Raw vector
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:NCVSS and EPSS are reproduced from their sources (NVD, FIRST EPSS). EPSS, Forum of Incident Response and Security Teams (FIRST), epss.first.org. Risk Priority is our own derived reading, not an NVD score.
Summary
CVE-2023-0737 is a medium-severity CSRF (CWE-352) vulnerability in Wallabag. Its CVSS base score is 6.5 (Medium).
Operationally, exploitation aligns with the MITRE ATT&CK technique Create Account (T1136); ranked at the 26th percentile by exploit likelihood (below the median); it is not currently listed in the CISA KEV catalog; a public proof-of-concept is referenced.
The strongest mitigations our analysis identified map to AC-3 (Access Enforcement) and SC-23 (Session Authenticity) — see the control section below for these in your framework.
OWASP Top 10 for Web (2025)
EU & UK References
- 🇪🇺 ENISA EUVD: EUVD-2024-3229
Vulnerability Data
wallabag version 2.5.2 contains a Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF) vulnerability that allows attackers to arbitrarily delete user accounts via the /account/delete endpoint. This issue is fixed in version 2.5.4.
- CWE(s)
Related Threats
MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise Techniques
MITRE ATT&CK v20.0
CVEs Like This One
Affected Assets
Mitigating Controls
Control response
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V3.3.2V3.5.1V10.2.1
Mitigating Controls (NIST 800-53 r5)
Our mappings, made for this CVE.
Access enforcement requires verifying that state-changing requests originate from the authenticated user rather than a forged cross-site source.
Protecting session authenticity prevents attackers from replaying or forging authenticated requests via the victim's browser.
Mitigating Controls (NIST CSF 2.0)
Our mappings, derived directly from the weakness types (CWEs) cited in the NVD entry via our CWE→CSF cross-walk — links open the control.
Secure SDLC practices directly require anti-CSRF controls such as tokens or SameSite attributes.
Mitigating Controls (ISO/IEC 27001:2022 Annex A)
Our mappings, derived directly from the weakness types (CWEs) cited in the NVD entry via our CWE→ISO cross-walk — links open the control.
A.8.29's combined programme of code review, SAST, and penetration testing reaches CSRF through both source and runtime channels: missing tokens and unprotected state-changing endpoints are standard SAST and pen-test findings. The remainder is bounded and nameable — subtle flaws in token validation logic, referer-checking bypasses, and CSRF in less common frameworks or non-HTML endpoints that automated tools flag inconsistently.
Training developers about CSRF and the need for tokens/SameSite cookies reduces instances where the weakness arises from ignorance, but CSRF is a specific implementation defect requiring correct technical countermeasures, and trained developers still introduce it through flawed token validation or missing protections — a minority effect, matching the A.6.3 -> CWE-598 anchor at the same rung.
A.8.28 mandates secure design, threat modelling, secure coding standards and SAST, which a well-implemented programme would extend to CSRF countermeasures (tokens, SameSite, Origin checks), but as a practice-mandating clause the actual coverage depends on implementation rigour, leaving a nameable remainder of instances where CSRF defences are not adopted.
A.8.30 carries its effect through the secure-development practices its contract requires of the supplier (8.25 to 8.29), so it reduces ordinary software weaknesses in delivered code the way those practices do; CSRF is such a weakness, addressed when the supplier implements CSRF tokens and other protections under contracted secure coding/testing, but the effect is fallible and depends on the supplier's implementation, matching the A.8.30 -> CWE-134 anchor at the clause's declared ceiling of `partial`.
A.8.8's reach is published advisories and component inventory; CSRF is overwhelmingly a first-party application design flaw, so A.8.8 only discovers it where it has already been published as a CVE in a third-party component (e.g., a web framework or CMS), which is a minority of latent CSRF instances — the same disclosure-bounded logic that graded A.8.8 -> CWE-89 at `partial`.