A.7.6 Physical
Working in secure areas
Structured attributes from ISO/IEC 27002:2022 — control type · CIA properties · cybersecurity concept · operational capability · security domain. What do these mean?
Mapped NIST 800-53 r5 controls (14)
Our reading (mostly llm_verified) of how this ISO control and each NIST 800-53 control relate. Not an ISO or NIST product.
Direction: ← other covers this;
→ this covers other (F/M/P = full / mostly /
partial). gov = governs / implements (a mandate, not coverage).
Aligned NIST CSF 2.0 outcomes (13)
NIST CSF 2.0 outcomes this ISO control aligns with — our analysis (mostly llm_verified).
Direction: ← other covers this;
→ this covers other (F/M/P = full / mostly /
partial). gov = governs / implements (a mandate, not coverage).
Why these map — rationale
- PR.AA-06domain mandateimplements — A.7.6 operationalizes physical-entry controls, monitoring, and enforcement inside secure areas to achieve the exact risk-commensurate physical-access outcome named by PR.AA-06
Related weaknesses / CWE (2)
Weakness classes this ISO control helps prevent or mitigate — our analysis (mostly llm_verified).
Direction: ← other covers this;
→ this covers other (F/M/P = full / mostly /
partial). gov = governs / implements (a mandate, not coverage).
Mitigated MITRE ATT&CK techniques (3130)
Adversary techniques (MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise) this ISO control helps mitigate; links open attack.mitre.org. Our analysis (mostly llm_verified).
Direction: ← other covers this;
→ this covers other (F/M/P = full / mostly /
partial). gov = governs / implements (a mandate, not coverage).
Why these map — rationale
- T1011partialprevents — A.7.6(e) controls endpoint devices in secure areas and (d) prohibits unauthorized recording equipment, which directly addresses alternative-medium exfiltration vectors (Bluetooth, WiFi, cellular) within the secure area; however, the control only applies inside defined secure areas and does not address the technique when executed from non-secure locations or via infrastructure outside its scope.
- T1011.001partialprevents — A.7.6(d) prohibits unauthorized recording equipment and A.7.6(e) controls carrying and use of user endpoint devices in secure areas, which constrains Bluetooth-capable endpoints as exfiltration vectors within those areas; however, the control applies only to secure areas (not the whole estate), does not name Bluetooth specifically, and cannot reach Bluetooth exfiltration from non-endpoint devices or from areas outside its scope.
- T1052partialprevents — A.7.6 restricts recording equipment and controls user endpoint devices in secure areas, which blocks the most direct exfiltration path, but the technique can still be executed by an authorized device or a concealed medium that the control's physical checks do not catch.
- T1052.001partialprevents — A.7.6's provisions (d) and (e) directly address controlling user endpoint devices and recording equipment in secure areas, which constrains USB-based exfiltration where the technique requires introducing or using a device in a controlled space; however, the control is physical/administrative and cannot prevent exfiltration via already-authorized devices used in unauthorized ways, cannot reach USB usage outside secure areas, and does not impose technical port controls, leaving a named remainder.
- T1056partialprevents — A.7.6's controls on recording equipment and endpoint devices in secure areas prevent some physical-world input capture (e.g., shoulder-surfing via camera, unauthorized keyloggers as hardware), but the bulk of T1056 — credential API hooking, web portal capture, software keyloggers — runs on the system and is unaffected by physical security measures in secure areas.
- T1091partialprevents — A.7.6(e) controls the carrying and use of user endpoint devices in secure areas, which addresses the mobile-device-via-USB vector of T1091, but the primary vector — removable media such as USB sticks carrying malware to air-gapped systems — is not an 'endpoint device' and falls outside the clause's scope, so only a slice of the technique is prevented.
- T1092partialprevents — A.7.6's measures on unsupervised work (b) and controlling endpoint devices (e) in secure areas reduce the opportunity for an adversary to physically insert removable media to relay commands, but the clause addresses general physical security for personnel in secure areas rather than specifically mandating removable media controls, and the technique can still execute where systems sit outside designated secure areas or where the adversary gains brief unsupervised access.
