A.6.8 People
Information security event reporting
Structured attributes from ISO/IEC 27002:2022 — control type · CIA properties · cybersecurity concept · operational capability · security domain. What do these mean?
Mapped NIST 800-53 r5 controls (15)
Our reading (mostly llm_verified) of how this ISO control and each NIST 800-53 control relate. Not an ISO or NIST product.
Direction: ← other covers this;
→ this covers other (F/M/P = full / mostly /
partial). gov = governs / implements (a mandate, not coverage).
Why these map — rationale
- IR-6mostlycovers — A.6.8's focus on timely/consistent/effective event reporting by personnel directly accounts for the bulk of IR-6's personnel reporting requirement and organizational routing, but leaves a residual on the second IR-6 clause (external/authority reporting parameters) that sits outside A.6.8's defined scope.
Aligned NIST CSF 2.0 outcomes (17)
NIST CSF 2.0 outcomes this ISO control aligns with — our analysis (mostly llm_verified).
Direction: ← other covers this;
→ this covers other (F/M/P = full / mostly /
partial). gov = governs / implements (a mandate, not coverage).
Why these map — rationale
- RS.CO-02domain mandateimplements — A.6.8's operational mechanism for timely event reporting directly gives effect to the notification outcome in RS.CO-02 within the response/communications domain, though the CSF outcome does not name reporting as the exclusive means
- RS.CO-03domain mandateimplements — A.6.8 operationalizes timely event reporting which directly supplies the information-sharing required by RS.CO-03 within the response-coordination domain
- RS.MA-02domain mandateimplements — A.6.8 operationalizes timely event reporting which directly supplies the validated incident reports that RS.MA-02 requires within the response domain
Related OWASP ASVS 5.0 requirements (4)
Application-security verification requirements (OWASP ASVS 5.0) this ISO control aligns with; links open the ASVS chapter. Our analysis (mostly llm_verified) — many ISO controls have no ASVS counterpart.
Direction: ← other covers this;
→ this covers other (F/M/P = full / mostly /
partial). gov = governs / implements (a mandate, not coverage).
Related weaknesses / CWE (2402)
Weakness classes this ISO control helps prevent or mitigate — our analysis (mostly llm_verified).
Direction: ← other covers this;
→ this covers other (F/M/P = full / mostly /
partial). gov = governs / implements (a mandate, not coverage).
Why these map — rationale
- CWE-1428partialfinds — A.6.8 is a passive personnel-reporting mechanism rather than a systematic discovery programme, so it can make some externally visible HTTP-instead-of-HTTPS instances known when staff notice and report them, but it leaves the bulk of latent instances undiscovered.
- CWE-210partialfinds — Personnel encountering error messages that leak sensitive information could report them under the clause's 'vulnerabilities' or 'breach of confidentiality' categories, but this is a minority share because most instances are never triggered in user-visible error conditions and users typically do not recognize sensitive content in diagnostic output as a security defect to report.
- CWE-211partialfinds — A.6.8's reporting channel can surface CWE-211 instances when personnel encounter externally-generated error messages containing sensitive information (e.g., stack traces, file paths) and report them under categories (b) confidentiality breach or (g) anomalous system behaviour, but discovery is opportunistic — limited to what users happen to trigger, notice as sensitive, and bother to report — so it catches a minority of latent instances while systematic discovery belongs to code review, SAST, and security testing.
- CWE-284partialfinds — Prompt disclosure of access violations allows the organization to revoke unauthorized privileges and close the control gap.
- CWE-549partialfinds — A.6.8's mechanism is personnel reporting observed security events, and CWE-549 (missing password field masking) is directly observable by end users every time they enter a password, so the clause's listed categories ('ineffective information security controls', 'anomalous system behaviour') cover it; however, most users either do not recognize the unmasked field as a security issue, report it through ordinary support rather than the security channel, or do not report it at all, so only a minority of latent instances become known through this route.
Mitigated MITRE ATT&CK techniques (3278)
Adversary techniques (MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise) this ISO control helps mitigate; links open attack.mitre.org. Our analysis (mostly llm_verified).
Direction: ← other covers this;
→ this covers other (F/M/P = full / mostly /
partial). gov = governs / implements (a mandate, not coverage).
Why these map — rationale
- T1003mostlyresponds — A.6.8's purpose and guidance require personnel to report observed events (including breaches, access violations, malware, anomalous behaviour, and ineffective controls) once they occur, enabling timely incident response that contains and eradicates an in-flight T1003 campaign; the named remainder is stealthy dumps that produce no observable event for personnel to report.
- T1055.001mostlyresponds — A.6.8 makes personnel the detection surface for anomalous system behaviour, suspected malware, access violations and ineffective controls (all observable during or after T1055.001 execution) and requires timely reporting that feeds directly into incident response; the control does not itself contain or eradicate but its output enables the response that does, matching the verb's definition on the event lane.
