A.5.25 Organizational
Assessment and decision on information security events
Structured attributes from ISO/IEC 27002:2022 — control type · CIA properties · cybersecurity concept · operational capability · security domain. What do these mean?
Mapped NIST 800-53 r5 controls (10)
Our reading (mostly llm_verified) of how this ISO control and each NIST 800-53 control relate. Not an ISO or NIST product.
Direction: ← other covers this;
→ this covers other (F/M/P = full / mostly /
partial). gov = governs / implements (a mandate, not coverage).
Why these map — rationale
- IR-4partialcovers — A.5.25's narrow focus on event assessment/categorization/prioritization addresses only the detection-and-analysis slice of IR-4's broader incident handling capability (prep/detection/analysis/containment/eradication/recovery + coordination + lessons learned); a real residual of the target remains uncovered
- IR-5partialcovers — A.5.25's focus on assessment/prioritization of events addresses only a slice of IR-5's broader requirement to track and document the full incident lifecycle
Aligned NIST CSF 2.0 outcomes (17)
NIST CSF 2.0 outcomes this ISO control aligns with — our analysis (mostly llm_verified).
Direction: ← other covers this;
→ this covers other (F/M/P = full / mostly /
partial). gov = governs / implements (a mandate, not coverage).
Why these map — rationale
- RS.AN-03domain mandateimplements — A.5.25's assessment/prioritization of events directly operationalizes the incident analysis and root-cause determination required by RS.AN-03 within the response-analysis domain
- RS.AN-08domain mandateimplements — A.5.25's assessment/prioritization of security events directly operationalizes the estimation and validation of incident magnitude within the response-analysis domain named by RS.AN-08
- RS.MA-02domain mandateimplements — A.5.25's assessment/prioritization of security events directly operationalizes the triage-and-validation outcome named in RS.MA-02 within the incident-response domain
- RS.MA-03explicit mandateimplements — A.5.25's defined purpose (categorization and prioritization of security events) directly operationalizes exactly what RS.MA-03 requires of incident handling
Related OWASP ASVS 5.0 requirements (5)
Application-security verification requirements (OWASP ASVS 5.0) this ISO control aligns with; links open the ASVS chapter. Our analysis (mostly llm_verified) — many ISO controls have no ASVS counterpart.
Direction: ← other covers this;
→ this covers other (F/M/P = full / mostly /
partial). gov = governs / implements (a mandate, not coverage).
Mitigated MITRE ATT&CK techniques (2592)
Adversary techniques (MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise) this ISO control helps mitigate; links open attack.mitre.org. Our analysis (mostly llm_verified).
Direction: ← other covers this;
→ this covers other (F/M/P = full / mostly /
partial). gov = governs / implements (a mandate, not coverage).
Why these map — rationale
- T1003mostlyresponds — A.5.25 requires assessment/prioritization of security events (including those from credential-dumping TTPs) to drive coordinated incident response, which matches the `responds` verb once the technique is underway.
- T1003.001mostlyresponds — A.5.25 requires assessment/prioritization of security events (including those matching T1003.001 activity such as LSASS access or dumps) to decide on incident response, directly enabling the containment/eradication act that `responds` names once the technique is underway.
- T1003.003mostlyresponds — A.5.25 requires competent personnel to assess each security event against an agreed categorization/prioritization scheme (including criteria that turn events into incidents) and to decide on and record the outcome; this is the core act of incident response once an event such as T1003.003 is underway, enabling containment/eradication decisions, with only the already-realized credential theft as named remainder.
- T1003.006mostlyresponds — A.5.25 requires competent personnel to assess each security event against an agreed categorization/prioritization scheme (including criteria that turn events into incidents) and to decide on and record the outcome; this is the core act of responding once an in-progress DCSync technique has produced observable events.
- T1020mostlyresponds — A.5.25 requires competent personnel to assess each security event against an agreed scheme that decides whether it is an incident and what priority it receives; this is the exact act of responding once the automated exfiltration technique is already underway, with the named remainder being full incident eradication and recovery that live in separate controls.
- T1020.001mostlyresponds — A.5.25 requires personnel to assess each security event against an agreed categorization/prioritization scheme (including criteria that turn events into incidents) and then decide on and record the outcome; this is the core of incident response once an event is underway, directly matching the `responds` verb for a technique that produces observable network events.
- T1021.001mostlyresponds — A.5.25 requires competent personnel to assess each security event against an agreed categorization/prioritization scheme (including criteria that turn events into incidents) and to decide on and record the outcome; this is the core of incident response once an RDP-based technique is underway, with the named remainder being full containment/eradication (handled by A.5.26).
- T1021.002mostlyresponds — A.5.25 requires personnel to assess each security event against an agreed categorization/prioritization scheme (including criteria that turn events into incidents) and to decide on and record the outcome; this is the core of incident response once an event is underway, and T1021.002's use of valid accounts over SMB is a detectable lateral-movement event that would trigger exactly that assessment/decision process.
- T1021.004mostlyresponds — A.5.25 requires assessment/prioritization of events (including those matching T1021.004) to decide on incident response, directly enabling the containment/eradication act that `responds` names once the technique is underway.
- T1021.005mostlyresponds — A.5.25 requires competent personnel to assess each security event against an agreed categorization/prioritization scheme (including criteria that turn events into incidents) and to decide on and record the outcome; this is the core of incident response once an event is underway, directly matching the `responds` verb for a VNC-abuse technique that has already executed.
- T1021.006mostlyresponds — A.5.25 requires competent personnel to assess each security event against an agreed categorization/prioritization scheme (including criteria that turn events into incidents) and to decide on and record the outcome; this is the core of incident response once an event is underway, directly matching the `responds` verb for a WinRM-based technique that has already executed.
- T1021.007mostlyresponds — A.5.25 requires personnel to assess each security event against an agreed categorization/prioritization scheme (including criteria that turn events into incidents) and to decide on and record the outcome; this is the core of incident response once an event is underway, directly matching the `responds` verb for the T1021.007 technique.
- T1027.006mostlyresponds — A.5.25 requires assessment of each security event against an agreed categorization/prioritization scheme to decide if it is an incident and record the outcome; this directly enacts the `responds` verb once an HTML-smuggling event is detected and underway.
- T1036mostlyresponds — A.5.25 requires personnel to assess each security event against an agreed categorization/prioritization scheme (including criteria that turn events into incidents) and to decide on and record the outcome; this is the core act of responding once a masquerading technique is underway, with only a bounded remainder (e.g., fully automated low-fidelity events) left unreached.
- T1036.001mostlyresponds — A.5.25 requires personnel to assess each security event against an agreed categorization/prioritization scheme (including criteria that turn events into incidents) and to record the decision; this directly enacts the `responds` act of containment/eradication triage once the invalid-signature technique has produced a detectable event.
- T1036.003mostlyresponds — A.5.25 requires assessment/prioritization of events (including those from renamed utilities evading monitoring) to decide on incident response, directly matching the `responds` verb once the technique is underway.
