A.5.17 Organizational
Authentication information
Structured attributes from ISO/IEC 27002:2022 — control type · CIA properties · cybersecurity concept · operational capability · security domain. What do these mean?
Mapped NIST 800-53 r5 controls (20)
Our reading (mostly llm_verified) of how this ISO control and each NIST 800-53 control relate. Not an ISO or NIST product.
Direction: ← other covers this;
→ this covers other (F/M/P = full / mostly /
partial). gov = governs / implements (a mandate, not coverage).
Why these map — rationale
- IA-2mostlycovers — A.5.17's full set of requirements for protecting and handling authentication information (issuance, protection, storage, transmission, use) accounts for the bulk of what IA-2 requires to achieve unique identification and authentication of organizational users, but leaves a residual slice (explicit association of the authenticated identity with processes acting on the user's behalf) uncovered.
- IA-5mostlycovers — Both controls establish requirements for the secure issuance, distribution, storage, and lifecycle management of authenticators including password strength, change enforcement, and protection against reuse or compromise.
Aligned NIST CSF 2.0 outcomes (16)
NIST CSF 2.0 outcomes this ISO control aligns with — our analysis (mostly llm_verified).
Direction: ← other covers this;
→ this covers other (F/M/P = full / mostly /
partial). gov = governs / implements (a mandate, not coverage).
Why these map — rationale
- PR.AA-01mostlycovers — The ISO control's detailed rules for issuing, protecting, and rotating credentials directly implement the CSF outcome of managing identities and credentials for authorized users and services.
- PR.AA-02domain mandateimplements — A.5.17 operationalizes identity proofing and credential binding (the exact subject of PR.AA-02) within the authentication domain, though the control does not name proofing/binding explicitly
- PR.AA-03explicit mandateimplements — A.5.17 directly operationalizes entity authentication to achieve the exact outcome named in PR.AA-03
- PR.AA-05domain mandateimplements — A.5.17 operationalizes proper entity authentication which is a core means within the PR.AA-05 domain of defining/managing/enforcing access permissions and authorizations (including least privilege), though the outcome does not name authentication explicitly
Related OWASP ASVS 5.0 requirements (15)
Application-security verification requirements (OWASP ASVS 5.0) this ISO control aligns with; links open the ASVS chapter. Our analysis (mostly llm_verified) — many ISO controls have no ASVS counterpart.
Direction: ← other covers this;
→ this covers other (F/M/P = full / mostly /
partial). gov = governs / implements (a mandate, not coverage).
Why these map — rationale
- V6.2.12fullcovers — ISO's explicit prohibition on compromised username/password pairs from hacked systems matches the ASVS requirement to check passwords against a set of breached passwords.
- V6.2.2fullcovers — The ISO stipulation that users must be able to select and change their own passwords with a confirmation step implements the ASVS rule that users can change their password.
- V6.2.3fullcovers — ISO's requirement for a confirmation procedure when changing passwords corresponds to the ASVS rule that password change functionality must require both the current and new password.
- V6.2.4fullcovers — The ISO mandate to block commonly-used and previously compromised passwords aligns exactly with the ASVS requirement to check submitted passwords against at least the top 10000 breached passwords.
- V6.2.6fullcovers — The ISO directive that passwords must not be displayed on screen when entered directly satisfies the ASVS requirement that password input fields use type=password to mask entry.
- V6.2.8fullcovers — ISO's requirement to store and transmit passwords only in protected form aligns with the ASVS rule that the application verifies the user's password exactly as received without any modifications such as truncation.
- V6.4.1fullcovers — The ISO requirement that automatically generated temporary credentials be non-guessable, unique, and changed at first use directly implements the ASVS rule that system-generated initial passwords must be securely random and follow the existing password policy.
Related weaknesses / CWE (3264)
Weakness classes this ISO control helps prevent or mitigate — our analysis (mostly llm_verified).
Direction: ← other covers this;
→ this covers other (F/M/P = full / mostly /
partial). gov = governs / implements (a mandate, not coverage).
Why these map — rationale
- CWE-13fullremoves — A.5.17's password management system guidance requires passwords to be stored and transmitted in protected form, with encryption/hashing per approved cryptographic techniques; applied to a system with plaintext passwords in configuration files, the mandate requires those passwords to be encrypted, which removes the CWE-13 weakness completely with no remainder.