- T1137.005mostlyresponds — A.6.8 requires personnel to report security events (including malware, anomalous behavior, breaches, and access violations) as quickly as possible once identified, directly enabling the incident response process that contains and eradicates the persistence mechanism once the malicious rule is triggered by a crafted email.
- T1203mostlyresponds — A.6.8 explicitly lists suspected malware, vulnerabilities, anomalous behaviour, ineffective controls and breaches as reportable events; once T1203 exploitation has occurred these become observable on the estate, triggering the reporting/response procedure that contains and eradicates the incident (the technique has run and its effects are addressed).
- T1204.001mostlyresponds — A.6.8 requires personnel to report events (including malware, anomalous behavior, breaches, and suspected vulnerabilities) as quickly as possible once identified, enabling the incident response process that contains and eradicates the T1204.001 execution once underway; the named remainder is events that go entirely unobserved by any person.
- T1204.002mostlyresponds — A.6.8 requires personnel to report events (including malware, anomalous behavior, breaches, and human-error openings of malicious files) as quickly as possible so the organization can contain and eradicate the incident once underway, which is exactly what `responds` names on the event lane.
- T1204.004mostlyresponds — A.6.8 requires personnel to report events (including malware, anomalous behaviour, human errors, access violations, and suspected incidents) as quickly as possible once they occur; this directly engages the post-execution response activities (containment, eradication, evidence collection) once the user has pasted and run the malicious command.
- T1218.003mostlyresponds — A.6.8 requires personnel to report events (including malware, anomalous behavior, access violations, ineffective controls) once observed; this surfaces the CMSTP abuse in flight for incident response to contain/eradicate, which is exactly what `responds` names on the event lane.
- T1218.010mostlyresponds — A.6.8 makes personnel the detection surface for anomalous system behaviour, suspected malware, access violations, ineffective controls and other observables that would be raised by a Regsvr32 Squiblydoo execution, then feeds those events into the incident-response process that contains and eradicates the actor's foothold once the technique is underway.
- T1485mostlyresponds — A.6.8 requires personnel to report events including malware, anomalous behaviour, breaches of availability, ineffective controls and access violations; once reported these feed directly into the incident response process that contains and eradicates an in-progress data-destruction campaign (the technique is already running when the observable events occur).
- T1498mostlyresponds — A.6.8 requires personnel to report observed events (including anomalous behaviour, ineffective controls, availability breaches and suspected malware) as quickly as possible so that response actions can be taken; this directly engages the containment/eradication steps of an in-progress Network DoS once it is noticed by users or monitoring, though pre-compromise reconnaissance and the bandwidth-exhaustion impact itself sit outside the reporting act.
- T1498.001mostlyresponds — A.6.8 makes personnel the detection surface for anomalous system behaviour, malfunctions, ineffective controls and suspected incidents (including availability-impacting floods), triggering the incident-response process that contains and eradicates the attack once underway; the named remainder is fully automated floods that produce no observable human-visible artefact before impact is realised.
- T1499mostlyresponds — A.6.8 makes personnel the detection surface for anomalous system behaviour, malfunctions, ineffective controls and suspected malware that are the observable precursors or in-flight indicators of Endpoint DoS; once reported the incident-response process (A.5.26) can contain and eradicate, satisfying the verb at the event-already-underway rung.
- T1531mostlyresponds — A.6.8's purpose and guidance exist to drive timely reporting of events (including access violations, account manipulations, ineffective controls, anomalous behaviour and suspected malware) so they can be actioned; once T1531 is underway this feeds directly into the incident response workflow that contains and eradicates the actor's changes.
- T1534mostlyresponds — A.6.8 makes personnel the detection surface for the phishing campaign (human errors, anomalous behaviour, suspected malware, access violations, breaches of confidentiality) and explicitly feeds those events into the incident response process that contains and eradicates the internal spearphishing once underway.
- T1539mostlyresponds — A.6.8 requires personnel to report observed events (including malware, access violations, anomalous behaviour, breaches of confidentiality/integrity, and suspected vulnerabilities) once they occur; this surfaces T1539 artifacts (e.g. cookie theft via malware, JS injection, or phishing) for incident response containment and eradication while the technique is underway.
- T1546.003mostlyresponds — A.6.8's purpose and guidance require personnel to report events (including anomalous behaviour, malware, access violations, ineffective controls) as quickly as possible so incidents can be contained/eradicated once underway; T1546.003's anomalous WMI subscription, SYSTEM-level execution and persistence are reportable events that trigger the response procedure.
- T1561.002mostlyresponds — A.6.8 requires personnel to report events including malware, anomalous behaviour, breaches of availability expectations, ineffective controls and physical breaches; once reported these feed directly into incident response that contains and eradicates an in-progress disk-structure wipe (the technique is already running when the observable occurs).
- T1566.001mostlyresponds — A.6.8's defined purpose and guidance require personnel to report events (including suspected malware, breaches, human errors, access violations, and anomalous behaviour) as quickly as possible so the organisation can contain and eradicate an incident once underway, which is exactly what `responds` names on the event lane; the named remainder is that the initial delivery step has already succeeded before any report occurs.