- T1113partialprevents — A.7.6(d) prohibits cameras in user endpoint devices and (e) controls carrying/use of endpoint devices in secure areas, which directly prevents the device-based and physical capture vectors of T1113; however, the bulk of the technique — software-based screen capture via native APIs (CopyFromScreen, xwd, screencapture) or remote access tools on authorized systems in the secure area — is outside the clause's physical-security mechanism.
- T1123partialprevents — A.7.6(d) prohibits photographic, video, audio and other recording equipment including microphones in endpoint devices unless authorized, and (e) controls carrying and use of endpoint devices in secure areas — directly addressing the physical-device mechanism of T1123 within the secure area. It does not prevent malware-based capture on authorized devices, capture via voice/video call services, or capture outside secure areas, so the prevention is bounded to the secure-area scope and the unauthorized-device vector.
- T1125partialprevents — A.7.6(d) prohibits photographic/video/audio recording equipment including cameras in user endpoint devices unless authorized, and (e) controls endpoint devices in secure areas — directly addressing the physical-device vector of T1125 within secure areas, but the control's scope is limited to designated secure areas and does not reach video capture outside them or remote malware-driven webcam activation.
- T1200partialprevents — A.7.6 requires physical controls like avoiding unsupervised work, locking vacant areas, and restricting recording equipment, which reduce the opportunity to introduce unauthorized hardware, but the control does not mandate continuous physical inspection or device authentication that would fully prevent a determined insider or a brief unattended moment.
- T1200partialdetects — A.7.6's supervision of personnel and periodic inspection of vacant secure areas can surface unauthorized hardware introduced into the space, but the control's primary purpose is prevention (need-to-know, supervised work, locked areas, controlled endpoint devices) rather than detection, and the inspection cadence and scope leave significant gaps for hardware additions that occur during active work or between inspections.
- T1219.003partialprevents — A.7.6's physical measures — controlling endpoint devices (e), prohibiting unauthorized recording equipment (d), avoiding unsupervised work (b), and inspecting vacant secure areas (c) — directly address the physical installation of unauthorized KVM hardware inside secure areas, but the technique can also be installed in non-secure areas, by personnel with legitimate access, or post-compromise via remote means, leaving a substantial remainder outside the clause's scope.
- T1219.003partialdetects — A.7.6's physical security measures — particularly supervision of work (b), periodic inspection of vacant areas (c), and control of endpoint devices (e) — can incidentally surface unauthorized KVM hardware installation in secure areas, but the control is preventive in design and the detection is a side effect of physical checks rather than dedicated monitoring, leaving gaps when hardware is installed during authorized work or resembles legitimate equipment.
- T1557.004partialprevents — A.7.6(e) controls the carrying and use of endpoint devices in secure areas, which can prevent users physically within the secure area from connecting to a rogue AP, but the technique itself (hosting the evil twin) runs unimpeded and users outside the secure area — the technique's primary target population in airports, cafés, libraries — remain fully exposed.
- T1674partialprevents — A.7.6's control of endpoint devices in secure areas (e) and avoidance of unsupervised work (b) can prevent the physical HID variant (malicious USB keystroke injection), but the software-based input injection vector — monitoring the message loop and simulating keystrokes programmatically — is unaffected by physical security measures in secure areas.
Control IDs, short titles and the structured attribute table (control type, CIA properties, cybersecurity-concept, operational capability, security domain) are facts from ISO/IEC 27001:2022 Annex A / ISO/IEC 27002:2022. The full implementation guidance prose lives in ISO/IEC 27002:2022 — not reproduced here. Cross-walks to NIST 800-53, NIST CSF 2.0, OWASP ASVS, CWE, MITRE ATT&CK and OWASP Web Top 10 are our own analysis (mostly llm_verified), not an ISO, NIST, MITRE or OWASP product — how ours compare.