- CWE-1392fullremoves — A.5.17 item (e) mandates that default authentication information be changed immediately following installation, so applying the clause to a system where it was previously absent removes the default credentials that constitute CWE-1392.
- CWE-1392fullprevents — A.5.17 guidance item (e) requires that default authentication information as predefined or provided by vendors be changed immediately following installation of systems or software, so a system under the clause does not retain default credentials at all -- the same mechanism that earned A.8.9 -> CWE-1394 `full`, and here the clause's scope (authentication information) aligns even more directly with the weakness (default credentials).
- CWE-1393fullremoves — A.5.17(e) explicitly requires default vendor authentication information to be changed immediately after installation, so applying the control to a system where it was previously absent removes the default password entirely.
- CWE-1393fullprevents — A.5.17(e) requires that default authentication information as predefined or provided by vendors be changed immediately following installation of systems or software, so a system under the clause does not retain a default password — the same mechanism the owner graded `full` for A.8.9 vs CWE-1394, and A.5.17 is the clause whose subject matter (authentication information) is exactly what CWE-1393 is about.
- CWE-256fullremoves — A.5.17 mandates that passwords be stored in protected form, so implementing it removes existing plaintext storage.
- CWE-257fullremoves — A.5.17's password management system section mandates that passwords be stored in protected form (h) and that password encryption and hashing be performed according to approved cryptographic techniques, which directly addresses CWE-257's recoverable-format storage; applied to a system that previously stored passwords reversibly, the implementation requires re-hashing with approved one-way techniques, so the weakness stops being present with no nameable remainder.
- CWE-521fullremoves — A.5.17 mandates strong password requirements, so applying it to a system that previously lacked them removes the weakness by imposing the requirement.
- CWE-521fullprevents — A.5.17 explicitly requires password management systems to enforce strong passwords according to best practice and user responsibilities to select them, so a system under the clause does not acquire weak password requirements at all.
- CWE-523fullremoves — A.5.17 mandates that authentication information be transmitted in protected form (allocation guidance (c) and password management system (h)), so implementing it where it was not applied before requires HTTPS/TLS protection of credential transport, which removes the unprotected-transport weakness that CWE-523 describes.
- CWE-549fullprevents — The clause's password management system item (g) explicitly requires that passwords are not displayed on the screen when being entered, so a system under this control does not acquire the missing-masking weakness at all.
- CWE-1393mostlyblocks — Mandates secure handling and change of authentication secrets, directly addressing default passwords.
- CWE-261mostlyremoves — A.5.17 mandates that password hashing use approved cryptographic techniques (not weak encodings like base64), so applying it where it was missing requires replacing the weak encoding with proper hashing, which removes CWE-261; the remainder is application code that handles passwords outside the password management system's reach and legacy code not brought into compliance.
- CWE-521mostlyblocks — Enforcing minimum length, complexity, non-dictionary, and non-reuse rules directly counters weak password policies that allow attackers to guess or brute-force credentials.
- CWE-555mostlyremoves — A.5.17's password management system explicitly mandates that passwords be stored and transmitted in protected form (with cryptographic techniques per A.8.24), so applying it to a system with plaintext passwords in config files requires those to be stored in protected form, removing the weakness; the remainder is bounded by implementation reach across all authentication information stores and by cases where the mandate is not fully operationalised.
- CWE-759mostlyremoves — A.5.17's password management system section mandates that passwords be stored in protected form and that hashing follow approved cryptographic techniques (referencing A.8.24), which includes salting; applying it to a system previously using unsalted hashes requires the password management system to be reconfigured to use proper salting, removing the weakness in most cases, with nameable remainders in legacy password stores that require user-driven migration, third-party authentication components outside the organization's password management system, and hardcoded hashing in application code.
- CWE-760mostlyremoves — A.5.17's password management system guidance mandates that hashing be performed according to approved cryptographic techniques (referencing 8.24), which requires unpredictable salts; applied to a system that previously used a predictable salt, the weakness is removed in the mandated password management system. The remainder is password hashing performed in custom authentication code outside the password management system the clause governs.
- CWE-1188partialremoves — A.5.17 mandates changing default authentication information, removing that subset of CWE-1188 instances, but does not address insecure defaults unrelated to authentication.