- T1566.002mostlyresponds — A.6.8 makes personnel the detection surface for spearphishing events (including the listed human-error, access-violation, malware and anomalous-behaviour indicators), hands them to the incident-response process for containment/eradication once underway, and explicitly covers the social-engineering delivery step that T1566.002 relies on; the named remainder is the fully automated or pre-compromise reconnaissance slice that never reaches a user.
- T1566.004mostlyresponds — A.6.8 explicitly requires personnel to report security events (including human errors, access violations, suspected malware, breaches of confidentiality/integrity/availability, and non-compliance) as quickly as possible to enable timely response that contains or eradicates an in-flight spearphishing-voice event once underway; the named remainder is events that evade user detection entirely.
- T1598.003mostlyresponds — A.6.8 explicitly lists spearphishing indicators (human errors, access violations, suspected malware, ineffective controls, anomalous behaviour) as reportable events; once reported the incident-response pipeline can contain/eradicate the phishing campaign that is already underway, which is exactly what `responds` names on the event lane.
- T1684.001mostlyresponds — A.6.8 explicitly requires personnel to report impersonation-driven events (phishing, social engineering, suspected breaches, access violations, human errors) once they occur, enabling timely incident response that contains and eradicates the ongoing campaign per the event-lane definition of `responds`.
- T1021.005partialdetects — A.6.8 provides a reporting mechanism that personnel can use when they observe anomalous activity, and VNC's screen-sharing nature produces user-visible artifacts (cursor movement, windows opening, files being accessed) that a present user could notice and report; however, detection depends entirely on user presence and attention, and VNC attacks frequently target unattended workstations, so the control catches a slice rather than the bulk of instances.
- T1027.017partialdetects — A.6.8's reporting channel can surface SVG smuggling when personnel notice user-visible artifacts (fake login forms, redirects, unexpected downloads) and report them through the mechanism — these are real observables the technique produces — but the technique is specifically designed to look benign as an image file, many payloads execute without obvious user-visible side effects, and the reporting depends on personnel recognizing the artifact as suspicious, so only a slice of instances is caught.
- T1036partialdetects — A.6.8 requires personnel to report observed anomalies including malfunctions and access violations, which can surface masquerading artifacts a user encounters, but the control's mechanism is a human who cannot see the manipulation itself and will miss artifacts that are technically invisible or never presented to them.
- T1052partialdetects — A.6.8 establishes a reporting mechanism for personnel to report observed events, and a user noticing an unauthorized USB drive or unusual data transfer can report it, but the control relies on human observation of a physical act that is often covert and outside the user's direct view, so detection is a slice rather than comprehensive.
- T1052.001partialdetects — A.6.8's reporting channel can surface USB exfiltration when personnel notice a physical USB device, anomalous system behaviour, or an access violation, and the clause's enumerated situations (g, h, j) cover what a user might observe; however, the technique is designed to be covert — air-gapped hops, after-hours activity, and insider scenarios place no user in the loop to notice — so the reporting mechanism catches a slice rather than the bulk.
- T1056.002partialdetects — A.6.8's mechanism is human reporting, and a user CAN see a GUI prompt and report it as suspicious via the event-reporting channel — unlike T1055 where the user has no vantage point. But the technique is specifically designed to mimic legitimate OS/browser credential dialogs, so most users will not recognize it as fake; detection depends on the user being suspicious enough to report, which is a slice rather than a reliable catch.
- T1059partialdetects — Users reporting anomalous command-line or scripting activity can trigger early investigation that interrupts an adversary’s use of interpreters to execute malicious code.
- T1078partialdetects — Prompt reporting of access violations and suspected account misuse increases the chance that compromised valid accounts are detected and contained before they are used for persistence or lateral movement.
- T1098partialdetects — A.6.8's reporting channel covers situations (b) breach of integrity expectations and (h) access violations, which encompass some forms of account manipulation a user might notice (e.g., their own permissions or group memberships changing, unexpected new accounts), but most account manipulation—service accounts, other users' accounts, credential rotation, permission grants on systems the user does not administer—occurs outside any user's line of sight, so personnel surface only a slice of the technique.
- T1110partialdetects — A.6.8's reporting mechanism covers access violations and anomalous system behaviour, and a user may notice artifacts of brute force (account lockouts, failed-login notifications, suspicious activity in their own account) and report them — but the user is not the primary detection surface for brute force, which is typically surfaced by automated monitoring of authentication systems rather than personnel observation.
- T1110.001partialdetects — A.6.8 makes personnel aware of their responsibility (and the easy mechanism) to report observed events including access violations, suspected malware, anomalous behaviour, ineffective controls and non-compliance; some password-guessing attempts produce visible artefacts (failed logons, lockouts, anomalous access patterns) that a trained user or admin can notice and report, but most guessing occurs at management ports or in automated fashion with no human-visible signal and the control has no instrumentation of its own.
