A.5.30 Organizational
ICT readiness for business continuity
Structured attributes from ISO/IEC 27002:2022 — control type · CIA properties · cybersecurity concept · operational capability · security domain. What do these mean?
Mapped NIST 800-53 r5 controls (25)
Our reading (mostly llm_verified) of how this ISO control and each NIST 800-53 control relate. Not an ISO or NIST product.
Direction: ← other covers this;
→ this covers other (F/M/P = full / mostly /
partial). gov = governs / implements (a mandate, not coverage).
Why these map — rationale
- CP-10mostlycovers — A.5.30's broad ICT readiness requirement for availability during disruption accounts for the bulk of CP-10's recovery/reconstitution to a known state, but leaves a residual of specific technical reconstitution procedures, parameters, and post-disruption triggers not fully detailed in the ISO control.
- CP-2mostlycovers — A.5.30's ICT readiness directly implements the core of CP-2's contingency planning and continuity requirements for information assets, but leaves some residual (e.g., explicit mission/business function identification, metrics, and full role/contact details) that sit outside its narrower ICT focus.
- CP-7mostlycovers — A.5.30's broad requirement to ensure ICT availability during disruption accounts for the bulk of CP-7's alternate-site mandate (as one primary way to achieve continuity), but leaves a residual of CP-7's specifics (agreements, exact RTO parameters, on-site equipment/supplies) uncovered by the higher-level ISO statement.
- CP-4partialcovers — A.5.30's broad requirement to ensure ICT availability during disruption is addressed in part by CP-4's testing/review/corrective-action steps that validate and improve contingency readiness, but most of A.5.30 (planning, resource provisioning, and actual continuity measures) sits outside this testing control.
- CP-9partialcovers — A.5.30's broad ICT-readiness-for-BC requirement touches backup as one enabling slice for availability during disruption, but the bulk of cp-9's specific backup-frequency, scope, and protection details sit outside what A.5.30 itself mandates.
Aligned NIST CSF 2.0 outcomes (20)
NIST CSF 2.0 outcomes this ISO control aligns with — our analysis (mostly llm_verified).
Direction: ← other covers this;
→ this covers other (F/M/P = full / mostly /
partial). gov = governs / implements (a mandate, not coverage).
Why these map — rationale
- PR.IR-03domain mandateimplements — A.5.30 directly operationalizes ICT continuity mechanisms that achieve the exact resilience requirements named in PR.IR-03 for normal and adverse situations
Related OWASP ASVS 5.0 requirements (4)
Application-security verification requirements (OWASP ASVS 5.0) this ISO control aligns with; links open the ASVS chapter. Our analysis (mostly llm_verified) — many ISO controls have no ASVS counterpart.
Direction: ← other covers this;
→ this covers other (F/M/P = full / mostly /
partial). gov = governs / implements (a mandate, not coverage).
Related weaknesses / CWE (2401)
Weakness classes this ISO control helps prevent or mitigate — our analysis (mostly llm_verified).
Direction: ← other covers this;
→ this covers other (F/M/P = full / mostly /
partial). gov = governs / implements (a mandate, not coverage).
Mitigated MITRE ATT&CK techniques (3351)
Adversary techniques (MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise) this ISO control helps mitigate; links open attack.mitre.org. Our analysis (mostly llm_verified).
Direction: ← other covers this;
→ this covers other (F/M/P = full / mostly /
partial). gov = governs / implements (a mandate, not coverage).
Why these map — rationale
- T1485fullrecovers — A.5.30 requires ICT continuity plans with RPOs and procedures for restoring prioritized ICT resources (information), which is exactly the `recovers` verb against data destruction; the owner graded the more severe T1561.002 (Disk Structure Wipe) at `full` on this same clause, and T1485's file-level destruction is addressed by the same backup-and-restore framework the clause mandates.
- T1486fullrecovers — A.5.30's ICT continuity plans, RTO/RPO specifications, and tested recovery procedures address restoration of data and services after ransomware encryption, consistent with the full grade given for the analogous T1561.002 disk structure wipe technique on the same control.
- T1529fullrecovers — A.5.30 mandates ICT continuity plans with recovery procedures (RTOs, RPOs, restoration procedures) that cover bringing systems back up after shutdown/reboot, including the 'may not be able to boot again' case via image restoration or hardware replacement; consistent with the A.5.30 vs T1561.002 = full anchor on the same cell.
