal invocation counter.
Attackers positioned to observe encrypted TLS 1.2 or DTLS 1.2 traffic using vulnerable ARIA-GCM cipher suites could exploit the nonce reuse, associated with CWE-323 (Reused Initialization Vector), to potentially decrypt application data or forge records. Exploitation requires the target to be using the specific non-default wolfSSL configuration with MagicCrypto SDK.
Mitigation is provided through a patch in the wolfSSL GitHub pull request at https://github.com/wolfSSL/wolfssl/pull/10111. Security practitioners should update affected wolfSSL builds and avoid the --enable-aria configuration with MagicCrypto SDK unless required for regulatory compliance.
OWASP Top 10 for Web (2025)
EU & UK References
- 🇪🇺 ENISA EUVD: EUVD-2026-21180
Vulnerability Data
In wolfSSL, ARIA-GCM cipher suites used in TLS 1.2 and DTLS 1.2 reuse an identical 12-byte GCM nonce for every application-data record. Because wc_AriaEncrypt is stateless and passes the caller-supplied IV verbatim to the MagicCrypto SDK with no internal counter,…
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and because the explicit IV is zero-initialized at session setup and never incremented in non-FIPS builds. This vulnerability affects wolfSSL builds configured with --enable-aria and the proprietary MagicCrypto SDK (a non-default, opt-in configuration required for Korean regulatory deployments). AES-GCM is not affected because wc_AesGcmEncrypt_ex maintains an internal invocation counter independently of the call-site guard.
- CWE(s)
Related Threats
CVEs Like This One
Affected Assets
Mitigating Controls
Control response
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V6.8.3V11.3.4
Mitigating Controls (NIST 800-53 r5) AI
Developer testing and evaluation can discover nonce reuse through static analysis, fuzzing, or known-answer tests.
Engineering principles include correct use of cryptographic primitives such as unique nonces per key.
Selecting and implementing appropriate cryptographic algorithms and modes reduces nonce-reuse exposure.
Mitigating Controls (NIST CSF 2.0) AI
Derived directly from the weakness types (CWEs) cited in the NVD entry via our AI-authored CWE→CSF cross-walk (authority under review) — links open the control.
Secure SDLC practices directly prevent nonce/key reuse errors in cryptographic implementations.
Mitigating Controls (ISO/IEC 27001:2022 Annex A) AI
Derived directly from the weakness types (CWEs) cited in the NVD entry via our AI-authored CWE→ISO cross-walk (authority under review) — links open the control.
Mandates proper cryptographic key and nonce management, directly preventing nonce/key-pair reuse.
Security testing can detect nonce reuse, yet the control addresses many other issues beyond this CWE.
Secure-coding rules can require unique nonces, but the control is broader than this single weakness.