- CWE-1188partialprevents — A.5.17(e) requires default authentication information to be changed immediately after installation, which prevents the authentication-information subset of CWE-1188, but the weakness class is much broader (default configuration parameters, default service modes, uninitialized code variables, default file permissions, etc.) and authentication defaults are a minority of the class.
- CWE-1240partialremoves — A.5.17 mandates that password encryption and hashing use approved cryptographic techniques, so applying it to a system that previously used a risky primitive for password hashing would require switching to an approved one, removing that CWE-1240 instance; however, the clause's reach is limited to authentication-information cryptography, which is a narrow slice of the broader CWE-1240 class covering all cryptographic primitives across the system.
- CWE-13partialprevents — A.5.17's password management system mandates that passwords be 'store[d] and transmit[ted] in protected form' using approved cryptographic techniques, which directly addresses CWE-13's plaintext-in-config-file weakness, but as a policy/practice clause its actual prevention depends on developer compliance and configuration management enforcement, leaving a fallible remainder similar to A.8.28 vs CWE-79.
- CWE-1394partialremoves — A.5.17 mandates that default vendor authentication information be changed immediately after installation, which prevents the weakness from persisting in new deployments but does not remove a default cryptographic key already in use on an existing system.
- CWE-1394partialprevents — A.5.17 item (e) requires default authentication information to be changed immediately after installation, which prevents default cryptographic keys used for authentication (e.g., default SSH keys, default SSL private keys for server auth), but the clause is narrowly scoped to authentication information and does not reach default cryptographic keys used for other critical functionality such as data-at-rest encryption (e.g., default master encryption keys), leaving a nameable remainder of CWE-1394 instances uncovered.
- CWE-256partialblocks — Directly requires secure handling and protection of authentication information, preventing plaintext password storage.
- CWE-258partialblocks — Requires secure handling and protection of authentication credentials, directly addressing empty passwords in config files.
- CWE-258partialprevents — A.5.17's password management system requirements (strong passwords, preventing commonly-used passwords) would block empty passwords if applied to those credentials, and its purpose of preventing authentication failures conceptually reaches them; however, the clause's mechanisms (user-facing password management system, user responsibilities) are scoped to user authentication, not to configuration-file service credentials set by developers/administrators, so only a minority of CWE-258 instances are covered.
- CWE-290partialblocks — Authentication information management directly addresses credential handling that prevents spoofing.
- CWE-308partialblocks — A.5.17's password management (strong passwords, no reuse, blocking common/compromised passwords, secure storage/transmission, forced change on compromise) makes the single factor harder to compromise via guessing, brute-force, dictionary, and credential-stuffing attacks, but the single-factor weakness remains fully exploitable through phishing, keyloggers, social engineering, and credential-database theft — vectors that do not depend on password strength — and the clause never mandates a second factor.
- CWE-309partialblocks — A.5.17 hardens the password system against many listed attack patterns (strong passwords block dictionary/brute force, default-change blocks default-credential attacks, approved hashing with salt blocks rainbow tables, compromised-password screening blocks credential stuffing, secure transmission blocks interception), but the architectural weakness — passwords as the sole authentication factor — is unchanged, and exploitation via phishing, keylogging, shoulder-surfing, and social engineering is not addressed.
- CWE-312partialremoves — A.5.17 mandates that passwords be stored in protected form (encrypted/hashed per approved cryptographic techniques) and transmitted securely, which removes the cleartext-storage weakness for authentication information specifically; however, CWE-312 covers all sensitive information (PHI, financial data, configuration secrets, etc.), and A.5.17's scope is limited to authentication information, so it addresses only a portion of the weakness class.
- CWE-312partialprevents — A.5.17 mandates that passwords and other authentication information be stored and transmitted in protected form (h) and references approved cryptographic techniques (8.24), so a system under the clause does not store authentication credentials in cleartext — that subset of CWE-312 is prevented. The remainder is bounded and nameable: CWE-312 also covers non-credential sensitive data (PHI, financial records, personal data in S3 buckets, etc.) which A.5.17 does not reach.
- CWE-313partialremoves — A.5.17 mandates that passwords be stored and transmitted in protected form (encrypted/hashed per approved cryptographic techniques), which removes the cleartext-storage weakness for authentication information; however, CWE-313 is broader than passwords and also covers private keys, messages, and other sensitive data stored in cleartext, which A.5.17 does not reach.