- T1561fullrecovers — A.5.30's ICT continuity plans specify RTOs, RPOs and restoration procedures that recover ICT services after disruption; disk wipe is exactly the availability-impacting event these plans address, and the anchor for the sub-technique T1561.002 already establishes `full` on the same clause.
- T1561.001fullrecovers — A.5.30's ICT continuity framework — BIA, RPO, restoration procedures for prioritized information — directly addresses recovery from disk content wipe, consistent with the owner-graded `full` anchor on the closely related T1561.002 (Disk Structure Wipe), since both techniques destroy data that the same backup/restore procedures recover.
- T1561.002fullrecovers — A.5.30 explicitly requires ICT continuity plans with defined RTO/RPO plus tested procedures to restore prioritized ICT services and information after disruption, directly recovering availability destroyed by disk-structure wipe (the technique's core impact).
- T1485.001mostlyrecovers — A.5.30 mandates RPO-based information restoration procedures, which directly recover data deleted by a lifecycle policy, with the remainder being data written after the last recovery point.
- T1489mostlyrecovers — A.5.30 requires ICT continuity plans with RTOs and RPOs that restore services and information after disruption, and a service stop is a disruption those plans are designed to recover from, with the remainder being the unrecoverable window since the last backup or state capture.
- T1491mostlyrecovers — A.5.30 requires ICT continuity plans with RTOs and RPOs that restore services and information after disruption, and defacement is a disruption to content integrity that restoration procedures can reverse from backups or clean copies, with the remainder being the time window since the last recovery point.
- T1495mostlyrecovers — A.5.30 requires ICT continuity plans with RTOs and RPOs that restore prioritized ICT services and information after disruption, and firmware corruption is a disruption that a tested plan with recovery procedures addresses; the remainder is the time window since the last RPO and the possibility that the firmware corruption itself damages the recovery mechanism.
- T1498mostlyrecovers — A.5.30's ICT continuity strategies (redundancy, failover, alternative sites, capacity specifications) genuinely restore service availability after a Network DoS, but the same remainder that bounds A.8.14 against T1498 applies here: a bandwidth-exhaustion attack continues to reach whatever is restored to, so component-level bandwidth limits are not addressed by the continuity strategies the clause mandates.
- T1531mostlyrecovers — A.5.30 requires ICT continuity plans with RTOs/RPOs and restoration procedures for prioritized ICT services, and identity/authentication is an ICT service whose access state can be restored from directory backups and credential resets; the bounded remainder is that changed credentials not captured by the RPO and permissions revoked outside the backup window cannot be fully restored to their pre-disruption state.
- T1561.002mostlyresponds — A.5.30 requires plans, structure, procedures and tested exercises that respond to and recover from a disruption (including one caused by disk-structure wipe), bounding its impact once underway.
- T1565.001mostlyrecovers — A.5.30 mandates ICT continuity plans with RPOs and restoration procedures that recover information to a known-good state, but data manipulated before the last recovery point is not restored.
- T1565.003mostlyrecovers — Invoking ICT continuity and recovery plans can rebuild the compromised systems and restore uncorrupted application binaries, though any business transactions processed during the manipulation window are not undone by system restoration.
- T1578.003mostlyrecovers — A.5.30 requires ICT continuity plans with RTOs and RPOs that restore prioritized ICT services and information after disruption, and a deleted cloud instance is a disruption whose recovery is governed by those plans; the remainder is the gap between the RPO and the moment of deletion, which is a named boundary of the control's own specification rather than a failure to reach the technique.
- T1495partialresponds — A.5.30 requires plans, structure, procedures and tested response/recovery actions that activate once an ICT disruption (including firmware corruption rendering devices inoperable) is underway, enabling containment, restoration of prioritized ICT services within RTO/RPO, and return to availability; this matches the `responds` verb but is partial because the clause is scoped to organization-owned ICT continuity rather than all possible firmware targets (e.g. third-party network devices or non-prioritized hardware) and does not itself perform the response.
- T1496partialrecovers — A.5.30's ICT continuity framework — BIA-driven RTOs/RPOs, response and recovery procedures, and tested continuity plans — directly addresses availability restoration after resource hijacking, which degrades ICT service availability; the remainder is that recovery is bounded by the need to first halt the ongoing consumption (a response action the continuity plan initiates but does not itself perform) and that A.5.30 is a planning framework whose execution depends on the technical controls it specifies.
