A.7.4 Physical
Physical security monitoring
Structured attributes from ISO/IEC 27002:2022 — control type · CIA properties · cybersecurity concept · operational capability · security domain. What do these mean?
Mapped NIST 800-53 r5 controls (14)
Our reading (mostly llm_verified) of how this ISO control and each NIST 800-53 control relate. Not an ISO or NIST product.
Direction: ← other covers this;
→ this covers other (F/M/P = full / mostly /
partial). gov = governs / implements (a mandate, not coverage).
Why these map — rationale
- PE-3mostlycovers — A.7.4's monitoring to detect/deter unauthorized access accounts for the audit-log, verification, and control-of-ingress/egress pieces of PE-3, but leaves a real residual around pre-authorization enforcement mechanisms and designated public-area handling that sit outside pure monitoring.
- PE-6mostlycovers — A.7.4's monitoring to detect and deter unauthorized physical access accounts for the core detection/review portion of PE-6, but leaves a real residual (explicit coordination with incident response and the 'respond' part of PE-6) uncovered.
Aligned NIST CSF 2.0 outcomes (12)
NIST CSF 2.0 outcomes this ISO control aligns with — our analysis (mostly llm_verified).
Direction: ← other covers this;
→ this covers other (F/M/P = full / mostly /
partial). gov = governs / implements (a mandate, not coverage).
Why these map — rationale
Related weaknesses / CWE (2)
Weakness classes this ISO control helps prevent or mitigate — our analysis (mostly llm_verified).
Direction: ← other covers this;
→ this covers other (F/M/P = full / mostly /
partial). gov = governs / implements (a mandate, not coverage).
Mitigated MITRE ATT&CK techniques (3145)
Adversary techniques (MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise) this ISO control helps mitigate; links open attack.mitre.org. Our analysis (mostly llm_verified).
Direction: ← other covers this;
→ this covers other (F/M/P = full / mostly /
partial). gov = governs / implements (a mandate, not coverage).
Why these map — rationale
- T1200mostlydetects — Continuous video and motion detection at entry points raises the likelihood that an adversary physically attaching or tampering with hardware will be observed or recorded, limiting covert hardware-introduction attempts.
- T1091partialdetects — Intruder alarms and tamper-proof sensors on doors and windows increase the chance that removable-media replication or data transfer through physical media will trigger an alert before the adversary can complete the action.
- T1200partialprevents — continuous physical monitoring (alarms, CCTV, motion detectors on doors/windows/sensitive areas) deters and enables rapid response to unauthorized hardware additions in covered premises, but cannot stop all vectors such as social engineering, insider placement, or additions outside monitored zones/times
- T1219.003partialdetects — A.7.4's CCTV and motion/contact detectors can observe the physical act of installing a KVM-style device in a monitored area, but the technique's core mechanism — the remote C2 channel established through the hardware — is an electronic/network event that physical premises monitoring cannot see, and the installation may occur during authorized access or in unmonitored spaces.
- T1669partialdetects — A.7.4's surveillance, alarms, and motion/contact detectors can surface physical proximity or unauthorized presence needed for close-access Wi-Fi connection attempts (especially at premises housing critical systems), but this is only a minority slice of T1669 which also covers remote dual-homed bridging, open networks, and post-connection sniffing without any physical intrusion
- T1669partialprevents — A.7.4's physical monitoring (alarms, CCTV, motion detectors on doors/windows/premises) directly deters and detects the physical-proximity method of connecting to Wi-Fi networks, but leaves the remote dual-homed bridge method, open networks, and credential-based access untouched.
Prevented OWASP Web Top 10 (2025) risks (3)
OWASP Web Top 10 (2025) risk categories this ISO control helps prevent or mitigate — our analysis (mostly llm_verified).
Direction: ← other covers this;
→ this covers other (F/M/P = full / mostly /
partial). gov = governs / implements (a mandate, not coverage).
Why these map — rationale
- A09partialfinds — A.7.4's surveillance, alarms, and detectors directly discover unauthorized physical access and suspicious behavior (a core slice of security-relevant events), but the control is scoped exclusively to physical premises and has no view of application/web-layer logging, alerting, or log-integrity failures that dominate A09:2025.
Control IDs, short titles and the structured attribute table (control type, CIA properties, cybersecurity-concept, operational capability, security domain) are facts from ISO/IEC 27001:2022 Annex A / ISO/IEC 27002:2022. The full implementation guidance prose lives in ISO/IEC 27002:2022 — not reproduced here. Cross-walks to NIST 800-53, NIST CSF 2.0, OWASP ASVS, CWE, MITRE ATT&CK and OWASP Web Top 10 are our own analysis (mostly llm_verified), not an ISO, NIST, MITRE or OWASP product — how ours compare.