- T1110.004partialdetects — A.6.8's reporting mechanism can surface credential stuffing indirectly when users report account lockouts, unfamiliar login locations, or suspicious activity notifications — all listed under 'access violations' and 'anomalous behaviour' — but the attack itself is automated and not directly user-observable, so what reaches the procedure is a downstream symptom rather than the technique in flight.
- T1114partialdetects — A.6.8 establishes a reporting mechanism for personnel to surface observed anomalies, and a user noticing unusual email forwarding rules or mailbox access can report it, but the control relies on human observation of a technique that often leaves no user-visible artefact, so what is caught is a slice rather than the bulk.
- T1114.003partialdetects — Personnel can in principle notice forwarding rules — missing expected mail, unexpected rules in mailbox settings, or colleagues reporting non-receipt — and A.6.8's reporting mechanism covers anomalous system behaviour and access violations, but the technique is explicitly designed to be hidden via MAPI rule-property modification invisible from Outlook/OWA, so most instances produce no user-visible artefact to report.
- T1137.005partialdetects — Personnel can observe and report anomalous Outlook behavior like unexpected rules or emails triggering actions, but the mechanism relies on a human noticing a subtle persistence artifact that provides no obvious user-visible alert.
- T1176partialdetects — A.6.8's reporting mechanism covers situations like anomalous system behaviour (g) and suspected malware infection (j), and software extensions have a user-visible surface (extension lists, browser/IDE UI) that a user could notice and report — unlike process injection which is purely in-memory. However, the technique is explicitly designed to blend into normal workflows and inherit trust, so most malicious extensions will not produce a user-observable artefact, making the reporting pathway catch only a slice of instances.
- T1176.001partialdetects — Personnel can sometimes notice and report browser extension abuse — an unfamiliar extension in the browser UI, anomalous browser behaviour, or suspected malware infection all fall within A.6.8's reportable situations (g, i, j) — but many installations are silent (Preferences file modification, mobileconfig planting) and the malicious activity (background browsing, credential theft) is typically invisible to the user, so only a slice of instances surfaces through this reporting channel.
- T1190partialresponds — A.6.8 makes personnel aware of the duty and easy mechanism to report events including vulnerabilities, ineffective controls, breaches, malware, and anomalous behaviour; once reported this feeds the incident response process that contains and eradicates an ongoing T1190 exploitation, but the control itself performs none of the containment/eradication actions and many T1190 cases (e.g. fully automated or zero-day against unmonitored edge devices) produce no reportable event observable by personnel.
- T1199partialdetects — Rapid reporting of anomalous system behaviour and access violations can surface early indicators of an adversary leveraging a trusted third-party relationship before the foothold expands.
- T1200partialdetects — A.6.8's reporting mechanism covers 'breaches of physical security measures,' 'system changes that have not gone through change management,' and 'malfunctions or other anomalous system behaviour' — all of which can surface a hardware addition when personnel notice an unfamiliar device, a new wireless access point, or unexpected network behaviour. But the mechanism is human observation: covert implants (cable-tap devices, DMA tools, keystroke injectors hidden in peripherals) leave no user-visible artefact, so the reporting channel never engages for those cases.
- T1204partialdetects — Educating users to report suspected malware or unexpected file behaviour raises the likelihood that malicious user execution attempts are identified before the payload fully executes.
- T1204partialresponds — A.6.8 requires personnel to report observed events (including malware, anomalous behavior, breaches, and human-error execution of malicious code) so the organization can respond; this directly engages the containment/eradication steps of `responds` once T1204 has occurred, with the bounded remainder being fully automated or non-user-visible executions that produce no observable event for a person to report.
- T1204.001partialdetects — A.6.8 establishes a reporting mechanism that surfaces user-observed events, and a user who clicks a malicious link and notices anomalous behaviour (e.g., unexpected redirects, pop-ups, or system changes) can report it, but the mechanism depends on the user recognising the event and choosing to report, which is a slice rather than a comprehensive detection capability.
- T1204.002partialdetects — A.6.8's mechanism is personnel reporting what they notice, and T1204.002's post-execution effects (anomalous system behaviour, suspected malware infection — items g and j) are reportable events a user can observe and escalate; but the core act — the user opening the file — is performed by the user themselves and is not visible to them, and many malicious files execute silently, so the detection path catches a slice of instances through consequences rather than the technique itself.
- T1204.004partialdetects — A.6.8's mechanism is personnel reporting identified events, and for T1204.004 the user is actively in the execution loop (copying/pasting code), giving them opportunity to notice suspicious commands, post-execution anomalies, or realize they were tricked — which they can then report under items (g) malfunctions/anomalous behaviour or (j) suspected malware infection. However, the technique is specifically designed to be deceptive (fake CAPTCHAs, error fixes, obfuscated commands), so detection is unreliable and typically only post-execution when effects become visible to a non-technical user, not at the point of execution.
- T1204.005partialdetects — A.6.8's reporting list includes 'malfunctions or other anomalous system behaviour' (g) and 'suspected malware infection' (j), giving personnel a path to surface a malicious library through post-install symptoms (slowdown, battery drain, unusual network activity), but the user installed the library voluntarily and typically without any cue that it is malicious, so the connection between observed symptoms and the library is one the user has no specific reason to make — detection is a slice, not a mechanism that mostly works.
