A.5.21 Organizational
Managing information security in the ICT supply chain
Structured attributes from ISO/IEC 27002:2022 — control type · CIA properties · cybersecurity concept · operational capability · security domain. What do these mean?
Mapped NIST 800-53 r5 controls (29)
Our reading (mostly llm_verified) of how this ISO control and each NIST 800-53 control relate. Not an ISO or NIST product.
Direction: ← other covers this;
→ this covers other (F/M/P = full / mostly /
partial). gov = governs / implements (a mandate, not coverage).
Why these map — rationale
- SR-2domain mandategoverns — A.5.21's policy-level mandate to maintain agreed security levels throughout supplier relationships directly owns the supply-chain-risk-management domain that SR-2's plan operationalizes.
- SR-3domain mandategoverns — A.5.21's governance objective to maintain agreed security levels in supplier relationships directly mandates the domain of supply chain risk processes that SR-3 operationalizes, without naming the specific control.
- SR-4domain mandategoverns — A.5.21's governance objective of maintaining agreed security levels in the ICT supply chain directly encompasses the domain of provenance tracking for supplier-provided systems/components/data as one established means of assurance.
- SR-6domain mandategoverns — A.5.21's governance objective of maintaining agreed security levels in supplier relationships directly encompasses the supply-chain risk assessment domain that SR-6 operationalizes.
Aligned NIST CSF 2.0 outcomes (22)
NIST CSF 2.0 outcomes this ISO control aligns with — our analysis (mostly llm_verified).
Direction: ← other covers this;
→ this covers other (F/M/P = full / mostly /
partial). gov = governs / implements (a mandate, not coverage).
Why these map — rationale
- GV.SC-01mostlycovers — The ISO control establishes a comprehensive ICT supply-chain security program that includes objectives, policies, and processes for managing supplier-related risks.
- GV.SC-05mostlycovers — It requires security requirements to be defined, prioritized, and embedded into supplier contracts and acquisition processes.
- GV.SC-07mostlycovers — The control mandates understanding, recording, and prioritizing risks from suppliers, their products, and sub-suppliers throughout the chain.
- GV.SC-03partialcovers — A.5.21's focus on maintaining agreed security levels in supplier relationships addresses only a slice of GV.SC-03's broader integration of supply chain risk into enterprise risk, assessment, and improvement processes.
- ID.RA-09domain mandategoverns — A.5.21's governance mandate to maintain agreed security levels in the ICT supply chain directly encompasses the pre-acquisition authenticity/integrity assessment named in ID.RA-09 as a core means within that domain
Related OWASP ASVS 5.0 requirements (11)
Application-security verification requirements (OWASP ASVS 5.0) this ISO control aligns with; links open the ASVS chapter. Our analysis (mostly llm_verified) — many ISO controls have no ASVS counterpart.
Direction: ← other covers this;
→ this covers other (F/M/P = full / mostly /
partial). gov = governs / implements (a mandate, not coverage).
Related weaknesses / CWE (3233)
Weakness classes this ISO control helps prevent or mitigate — our analysis (mostly llm_verified).
Direction: ← other covers this;
→ this covers other (F/M/P = full / mostly /
partial). gov = governs / implements (a mandate, not coverage).
Why these map — rationale
- CWE-1104mostlyfinds — A.5.21's supply chain programme requires suppliers to disclose component information (item d), tracks component lifecycle and end-of-availability risks (item m), and identifies critical components requiring scrutiny (item g) — a well-implemented programme builds a component inventory with maintenance status that surfaces most unmaintained third-party components, with a bounded remainder (sub-components the prime supplier does not track, status changes the supplier fails to notify).
- CWE-1068partialfinds — A.5.21's supplier validation, penetration testing, and attestation processes can surface externally observable mismatches between documented security functions/requirements and delivered behavior, but without source-level design review most internal implementation-versus-documentation inconsistencies latent in supplied code go unfound.
- CWE-1104partialblocks — Periodic validation, certification demands, and life-cycle monitoring of supplier components help surface and replace unmaintained third-party elements before they become exploitable liabilities.
- CWE-1242partialprevents — A.5.21 item (i) directly requires assurance that delivered ICT products function 'without any unexpected or unwanted features,' and item (f) supports validation via penetration testing and third-party attestations, so a well-implemented clause places contractual and validation pressure on suppliers that prevents chicken bits/undocumented features from arriving in many delivered products; the remainder is the supplier's internal architecture and implementation choices, which sit outside the acquiring organisation's direct control and can escape both contractual coverage and validation depth.
- CWE-1329partialfinds — A.5.21's supply chain management mechanisms — particularly item (d) requesting software component information, item (g) identifying critical components, and item (m) managing ICT component life cycle and availability — can surface some non-updateable components through supplier questionnaires and life cycle tracking, but the clause has no SOURCE or RUNTIME reach and relies on supplier-disclosed information, leaving first-party design decisions and undocumented cases outside its discovery scope.
- CWE-1392partialfinds — A.5.21's monitoring process (item f) explicitly names penetration testing and validation of third-party attestations as methods for validating delivered ICT products, and these are standard routes for finding default credentials in third-party products; however, the reach is bounded to products that go through this validation, the validation is typically sample-based rather than comprehensive, and the control is a process/contractual layer that requires and supervises the testing rather than performing continuous discovery itself, leaving a nameable remainder of products and authentication surfaces outside its validation scope.