- T1036.004mostlyresponds — A.5.25 requires assessment of each security event against an agreed scheme to decide if it is an incident and to prioritize it; this directly enacts the `responds` verb once the masquerading technique has produced a detectable event (e.g., anomalous task/service), with the named remainder being events that evade initial detection or categorization.
- T1036.010mostlyresponds — A.5.25 requires personnel to assess each security event against an agreed categorization/prioritization scheme (including criteria that turn events into incidents) and to record the decision; this directly enacts the `responds` act of containment/eradication once the masquerading-account technique is already underway as an observable event.
- T1040mostlyresponds — A.5.25 requires personnel to assess each security event against an agreed categorization/prioritization scheme (including criteria that turn events into incidents) and to record the decision; this is the core of incident response once an event such as network sniffing is detected and reported.
- T1041mostlyresponds — A.5.25 requires competent personnel to assess each security event against an agreed categorization/prioritization scheme (including criteria that turn events into incidents) and to decide on and record the outcome; this is the core act of responding once an exfiltration-over-C2 event is underway, with the named remainder being actual containment/eradication that lives in the separate incident-handling clause.
- T1047mostlyresponds — A.5.25's assessment/prioritization of events (including those involving WMI abuse as an incident) directly enables and is performed by the personnel who coordinate and respond, matching the `responds` verb once the technique is underway.
- T1048mostlyresponds — A.5.25 requires assessment/prioritization of security events (including exfiltration) once underway to enable coordinated response, directly matching the `responds` verb of containing/eradication once the technique has begun.
- T1048.001mostlyresponds — A.5.25 requires assessment/prioritization of events (including exfiltration) once they are recognized as incidents, which directly enacts the containment/eradication decision step that `responds` names once the technique is underway.
- T1048.002mostlyresponds — A.5.25 requires assessment/prioritization of security events (including exfiltration) by the incident response team once they occur, which is the core act named by `responds` (containment/eradication once underway); the named remainder is that it stops short of actual containment steps.
- T1048.003mostlyresponds — A.5.25 requires assessment/prioritization of security events (including exfiltration) to decide on and coordinate incident response, which directly enacts the `responds` verb once the technique is underway.
- T1052.001mostlyresponds — A.5.25 requires assessment/prioritization of events to decide on incident response, which directly enables containment and eradication once an exfiltration event is underway.
- T1053.002mostlyresponds — A.5.25 directly requires assessment/prioritization of security events (including those from T1053.002 abuse) by the incident response team once the event is detected, which is the core act named by `responds`.
- T1053.005mostlyresponds — A.5.25 requires assessment/prioritization of events using an agreed scheme and recording results; this directly engages the detection of a scheduled-task creation or execution (an observable information security event), enabling the incident response process that contains and eradicates the technique once underway, with a bounded remainder for stealth/hidden variants that evade initial categorization.
- T1053.007mostlyresponds — A.5.25 requires competent personnel to assess each security event against an agreed categorization/prioritization scheme (including explicit criteria for declaring an incident) and to decide on and record the outcome; this is the core act of incident response once an event (such as a suspicious CronJob or container-orchestration scheduling activity) is already underway.
- T1055mostlyresponds — A.5.25 requires assessment/prioritization of security events (including those from T1055) by the incident response team once the technique is underway, which is exactly what `responds` names; the remainder is that it stops at decision-making and does not itself perform containment/eradication.
- T1055.001mostlyresponds — A.5.25 requires personnel to assess each security event using an agreed categorization/prioritization scheme (including criteria to declare it an incident) and record the decision; this directly enacts the `responds` act of handling a T1055.001 event once underway by deciding its priority and routing it for containment/eradication.
- T1055.002mostlyresponds — A.5.25 requires assessment/prioritization of security events (including in-flight process-injection techniques) by the incident-response team to decide on and coordinate an appropriate response, which is exactly what `responds` names.
- T1055.003mostlyresponds — A.5.25 requires competent personnel to assess each security event against an agreed categorization/prioritization scheme (including criteria that turn events into incidents) and to decide on and record the outcome; this is the core act of responding once an in-flight technique such as thread execution hijacking is detected.
- T1055.012mostlyresponds — A.5.25 requires assessment of security events using an agreed scheme to categorize, prioritize, decide on incidents and record results; this directly enacts the containment/eradication decision step once a hollowing-based incident is underway.
- T1055.015mostlyresponds — A.5.25 requires competent personnel to assess every security event against an agreed categorization/prioritization scheme and decide whether it is an incident; this is the core of incident response once the technique is underway, with the named remainder being post-decision containment/eradication steps that live in A.5.26.
- T1056.003mostlyresponds — A.5.25 requires competent personnel to assess each security event against an agreed categorization/prioritization scheme (including criteria that turn events into incidents) and to decide on and record the outcome; this is the core of incident response once an event is underway, and directly matches the containment/eradication act that `responds` names for a post-compromise web-portal credential-capture technique.
- T1059mostlyresponds — A.5.25 requires competent personnel to assess each security event against an agreed categorization/prioritization scheme (including criteria that turn events into incidents) and to decide on and record the outcome; this is the core act of responding once an interpreter-abuse event is underway, with the named remainder being full incident containment/eradication that lives in A.5.26.
- T1059.001mostlyresponds — A.5.25 requires personnel to assess each security event against an agreed categorization/prioritization scheme (including criteria that turn events into incidents) and to decide on and record the outcome; this is the core of incident response once the technique is already underway.
- T1059.004mostlyresponds — A.5.25 requires assessment/prioritization of security events (including those from T1059.004 execution) to decide on incident response, directly enabling the containment/eradication act that `responds` names once the technique is underway.
- T1059.006mostlyresponds — A.5.25 requires competent personnel to assess each security event against an agreed categorization/prioritization scheme (including criteria that turn events into incidents) and to decide on and record the outcome; this is the core act of responding once an in-flight technique such as Python-based execution is detected.
- T1059.009mostlyresponds — A.5.25's assessment/prioritization of events (including deciding they are incidents) directly feeds and triggers the incident response process once an API-abuse event is underway, containing/eradication steps follow per the event-lane definition of responds; mostly because the control stops at assessment/decision/recording and does not itself perform containment.
- T1068mostlyresponds — A.5.25 requires assessment/prioritization of security events (including those from exploitation) by the incident response team once they occur, which is the core act named by `responds`.
- T1070.004mostlyresponds — A.5.25 requires assessment/prioritization of security events (including those from post-intrusion file deletion) to decide on and coordinate incident response, which directly enacts the `responds` verb once the technique is underway.
- T1070.007mostlyresponds — A.5.25 requires competent personnel to assess each security event against an agreed categorization/prioritization scheme (including criteria that turn events into incidents) and to decide on and record the outcome; this is the core act of responding once an event (such as an adversary clearing network connection artifacts) is already underway.
- T1070.009mostlyresponds — A.5.25 requires assessment/prioritization of security events (including those from T1070.009 cleanup) by the incident response team once the technique has run, which is the core act named by `responds`.
