A.6.6 People
Confidentiality or non-disclosure agreements
Structured attributes from ISO/IEC 27002:2022 — control type · CIA properties · cybersecurity concept · operational capability · security domain. What do these mean?
Mapped NIST 800-53 r5 controls (12)
Our reading (mostly llm_verified) of how this ISO control and each NIST 800-53 control relate. Not an ISO or NIST product.
Direction: ← other covers this;
→ this covers other (F/M/P = full / mostly /
partial). gov = governs / implements (a mandate, not coverage).
Why these map — rationale
- PS-6mostlycovers — A.6.6's NDA-focused confidentiality agreements form the core of what PS-6 requires for access agreements (especially the sign/re-sign verification), but PS-6 is broader in scope (any access terms, not just confidentiality) leaving a residual of the target uncovered
Aligned NIST CSF 2.0 outcomes (19)
NIST CSF 2.0 outcomes this ISO control aligns with — our analysis (mostly llm_verified).
Direction: ← other covers this;
→ this covers other (F/M/P = full / mostly /
partial). gov = governs / implements (a mandate, not coverage).
Why these map — rationale
- GV.OC-03domain mandateimplements — GV.OC-03 requires understanding and managing all legal/regulatory/contractual cybersecurity obligations (explicitly including privacy); A.6.6 is the specific technical/operational control that directly operationalizes the contractual NDA slice of that governance outcome within its domain.
Mitigated MITRE ATT&CK techniques (1121)
Adversary techniques (MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise) this ISO control helps mitigate; links open attack.mitre.org. Our analysis (mostly llm_verified).
Direction: ← other covers this;
→ this covers other (F/M/P = full / mostly /
partial). gov = governs / implements (a mandate, not coverage).
Why these map — rationale
- T1110.001mostlyprevents — A.6.6 legally binds personnel and external parties (including those with access to management services, SSO, cloud apps, or network devices) to protect credentials and report unauthorized disclosure attempts, which directly constrains the human-enabled guessing vector in the technique; the bounded remainder is fully automated guessing against non-human accounts or systems where no NDA applies.
- T1199partialprevents — NDAs with legally enforceable terms, responsibilities to avoid unauthorized disclosure, permitted-use clauses, audit rights, breach-notification duties, and return/destruction requirements directly constrain the third-party-provider scenario that T1199 names, but do not stop the initial compromise of the provider, the abuse of already-granted elevated/valid accounts, or the supply-chain trust that lets the technique succeed.
- T1213partialprevents — NDAs legally bind personnel and external parties against unauthorized disclosure or external sharing of repository contents (including the listed sensitive items), constraining the technique's success when the actor is a signatory; this is only a slice of the class because the technique also succeeds via technical access-control failures on the repositories themselves, which NDAs do not address.
- T1213.002partialprevents — A.6.6 legally binds personnel and external parties (via NDAs) to protect classified information they access, which directly constrains the insider or authorized-user subset of SharePoint mining (e.g. policies, diagrams, credentials) but leaves the external adversary path, misconfigurations, and post-breach exfiltration untouched.
- T1213.005partialprevents — NDA clauses on definition of protected info, permitted use, ownership, notification of leaks, and non-compliance actions directly constrain the technique of mining proprietary/source/credential data from internal messaging apps by authorized users, but do not stop external adversaries, post-breach exfiltration, or technical access once data is already in the app.
- T1598partialprevents — NDAs legally bind personnel and external parties against unauthorized disclosure of defined confidential information, which constrains the success of phishing-for-information techniques that target those parties (especially internal staff or trusted externals) by raising consequences and reminding them of obligations, but does not stop the adversary from sending the messages or prevent all cases (e.g., non-bound victims, social engineering that evades awareness of the agreement).
- T1598.004partialprevents — NDAs legally bind personnel and external parties against unauthorized disclosure of defined confidential information, which directly constrains the success of vishing attempts that rely on tricking those parties into divulging it; partial because the control is a governance/contractual instrument that does not stop the adversary technique from being attempted or reaching non-bound parties.
- T1684partialprevents — A.6.6 legally binds personnel and external parties to protect confidential information and avoid unauthorized disclosure, which directly constrains the social-engineering outcome of tricking authorized disclosure; it does not stop the adversary from running the influence technique itself or from targeting non-bound parties, so the covered slice is genuine but bounded.
Control IDs, short titles and the structured attribute table (control type, CIA properties, cybersecurity-concept, operational capability, security domain) are facts from ISO/IEC 27001:2022 Annex A / ISO/IEC 27002:2022. The full implementation guidance prose lives in ISO/IEC 27002:2022 — not reproduced here. Cross-walks to NIST 800-53, NIST CSF 2.0, OWASP ASVS, CWE, MITRE ATT&CK and OWASP Web Top 10 are our own analysis (mostly llm_verified), not an ISO, NIST, MITRE or OWASP product — how ours compare.