A.6.7 People
Remote working
Structured attributes from ISO/IEC 27002:2022 — control type · CIA properties · cybersecurity concept · operational capability · security domain. What do these mean?
Mapped NIST 800-53 r5 controls (19)
Our reading (mostly llm_verified) of how this ISO control and each NIST 800-53 control relate. Not an ISO or NIST product.
Direction: ← other covers this;
→ this covers other (F/M/P = full / mostly /
partial). gov = governs / implements (a mandate, not coverage).
Why these map — rationale
- AC-17mostlycovers — The ISO control establishes policy, technical safeguards, and monitoring requirements for all remote access to organizational systems, directly satisfying the core intent of AC-17.
- AC-19mostlycovers — By mandating controls over mobile and privately-owned devices used outside organizational premises, the ISO guidance fulfills the same objective as AC-19.
- AC-20mostlycovers — The requirement to define permitted external-system use, device ownership rules, and security mechanisms for remote locations aligns with AC-20’s scope.
- PE-17mostlycovers — Physical-security, visitor, and equipment-protection measures for alternate work sites are explicitly addressed, matching the intent of PE-17.
Aligned NIST CSF 2.0 outcomes (30)
NIST CSF 2.0 outcomes this ISO control aligns with — our analysis (mostly llm_verified).
Direction: ← other covers this;
→ this covers other (F/M/P = full / mostly /
partial). gov = governs / implements (a mandate, not coverage).
Related OWASP ASVS 5.0 requirements (11)
Application-security verification requirements (OWASP ASVS 5.0) this ISO control aligns with; links open the ASVS chapter. Our analysis (mostly llm_verified) — many ISO controls have no ASVS counterpart.
Direction: ← other covers this;
→ this covers other (F/M/P = full / mostly /
partial). gov = governs / implements (a mandate, not coverage).
Related weaknesses / CWE (3232)
Weakness classes this ISO control helps prevent or mitigate — our analysis (mostly llm_verified).
Direction: ← other covers this;
→ this covers other (F/M/P = full / mostly /
partial). gov = governs / implements (a mandate, not coverage).
Why these map — rationale
- CWE-1428partialblocks — A.6.7's communications security requirements for remote access (VPN, secure tunnels per item d) mask the HTTP vulnerability during remote-access transit, but the weakness remains present in the product and is exploitable from non-remote contexts where the clause does not reach.
- CWE-308partialremoves — A.6.7 guidance item (k) explicitly names single-factor authentication as a vulnerability to consider for remote access, so a well-implemented remote working policy would mandate multi-factor for remote access and remove that subset of CWE-308; however, the language is 'taking into consideration' rather than a direct mandate of multi-factor, the actual implementation requires other access-management controls, and CWE-308 extends beyond the remote-access context, leaving a nameable remainder.
- CWE-308partialblocks — A.6.7 guidance item (k) specifically names single-factor authentication as a vulnerability to consider for remote access, so a well-implemented clause mandates multi-factor authentication for remote access, blocking exploitation in that context; the weakness remains present in the underlying system and is still exploitable in non-remote-access contexts, which is the nameable remainder.
- CWE-309partialblocks — A.6.7 guidance item (k) explicitly requires secure authentication mechanisms for remote access, taking into consideration the vulnerability of single-factor authentication, so well implemented it mandates MFA for remote access and blocks exploitation of password-only auth in that context; the remainder is bounded and nameable -- on-premises, internal-application, and other non-remote authentication contexts where the clause does not reach.
- CWE-309partialprevents — A.6.7 guidance item (k) explicitly addresses the vulnerability of single-factor (password-only) authentication for remote access, so a well-implemented clause mandates stronger mechanisms for remote network access and prevents CWE-309 from arising in that context; the remainder is nameable — on-premises and local-network authentication, where the clause does not reach.
- CWE-319partialblocks — A.6.7 mandates communications security requirements for remote access (items d, h, k) and the provision of suitable communication equipment with methods for securing remote access, which blocks cleartext transmission during remote working; however, CWE-319 applies to all communication channels — internal networks, server-to-server, hardware/JTAG, application-layer — and A.6.7's scope is limited to remote working, leaving the bulk of cleartext-transmission instances outside its reach.
- CWE-419partialblocks — A.6.7 mandates secure remote access mechanisms (encrypted channels, authentication, firewalls) for remote working, which blocks exploitation of an unprotected primary channel when that channel is used for remote administration; the remainder is the product's unprotected channel in non-remote contexts and the underlying design flaw itself, which the clause does not reach.