- T1070.010mostlyresponds — A.5.25 requires assessment of security events (including those involving evasion like T1070.010) using an agreed scheme to categorize, prioritize, decide on incident status, and record results, which is the core of `responds` once the technique is underway.
- T1071.004mostlyresponds — A.5.25 requires assessment/prioritization of security events (including those from anomalous DNS traffic) once detected and the decision whether they constitute an incident, which is the core of `responds` (containment/eradication pathway once the technique is underway); extent is mostly because it stops at assessment/decision/recording and does not itself perform the subsequent containment steps.
- T1072mostlyresponds — A.5.25 requires competent personnel to assess each security event against an agreed categorization/prioritization scheme (including explicit criteria for declaring an incident) and to decide on and record the outcome; this is the core act of incident response once an event is underway, directly matching the `responds` verb against T1072 abuse of deployment tools.
- T1074mostlyresponds — A.5.25 requires competent personnel to assess each security event against an agreed categorization/prioritization scheme (including criteria that turn events into incidents) and to decide on and record the outcome; this is the core act of incident response once an event such as data staging is underway, enabling containment/eradication decisions.
- T1078mostlyresponds — A.5.25 requires competent personnel to assess each security event against an agreed categorization/prioritization scheme (including criteria that turn events into incidents) and to decide on and record the outcome; this is the core act of incident response once an event is underway, directly addressing T1078 abuse that is already in progress and harder to detect because it uses legitimate credentials.
- T1078.002mostlyresponds — A.5.25 requires assessment/prioritization of security events (including those from credential abuse like T1078.002) by the incident response team once underway, enabling containment decisions; it does not itself perform eradication.
- T1078.003mostlyresponds — A.5.25 requires competent personnel to assess each security event against an agreed categorization/prioritization scheme (including criteria that turn events into incidents) and to decide on and record the outcome; this is the core act of responding once an event is underway, with a bounded remainder that the control stops at assessment/decision rather than performing full containment/eradication.
- T1078.004mostlyresponds — A.5.25 requires assessment/prioritization of security events (including those from valid cloud account abuse) by the incident response team once underway, enabling containment decisions; the named remainder is that it stops at assessment/decision and does not itself perform containment/eradication.
- T1098mostlyresponds — A.5.25 requires competent personnel to assess each security event against an agreed categorization/prioritization scheme (including criteria that turn events into incidents) and to decide on and record the outcome; this is the core act of incident response once an event is underway, and account manipulation is a detectable post-compromise event that would trigger exactly that assessment/decision workflow.
- T1098.003mostlyresponds — A.5.25 requires competent personnel to assess each security event against an agreed categorization/prioritization scheme (including criteria that turn events into incidents) and to decide on and record the outcome; this is the core act of incident response once an event is underway, directly matching the `responds` verb for a persistence/privilege-escalation technique that has already executed.
- T1098.005mostlyresponds — A.5.25 requires personnel to assess each security event against an agreed categorization/prioritization scheme (including criteria that turn events into incidents) and to decide/record the outcome; this directly enacts the containment/eradication decision once an adversary device-registration technique is already underway as an event.
- T1102.002mostlyresponds — A.5.25 requires competent personnel to assess every security event against an agreed categorization/prioritization scheme (including explicit criteria for declaring an incident) and to decide on and record the outcome; this is the core act of incident response once an event is underway, and T1102.002's C2 channel produces observable events (outbound connections, posts, updates) that the scheme would classify and act upon.
- T1110mostlyresponds — A.5.25 requires personnel to assess each security event against an agreed categorization/prioritization scheme (including criteria that turn events into incidents) and to decide on and record the outcome; this directly enacts the `responds` act of handling an in-flight brute-force technique once observed.
- T1110.001mostlyresponds — A.5.25 requires competent personnel to assess each security event against an agreed categorization/prioritization scheme (including criteria that turn events into incidents) and to decide on and record the outcome; this is the core of incident response once the guessing technique has produced observable authentication failures or lockouts.
- T1110.002mostlyresponds — A.5.25 requires assessment/prioritization of security events (including those from observed cracking attempts) by the incident response team to decide on handling, which is the core of `responds` once the technique is underway.
- T1110.003mostlyresponds — A.5.25 requires assessment/prioritization of security events (including those from password spraying attempts) by the incident response team once underway, enabling a decision on whether to treat as an incident and record results for coordinated response.
- T1110.004mostlyresponds — A.5.25 requires competent personnel to assess each security event against an agreed categorization/prioritization scheme (including criteria that turn events into incidents) and to decide on and record the outcome; this is the core act of responding to an in-flight credential-stuffing event once it is detected as an information security event.
- T1111mostlyresponds — A.5.25 requires personnel to assess each security event against an agreed categorization/prioritization scheme (including criteria that turn events into incidents) and to record the decision; this is the core act of responding to an MFA-interception event once it is detected and underway.
- T1114mostlyresponds — A.5.25 requires assessment/prioritization of security events (including those revealing T1114 email collection, e.g. via IR details in stolen mail) to drive coordinated response, which matches the `responds` verb once the technique is underway; mostly because it stops at assessment/decision/recording and does not itself perform containment or eradication.
- T1114.002mostlyresponds — A.5.25 requires assessment/prioritization of events to decide if they are incidents and trigger coordinated response, which directly enacts the `responds` verb once the T1114.002 collection technique is underway.
- T1114.003mostlyresponds — A.5.25 requires competent personnel to assess each security event against an agreed categorization/prioritization scheme (including criteria that turn events into incidents) and to decide on and record the outcome; this is the core of incident response once an event is underway, directly matching the `responds` verb for a technique that produces detectable forwarding-rule events.
- T1134.001mostlyresponds — A.5.25 requires competent personnel to assess each security event against an agreed categorization/prioritization scheme (including criteria that turn events into incidents) and to decide on and record the outcome; this is the core act of incident response once the technique is underway, with the named remainder being full containment/eradication (owned by A.5.26).
- T1136mostlyresponds — A.5.25 requires competent personnel to assess each security event against an agreed categorization/prioritization scheme (explicitly including criteria that turn events into incidents) and to decide on and record the outcome; this is the core act of responding once an event (account creation) is underway, with the named remainder being full incident containment/eradication that lives in A.5.26.
- T1136.003mostlyresponds — A.5.25 requires competent personnel to assess each security event against an agreed categorization/prioritization scheme (including criteria that turn events into incidents) and to decide on and record the outcome; this is the core of incident response once an event is underway, directly matching the `responds` verb for a persistence technique that has already succeeded in creating the account.
- T1137.003mostlyresponds — A.5.25 requires competent personnel to assess each security event against an agreed categorization/prioritization scheme (including criteria that turn events into incidents) and to decide on and record the outcome; this is the core act of incident response once the T1137.003 persistence technique has executed and produced observable events.
- T1137.004mostlyresponds — A.5.25 requires competent personnel to assess each security event against an agreed categorization/prioritization scheme (including criteria that turn events into incidents) and to decide on and record the outcome; this is the core act of responding once an event is underway, with the named remainder being full containment/eradication that lives in A.5.26.
