A.7.13 Physical
Equipment maintenance
Structured attributes from ISO/IEC 27002:2022 — control type · CIA properties · cybersecurity concept · operational capability · security domain. What do these mean?
Mapped NIST 800-53 r5 controls (13)
Our reading (mostly llm_verified) of how this ISO control and each NIST 800-53 control relate. Not an ISO or NIST product.
Direction: ← other covers this;
→ this covers other (F/M/P = full / mostly /
partial). gov = governs / implements (a mandate, not coverage).
Why these map — rationale
- MA-2mostlycovers — A.7.13's maintenance objective and preventive intent fully account for the scheduling, documentation, review, approval, and monitoring requirements in MA-2, but a real residual remains around MA-2's explicit emphasis on manufacturer/vendor specifications, on-site vs. remote distinctions, and removal of components that A.7.13 does not detail.
- MA-6partialcovers — A.7.13's broad requirement to maintain equipment to avoid operational interruption and asset compromise is only partially accounted for by MA-6's narrower focus on obtaining timely support/spare parts after failure; the ISO control also encompasses preventive/scheduled maintenance, procedures, and records not required by MA-6.
Aligned NIST CSF 2.0 outcomes (16)
NIST CSF 2.0 outcomes this ISO control aligns with — our analysis (mostly llm_verified).
Direction: ← other covers this;
→ this covers other (F/M/P = full / mostly /
partial). gov = governs / implements (a mandate, not coverage).
Why these map — rationale
- ID.AM-08domain mandateimplements — A.7.13 operationalizes the hardware/equipment portion of the asset life-cycle management outcome named in ID.AM-08 (maintenance prevents loss/damage/interruption across the life cycle); the link is within the shared domain but ID.AM-08 does not name maintenance explicitly.
- PR.PS-03explicit mandateimplements — A.7.13 directly operationalizes the hardware maintenance outcome named in PR.PS-03
Mitigated MITRE ATT&CK techniques (3165)
Adversary techniques (MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise) this ISO control helps mitigate; links open attack.mitre.org. Our analysis (mostly llm_verified).
Direction: ← other covers this;
→ this covers other (F/M/P = full / mostly /
partial). gov = governs / implements (a mandate, not coverage).
Why these map — rationale
- T1199partialprevents — A.7.13 constrains the maintenance-personnel slice of T1199 through authorized-personnel rules, confidentiality agreements, on-site supervision, and controlled remote maintenance access, but the technique's bulk — IT services contractors, managed security providers, cloud delegated administration partners, and infrastructure contractors like HVAC/elevator — sits outside the clause's scope, so what is prevented is a named slice rather than the technique as a whole.
- T1200partialprevents — A.7.13's maintenance-focused mechanisms — supervising on-site maintenance personnel (f), restricting repairs to authorized staff (c), and inspecting equipment for tampering before returning it to operation (j) — prevent hardware additions that occur through or during maintenance, but the control's purpose is explicitly scoped to issues 'caused by lack of maintenance' and does not address the broader T1200 vectors (parking-lot USB drops, rogue APs, DMA implants, keystroke injection devices) that fall outside any maintenance window.
- T1219.002partialprevents — A.7.13 requires remote maintenance access to be authorized and controlled, which can prevent some unauthorized remote desktop use, but it does not eliminate legitimate remote desktop software that may still be abused for C2.
Control IDs, short titles and the structured attribute table (control type, CIA properties, cybersecurity-concept, operational capability, security domain) are facts from ISO/IEC 27001:2022 Annex A / ISO/IEC 27002:2022. The full implementation guidance prose lives in ISO/IEC 27002:2022 — not reproduced here. Cross-walks to NIST 800-53, NIST CSF 2.0, OWASP ASVS, CWE, MITRE ATT&CK and OWASP Web Top 10 are our own analysis (mostly llm_verified), not an ISO, NIST, MITRE or OWASP product — how ours compare.