- CWE-5partialblocks — A.6.7 guidance item (d) mandates communications security requirements for remote access, which would mask the CWE-5 vulnerability during remote transit (e.g., via VPN), but the underlying J2EE misconfiguration remains and is exploitable from non-remote contexts the clause does not reach.
- CWE-521partialblocks — A.6.7 guidance item (k) requires secure authentication mechanisms for remote access, explicitly calling out the vulnerability of single-factor authentication; a well-implemented control would mandate multi-factor authentication for remote access, which blocks exploitation of weak passwords in that context, but the weakness remains exploitable via local network access, other services, and any non-remote authentication paths.
- CWE-523partialblocks — The remote-working control can require protected remote-access channels that prevent credential interception on remote links, but it does not mandate end-to-end protection of every client-to-server login path, leaving some transport exposure exploitable.
- CWE-549partialblocks — A.6.7 can impose remote-working physical and environmental protections that make visual observation of an unmasked password harder, but the password field itself remains unmasked and the control reaches only some remote-working shoulder-surfing paths rather than the whole weakness.
- CWE-654partialremoves — A.6.7 item (k) explicitly mandates secure authentication mechanisms for remote access, calling out the vulnerability of single-factor authentication, so implementing it where it was not applied before removes the single-factor weakness in the remote-access slice; however, CWE-654 is broader than remote access (it covers any single-factor security decision, including local authentication, authorization checks, and certificate validation), so only a minority of instances are reached.
- CWE-654partialblocks — A.6.7 item (k) explicitly requires consideration of single-factor authentication vulnerability for remote access, and items (d), (i), (j) provide device locks, remote wipe, firewalls and monitoring that partially mask exploitation of a compromised single factor during a remote session; however, the clause only requires 'consideration' rather than mandating multi-factor authentication, so the core weakness remains exploitable whenever the single factor is captured.
Mitigated MITRE ATT&CK techniques (3300)
Adversary techniques (MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise) this ISO control helps mitigate; links open attack.mitre.org. Our analysis (mostly llm_verified).
Direction: ← other covers this;
→ this covers other (F/M/P = full / mostly /
partial). gov = governs / implements (a mandate, not coverage).
Why these map — rationale
- T1021partialprevents — A.6.7 mandates secure authentication mechanisms and restricts remote access to authorized systems, which reduces the attack surface for T1021, but the technique can still be executed using valid accounts and approved remote services that the policy permits.
- T1021.001partialprevents — A.6.7 addresses remote access mechanisms and explicitly calls out the vulnerability of single-factor authentication (k), requires communications security (d), and mandates audit/monitoring (j), which collectively constrain credential-based RDP abuse for remote access; however, it is a topic-specific policy/guidance control focused on remote working rather than a technical control, and it does not directly address RDP used for lateral movement within the network, so implementation depends on other controls and the coverage is a slice.
- T1021.005partialprevents — A.6.7 mandates authentication mechanisms (specifically noting single-factor vulnerability for remote access), firewalls, and restrictions on which systems remote workers may access, which can prevent unauthorized VNC use; however, the control is fundamentally about employee remote working conditions and policies rather than specifically preventing adversary abuse of VNC for lateral movement, so the prevention is indirect and partial.
- T1040partialdetects — A.6.7's guidelines include 'audit and security monitoring' (item j of the second list) and 'use of security measures, such as firewalls' (item i), which can surface some network sniffing at the remote access boundary or on organization-issued equipment, but the clause is a remote-working policy framework rather than a monitoring control, and sniffing on home/public networks or passive captures outside the VPN tunnel largely fall outside its visibility.
- T1040partialprevents — A.6.7's guidance on communications security requirements (item d), use of firewalls (item i), home/public network configuration (item h), and authentication mechanisms (item k) addresses some vectors through which network sniffing occurs in remote working contexts, but the control is a broad remote-working policy that does not specifically or comprehensively prevent T1040 — actual prevention depends on the technical measures mandated (encryption, VPN) which live in A.8.24, and sniffing via promiscuous mode, span ports, or cloud traffic mirroring remains reachable regardless of remote-working policy.
- T1078partialprevents — A.6.7 mandates secure authentication mechanisms for remote access (explicitly noting single-factor vulnerability) and revocation of access rights when remote working terminates, which prevents the remote-access and inactive-account vectors of T1078; however, the clause is scoped to remote working and does not address local, domain, or cloud account abuse, leaving the bulk of the technique untouched.