- CWE-314partialremoves — A.5.17's password management system mandates that passwords be stored in protected form (encrypted/hashed), so applying it to a system with cleartext passwords in the registry removes that subset of CWE-314; however, CWE-314 covers any sensitive information in the registry, and A.5.17 only addresses authentication information, leaving a nameable remainder of non-authentication sensitive data.
- CWE-314partialprevents — A.5.17's password management system guidance mandates that passwords be stored and transmitted in protected form (item h) and encrypted/hashed per approved cryptographic techniques, which prevents cleartext storage of authentication information in the registry; however, CWE-314 covers any sensitive information stored in cleartext in the registry, and A.5.17's scope is limited to authentication information, leaving non-credential sensitive data in the registry outside its reach.
- CWE-315partialremoves — A.5.17's password management system mandates that passwords be stored and transmitted in protected form (h), which would remove cleartext password storage in cookies — the dominant observed case in CWE-315's CVE list — but the CWE is defined more broadly to cover any sensitive information in a cookie, and A.5.17 only reaches the authentication-information subset.
- CWE-315partialprevents — A.5.17 requires passwords and authentication information to be stored and transmitted in protected form, so it prevents cleartext authentication data in cookies, but it does not reach other sensitive information such as account IDs or non-auth profile data stored in cookies.
- CWE-317partialremoves — A.5.17 mandates that passwords not be displayed on screen when entered (g) and be stored/transmitted in protected form (h), so applying it to a system that previously stored credentials in cleartext within a GUI removes that subset of CWE-317 instances; the remainder is sensitive information in GUI that is not authentication information, which the clause does not reach.
- CWE-318partialprevents — A.5.17's requirement to store passwords in protected form prevents cleartext authentication secrets from being embedded in executables, but it does not cover other sensitive information stored in executables that falls under CWE-318.
- CWE-319partialremoves — A.5.17 mandates secure transmission of authentication information, removing cleartext transmission of that specific sensitive data, but does not address other sensitive information transmitted in cleartext, so it removes only a subset of CWE-319 instances.
- CWE-319partialprevents — A.5.17 mandates that authentication information be transmitted in protected form (allocation item c, password management system item h), which prevents the password/authentication-information instances of CWE-319, but CWE-319 is broader and includes non-authentication sensitive data such as encryption keys, session tokens, and configuration information that A.5.17 does not reach.
- CWE-328partialremoves — A.5.17 mandates that password hashing use approved cryptographic techniques (referencing A.8.24), so applying it where it was not applied before would require replacing a weak password hash (e.g., unsalted MD5/SHA-1) with an approved one, removing CWE-328 in the password-storage context; however, its reach is bounded to password hashing and does not address the many other uses of weak hash (DNS name digests, certificate/code-signing, general data integrity), so a nameable remainder of the weakness class survives.
- CWE-341partialprevents — A.5.17(a) requires temporary authentication information to be non-guessable and unique, which addresses the slice of CWE-341 where predictable values are used as authentication secrets (e.g., CVE-2024-48445's guessable timestamp in a weak auth algorithm), but the clause's reach is limited to authentication information and does not cover the broader class of predictable session IDs, filenames, PRNG state, or other security-relevant values shown in the other observed examples.
- CWE-342partialprevents — A.5.17 prevents predictable authentication values (non-guessable temporary passwords, strong passwords, blocking commonly-used passwords and reuse) but CWE-342 is broader than authentication — it covers predictable TCP sequence numbers, DNS IDs, and other non-authentication random values that A.5.17 does not reach.
- CWE-359partialremoves — A.5.17 mandates hashing and protected storage/transmission of authentication credentials, which removes existing instances of credential exposure — one slice of CWE-359. The remainder is bounded and nameable: CWE-359 covers many other PPI categories (location, financial, health, communications, identifiers, etc.) that A.5.17 does not touch, so it removes only a minority of the class.
- CWE-359partialprevents — A.5.17 prevents the credential-related slice of CWE-359 by mandating protected storage/transmission of passwords, no on-screen display, and confidential record-keeping, but the weakness is much broader than credentials — location, health, financial, contact, and other PPI categories are outside the clause's scope, leaving a nameable majority uncovered.