- T1219partialdetects — Personnel can sometimes notice user-visible artifacts of remote access tools (unexpected remote session indicators, unfamiliar software in task lists, anomalous system behaviour) and report them under A.6.8's listed situations (g, h, j), but the technique is specifically designed to use legitimate tools that blend with normal admin activity, so detection by personnel is unreliable and a slice rather than a bounded remainder of a working mechanism.
- T1219.002partialdetects — Personnel at a workstation may notice anomalous behaviour from active remote desktop sessions (unexpected cursor movement, unfamiliar windows, performance issues) and report it under A.6.8's 'malfunctions or anomalous system behaviour' category, but the technique uses legitimate-looking software designed to be unobtrusive and often runs when users are away from their desks, so user-driven reports catch only a slice of instances.
- T1485partialdetects — A.6.8 establishes the reporting channel through which personnel surface observed events, and data destruction typically produces user-visible artefacts (missing files, failed applications, unavailable systems) that fall under the clause's listed situations (b) availability breach and (g) anomalous system behaviour; however, not all data destruction is immediately user-visible (cloud object deletion, background file wiping, silent overwrites), and reporting depends on personnel noticing and choosing to report, so the control enables detection of a slice rather than the bulk.
- T1486partialdetects — A.6.8 establishes the reporting channel through which personnel observations of malware infection and anomalous system behaviour become organizational detections; T1486 produces strongly user-visible artefacts (encrypted files, ransom notes, system misbehaviour) that fall squarely in the clause's enumerated reportable events, so reports do flow. Partial because the mechanism is human-speed and human-coverage: server-side or background encryption of systems without active users is not seen, and detection depends on personnel both noticing and choosing to report — the same shape the at-2 anchor teaches, applied to the reporting procedure rather than the training.
- T1489partialdetects — A.6.8's reporting mechanism catches user-observable events, and service unavailability is generally noticed by personnel (matching item g: 'malfunctions or other anomalous system behaviour'), but detection depends on personnel noticing and choosing to report — background services, cloud API disables, and stops on unattended systems may not surface through this channel, so it is a slice rather than a bounded remainder of a mechanism that mostly works.
- T1491partialdetects — A.6.8 establishes a reporting mechanism for personnel to surface observed anomalies, and defacement produces a visible change that a user can notice and report, but the control relies on a human noticing and acting, which covers only the slice of defacements that are both visible and reported.
- T1491.001partialdetects — A.6.8 requires personnel to report observed anomalies including malfunctions and access violations, which can surface internal defacement when a user sees the altered wallpaper or login message, but the control relies on a human noticing and acting, so it catches only the slice of defacements that are visible to a person who reports them.
- T1491.002partialdetects — A.6.8 establishes a reporting mechanism for personnel to surface observed anomalies, and a defaced external website is an observable breach of integrity expectations that a user can report, but the control relies on a human noticing and acting, so it detects only the slice of defacements that are seen and reported rather than the bulk.
- T1496partialdetects — A.6.8's reporting mechanism can surface T1496 when personnel notice symptoms listed in the clause itself — (g) malfunctions or anomalous system behaviour, (j) suspected malware infection, or (h) access violations from the hijacked system — but the technique is engineered for stealth (low-footprint mining, bandwidth resale), so most instances produce no user-visible artefact to report, and the control depends entirely on a person noticing rather than on instrumentation.
- T1496.001partialdetects — A.6.8 explicitly lists 'malfunctions or other anomalous system behaviour of software or hardware' as a reportable event, and compute hijacking produces user-observable symptoms (system slowness, unresponsiveness, high resource use) that personnel can notice and report; however, this is a slice of the detection surface — cloud, server, and container environments often have no human observer, and users frequently attribute slowness to other causes, so user reports catch some instances but not the bulk.
- T1496.002partialdetects — A.6.8's mechanism is personnel reporting anomalous behaviour (g) and suspected malware (j), and bandwidth hijacking does produce user-visible symptoms — system slowdown, unusual network consumption, degraded hosted-service availability — that a user could notice and report through the channel A.6.8 establishes; but the technique often runs as background activity with subtle footprint, and many cases (proxyjacking, low-volume scanning, botnet participation) produce no symptom a typical user attributes to a security event, so what reaches the reporting procedure is a slice rather than the bulk.
- T1498partialdetects — Personnel can notice and report service unavailability (a 'breach of availability expectations' per clause b, or 'anomalous system behaviour' per g), which is a user-visible symptom of T1498, but they cannot distinguish a DoS from other causes of outage and the actual identification of the attack vector requires network monitoring (A.8.16), so the contribution is a slice of the detection path rather than the mechanism that catches the technique.