- T1078.002partialprevents — A.6.7's authentication requirements (k) explicitly address the vulnerability of single-factor mechanisms for remote access, and its remote-access mechanisms (e.g., VDI), communications security (d), and monitoring (j) constrain how domain account credentials can be abused from outside the premises; however, the clause is scoped to remote working only, so it does not address credential abuse from inside the corporate network, initial credential compromise, or non-remote vectors, leaving a substantial remainder.
- T1078.004partialprevents — A.6.7 mandates secure authentication mechanisms for remote access (k), security measures like firewalls and anti-malware (i), and revocation of access rights (k, second list), which constrain credential theft and unauthorized access from remote working contexts — a real slice of the cloud account attack surface. It does not address cloud-specific misconfigurations, federated identity issues, service accounts, role-assignment weaknesses, or phishing of cloud credentials outside the remote-working frame, so the prevention is partial rather than mostly.
- T1110partialprevents — A.6.7 explicitly calls out the vulnerability of single-factor authentication for remote access (clause k) and requires consideration of firewalls, communications security, and authentication mechanisms — all directly relevant to brute force against remote access points. However, it is a policy/guidance control that mandates consideration rather than implementing specific prevention mechanisms (which live in A.8.5, network controls, etc.), and it only addresses the remote-access portion of the brute-force attack surface, leaving local and other vectors untouched.
- T1110.001partialprevents — A.6.7 explicitly addresses authentication for remote access (clause k) and notes the vulnerability of single-factor mechanisms, which constrains password guessing against remote-access services; however, the control only governs remote working contexts, leaving password guessing against local services, cloud/SSO, and on-premises endpoints outside its scope, so it prevents a slice rather than the bulk.
- T1110.003partialprevents — A.6.7 explicitly addresses authentication for remote access (clause k), calling out the vulnerability of single-factor mechanisms, and governs remote access services (RDP, SSH, VPN, etc.) that are primary password-spraying targets; however, it is a policy/guidance control limited to remote-working contexts, and the actual prevention depends on implementation in A.8.5 and technical controls, leaving non-remote services and exempted accounts reachable.
- T1110.004partialprevents — A.6.7's clause (k) explicitly addresses the vulnerability of single-factor authentication for remote access and requires secure authentication mechanisms, which directly counters credential stuffing against remote-access services (VPN, RDP, SSH, webmail) — but the clause is scoped to remote working contexts, sets requirements rather than mandating specific mechanisms like MFA, and does not cover credential stuffing against on-premises or non-remote-access services.
- T1114.002partialprevents — A.6.7's remote-access authentication requirements (k), communications security (d), virtual desktop mechanisms (e), and restrictions on what remote workers can access (guideline b) constrain credential-based email collection via remote paths, but the technique also runs from inside the corporate network and against the email service itself, where A.6.7's remote-working scope does not reach.
- T1133partialprevents — A.6.7 mandates authentication mechanisms (k) considering single-factor vulnerability, communications security requirements (d), firewalls and malware protection (i), and secure remote access mechanisms (e) — all of which constrain T1133 vectors like VPN/Citrix abuse and exposed services. However, the clause is a remote-working policy framework whose scope is the worker's environment and access conditions, not the hardening of the services themselves; it cannot eliminate the remote services adversaries leverage (they exist for the remote work it authorises), does not address all vectors (e.g., exposed container APIs, Tor hidden services), and is bounded by jurisdictional applicability noted in the clause itself.
- T1189partialprevents — A.6.7 mandates firewalls, malware protection, organization-controlled equipment, and security training for remote workers, all of which contribute to preventing drive-by compromise on remote endpoints, but the control addresses remote working conditions broadly rather than specifically targeting browser exploitation, exploit mitigation, or web filtering, leaving a substantial remainder.
- T1200partialprevents — A.6.7 addresses physical security of remote sites, threats from unauthorized persons at those sites, and use of organization-controlled equipment — all of which can prevent opportunistic hardware additions at remote locations — but it only covers the remote-working subset of the attack surface (not main premises), does not mandate specific anti-tampering measures like USB port controls, and cannot stop a determined attacker with physical access to a remote worker's environment.
- T1204.001partialprevents — A.6.7 includes training for remote workers on secure conduct (item c) and security measures such as firewalls and anti-malware (item i), which reduce the rate at which remote users click malicious links and can block some payloads, but the technique's mechanism is the user clicking and neither training nor perimeter controls can move that rate to zero.
- T1204.002partialprevents — A.6.7 includes remote-worker training on secure working (item c) and technical measures (firewalls, malware protection, restrictions on privately-owned equipment, virtual desktop isolation) that reduce the likelihood of a user opening or executing a malicious file in remote contexts, but the user-execution step still depends on a person clicking, and training moves the rate without closing it — the same shape the A.6.3 anchor carries, with marginal additional reduction from the technical items.
