Security Resilience
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SBOMs Alone Can't Reveal the Scope of a Supply Chain Attack

Our takeSBOMs give you a static parts list; the Shai-Hulud attack on Polymarket shows they can't reveal which instances are running the malicious code right now. Real-time visibility into prod beats offline manifests every time.
Sources (2)
What this means for you — Security leader:Inventory your third-party dependencies and maintain an accurate SBOM, but also instrument production runtimes with real-time visibility and behavioral monitoring to detect and scope supply-chain compromises quickly.
What this means for you — Lean IT orgs:Keep an up-to-date list of the software and services you rely on, but also watch for unexpected changes in how your tools behave or where money goes; review permissions on any monitoring or analytics add-ons you use.
What this means for you — MSP:Advise clients to combine SBOMs with runtime visibility and session monitoring; review all third-party website tools and monitoring services across client environments for unexpected code changes or excessive permissions.
What this means for you — Researcher:The Shai-Hulud and Polymarket incidents show SBOMs alone are insufficient for live supply-chain attacks; pair them with runtime integrity checking, behavioral analytics, and rapid response tooling.