- T1496partialresponds — A.5.30 requires plans, structure, procedures and tested response/recovery actions that activate once an ICT disruption (including resource-exhaustion hijacking) is underway, containing impact and restoring prioritized services to meet RTO/RPO; the named remainder is non-ICT hijacking vectors outside its explicit scope.
- T1496.001partialrecovers — A.5.30's ICT continuity plans (failover, redundancy, recovery procedures) can restore service availability after compute hijacking causes systems to become unresponsive, but the attack is an ongoing resource-consumption vector — restoring or failing over to an identical system does not increase capacity while the hijacking process continues to consume resources on the restored systems, and A.5.30 does not address the underlying compromise that must be remediated for full recovery.
- T1496.002partialrecovers — ICT continuity plans can restore service availability by failing over or provisioning additional capacity, but the restored environment may still be subject to the ongoing hijacking if the underlying malware or access vector is not eradicated.
- T1496.003partialrecovers — A.5.30's ICT continuity plans include response and recovery procedures for ICT service disruptions, and SMS pumping does impact messaging service availability by overwhelming communication channels, so recovery procedures (failover, restoring normal messaging operations) can apply; however, the primary impact is financial (SMS costs) which A.5.30 does not recover, and the recovery is contingent on messaging services being explicitly within the BIA scope and continuity plans.
- T1496.004partialrecovers — A.5.30's ICT continuity plans include recovery procedures (RTO/RPO-based) that can restore service availability after the resource exhaustion and availability impact of cloud service hijacking, but the financial costs already incurred are not recoverable, and the recovery is contingent on the abuse being stopped first (an access-revocation response action outside A.5.30's scope), so the verb holds only against the availability portion of the impact.
- T1498partialresponds — A.5.30 explicitly includes 'response and recovery procedures' within ICT continuity plans for managing ICT service disruption, and a Network DoS is an ICT service disruption that would activate those procedures (failover, engaging upstream mitigation, stakeholder communication). However, the response procedures focus on maintaining/restoring service availability rather than containing the attack itself — the actual threat containment (DDoS scrubbing, filtering, blackholing) is performed by network security controls, and A.5.30 does not enumerate forensic investigation or threat eradication, so the response is a slice of the full response set.
- T1498.001partialrecovers — A.5.30's ICT continuity framework — BIA-driven RTOs/RPOs, continuity strategies for before/during/after disruption, and tested response and recovery procedures — genuinely restores service after a direct network flood through failover, alternative paths, and pre-arranged mitigation; the named remainder is the same one A.8.14 carries against T1498: component-level bandwidth saturation during an active flood is not addressed by the plan itself.
- T1499partialrecovers — A.5.30's ICT continuity plans (RTO/RPO, failover, capacity specs, tested recovery procedures) can restore service after an endpoint DoS, but for ongoing resource-exhaustion attacks the restored system faces the same bottleneck, and for persistent crash-condition exploits the recovery is bounded by what the specific continuity strategy selected actually delivers — the clause is a framework whose recovery depends on the chosen strategies, not a mechanism that absorbs attack volume.
- T1499.001partialrecovers — A.5.30 includes ICT continuity plans with recovery procedures (RTO/RPO, restoration of ICT services), so recovery is in scope, but T1499.001 is a capacity-exhaustion attack that continues while it runs — restoring the OS or failing over to a redundant node does not stop the flood from exhausting the replacement, mirroring the A.8.14 vs T1499.004 anchor where restoration of an identical copy does not increase capacity under a capacity-based vector.
- T1499.001partialresponds — A.5.30 requires plans, structure, exercises and procedures to respond to and recover from ICT disruptions (including those from resource-exhaustion DoS that impair availability), but its BIA-driven focus on pre-planned RTO/RPO restoration of prioritized services does not address containment or eradication of the live flood itself, leaving a large slice of the incident-response act named by the verb unaddressed.
- T1499.002partialrecovers — A.5.30 ensures ICT continuity plans with RTOs and RPOs are in place to restore services after disruption, but a service exhaustion flood is a capacity-based attack where restoring an identical service does not increase capacity to withstand the ongoing flood, so recovery is short-lived or ineffective while the attack continues.
