CVE-2023-0452

Enforces approved cryptographic algorithms for each use case, blocking use of broken or risky algorithms.

Flaw remediation replaces broken or risky cryptographic algorithms once safer implementations are released by vendors.

Contacts with security groups provide timely information on broken or risky cryptographic algorithms, reducing the likelihood of their selection and use.

Ongoing education and sharing of recommended practices helps organizations identify and migrate away from broken or risky cryptographic algorithms.

Cross-organization threat feeds commonly include advances in cryptanalysis and active exploits against weak or broken algorithms, allowing organizations to deprecate them proactively.

Capital planning and funding allow selection and ongoing support of strong cryptographic algorithms rather than weak or broken ones.

Risk updates surface newly-broken or risky cryptographic algorithms as threat intelligence and computing advances evolve, enabling timely replacement.

Scanners flag use of broken or weak cryptographic algorithms via known-vulnerability databases.

Proper data-at-rest integrity protection requires strong cryptographic hashes, directly blocking weak-hash usage.

Data-in-transit integrity likewise depends on strong hashes, so the control prevents the weakness while the weakness only partially satisfies the outcome.

Secure-SDLC requirements explicitly forbid weak cryptographic algorithms, fully preventing CWE-328 while covering only one aspect of development practice.

A.5.31 only requires identifying, reviewing and considering legal/regulatory/contractual requirements (including crypto restrictions); it does not itself stop use of a broken algorithm or block its exploitation

A.5.6 only promotes membership in groups to receive early warnings, advisories, and specialist advice about vulnerabilities (including risky crypto); it does not stop exploitation of an already-present broken algorithm, which requires other controls (e.g. A.8.24) to act.

A.8.24's policy, algorithm selection (b,f), and key management directly require strong hashes meeting security expectations, preventing weak-hash use in most approved cryptographic contexts, but leaves a bounded remainder for non-crypto uses of hashing (e.g. data structures, non-security checksums) where the clause has no mandate.

A.8.26 only requires that security requirements (including those that could call for strong hashing via 8.24) be identified during development or acquisition; it does not itself mandate, enforce or implement any specific algorithm or protection that stops a weak hash from being exploitable.