- CWE-359partialblocks — A.5.17 blocks credential exposure (a named subset of CWE-359) via secure transmission, protected storage, and default-credential change requirements, but the vast majority of PPI categories listed in CWE-359 — location, health, employment, financial, communications, behavioral data, etc. — fall outside the clause's authentication-information scope.
- CWE-5partialremoves — A.5.17 mandates that authentication information be transmitted in protected form (items c and h), so applying it where it was not applied before removes the specific CWE-5 instance where authentication data crosses the network in cleartext; the remainder is bounded and nameable — all non-authentication data transmission in the J2EE application, which is the bulk of CWE-5.
- CWE-526partialremoves — A.5.17's password management system mandates that passwords be stored and transmitted in protected form (item h) and that password encryption/hashing follow approved cryptographic techniques, so applying it to a system where authentication information sat in cleartext in an environment variable would require that storage to be hashed/encrypted or moved, removing those instances; however, CWE-526 covers all sensitive information in environment variables, and A.5.17 only reaches the authentication-information subset, leaving non-credential sensitive data untouched.
- CWE-526partialprevents — A.5.17's password management system requires authentication information to be stored and transmitted in protected form (item h) and encrypted/hashed per approved cryptographic techniques, which prevents the weakness when the environment variable holds credentials; but CWE-526 covers all sensitive information in environment variables (API keys, tokens, personal data), not just authentication information, leaving a nameable remainder the clause does not reach.
- CWE-549partialremoves — A.5.17 mandates that the password management system 'not display passwords on the screen when being entered,' which directly addresses CWE-549; when applied to a system that previously displayed passwords, compliance requires the field to be masked and the weakness stops being present. However, A.5.17 is a policy/requirement control — it mandates the measure but does not itself perform the code changes needed to remediate existing instances, and coverage is bounded by which systems are in scope and modifiable (legacy and third-party UI components may remain unmasked).
- CWE-640partialprevents — A.5.17(b) requires identity verification before providing new, replacement or temporary authentication information, and (c) requires secure transmission — both directly touch the recovery flow and prevent some weak-recovery designs (e.g. no verification, cleartext delivery). The clause does not address throttling on reset attempts, token invalidation after use, security-question design, or other recovery-specific weaknesses catalogued under CWE-640, so a meaningful remainder is left.
- CWE-654partialblocks — A.5.17 hardens and protects the single authentication factor through strong, unique, non-guessed passwords and secure handling, blocking guessing, stuffing, and default-credential attacks, but it does not require a second factor, so the underlying single-factor weakness remains exploitable when the credential is compromised through an uncovered channel such as phishing or theft.
- CWE-759partialprevents — A.5.17 mandates that password hashing be performed according to approved cryptographic techniques (delegating the specifics to A.8.24), and a well-implemented password management system under this clause would use salted hashes as part of 'approved techniques'; however, the clause itself does not name salting, the cryptographic specification is delegated to A.8.24, and the mechanism is configuration/practice that is fallible, so the effect is real but a minority one.
Mitigated MITRE ATT&CK techniques (2647)
Adversary techniques (MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise) this ISO control helps mitigate; links open attack.mitre.org. Our analysis (mostly llm_verified).
Direction: ← other covers this;
→ this covers other (F/M/P = full / mostly /
partial). gov = governs / implements (a mandate, not coverage).
Why these map — rationale
- T1078.001fullprevents — A.5.17(e) requires default authentication information to be changed immediately after installation, and a default account whose credentials have been changed is no longer a default account the technique can abuse.
- T1078mostlyprevents — Requiring immediate change of default or temporary credentials and verifying user identity before issuing replacements limits the viability of using vendor-supplied or stolen valid accounts.
- T1110.001mostlyprevents — A.5.17's password management system enforces strong passwords, blocks common/compromised/dictionary passwords, prevents reuse, and forces first-login change — collectively making the bulk of password guessing attempts fail even though the technique still runs. The remainder is systems outside the management system's reach (legacy protocols, service accounts on static secrets, federated/SSO paths the clause does not address) and the absence of rate-limiting or lockout, which is A.8.5's territory.