- T1499.002partialresponds — A.5.30 requires ICT continuity plans with response procedures, organizational structure to respond to disruption, and tested plans that restore prioritized ICT services within RTO/RPO once a service-exhaustion flood is underway; this matches the `responds` verb for containment/eradication of realized impact, but only partially because the clause is scoped to planned/prioritized ICT services from BIA (not all possible network services or non-ICT elements in the technique) and recovery does not always bound an ongoing flood.
- T1499.003partialrecovers — A.5.30's ICT continuity plans include recovery procedures (RTO, RPO, restoration of ICT components) that genuinely restore the application service, but the technique is an ongoing flood that continues to exhaust resources after restoration, so what is recovered does not survive while the attack continues — the same discriminator the owner used on A.8.14 vs T1499.004.
- T1499.003partialresponds — A.5.30 requires plans, structure, exercises and procedures that respond to and recover from ICT disruptions (including resource-exhaustion DoS once underway), but its BIA-driven focus on pre-planned continuity for prioritized services leaves many application-exhaustion vectors (non-prioritized apps, untested edge cases, novel flood patterns) outside the scoped response
- T1499.004partialrecovers — A.5.30 includes ICT continuity plans with response and recovery procedures, RTOs, RPOs, and restoration procedures for ICT services, which genuinely restore crashed applications/systems; however, the same vulnerability that caused the crash typically remains exploitable, so the restored service can be re-crashed — what is restored does not survive an attack that is still reachable, mirroring the A.8.14 vs T1499.004 anchor.
- T1499.004partialresponds — A.5.30 requires plans, structure, exercises and procedures that respond to and recover from ICT disruptions (including those from exploitation-induced crashes), but its focus is on pre-planned continuity for named business services rather than on-the-fly containment/eradication of an in-progress T1499.004 exploit.
- T1561.002partialdetects — A.5.30 requires ICT continuity plans (including response procedures) to be regularly evaluated through exercises and tests that surface whether the organization can still meet RTO/RPO when disk structures are wiped, thereby detecting gaps in readiness; this is only a slice of the full technique because the control is silent on real-time detection of the wipe itself while it is underway.
- T1561.002partialprevents — A.5.30 requires BIA-driven ICT continuity strategies, plans, and tested recovery procedures (with explicit RTO/RPO) that prepare for, mitigate, and respond to disruptions including those from disk-structure wipes, thereby stopping the full availability-loss impact of the technique in scoped critical systems; it does not stop the adversary from executing the wipe itself.
- T1565partialrecovers — ICT continuity plans and RPO-driven restoration procedures recover manipulated data to a known good state, with the bounded remainder being the unrecoverable window of legitimate changes made since the last recovery point.
- T1578.004partialrecovers — A.5.30's ICT continuity plans with defined RPOs and restoration procedures can recover service state and data lost when an adversary reverts a cloud instance, but the extent is partial because the control is designed for business continuity disruptions rather than adversarial evidence destruction, recovery is bounded by the RPO window, and it depends on backups existing outside the snapshot system the adversary exploited.
- T1578.004partialresponds — A.5.30's response procedures, organizational structure for responding to disruption, and tested plans for restoring ICT services within RTO/RPO bounds can contain/eradicate a reversion that disrupts availability (e.g. by failing over or restoring from clean backups), but the control's focus is on unplanned business disruptions rather than deliberate adversarial evasion, leaving most of the technique's post-reversion cleanup and detection aspects untouched.
Prevented OWASP Web Top 10 (2025) risks (2)
OWASP Web Top 10 (2025) risk categories this ISO control helps prevent or mitigate — our analysis (mostly llm_verified).
Direction: ← other covers this;
→ this covers other (F/M/P = full / mostly /
partial). gov = governs / implements (a mandate, not coverage).
Control IDs, short titles and the structured attribute table (control type, CIA properties, cybersecurity-concept, operational capability, security domain) are facts from ISO/IEC 27001:2022 Annex A / ISO/IEC 27002:2022. The full implementation guidance prose lives in ISO/IEC 27002:2022 — not reproduced here. Cross-walks to NIST 800-53, NIST CSF 2.0, OWASP ASVS, CWE, MITRE ATT&CK and OWASP Web Top 10 are our own analysis (mostly llm_verified), not an ISO, NIST, MITRE or OWASP product — how ours compare.