- T1137.005mostlyresponds — A.5.25's assessment/prioritization of events (including deciding they are incidents) directly feeds and initiates the incident response process once the malicious rule has executed on a crafted email, with the named remainder being full containment/eradication handled by separate response procedures.
- T1137.006mostlyresponds — A.5.25 requires competent personnel to assess each security event against an agreed categorization/prioritization scheme (including criteria that turn events into declared incidents) and to decide on and record the outcome; this is the core act of responding once the add-in persistence technique has produced a detectable event.
- T1185mostlyresponds — A.5.25 requires competent personnel to assess each security event against an agreed categorization/prioritization scheme (including criteria that turn events into incidents) and to decide on and record the outcome; this is the core of incident response once an event is underway, and T1185's browser-injection/pivoting actions are observable events that would trigger exactly that assessment/decision process.
- T1189mostlyresponds — A.5.25 requires personnel to assess each security event against an agreed categorization/prioritization scheme (including criteria that turn events into incidents) and to decide on and record the outcome; this is the core act of responding to an event already underway, with the named remainder being full incident containment/eradication that lives in A.5.26.
- T1190mostlyresponds — A.5.25 requires assessment/prioritization of security events (including those from T1190 exploitation) by the incident response team once the event has occurred and is underway, enabling containment decisions; this matches the `responds` verb but leaves a named remainder for full eradication/recovery handled by other controls.
- T1203mostlyresponds — A.5.25 requires personnel to assess each security event against an agreed scheme, decide whether it qualifies as an incident, and record the outcome; this is the core act of responding once the exploitation technique has produced observable events.
- T1204mostlyresponds — A.5.25 requires personnel to assess each security event against an agreed categorization/prioritization scheme (including criteria that turn events into incidents) and to decide on and record the outcome; this is the core of incident response once the user-execution technique has produced observable follow-on behavior.
- T1204.001mostlyresponds — A.5.25 requires competent personnel to assess each security event against an agreed categorization/prioritization scheme (including criteria that turn events into incidents) and to decide on and record the outcome; this is the core act of responding to an in-flight incident whose follow-on behavior is the T1204.001 user click.
- T1204.002mostlyresponds — A.5.25 requires assessment/prioritization of security events (including those from T1204.002 user execution) by the incident response team to decide on handling, which is the core of `responds` once the technique is underway; mostly because it stops at categorization/decision and does not itself perform containment/eradication.
- T1204.004mostlyresponds — A.5.25 requires assessment, categorization, prioritization, and recorded decision on security events (including those from social-engineering-driven user actions like ClickFix), which directly enacts the containment/eradication steps of `responds` once the technique is underway; the named remainder is that it stops short of full incident-handling actions such as eradication or recovery.
- T1204.005mostlyresponds — A.5.25 requires assessment/prioritization of security events (including those from malicious library execution) by the incident response team once underway, which is exactly what `responds` names.
- T1207mostlyresponds — A.5.25 requires competent personnel to assess each security event against an agreed categorization/prioritization scheme (including criteria that turn events into incidents) and to decide on and record the outcome; this directly enacts the containment/eradication decision once a T1207 rogue-DC registration event is underway and detected.
- T1210mostlyresponds — A.5.25 requires competent personnel to assess each security event against an agreed categorization/prioritization scheme (including criteria that turn events into incidents) and to decide on and record the outcome; this directly enacts the `responds` verb once T1210 exploitation is underway as an observable event, with the named remainder being events that evade initial detection or fall outside the agreed scheme.
- T1213.005mostlyresponds — A.5.25 requires assessment/prioritization of events (including those involving messaging apps leaking IR discussions or credentials) to drive coordinated response, directly matching the `responds` verb once the technique is underway.
- T1218.003mostlyresponds — A.5.25 requires personnel to assess each security event against an agreed categorization/prioritization scheme (including criteria to declare it an incident) and record the decision; this is the core of incident response once the CMSTP abuse event is underway, with the bounded remainder being full eradication/containment actions that live in A.5.26.
- T1218.005mostlyresponds — A.5.25 requires personnel to assess each security event against an agreed categorization/prioritization scheme (including criteria that turn events into incidents) and to record the decision; this is the core of incident response once the mshta abuse event is underway, with the named remainder being the subsequent containment/eradication steps that live in A.5.26.
- T1218.010mostlyresponds — A.5.25 requires competent personnel to assess each security event against an agreed categorization/prioritization scheme (including criteria that turn events into incidents) and to decide on and record the outcome; this is the core of incident response once an event is underway, directly matching the `responds` verb for a technique already in flight.
- T1218.013mostlyresponds — A.5.25 requires personnel to assess each security event against an agreed categorization/prioritization scheme (including criteria that turn events into incidents) and to decide on and record the outcome; this is the core of incident response once the technique is underway.
- T1218.014mostlyresponds — A.5.25 requires assessment of each security event against an agreed categorization/prioritization scheme to decide if it is an incident and to record the outcome; this directly enacts the `responds` verb (act on an event once underway via containment/eradication workflow) for T1218.014 MMC abuse when it is surfaced as an event.
- T1219mostlyresponds — A.5.25's assessment/prioritization of events (including those involving RAT C2) directly feeds and enables the incident response process once the technique is underway, satisfying the verb even though the control itself stops at assessment rather than performing containment.
- T1219.002mostlyresponds — A.5.25 requires competent personnel to assess each security event against an agreed categorization/prioritization scheme (including explicit criteria to declare it an incident) and to decide on and record the outcome; this is the core act of responding to an in-flight technique that has already produced observable events.
- T1484.001mostlyresponds — A.5.25 requires assessment, categorization, prioritization, and recorded decision on security events (including those from GPO modification), which directly enacts the containment/eradication decision step once the technique is underway.
- T1484.002mostlyresponds — A.5.25 requires assessment of each security event against an agreed categorization/prioritization scheme (including criteria to declare it an incident) plus recording the decision; this directly enacts the containment/eradication decision point once a trust-modification technique is already underway, with the named remainder being full incident response workflow beyond mere assessment.
- T1485mostlyresponds — A.5.25 requires personnel to assess each security event against an agreed categorization/prioritization scheme (including criteria that turn events into declared incidents) and to record the decision; this is the exact act of responding once an incident is underway, with the named remainder that it stops at assessment/prioritization rather than performing containment or eradication.
- T1486mostlyresponds — A.5.25 requires assessment/prioritization of events using an agreed scheme plus recording results, which directly enables and is the first step of incident response once the ransomware encryption event is underway (containment/eradication follow from that decision).
- T1489mostlyresponds — A.5.25's assessment/prioritization of events (including those that stop services to inhibit incident response) directly enables the coordinated response once the technique is underway, matching the event-lane definition of responds; mostly because the control stops at assessment/decision/recording and does not itself perform containment or eradication.
- T1490mostlyresponds — A.5.25 requires assessment/prioritization of security events (including those that have already executed T1490) by the incident response team and records the decision, which is the core of `responds` once the technique is underway.