- T1498.001partialdetects — A.6.8 establishes the reporting channel through which personnel observations become security events, and a direct network flood produces user-visible symptoms (availability loss, system malfunction, anomalous behaviour) that fall under items (b) and (g) in the clause's own list; however, the control itself does not instrument or sense the attack — it depends on personnel noticing and choosing to report, and only the user-visible surface is captured, not the volumetric traffic itself.
- T1498.002partialdetects — A.6.8's mechanism is personnel reporting events they notice, and a reflection amplification attack produces a user-visible artifact (service unavailability or severe degradation) that falls under items (b) and (g) of the reportable situations; however, this is a slow, imprecise slice of detection that depends on users being affected and noticing, and cannot catch attacks absorbed by capacity or distinguish reflection amplification from other causes of unavailability.
- T1499partialdetects — A.6.8's mechanism is personnel noticing and reporting events, and T1499 produces highly visible symptoms (service unavailability, system crashes, anomalous behavior — item g in the clause's own list) that users can observe and report; however, the extent is partial because some endpoint DoS degrades rather than fully blocks, some targets are backend services users do not directly interact with, and reporting depends on user awareness and willingness to act rather than on instrumentation that catches the event regardless.
- T1499.001partialdetects — Personnel using affected systems can notice the user-visible symptoms of OS exhaustion (sluggishness, unresponsiveness) and report them through A.6.8's channel, so the human-reporting mechanism does surface the event; however, this is a slice — personnel observe the symptom rather than identify the technique, severe floods can render the system unreachable before anyone can report, and automated monitoring (A.8.16) carries the bulk of detection for this network-level vector.
- T1499.002partialdetects — A.6.8's reporting mechanism can capture personnel observations of availability breaches and anomalous system behaviour, which a service exhaustion flood produces as user-visible service degradation; however, personnel report symptoms (slowness, unavailability) rather than the attack itself, and the control depends on someone noticing and choosing to report, so detection is indirect and incomplete.
- T1499.003partialdetects — A.6.8's reporting scope explicitly covers availability breaches and anomalous system behaviour, so personnel can report the user-visible symptom (application slow/unavailable) that an application exhaustion flood produces; however, they detect the consequence rather than the technique itself, since the automated request flood is not user-observable, and the actual pattern identification requires technical monitoring.
- T1499.004partialdetects — A.6.8's reporting channel captures user-observable crashes and availability loss (items b, g, h in its event list), and personnel would notice application/system unavailability from T1499.004; however, auto-restart of critical services can mask exploitation from users, and reporting depends on personnel awareness and willingness to escalate, so detection is a slice rather than the bulk.
- T1529partialdetects — A.6.8 is the reporting channel that captures personnel observations, and T1529 (system shutdown/reboot) is highly user-visible — users directly experience their machine or service going down, matching the clause's item (b) availability breach and item (g) anomalous system behaviour — so reports do flow through this control; however, A.6.8 is the reporting mechanism rather than an instrumented detector, and not all instances are user-visible (servers, network devices, unattended endpoints) nor would all be reported as suspicious rather than routine.
- T1534partialdetects — Internal spearphishing arrives in users' inboxes or chat apps as a visible artefact, and A.6.8 establishes the reporting channel personnel use when they notice it; however, detection depends on user recognition, and messages from a compromised legitimate internal account are particularly hard to distinguish from normal traffic, so only a portion of campaigns surface through reporting.
- T1553.006partialdetects — A.6.8's reporting mechanism can catch T1553.006 when the modification produces user-observable artifacts (e.g., the Windows Test Mode watermark, anomalous system behaviour, or unauthorized system changes outside change management), but silent registry or kernel-memory modifications leave no user-visible signal for personnel to report.
- T1556.006partialdetects — A.6.8's mechanism is personnel noticing and reporting anomalies, and T1556.006 leaves some user-visible artifacts (absence of MFA prompts where they used to occur, unfamiliar MFA methods in account settings, admins noticing configuration drift) that fall under the clause's 'anomalous system behaviour' and 'ineffective security controls' categories — but the technique is designed to be stealthy, most users will not notice or report the change, and primary detection belongs to technical monitoring controls rather than personnel reporting.
- T1561partialdetects — A.6.8 enables detection by making personnel aware to report system malfunctions and anomalous behaviour (items g and j in its list), and disk wipe produces user-visible effects (systems unavailable, files missing, boot failures) that personnel can observe and report through the channel A.6.8 establishes; however, detection is bounded because much disk wiping occurs on servers without end-user presence, happens too quickly for personnel to notice in time, or is masked by the worm-like propagation described in the technique, so A.6.8 catches a slice rather than the bulk.
- T1561.001partialdetects — Personnel can observe the user-visible aftermath of a disk content wipe — files becoming inaccessible, systems failing, storage errors — and report these under A.6.8's categories (b) availability breach and (g) anomalous system behaviour, but they cannot observe the wiping mechanism itself (direct disk writes, RawDisk driver) in progress, so detection is limited to impact rather than the technique.
- T1563partialdetects — Personnel can observe and report anomalous session behaviour (e.g., unexpected disconnections, concurrent logins) but cannot see the hijack itself, which occurs at the protocol or token level without a user-visible artefact.