- T1110.004mostlyprevents — A.5.17 directly targets credential stuffing through its prohibition on password reuse across services (user responsibility d) and its requirement that the password management system prevent use of compromised username/password combinations from hacked systems (f), which are the two mechanisms the technique exploits; the remainder is users who reuse passwords despite policy, breach databases that lag new dumps, and implementations that do not check against all known compromised credential lists.
- T1003.003partialresponds — A.5.17 mandates changing compromised passwords after a security incident, which eradicates the utility of the credentials stolen during an NTDS dump, though it does not contain the dumping activity itself.
- T1021partialprevents — A.5.17 reduces the likelihood that adversaries obtain valid credentials needed for T1021 (strong unique passwords, secure transmission, default credential changes, user confidentiality obligations), but it does not prevent the technique from running if credentials are acquired through other means such as phishing, keylogging, or third-party breaches.
- T1021.004partialprevents — A.5.17 prevents a slice of T1021.004 by requiring default SSH credentials to be changed at installation (clause e), enforcing strong passwords and blocking common/compromised passwords (password management system b, f), and mandating rotation of compromised credentials (user responsibility b) — so adversaries cannot ride default or guessable secrets into an SSH session; however, the technique is defined as using *valid* accounts, and once credentials are legitimately obtained through other means A.5.17 adds no barrier to the SSH login itself, leaving the bulk of the technique reachable.
- T1021.005partialprevents — A.5.17 prevents several vectors by which VNC credentials could be obtained or abused — default VNC passwords being left in place (item e), guessable VNC passwords (user responsibilities c, password management b/f), interception during transmission (item c, password management h), and reuse of compromised credentials (user responsibilities b) — but it does not prevent the technique when an adversary already holds valid VNC credentials obtained through other means, nor does it address VNC-specific vulnerabilities such as memory exploitation or brute force against weak VNC implementations.
- T1021.006partialresponds — A.5.17 mandates changing compromised authentication information immediately upon notification of a compromise, which eradicates the adversary's ability to establish new WinRM sessions using those credentials, though it does not terminate active sessions or contain the WinRM service itself.
- T1040partialprevents — A.5.17 requires authentication information to be transmitted securely and stored in protected form (hashed/encrypted), which prevents credential capture via network sniffing for compliant implementations; however, the control does not prevent the sniffing technique itself, only addresses authentication information rather than other sniffed data, and is a management control whose technical effect depends on implementation by controls like A.8.24.
- T1078.002partialprevents — A.5.17 prevents several acquisition vectors for domain account credentials — weak/default passwords, password reuse across services, and unchanged temporary secrets — but does not address OS credential dumping (T1003), domain controller compromise, or phishing, which are the primary means of obtaining domain credentials, and the technique's core is abusing valid accounts once obtained.
- T1078.002partialresponds — A.5.17 mandates changing compromised passwords immediately after an incident, which eradicates the adversary's ability to continue authenticating with the compromised domain account, though it does not cover other response tasks like revoking active sessions.
- T1078.003partialprevents — A.5.17 requires strong, unique, non-reused passwords and forces changes on first use and after compromise, which reduces the credential material available for abuse, but it cannot eliminate local accounts or prevent credential dumping from memory, so the technique is constrained rather than blocked.
- T1078.004partialprevents — A.5.17's password management requirements (strong passwords, preventing reuse and common passwords, secure storage/transmission) prevent some password-based cloud account compromise such as brute force and credential reuse, but the technique spans federated identity, managed identities, service principals, API keys, token theft and MFA bypass via additional cloud credentials — none of which A.5.17 addresses.
- T1110partialprevents — A.5.17 enforces strong password selection, prevents common/compromised passwords, and mandates non-guessable temporary credentials, which raises the work factor against guessing but does not eliminate the possibility of a correct guess, especially offline against a stolen hash.
- T1110.002partialprevents — A.5.17's password management system directly addresses cracking by mandating approved cryptographic hashing (making hash extraction and brute-force expensive), enforcing strong passwords (expanding the search space), and blocking common/compromised passwords (eliminating the easiest targets), but the technique runs offline against obtained hashes and can still succeed given sufficient compute, and hash theft itself is upstream of this control.
- T1110.003partialprevents — A.5.17's password management system enforces strong passwords, prevents commonly-used and compromised passwords, and forces changes at first login, which blocks the single-common-password spray from succeeding, but the control cannot prevent the adversary from attempting the spray against accounts that exist outside its enforcement scope or against services that bypass the password management system.