- T1491mostlyresponds — A.5.25 requires assessment/prioritization of security events (including those from defacement) by the incident response team and recording of decisions, which is the core of responding once the technique is underway.
- T1491.001mostlyresponds — A.5.25 requires competent personnel to assess every security event against an agreed scheme that decides whether it is an incident and what priority it receives, which is the core of incident response once the defacement technique has run and is underway.
- T1491.002mostlyresponds — A.5.25 requires personnel to assess each security event against an agreed categorization/prioritization scheme (including whether it qualifies as an incident) and record the decision; external defacement is a visible, high-visibility event that would be assessed and decided upon as part of incident response once it has occurred.
- T1496mostlyresponds — A.5.25 requires competent personnel to assess each security event against an agreed scheme, decide if it is an incident, and record the outcome; this directly enacts the assessment/prioritization step that begins incident response once resource hijacking (T1496) is underway.
- T1496.001mostlyresponds — A.5.25 requires competent personnel to assess each security event against an agreed categorization/prioritization scheme (explicitly including criteria that turn events into incidents) and to decide on and record the outcome; this is the core of incident response once an event is underway, directly matching the `responds` verb for a compute-hijacking technique that manifests as observable resource-impact events.
- T1496.002mostlyresponds — A.5.25 requires assessment/prioritization of events (including those matching T1496.002 symptoms like anomalous bandwidth use) to decide on incident response, directly enabling the containment/eradication act that `responds` names once the technique is underway.
- T1496.003mostlyresponds — A.5.25 requires personnel to assess each security event against an agreed categorization/prioritization scheme (including criteria that turn events into incidents) and to decide on and record the outcome; this is the core act of responding once an SMS-pumping event is underway, with the named remainder being full incident containment/eradication that lives in A.5.26.
- T1496.004mostlyresponds — A.5.25 requires assessment/prioritization of events (including those matching T1496.004) by the incident response team once they are recognized, which directly enacts the containment/eradication decision step that `responds` names
- T1498mostlyresponds — A.5.25 requires competent personnel to assess each security event against an agreed categorization/prioritization scheme (including criteria that turn events into incidents) and to decide on and record the outcome; this is the core of incident response once a Network DoS event is underway, with the bounded remainder being actual containment/eradication actions that live in A.5.26.
- T1498.001mostlyresponds — A.5.25 requires assessment/prioritization of security events (including floods) by the incident response team once they occur, which is the core of `responds` (containment/eradication once underway); mostly because it stops at assessment/decision without mandating full eradication steps.
- T1498.002mostlyresponds — A.5.25 requires assessment, categorization, prioritization, and recorded decision on security events (including network DoS like reflection amplification), which is the core of incident response once the event is underway.
- T1499mostlyresponds — A.5.25 requires personnel to assess each security event against an agreed categorization/prioritization scheme (including criteria that turn events into incidents) and to decide on them, which is the core of incident response once an Endpoint DoS is underway; recording supports that process, though the control stops short of mandating full containment/eradication actions.
- T1499.001mostlyresponds — A.5.25 requires competent personnel to assess each security event against an agreed categorization/prioritization scheme (including criteria that turn events into incidents) and to decide on and record the outcome; this is the core act of responding to an in-flight DoS event once it is detected.
- T1499.002mostlyresponds — A.5.25 requires competent personnel to assess each security event against an agreed categorization/prioritization scheme (including criteria that turn events into incidents) and to decide on and record the outcome; this is the core act of incident response once the DoS flood is underway, with the named remainder being full containment/eradication (owned by A.5.26).
- T1499.003mostlyresponds — A.5.25 requires competent personnel to assess each security event against an agreed categorization/prioritization scheme (including criteria that turn events into incidents) and to decide on and record the outcome; this is the core act of incident response once the exhaustion flood is underway, with the bounded remainder being full eradication/containment that lives in the paired A.5.26 clause.
- T1505mostlyresponds — A.5.25 requires competent personnel to assess each security event against an agreed categorization/prioritization scheme (including criteria that turn events into incidents) and to decide on and record the outcome; this is the core act of incident response once an event is underway, and T1505's installed malicious server component would surface as such an event.
- T1505.003mostlyresponds — A.5.25 requires assessment/prioritization of security events (including those from web shell deployment) by the incident response team once the event is underway, which is exactly what `responds` names.
- T1505.004mostlyresponds — A.5.25 requires assessment, categorization, prioritization, and recorded decision on security events (including those from installed malicious IIS components), which is the core of incident response once the persistence technique is underway.
- T1528mostlyresponds — A.5.25 requires assessment/prioritization of security events (including those from token theft) by the incident response team once they have occurred, which is exactly what `responds` names; the remainder is that it stops at decision-making and does not itself perform containment/eradication.
- T1529mostlyresponds — A.5.25 requires assessment/prioritization of security events (including those from T1529 shutdowns that impede response/recovery) by the incident team once underway, directly enabling the containment/eradication acts that `responds` names.
- T1530mostlyresponds — A.5.25 requires assessment/prioritization of security events (including data-access incidents) by the incident-response team once they are identified, which directly enacts the `responds` verb on T1530 once the technique is underway.
- T1531mostlyresponds — A.5.25 requires competent personnel to assess each security event against an agreed categorization/prioritization scheme (including criteria that turn events into incidents) and to decide on and record the outcome; this is the core act of incident response once an Impact technique like T1531 is underway, enabling containment/eradication decisions, with the named remainder being that the control stops at assessment/decision rather than executing full containment.
- T1534mostlyresponds — A.5.25 requires assessment/prioritization of security events (including those matching internal spearphishing) by the incident response team to decide on handling, which is the core of `responds` once the technique is underway; mostly because it stops at categorization/decision and does not itself perform containment or eradication.
- T1537mostlyresponds — A.5.25's assessment/prioritization of events (including recorded decisions on whether they qualify as incidents) directly enables and is the first step of coordinated response once the exfiltration technique is underway, with the named remainder being full eradication/recovery actions that sit in separate controls.
- T1539mostlyresponds — A.5.25 requires personnel to assess each security event against an agreed categorization/prioritization scheme (including criteria that turn events into incidents) and to decide on and record the outcome; this is the core of incident response once an event is underway, and directly matches the containment/eradication boundary in the event-lane anchors for responds (e.g., A.5.26 vs T1486).
- T1543.002mostlyresponds — A.5.25 requires personnel to assess each security event using an agreed categorization/prioritization scheme (including criteria to declare it an incident) and record the decision; this directly enacts the `responds` verb once the persistence technique has produced a detectable event.
- T1543.003mostlyresponds — A.5.25 requires personnel to assess each security event against an agreed categorization/prioritization scheme (including criteria that turn events into incidents) and to record the decision; this is the core act of `responds` (containment/eradication once the technique is underway) for a persistence technique that surfaces as a detectable service modification or creation event.
