A.7.12 Physical
Cabling security
Structured attributes from ISO/IEC 27002:2022 — control type · CIA properties · cybersecurity concept · operational capability · security domain. What do these mean?
Mapped NIST 800-53 r5 controls (12)
Our reading (mostly llm_verified) of how this ISO control and each NIST 800-53 control relate. Not an ISO or NIST product.
Direction: ← other covers this;
→ this covers other (F/M/P = full / mostly /
partial). gov = governs / implements (a mandate, not coverage).
Why these map — rationale
- PE-4mostlycovers — Both controls focus on protecting transmission media from physical tampering and unauthorized access through conduit, shielding, and restricted entry points.
- PE-9mostlycovers — A.7.12's explicit scope for power and comms cabling (preventing loss/damage/theft/compromise and operational interruption) accounts for the bulk of PE-9's narrower requirement to protect power equipment/cabling from damage and destruction, but leaves a residual on explicit equipment protection and non-cabling power elements not addressed by the ISO control.
Aligned NIST CSF 2.0 outcomes (15)
NIST CSF 2.0 outcomes this ISO control aligns with — our analysis (mostly llm_verified).
Direction: ← other covers this;
→ this covers other (F/M/P = full / mostly /
partial). gov = governs / implements (a mandate, not coverage).
Mitigated MITRE ATT&CK techniques (3117)
Adversary techniques (MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise) this ISO control helps mitigate; links open attack.mitre.org. Our analysis (mostly llm_verified).
Direction: ← other covers this;
→ this covers other (F/M/P = full / mostly /
partial). gov = governs / implements (a mandate, not coverage).
Why these map — rationale
- T1040partialprevents — Physical protection and shielding of network cabling reduces the feasibility of passive network sniffing by making it harder for an adversary to attach devices or intercept traffic at the cable level.
- T1200partialprevents — A.7.12 directly addresses a subset of T1200 through controlled access to patch panels and cable rooms, locked termination points, and periodic sweeps for unauthorized devices attached to cables, but it does not reach the broader technique — keystroke injection via USB, DMA attacks, rogue wireless access points, and other non-cable hardware vectors fall outside the clause's cabling scope.
- T1557partialprevents — A.7.12 addresses the physical-tap and electromagnetic-interception variants of AiTM (fibre-optic cables resist tapping, shielding resists emanation interception, controlled patch-panel access and periodic sweeps block unauthorized device attachment), but the dominant AiTM vectors — ARP/DNS/LLMNR spoofing and protocol downgrade — operate at the logical layer and are unaffected by physical cabling controls, so only a slice of the technique is prevented.
- T1565.002partialprevents — A.7.12's physical-layer measures (fibre-optic cabling, electromagnetic shielding, technical sweeps for unauthorized devices, controlled access to patch panels, armoured conduit) prevent the physical-cable-tap variant of transmitted data manipulation, but T1565.002 explicitly includes software-based manipulation between system processes and over network connections that require no physical access to cabling, so the control addresses a slice of the technique's execution paths rather than the bulk.
Control IDs, short titles and the structured attribute table (control type, CIA properties, cybersecurity-concept, operational capability, security domain) are facts from ISO/IEC 27001:2022 Annex A / ISO/IEC 27002:2022. The full implementation guidance prose lives in ISO/IEC 27002:2022 — not reproduced here. Cross-walks to NIST 800-53, NIST CSF 2.0, OWASP ASVS, CWE, MITRE ATT&CK and OWASP Web Top 10 are our own analysis (mostly llm_verified), not an ISO, NIST, MITRE or OWASP product — how ours compare.