- T1563.002partialdetects — A.6.8's mechanism is human reporting, and T1563.002 does produce a user-visible artifact in many cases — Windows notifies the legitimate user when a session hijack is attempted — which a trained user could report as a security event; however, the technique explicitly notes hijacking can be performed 'without the need for credentials or prompts to the user,' and even when notified, users may not interpret the system message as a reportable security event, leaving a bounded remainder.
- T1564.008partialdetects — Personnel can surface this technique if they notice unexpected inbox rules, missing expected emails, or messages routed to unusual folders, but the technique is specifically designed to hide these signals from users, so detection depends on active vigilance rather than a natural user-visible artifact.
- T1565partialdetects — A.6.8 establishes a reporting mechanism for personnel to surface observed anomalies, and data manipulation can produce user-visible integrity violations (e.g., altered records, unexpected transaction values) that fall under the control's listed reporting situations, but the control relies entirely on human observation and willingness to report, so it catches only the subset of manipulations that produce symptoms a person notices and chooses to escalate.
- T1565.001partialdetects — A.6.8 establishes a reporting mechanism for personnel to report observed anomalies, and stored data manipulation can produce observable effects (e.g., corrupted records, unexpected changes) that a user might notice and report, but the control relies on human observation and willingness to report rather than automated detection, so it surfaces only a slice of occurrences.
- T1565.003partialdetects — A.6.8 establishes a reporting mechanism for personnel to surface observed anomalies, and runtime data manipulation that produces visible effects (e.g., altered financial displays) can be reported through it, but the control relies on human observation of symptoms rather than technical instrumentation, so it catches only the subset of manipulations that manifest visibly to a user.
- T1566partialdetects — Clear reporting channels for suspicious emails or links enable security teams to detect and respond to phishing campaigns before initial access is achieved.
- T1566.001partialdetects — A.6.8 establishes the reporting channel through which personnel can flag suspicious emails (including potential spearphishing attachments) as security events; when a user notices something off and reports it, that is a detection event flowing through A.6.8's mechanism. The extent is partial because sophisticated spearphishing often does not raise user suspicion, reporting depends on the user both noticing and choosing to use the channel, and many reports arrive only after the user has already interacted with the attachment.
- T1566.002partialdetects — A.6.8's reporting channel surfaces the technique when a user notices a suspicious email with a malicious link and reports it — the email and link are user-visible artifacts, unlike process injection where there is nothing for a person to see. Extent is partial because reporting depends on user recognition (A.6.3's domain) and initiative, sophisticated spearphishing often goes unreported, and the mechanism is human-dependent rather than systematic.
- T1566.003partialdetects — A.6.8's mechanism is personnel noticing and reporting events through an established channel, and T1566.003 does produce a user-visible artifact (a message arriving via social media or personal webmail) that a trained, aware user could recognize and report; however, the technique specifically routes through non-enterprise services where users may not perceive the message as an organizational security event worth reporting, so the reporting channel catches a slice rather than the bulk.
- T1566.004partialdetects — A.6.8 establishes the reporting mechanism and makes personnel aware of their responsibility to report events, and vishing directly involves the user receiving a call — so a user who notices a suspicious call can report it through A.6.8's channel, making this a viable detection pathway. However, A.6.8 itself does not actively detect; it is a passive conduit that only catches what personnel choose to report, and recognition depends on user awareness (more properly at-2's domain) and willingness to report, so the extent is partial rather than mostly.
- T1598partialdetects — A.6.8 establishes both the awareness that personnel should report security events and the reporting channel itself; phishing-for-information messages are user-visible artifacts (unlike process injection), so a user who notices a suspicious message can report it through this mechanism, making it a real detection path — but the control depends entirely on the user recognizing the lure and choosing to report, and well-crafted phishing is designed to defeat that recognition, so what is captured is a slice rather than the bulk.
- T1598.001partialdetects — Personnel can receive and recognize spearphishing messages delivered via third-party services and report them through A.6.8's mechanism, but the technique deliberately uses non-enterprise channels (personal webmail, social media) where employees are unlikely to connect the message to an organizational security event or route it through official reporting channels, leaving most instances unobserved by this control.
- T1598.003partialdetects — A.6.8 establishes the reporting channel through which personnel can surface suspicious emails they receive, and spearphishing links are user-visible artifacts (unlike process injection), so the mechanism is available; however, the control is procedural and depends entirely on personnel noticing and choosing to report, so detection is enabled but not guaranteed, and many spearphishing attempts go unreported.
- T1598.004partialdetects — A.6.8 establishes the reporting channel that captures vishing attempts when personnel who receive the calls recognize and report them, surfacing the technique to the organization; extent is partial because detection is entirely contingent on human recognition (at-2's domain) and many vishing attempts go unrecognized or unreported, so the channel only catches a slice of attempts.