- T1543.004mostlyresponds — A.5.25 requires assessment, categorization, prioritization, and recorded decision on security events (including those from persistence techniques like T1543.004 once underway), which directly enacts the containment/eradication decision step of `responds` with only a bounded remainder for events that evade initial detection
- T1546mostlyresponds — A.5.25 requires competent personnel to assess every security event against an agreed categorization/prioritization scheme and decide on it (including recording the outcome), which is the core of incident response once an event is underway; the T1546 technique (creating or abusing event triggers for persistence/escalation) is observable as a security event that would trigger this assessment/decision process, with the named remainder being events that evade initial detection or categorization.
- T1546.003mostlyresponds — A.5.25 requires assessment/prioritization of security events (including those from malicious WMI subscriptions) by the incident response team once they have occurred, which is the core act named by `responds`.
- T1546.007mostlyresponds — A.5.25 requires assessment/prioritization of security events (including those from persistence techniques like Netsh Helper DLL registration/execution) to decide on incident response, directly matching the `responds` verb once the event is underway.
- T1546.009mostlyresponds — A.5.25 requires competent personnel to assess every security event against an agreed categorization/prioritization scheme (including criteria that turn events into incidents) and to decide on and record the outcome; this is the core act of `responds` once the technique is underway, with only the bounded remainder of events that evade initial detection falling outside.
- T1546.015mostlyresponds — A.5.25 requires personnel to assess each security event against an agreed categorization/prioritization scheme (including criteria that turn events into incidents) and to record the decision; this directly enacts the `responds` verb once the persistence technique has produced a detectable event.
- T1546.016mostlyresponds — A.5.25 requires assessment of each security event against an agreed categorization/prioritization scheme (including criteria to declare it an incident) plus recording the decision; this directly enacts the `responds` verb once the installer technique has produced observable malicious content or persistence.
- T1547.014mostlyresponds — A.5.25 requires assessment, categorization, prioritization, and recorded decision on security events (including those revealing persistence like T1547.014), which is the core of `responds` once the technique has run and an event is raised.
- T1548.002mostlyresponds — A.5.25 requires personnel to assess each security event against an agreed categorization/prioritization scheme (explicitly including criteria to declare it an incident) and to record the decision, which is the core of responding once the UAC-bypass technique has executed and produced a detectable event.
- T1548.005mostlyresponds — A.5.25 requires personnel to assess each security event against an agreed categorization/prioritization scheme (including deciding whether it qualifies as an incident) and record the outcome; this is the core of incident response once an event is underway, though it stops short of containment/eradication actions named in other response controls.
- T1550.003mostlyresponds — A.5.25 requires assessment, categorization, prioritization, and recorded decision on security events (including those from PtT lateral movement), which is the core of incident response once the technique is underway.
- T1550.004mostlyresponds — A.5.25 requires personnel to assess each security event against an agreed categorization/prioritization scheme (including deciding whether it qualifies as an incident) and record the outcome; this is the core act of responding once an event (such as cookie theft or reuse) is underway, with the named remainder being full containment/eradication that lives in separate IR controls.
- T1554mostlyresponds — A.5.25 requires assessment/prioritization of security events (including those from binary compromise/persistence) by the incident response team once underway, enabling coordinated response.
- T1555.006mostlyresponds — A.5.25 requires competent personnel to assess each security event against an agreed categorization/prioritization scheme (including criteria that turn events into incidents) and to decide on and record the outcome; this is the core act of incident response once an event is underway, and directly applies to T1555.006 events (credential theft from a secrets manager).
- T1556.003mostlyresponds — A.5.25 requires assessment/prioritization of security events (including those from PAM modifications) by the incident response team once they are identified, which is the core of `responds` (containment/eradication once underway); mostly because it stops at assessment/decision/recording without mandating full eradication steps.
- T1556.008mostlyresponds — A.5.25 requires competent personnel to assess each security event against an agreed categorization/prioritization scheme (including criteria that turn events into incidents) and to decide/record the outcome; this directly enacts the containment/eradication decision once the T1556.008 technique has run and produced observable logon-related events, with the named remainder being post-decision eradication actions that live in a separate clause.
- T1557mostlyresponds — A.5.25 requires personnel to assess each security event against an agreed categorization/prioritization scheme (including criteria that turn events into incidents) and to record the decision; this directly enacts the `responds` verb once an AiTM technique is detected as an event underway, with the named remainder that the control stops at assessment/decision and does not itself perform containment or eradication.
- T1557.002mostlyresponds — A.5.25 requires personnel to assess each security event against an agreed categorization/prioritization scheme (including criteria that turn events into incidents) and to decide on and record the outcome; this is the core of incident response once an ARP-poisoning event is underway, with only the bounded remainder of fully automated or pre-assessment containment outside its scope.
- T1557.003mostlyresponds — A.5.25 requires competent personnel to assess each security event against an agreed categorization/prioritization scheme (including criteria that turn events into incidents) and to record the decision; this directly enacts the `responds` act of handling an in-flight technique once detected, with the named remainder being post-assessment containment/eradication steps that live in A.5.26.
- T1557.004mostlyresponds — A.5.25 requires personnel to assess each security event against an agreed categorization/prioritization scheme (including criteria that turn events into incidents) and to record the decision; this directly enacts the `responds` verb once an evil-twin event is underway, with the bounded remainder being the post-assessment containment/eradication steps that live in A.5.26.
- T1558mostlyresponds — A.5.25 requires assessment/prioritization of security events (including those matching T1558) by the incident response team once underway, enabling a decision on whether and how to respond, which is the core of the `responds` verb.
- T1558.001mostlyresponds — A.5.25 requires competent personnel to assess each security event against an agreed categorization/prioritization scheme (including criteria that turn events into incidents) and to decide on and record the outcome; this is the core act of incident response once an event is underway, and golden-ticket use (forged TGTs enabling domain-wide access) is a detectable information-security event that would trigger exactly this assessment/decision process.
- T1558.002mostlyresponds — A.5.25 requires personnel to assess each security event against an agreed categorization/prioritization scheme (explicitly including criteria to declare it an incident) and to record the decision, which is the core of incident response once an event is underway; the silver-ticket technique produces detectable events (forged TGS without KDC interaction) that this assessment directly acts on, with only a bounded remainder for events that evade initial detection.
- T1559.001mostlyresponds — A.5.25 requires assessment/prioritization of security events (including those from COM abuse) by the incident response team and recording of decisions, which is the core of `responds` once the technique is underway; the named remainder is that it stops short of containment/eradication actions themselves.
- T1559.002mostlyresponds — A.5.25 requires personnel to assess each security event against an agreed categorization/prioritization scheme (including criteria that turn events into incidents) and to record the decision; this is the core of incident response once the DDE-based technique is underway, with the named remainder being full containment/eradication actions that live in A.5.26.
- T1561mostlyresponds — A.5.25 requires competent personnel to assess each security event against an agreed categorization/prioritization scheme (including explicit criteria for declaring an incident) and to decide on and record the outcome; this is the core of incident response once the disk-wipe technique is underway, with only the post-decision containment/eradication steps lying outside this control.
