Security Resilience

CWE · MITRE source

CWE-1357Reliance on Insufficiently Trustworthy Component

Abstraction: Class · CVEs in our corpus: 10

The product is built from multiple separate components, but it uses a component that is not sufficiently trusted to meet expectations for security, reliability, updateability, and maintainability.

Many modern hardware and software products are built by combining multiple smaller components together into one larger entity, often during the design or architecture phase. For example, a hardware component might be built by a separate supplier, or the product might use an open-source software library from a third party. Regardless of the source, each component should be sufficiently trusted to ensure correct, secure operation of the product. If a component is not trustworthy, it can produce significant risks for the overall product, such as vulnerabilities that cannot be patched fast enough (if at all); hidden functionality such as malware; inability to update or replace the component if needed for security purposes; hardware components built from parts that do not meet specifications in ways that can lead to weaknesses; etc. Note that a component might not be trustworthy even if it is owned by the product vendor, such as a software component whose source code is lost and was built by developers who left the company, or a component that was developed by a separate company that was acquired and brought into the product's own company. Note that there can be disagreement as to whether a component is sufficiently trustworthy, since trust is ultimately subjective. Different stakeholders (e.g., customers, vendors, governments) have various threat models and ways to assess trust, and design/architecture choices might make tradeoffs between security, reliability, safety, privacy, cost, and other characteristics.

Last updated: 14 October 2026 20:41 UTC

Cumulative inbound coverage

How completely the frameworks we cross-walk collectively cover this — the verdict is the strongest single mapping (overlapping partials are not summed); breadth shows the corroboration behind it.

Collective: mostly · 26 mapping(s) from 5 framework(s): CSF 2.0 18 (mostly) · STIG oracle linux 9 3 (mostly) · STIG oracle linux 8 2 (mostly) · STIG rhel 7 2 (mostly) · STIG rhel 8 1 (mostly)

See the full cumulative-coverage rollup →

NIST 800-53 r5 controls PROPOSED for this weakness (0)AI-assisted

These are model PROPOSALS, not graded mappings. They come from controls_to_cwe_proposals, which carries no grade field at all; across the CWE pages 1,540 of 1,722 such associations (89%) have never been graded by anything. The heading said “address” until 2026-09-29, which asserted a relationship the data does not carry. Graded cross-walks are on the framework map, not here.

Control Title Family Why it addresses this CWE
No NIST controls proposed yet.

Top CVEs of this weakness type, ranked by Risk Priority

CVE Risk CVSS EPSS Published
CVE-2025-32800 7.49.80.00652025-06-16
CVE-2026-556757.410.00.00432026-10-13
CVE-2024-3313 6.28.40.00262024-04-09
CVE-2024-28042 6.18.40.00212024-05-15
CVE-2024-26024 6.18.40.00212024-05-28
CVE-2026-854695.78.00.00522026-09-16
CVE-2026-75569 5.67.70.00602026-08-19
CVE-2026-476195.26.60.00772026-08-04
CVE-2026-672754.25.30.00302026-08-26
CVE-2026-66783 3.54.40.00352026-08-18