CVE-2026-0169
Raw vector
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:HCVSS and EPSS are reproduced from their sources (NVD, FIRST EPSS). EPSS, Forum of Incident Response and Security Teams (FIRST), epss.first.org. Risk Priority is our own derived reading, not an NVD score.
Summary
CVE-2026-0169 is a high-severity Active Debug Code (CWE-489) vulnerability in Android (inferred from references). Its CVSS base score is 8.4 (High).
Operationally, exploitation aligns with the MITRE ATT&CK technique Office Test (T1137.002); ranked at the 3th percentile by exploit likelihood (below the median); it is not currently listed in the CISA KEV catalog.
OWASP Top 10 for Web (2025)
EU & UK References
- 🇪🇺 ENISA EUVD: EUVD-2026-122694
Vulnerability Data
In multiple functions of Android.bp, there is a possible way to bind to a privileged debug overlay service due to test or debugging code. This could lead to local escalation of privilege with no additional execution privileges needed. User interaction…
more
is not needed for exploitation.
- CWE(s)
Related Threats
MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise Techniques
MITRE ATT&CK v20.0
Affected Assets
Mitigating Controls
Likely Mitigating Controls
Our mappings. Per-CVE control mapping for this CVE has not run yet; the list below is derived from the weakness types (CWEs) cited in the NVD entry.
Minimal functionality precludes inclusion of active debug code or diagnostic interfaces.
Mitigating Controls (NIST CSF 2.0)
Our mappings, derived directly from the weakness types (CWEs) cited in the NVD entry via our CWE→CSF cross-walk — links open the control.
Secure SDLC practices directly require removal of debug code before release, covering most of this weakness while the control addresses many other development issues.
Mitigating Controls (ISO/IEC 27001:2022 Annex A)
Our mappings, derived directly from the weakness types (CWEs) cited in the NVD entry via our CWE→ISO cross-walk — links open the control.
Security testing in development and acceptance catches active debug code before deployment.
Configuration management can disable or remove debug features through hardened baselines.
A.5.21's guidance item (f) explicitly includes penetration testing of delivered ICT products as a validation method, and item (i) seeks assurance products function without unwanted features — both can surface externally accessible debug interfaces or backdoors. However, the control's primary mechanism is supply-chain governance (contractual requirements, attestations, monitoring for tampering), and most active debug code is internal code paths or configuration that runtime testing does not reach; the control does not mandate source review of supplier code, so the share of latent instances found is a minority.
A.8.20's firewalls, network authentication and segregation can block external network access to debug interfaces, denying the attacker use of the weakness over part of the path, but the debug code remains present and exploitable from within the network or via any interface the controls do not reach.
Secure coding standards explicitly prohibit leaving debug code active in production.
A.8.30's programme requires the supplier to implement secure development and testing practices (8.25–8.29), acceptance testing, and evidence of testing for malicious content and known vulnerabilities, which would surface active debug code through SAST, code review, and acceptance testing; however, the clause is a contractual/process control whose effect is mediated through supplier compliance and evidence documentation rather than direct testing, so only a minority of instances are reliably found.