- T1561.001mostlyresponds — A.5.25 requires assessment/prioritization of security events (including destructive incidents like disk wipes) by the incident response team once they occur, which directly enacts the `responds` verb of containment/eradication once underway.
- T1561.002mostlyresponds — A.5.25 requires assessment/prioritization of security events (including destructive incidents like disk-structure wipe) by the incident-response team once they are reported, which is the core act named by `responds`.
- T1563mostlyresponds — A.5.25 requires competent personnel to assess each security event against an agreed categorization/prioritization scheme (including criteria that turn events into incidents) and to decide on and record the outcome; this is the core act of responding to an in-flight T1563 hijacking once detected, with the named remainder being full eradication and recovery steps that live in separate clauses.
- T1563.001mostlyresponds — A.5.25 requires personnel to assess each security event against an agreed categorization/prioritization scheme (including criteria that turn events into incidents) and to decide on and record the outcome; this is the core act of incident response once an event is underway, and SSH session hijacking (a detectable lateral-movement technique) is a clear information-security event that would trigger exactly this assessment/decision workflow.
- T1563.002mostlyresponds — A.5.25 requires personnel to assess each security event against an agreed categorization/prioritization scheme (including criteria that turn events into incidents) and to decide on and record the outcome; this is the core of incident response once an RDP hijacking event is underway, with the named remainder being full containment/eradication actions that live in A.5.26.
- T1564.008mostlyresponds — A.5.25 requires personnel to assess each security event against an agreed categorization/prioritization scheme (including criteria that turn events into incidents) and to record the decision; this directly matches the responding act of triaging and deciding on alerts that the T1564.008 technique is designed to suppress or delay.
- T1565mostlyresponds — A.5.25 requires competent personnel to assess each security event against an agreed categorization/prioritization scheme (including criteria that turn events into incidents) and to decide on and record the outcome; this is the core act of incident response once an event is underway, directly addressing T1565 data-manipulation events that threaten integrity and affect decisions.
- T1565.001mostlyresponds — A.5.25 requires assessment/prioritization of security events (including those from stored data manipulation) by the incident response team once the event is underway, which is exactly what `responds` names; the remainder is that it stops short of full containment/eradication addressed in paired IR controls.
- T1565.002mostlyresponds — A.5.25 requires competent personnel to assess each security event against an agreed categorization/prioritization scheme (including criteria that turn events into incidents) and to decide on and record the outcome; this is the core act of responding once the T1565.002 technique has produced observable transmitted-data manipulation.
- T1566mostlyresponds — A.5.25 requires assessment/prioritization of events using an agreed scheme and recording results to drive coordinated response, which directly enacts the `responds` verb once a phishing event is underway; the named remainder is that it stops at decision-making and does not itself perform containment/eradication.
- T1566.001mostlyresponds — A.5.25 requires competent personnel to assess each security event against an agreed categorization/prioritization scheme (including criteria that turn events into incidents) and to decide on and record the outcome; this is the core act of responding once the spearphishing event is underway, with the named remainder being full incident handling/containment/eradication addressed by A.5.26.
- T1566.002mostlyresponds — A.5.25 requires assessment/prioritization of events (including those from spearphishing links) by the incident response team to decide on handling, which directly enacts the `responds` verb once the technique is underway; the named remainder is that it stops at categorization/decision rather than performing full containment/eradication.
- T1566.003mostlyresponds — A.5.25 requires personnel to assess each security event against an agreed categorization/prioritization scheme (including criteria that turn events into incidents) and to decide on them; this is the core of incident response once the spearphishing event is underway, with recording for verification.
- T1566.004mostlyresponds — A.5.25 requires personnel to assess each security event against an agreed categorization/prioritization scheme (including criteria that turn events into incidents) and to decide on and record the outcome; this is the core of incident response once the vishing technique has begun (assess, categorize, prioritize, decide), with the named remainder being full containment/eradication actions that live in A.5.26.
- T1567mostlyresponds — A.5.25 requires competent personnel to assess each security event against an agreed categorization/prioritization scheme (including criteria that turn events into incidents) and to decide on and record the outcome; this is the core act of responding once an exfiltration-over-web-service event is underway, with the named remainder being full incident containment/eradication that lives in A.5.26.
- T1567.001mostlyresponds — A.5.25 requires competent personnel to assess each security event against an agreed categorization/prioritization scheme (including criteria that turn events into incidents) and to decide on and record the outcome; this is the core act of responding once the exfiltration technique is underway, with the named remainder being full incident containment/eradication that lives in A.5.26.
- T1567.002mostlyresponds — A.5.25 requires assessment/prioritization of security events (including exfiltration) by the incident response team once they are identified, which directly enacts the `responds` verb of containment/eradication once the technique is underway.
- T1567.003mostlyresponds — A.5.25 requires competent personnel to assess each security event against an agreed categorization/prioritization scheme (including criteria that turn events into incidents) and to decide on and record the outcome; this is the core act of incident response once an exfiltration technique is underway, with the named remainder being full containment/eradication that lives in A.5.26.
- T1567.004mostlyresponds — A.5.25 requires personnel to assess each security event against an agreed categorization/prioritization scheme (including criteria that turn events into incidents) and to record the decision, which is exactly the initial assessment step that launches incident response once an exfiltration technique like T1567.004 is underway.
- T1569mostlyresponds — A.5.25 requires assessment/prioritization of security events (including those from T1569 abuse of services) by the incident response team once the event is underway, which is exactly what `responds` names.
- T1569.001mostlyresponds — A.5.25 requires assessment/prioritization of events (including those matching T1569.001 execution) to decide on incident response, directly enabling the containment/eradication act that `responds` names once the technique is underway.
- T1569.002mostlyresponds — A.5.25 requires assessment/prioritization of security events (including those from service execution) by the incident response team and recording of decisions, which directly enacts the containment/eradication decision step once the technique is underway.
- T1569.003mostlyresponds — A.5.25 requires competent personnel to assess each security event against an agreed categorization/prioritization scheme (including criteria that turn events into incidents) and to decide on and record the outcome; this is the core of incident response once an abuse-of-systemctl event is underway.
- T1570mostlyresponds — A.5.25 requires assessment/prioritization of security events (including those involving lateral tool transfer) by the incident response team once underway, enabling a decision on whether and how to respond, with recording for verification.
- T1571mostlyresponds — A.5.25's assessment/prioritization of events (including recording for response coordination) directly enacts the `responds` verb once T1571 is detected as an underway security event, with the named remainder being full incident eradication steps that live in A.5.26.
- T1574.004mostlyresponds — A.5.25 requires personnel to assess each security event against an agreed categorization/prioritization scheme (including criteria that turn events into incidents) and to record the decision; this is the core of incident response once the hijacking event is underway, with only the bounded remainder of non-incident-classified events left unaddressed.
- T1578mostlyresponds — A.5.25 requires competent personnel to assess each security event against an agreed categorization/prioritization scheme (including criteria that turn events into incidents) and to decide on and record the outcome; this is the core of incident response once an event is underway, directly addressing T1578 modifications that are already occurring to evade defenses or remove evidence.