- T1133partialprevents — A.5.17 prevents the credential-based slice of T1133 by enforcing strong, non-default, non-reused passwords and requiring immediate change of compromised credentials, but it does not prevent the remote service from being exposed, does not stop adversaries using stolen credentials that have not been reported as compromised, and does not address unauthenticated service paths or service-vulnerability exploitation — so only a portion of the technique is closed.
- T1530partialprevents — A.5.17 addresses the credential-based subset of T1530 (strong passwords, no reuse, change on compromise, default credential rotation) but does not address the dominant vectors — cloud storage misconfigurations (public buckets, overly-broad IAM, anonymous access) and leaked credentials from source repos/logs — which the technique description identifies as the primary mechanisms.
- T1550partialresponds — A.5.17 mandates changing compromised authentication information after an incident, which eradicates the utility of stolen hashes but may not immediately revoke active tickets or session tokens.
- T1552partialprevents — Mandating secure transmission, protected storage, and non-display of passwords reduces the chance that credentials are left in clear text files, registry entries, or other unsecured locations.
- T1552.001partialprevents — A.5.17's password management system requirements (store and transmit passwords in protected form, hashing per 8.24) directly address insecure credential storage in the password management system itself, but the technique's broader scope — configuration files, source code, user-created credential stores, cloud/container credential files, and GPP — sits outside the clause's reach.
- T1552.008partialprevents — A.5.17's user-responsibility clause explicitly prohibits sharing secret authentication information with anyone and requires strong, non-reused passwords, which directly addresses the user behavior that places credentials in chat; however, it is a policy/guidance control that cannot technically prevent users from pasting credentials into Slack/Teams/email, so the rate of credential-in-chat occurrences is reduced but not eliminated, matching the shape of the A.6.3 vs T1566.001 anchor.
- T1555partialprevents — A.5.17's password management system requirements — particularly storing and transmitting passwords in protected form (h) and applying approved cryptographic hashing — directly address the storage leg of T1555, so properly hashed credentials are not yielded in usable form when an adversary extracts them; the technique runs but does not succeed, which is what `prevents` asserts. The grade is `partial` because the clause governs authentication information the organization issues and manages, not third-party password stores, browser credential vaults, or cloud secrets managers that fall under T1555, and the protection can be defeated by weak hashing algorithms, offline cracking of obtained hashes, or stores outside the clause's scope.
- T1555partialresponds — A.5.17 mandates changing compromised passwords after an incident, which eradicates the utility of the credentials stolen from the password store but does not contain the adversary's access to the store itself.
- T1556.005partialprevents — A.5.17 mandates that passwords be stored in protected form using approved cryptographic techniques, which directly prohibits the reversible encryption that T1556.005 exploits, but the control is a policy requirement that depends on implementation and does not itself enforce the Active Directory property setting.
- T1558.003partialprevents — A.5.17's password management system requirements (strong passwords, prevention of common/compromised passwords, protected storage/transmission) make the offline cracking phase of Kerberoasting harder by raising service account password strength, but the technique itself still runs — TGS tickets are still requested and obtained — and the control does not address the Kerberos encryption algorithm choice (RC4/etype 23 vs AES) that is the root enabler of the attack, nor does it specifically govern service account password policies that often sit outside standard user password rules.
- T1558.004partialprevents — A.5.17 requires strong, non-guessable passwords and prevents the use of commonly-used or compromised credentials, which reduces the likelihood of cracking the AS-REP encrypted data, but it does not enforce Kerberos preauthentication or prevent the DC from sending the vulnerable response.
- T1586partialprevents — A.5.17's password management, generation, transmission, change-on-compromise, and non-reuse rules directly block several listed compromise vectors (brute-force/reuse from dumps, weak/default creds, insecure transmission) but leave untouched purchasing credentials, insider sales, or phishing-for-credentials that bypass the technical controls.
- T1586.002partialprevents — A.5.17's requirements for non-guessable/unique credentials, secure transmission, immediate default changes, strong password enforcement, no reuse, and protection against compromised passwords directly block the brute-force, credential-dump reuse, and weak/default-password vectors for acquiring email accounts, but leave the phishing-for-credentials, purchasing, and insider-payment vectors untouched.