- T1204.004partialprevents — A.6.7's training component (c) and security measures (firewalls, malware protection in i) partially prevent remote workers from falling for ClickFix-style copy-paste social engineering, but the technique can still succeed because training reduces rather than eliminates the rate at which users paste malicious code, and A.6.7 only addresses remote working contexts.
- T1539partialprevents — A.6.7 mandates measures that reduce cookie theft from remote endpoints — VDI keeps cookies off local devices, anti-malware counters cookie-stealing malware, screen locks and remote-wipe limit exposure of unattended devices — but it does not reach the network and browser vectors where T1539 also operates: adversary-in-the-middle proxies (T1557) steal cookies in transit regardless of endpoint posture, and JavaScript injection in the browser reads cookies from memory. The control is policy-level guidance whose implemented effect is a slice, not a closure.
- T1557partialprevents — A.6.7's guidance on communications security requirements, use of virtual desktop access, restrictions on home/public networks, and strong authentication (avoiding single-factor) directly addresses AiTM risk in the remote working context, but the clause is policy-level guidance rather than technical enforcement, and T1557 extends well beyond remote working scenarios (corporate LANs, etc.), so only a slice of the technique's attack surface is covered.
- T1557.004partialprevents — A.6.7 directly addresses the threat via (g) public places and (h) public networks and wireless configuration restrictions, and can mandate VPN use, certificate validation, and training on secure remote work — all of which reduce the success of evil twin attacks — but it is a policy/guidance control whose preventive effect depends on implementation and user compliance, so it cannot move the rate to zero.
- T1563.001partialprevents — A.6.7 mandates considerations — VDI usage (item e), organization-controlled equipment, anti-malware, and authentication mechanisms — that, if implemented, would constrain SSH hijacking by keeping SSH sessions on organization infrastructure rather than remote devices and reducing initial-compromise risk, but it is a policy/guidance control that requires these to be 'considered' rather than directly implementing them, and the technique presupposes a foothold the control does not primarily address.
- T1565.002partialprevents — A.6.7 mandates communications security requirements for remote access (clause d) and suitable communication equipment with methods for securing remote access (second-list d), which would include encryption/integrity protection that prevents manipulation of data in transit for remote workers; however, the clause is scoped to remote working only — T1565.002 can occur in any data-transmission context — and it sets requirements rather than mandating specific mechanisms, so the prevention covers a slice of the technique's surface and depends on implementation.
- T1566.001partialprevents — A.6.7's training component for remote workers (item c in the second list) includes how to conduct business securely while working remotely, which would cover recognition of phishing attempts; this reduces the rate at which a remote worker opens a malicious attachment but cannot move it to zero, and the training is scoped to remote workers rather than the whole workforce, leaving a bounded remainder.
- T1669partialprevents — A.6.7 directly addresses Wi-Fi security in remote working contexts (item h on home/public networks and wireless configuration, item k on authentication for remote access, item d on communications security), and these requirements — VPN use, WPA3, MFA, restrictions on open Wi-Fi — prevent the remote-working variant of T1669, but the control does not cover the organization's main office Wi-Fi infrastructure and even within remote working the prevention depends on faithful implementation of the guidance.
- T1674partialprevents — A.6.7 mandates organization-controlled equipment (reducing malicious HID/USB vectors), malware protection (i), rules on family/visitor access (f), and secure deployment mechanisms (j) — all of which constrain some input injection vectors in remote working contexts. But the control is policy/guidance scoped to remote working only, depends on other controls (A.8.7, A.8.5) to actually implement, and leaves sophisticated software-based keystroke injection vectors largely untouched.
Prevented OWASP Web Top 10 (2025) risks (2)
OWASP Web Top 10 (2025) risk categories this ISO control helps prevent or mitigate — our analysis (mostly llm_verified).
Direction: ← other covers this;
→ this covers other (F/M/P = full / mostly /
partial). gov = governs / implements (a mandate, not coverage).
Control IDs, short titles and the structured attribute table (control type, CIA properties, cybersecurity-concept, operational capability, security domain) are facts from ISO/IEC 27001:2022 Annex A / ISO/IEC 27002:2022. The full implementation guidance prose lives in ISO/IEC 27002:2022 — not reproduced here. Cross-walks to NIST 800-53, NIST CSF 2.0, OWASP ASVS, CWE, MITRE ATT&CK and OWASP Web Top 10 are our own analysis (mostly llm_verified), not an ISO, NIST, MITRE or OWASP product — how ours compare.