- T1621partialdetects — A.6.8's mechanism is personnel reporting events they identify, and T1621 (MFA push bombardment / MFA fatigue) produces a user-visible artifact — unexpected push notifications on the user's device — that the targeted user can recognize and report as an access violation or anomalous behaviour; however, single-push variants where the user accepts without realizing are not user-visible, and even visible instances depend on user awareness and willingness to report, so detection is a slice rather than most of the technique.
- T1667partialdetects — A.6.8 requires personnel to report observed events including malfunctions and anomalous system behaviour, so a user whose inbox is flooded can report the bombing, but the control only surfaces what a person notices and chooses to report rather than instrumenting the mail flow itself.
- T1668partialdetects — Personnel reporting can capture some user-visible side effects of T1668 (disabled services breaking workflows, stripped privileges causing access issues, anomalous system behaviour) under categories (f), (g) and (h), but the technique is designed to be stealthy — patching and removing other malware look indistinguishable from legitimate administration, so most instances produce no user-visible artifact to report.
- T1671partialdetects — A.6.8 establishes a reporting mechanism that can surface an OAuth application integration when personnel observe it as an access violation, anomalous system behaviour, or a system change outside change management, but the control only detects what a person notices and reports, not what occurs without a human in the loop.
- T1674partialdetects — Input injection produces user-visible effects (cursor movement, text appearing, applications launching without user action) that fall under A.6.8's reportable categories of anomalous system behaviour and suspected malware infection, so personnel can observe and report them; however, detection is partial because subtle or rapid injections may go unnoticed, users may dismiss obvious instances as glitches rather than security events, and HID-based attacks may complete before the user recognises the anomaly.
- T1684partialdetects — A.6.8 provides the reporting channel through which personnel who recognize a social engineering attempt can surface it, and unlike process injection the technique IS user-visible (the user receives the communication), so the mechanism can engage; but social engineering is specifically designed to minimize recognition, A.6.8 supplies the channel rather than the recognition (training lives in A.6.3), and the share of attempts that get reported is a slice rather than a bounded remainder of a mechanism that mostly works.
- T1684.001partialdetects — A.6.8 provides the reporting channel through which personnel can surface suspected impersonation, and the clause's enumerated situations (suspicious communications, access violations, suspected malware) cover the artifacts an impersonation attempt leaves; however, the technique is engineered to look legitimate, so most attempts are recognized only after the victim has acted, and the reporting mechanism captures a slice of incidents rather than the bulk of attempts in flight.
- T1686partialdetects — A.6.8's reporting mechanism can catch some instances through user-observable symptoms (anomalous system behaviour, ineffective security controls, access anomalies) that prompt personnel to report, but the firewall modification itself typically occurs at a privileged/administrative level outside end-user visibility, so what is reported is downstream effect rather than the act.
- T1686.003partialdetects — A.6.8 establishes a reporting mechanism for personnel to surface observed anomalies, and a disabled firewall is an observable control failure that falls under its listed situations (a, g, h), but the mechanism depends on a human noticing the change and reporting it, which is a slice rather than a systematic detection.
- T1688partialdetects — Personnel can observe the end-state artifact (a system unexpectedly booted into safe mode, with limited drivers/services and altered appearance) and report it as anomalous system behaviour under clause (g), but the underlying technique — BCD store modification, registry changes to add malicious services, and COM object registration — is not user-visible, so the preparation steps that constitute the technique itself go unobserved by the human reporting mechanism.
- T1697partialdetects — A.6.8's mechanism is personnel observing and reporting events through a defined channel, and some T1697 instances produce user-visible artefacts (a phishing attempt asking for an ASP, an unfamiliar ASP appearing in account settings, suspicious-account notifications from the IdP) that a user could notice and report; however, theft of an ASP stored on a system or generation of an ASP for an already-compromised account can occur without any user-visible signal, so the reporting mechanism catches a slice rather than the bulk.
- T1698partialdetects — Personnel can observe and report anomalous LLM behaviour under item (g) of A.6.8's reporting list, which is a real detection path for the symptoms, but the indirect prompt injection itself is hidden inside content the LLM retrieves and the user cannot see it — they report a malfunction, not the injection, so attribution is weak and what is caught is a slice of the technique's observable surface.
Prevented OWASP Web Top 10 (2025) risks (11)
OWASP Web Top 10 (2025) risk categories this ISO control helps prevent or mitigate — our analysis (mostly llm_verified).
Direction: ← other covers this;
→ this covers other (F/M/P = full / mostly /
partial). gov = governs / implements (a mandate, not coverage).
Control IDs, short titles and the structured attribute table (control type, CIA properties, cybersecurity-concept, operational capability, security domain) are facts from ISO/IEC 27001:2022 Annex A / ISO/IEC 27002:2022. The full implementation guidance prose lives in ISO/IEC 27002:2022 — not reproduced here. Cross-walks to NIST 800-53, NIST CSF 2.0, OWASP ASVS, CWE, MITRE ATT&CK and OWASP Web Top 10 are our own analysis (mostly llm_verified), not an ISO, NIST, MITRE or OWASP product — how ours compare.