- T1578.002mostlyresponds — A.5.25 requires assessment/prioritization of security events (including this technique once detected) plus recording for response coordination, which directly enacts the `responds` verb once the event is underway.
- T1578.003mostlyresponds — A.5.25 requires competent personnel to assess each security event against an agreed categorization/prioritization scheme (including criteria that turn events into incidents) and to decide on and record the outcome; this is the core of incident response once an event is underway, directly addressing the deletion technique in flight or immediately after to contain/eradicate and decide next actions.
- T1578.004mostlyresponds — A.5.25 requires competent personnel to assess each security event against an agreed categorization/prioritization scheme (including criteria that turn events into incidents) and to decide on and record the outcome; this is the core act of incident response once an event is underway, directly addressing T1578.004's post-activity reversion that attempts to erase evidence.
- T1598.003mostlyresponds — A.5.25 requires personnel to assess each security event against an agreed categorization/prioritization scheme (including criteria that turn events into incidents) and to record the decision; this directly enacts the `responds` verb of containment/eradication once the spearphishing event is underway, with the named remainder being events that evade initial detection entirely.
- T1606.002mostlyresponds — A.5.25 requires competent personnel to assess every security event against an agreed categorization/prioritization scheme (explicitly including criteria that turn events into incidents) and to decide on and record the outcome; this is the core of incident response once an event is underway, and the SAML-token-forgery technique is an observable information-security event that would trigger exactly this assessment/decision step.
- T1621mostlyresponds — A.5.25 requires competent personnel to assess each security event against an agreed categorization/prioritization scheme (including criteria that turn events into incidents) and to decide on and record the outcome; this is the core act of responding to an MFA-fatigue or push-bombardment event once it is underway, with a named remainder that the control stops at assessment/decision and does not itself perform containment or eradication.
- T1649mostlyresponds — A.5.25 requires personnel to assess each security event against an agreed categorization/prioritization scheme (including criteria that turn events into incidents) and to record the decision; this is the core of incident response once an event is underway, and T1649's certificate theft/forgery is a detectable event that would trigger exactly this assessment and decision process.
- T1654mostlyresponds — A.5.25 requires assessment/prioritization of security events (including real-time log monitoring by defenders that can reveal the T1654 technique in flight) plus recording results to drive coordinated incident response, which matches the `responds` verb once the technique is underway.
- T1657mostlyresponds — A.5.25 requires assessment/prioritization of security events (including those involving financial theft via ransomware, BEC, etc.) to decide on and coordinate incident response, directly matching the `responds` verb once the technique is underway.
- T1659mostlyresponds — A.5.25 requires personnel to assess each security event against an agreed categorization/prioritization scheme (including criteria that turn events into incidents) and to record the decision; this is the core act of responding to an in-flight technique once it has produced observable events.
- T1665mostlyresponds — A.5.25's assessment/prioritization of events (including those revealing hidden C2 via traffic anomalies or responder probes) directly enables the incident response act once the technique is detected and underway, with the named remainder being pre-assessment containment steps outside this clause.
- T1667mostlyresponds — A.5.25 requires assessment/prioritization of security events (including the flooding/disruption from T1667) to decide on incident response, directly matching the `responds` verb once the technique is underway.
- T1684.001mostlyresponds — A.5.25 requires assessment/prioritization of security events (including social-engineering impersonation campaigns once detected) to drive coordinated response, directly matching the `responds` verb of containing/eradication once underway; mostly because it stops at assessment/decision and does not itself perform containment.
- T1685mostlyresponds — A.5.25 requires competent personnel to assess each security event against an agreed categorization/prioritization scheme (including criteria that turn events into incidents) and to decide on and record the outcome; this is the core act of incident response once an event (such as tool tampering) is underway.
- T1685.005mostlyresponds — A.5.25 requires competent personnel to assess each security event against an agreed categorization/prioritization scheme (including criteria that turn events into incidents) and to decide on and record the outcome; this is the core of incident response once an event is underway, and clearing Windows event logs is a detectable technique that would trigger exactly such assessment and decision-making.
- T1685.006mostlyresponds — A.5.25 requires assessment/prioritization of security events (including log-clearing as an indicator) by the incident response team and records the decision, which directly enacts the `responds` verb once the technique is underway.
- T1686mostlyresponds — A.5.25 requires assessment/prioritization of security events (including those matching T1686 behaviors) by the incident response team to decide on and record the incident response path, which is the core of `responds` once the technique is underway.
- T1686.001mostlyresponds — A.5.25 requires assessment/prioritization of security events (including those matching T1686.001) once they have occurred and are underway, which directly enacts the `responds` verb of containment/eradication once the technique is in flight.
- T1070.008partialresponds — A.5.25 requires competent personnel to assess each security event against an agreed categorization/prioritization scheme (including criteria that turn events into incidents) and to decide on and record the outcome; this is the core act of incident response once an event is underway, directly addressing T1070.008's post-impact evidence-removal technique (e.g. deleting mailbox export requests or suspicious metadata that would otherwise trigger detection).
- T1102.001partialresponds — A.5.25's core act is to assess each security event using an agreed scheme, decide its categorization/priority as an incident, record the outcome, and hand off to personnel who coordinate and respond; this directly engages the detection-to-response handoff once a dead-drop resolver event is underway on the estate, with the named remainder being fully stealthy or pre-compromise uses that never surface as observable events.
- T1499.004partialresponds — A.5.25 requires assessment/prioritization of events using an agreed scheme plus recording results, which directly engages the core of incident response once an exploitation event is underway (triage to decide handling, escalation, and recording for eradication/follow-up).
- T1542.003partialresponds — A.5.25's assessment/prioritization scheme and recording directly enable the incident response team to decide and act on a suspected bootkit event once it is underway, which is the core of `responds`; the named remainder is that the control itself performs only the assessment step, not the full containment/eradication that follows from the decision.
- T1546.014partialresponds — A.5.25's assessment/prioritization scheme and recorded decision directly feed the incident response workflow once an emond persistence event is surfaced, enabling containment/eradication of the rule and service abuse (with the bounded remainder being pre-compromise rule installation that has not yet triggered).
Prevented OWASP Web Top 10 (2025) risks (3)
OWASP Web Top 10 (2025) risk categories this ISO control helps prevent or mitigate — our analysis (mostly llm_verified).
Direction: ← other covers this;
→ this covers other (F/M/P = full / mostly /
partial). gov = governs / implements (a mandate, not coverage).
Control IDs, short titles and the structured attribute table (control type, CIA properties, cybersecurity-concept, operational capability, security domain) are facts from ISO/IEC 27001:2022 Annex A / ISO/IEC 27002:2022. The full implementation guidance prose lives in ISO/IEC 27002:2022 — not reproduced here. Cross-walks to NIST 800-53, NIST CSF 2.0, OWASP ASVS, CWE, MITRE ATT&CK and OWASP Web Top 10 are our own analysis (mostly llm_verified), not an ISO, NIST, MITRE or OWASP product — how ours compare.