- T1586.003partialprevents — A.5.17 directly prevents the credential-compromise vectors named in the technique (password spraying, phishing-for-credentials, weak/default/reused/compromised passwords, insecure transmission) by mandating strong generation, secure issuance, user training, password-management enforcement, and cryptographic protection; it leaves the non-credential vectors (purchasing from third parties, stealing application access tokens, reconnaissance-driven targeting of privileged provider accounts) untouched.
- T1589partialprevents — A.5.17's requirements for non-guessable unique credentials, secure transmission, immediate default changes, strong password enforcement, no reuse, and protected storage directly stop the adversary from obtaining usable credentials or MFA details via leaks, enumeration of weak/default auth, or exposed datasets, but do not address gathering of non-credential personal data (names, emails, security questions) via phishing, social media, or scanning.
- T1589.001partialprevents — A.5.17's password management, generation, transmission, change-on-compromise, and non-reuse rules directly stop many common credential-gathering vectors (phishing elicitation, leaked defaults, reused personal/business passwords, breach dumps of weak creds) but leave untouched purchase of already-stolen credentials, MFA OTP compromise via provider breach, and cookie theft from compromised sites.
- T1598partialresponds — A.5.17 mandates the immediate change of compromised authentication information, which eradicates the utility of credentials stolen via phishing, though it does not contain the phishing campaign itself or address the theft of non-credential information.
- T1684partialprevents — A.5.17's identity verification requirement (b) before issuing new/replacement/temporary credentials directly addresses help-desk impersonation attacks seeking password resets, and the user-responsibility clauses constrain sharing of secrets, but the control does not reach the broader social engineering surface (financial approvals, malicious payload execution, voice phishing, consent-grant attacks) that T1684 covers.
- T1697partialprevents — A.5.17's user-responsibility clauses (keep authentication information confidential, change compromised credentials immediately) reduce the rate at which users disclose ASPs through social engineering, and the storage/transmission protections apply to organizational credentials, but the password management system requirements do not reach ASPs (which are managed by identity providers), and a human can still be tricked into handing one over — the same shape as the A.6.3/T1566.001 partial anchor.
- T1697partialresponds — A.5.17 mandates changing compromised authentication information upon notification, which eradicates the adversary's foothold by invalidating the stolen application-specific password, though it does not cover broader incident containment or investigation.
Prevented OWASP Web Top 10 (2025) risks (12)
OWASP Web Top 10 (2025) risk categories this ISO control helps prevent or mitigate — our analysis (mostly llm_verified).
Direction: ← other covers this;
→ this covers other (F/M/P = full / mostly /
partial). gov = governs / implements (a mandate, not coverage).
Why these map — rationale
- A07mostlyblocks — A.5.17 directly mandates generation of non-guessable unique credentials, identity verification before issuance, secure transmission, immediate change of defaults, strong-password enforcement, no reuse, protection against compromised lists, first-login forcing, and protected storage/transmission — all of which close the dominant authentication-failure vectors named in A07:2025 (weak credentials, credential stuffing, poor reset flows, session hijacking via predictable or leaked auth info).
- A02partialblocks — A.5.17 directly prevents the insecure-defaults slice of A02 by mandating immediate change of vendor/predefined defaults, non-guessable temporary secrets, strong-password enforcement, and no reuse of common/compromised passwords; it leaves the broader hardening, cloud, framework, and server misconfiguration surface untouched.
- A04partialblocks — A.5.17 mandates secure generation, transmission, storage, and change of authentication secrets (including use of approved cryptography per 8.24), which directly prevents many cryptographic failures for credentials in transit, at rest, and in use; however, the control is scoped only to authentication information and does not address the broader class of sensitive data or non-credential cryptographic misuses.
Control IDs, short titles and the structured attribute table (control type, CIA properties, cybersecurity-concept, operational capability, security domain) are facts from ISO/IEC 27001:2022 Annex A / ISO/IEC 27002:2022. The full implementation guidance prose lives in ISO/IEC 27002:2022 — not reproduced here. Cross-walks to NIST 800-53, NIST CSF 2.0, OWASP ASVS, CWE, MITRE ATT&CK and OWASP Web Top 10 are our own analysis (mostly llm_verified), not an ISO, NIST, MITRE or OWASP product — how ours compare.