- CWE-1393partialfinds — A.5.21(f) explicitly names penetration testing of delivered ICT products as a validation method, which is a real mechanism for finding default passwords in procured products when 'no default passwords' is a stated requirement; however, this reach is bounded to products the organization procures and chooses to test, and does not extend to first-party code or to procured products outside the validation scope, leaving a nameable remainder of latent instances undiscovered.
- CWE-494partialblocks — Mandating integrity checks, digital signatures, and origin tracing for ICT components directly reduces the chance that code or firmware lacking an integrity check will be accepted into the organisation’s environment.
- CWE-507partialfinds — A.5.21's mechanisms reach a minority of trojan horse instances: penetration testing and monitoring for unexpected/unwanted features (i) can surface some behavioral trojans, and hash verification plus anti-tamper (j) catches altered components, but a trojan designed into the original product by a malicious supplier evades specification-based validation, and Common Criteria evaluation (k) reaches only a small fraction of acquired ICT products.
- CWE-507partialprevents — A.5.21's guidance (i) requires assurance that delivered ICT products function as expected without unexpected or unwanted features, and (j) mandates prevention and detection of tampering during multiple SDLC stages using anti-tamper labels, cryptographic hash verifications, and digital signatures — both directly aimed at Trojan Horse functionality. However, the clause works through supplier relationships and validation methods (penetration testing, third-party attestations) that have inherent limits and cannot guarantee against sophisticated hidden malicious code, leaving a nameable remainder.
- CWE-508partialfinds — A.5.21's mechanisms — penetration testing of delivered products (item f), integrity verification via cryptographic hashes and digital signatures (item j), and monitoring for unexpected features (item i) — can surface some non-replicating malicious code in supplier deliverables, but these are incidental finding routes within a supply-chain management control, not a systematic malware-discovery programme; the remainder is bounded: malicious code that does not manifest as exploitable behaviour, does not involve tampering detectable by integrity checks, and does not produce observable anomalies is not found.
- CWE-510partialfinds — A.5.21's programme includes penetration testing of delivered products (item f), monitoring for unexpected or unwanted features (item i), and certification requirements (item k) such as Common Criteria, which can surface some trapdoors—particularly those discoverable through black-box testing or present in formally evaluated products. However, the control operates at the supplier-relationship level and its reach is primarily disclosure-based (supplier attestations, SBOMs) and runtime-based (pen testing), not source-based; well-hidden trapdoors designed to be invisible to external testing and not present in products undergoing high-assurance evaluation will not be found, and trapdoors rarely surface as CVEs, so the disclosed share is small.
- CWE-511partialprevents — A.5.21's guidance items (i) assurance against unexpected/unwanted features, (j) tamper detection, (f) monitoring/validation including penetration testing, and (k) certification provide mechanisms that can prevent some logic/time bombs from being delivered, but the control does not reach into the supplier's development practices to stop the code from being written, and detection has limits against well-hidden triggers.
- CWE-512partialprevents — A.5.21's item (i) directly addresses 'unexpected or unwanted features' and item (j) addresses tampering, so a well-implemented supply-chain control can prevent spyware introduced as a deliberate supplier feature or via tampered components through contractual requirements and pre-delivery validation; however, the control's mechanism is procedural/contractual rather than direct technical prevention, and it does not reach spyware introduced post-acquisition, through channels outside the supplier relationship, or where validation methods (penetration testing, attestation) fail to detect hidden collection behaviour.
- CWE-521partialfinds — A.5.21's supplier security requirements and validation methods can surface weak password requirements in acquired ICT products, but it does not systematically reach internally developed or legacy deployed software, so it finds only a minority of instances.
- CWE-603partialfinds — A.5.21's programme includes penetration testing of delivered products and validation of third-party attestations (item f), plus Common Criteria evaluation evidence (item k), which can discover client-side-only authentication in acquired ICT products; however, coverage is bounded to products the organization chooses to validate, authentication mechanisms the tests actually exercise, and attestations whose scope reaches this design property, leaving a nameable remainder of instances the supply-chain programme never inspects.
- CWE-829partialprevents — A.5.21's supply chain controls — vetting suppliers, requiring propagation of security practices, validating component genuineness via hash/signature checks, demanding SBOM-like disclosure, and verifying no unexpected features (items a, b, c, d, i, j, k) — prevent the supply-chain vector of CWE-829 where a malicious or compromised component enters through procurement; the bounded remainder is the non-supply-chain modes of the weakness (runtime inclusion of external web widgets, PHP/file-inclusion vulnerabilities, dynamic loading from untrusted sources at runtime), which the clause does not reach.
- CWE-829partialfinds — A.5.21's validation mechanisms — penetration testing of delivered products (f), component disclosure requirements (d), and assurance about no unexpected or unwanted features (i) — can surface some CWE-829 instances where untrusted-sphere functionality is externally observable or listed in supplier disclosures, but the remainder is bounded: latent inclusions not exercised by penetration tests, components not declared in supplier bills of materials, and functionality deeply embedded without externally visible behaviour are outside the clause's reach.
Mitigated MITRE ATT&CK techniques (523)
Adversary techniques (MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise) this ISO control helps mitigate; links open attack.mitre.org. Our analysis (mostly llm_verified).
Direction: ← other covers this;
→ this covers other (F/M/P = full / mostly /
partial). gov = governs / implements (a mandate, not coverage).
Prevented OWASP Web Top 10 (2025) risks (4)
OWASP Web Top 10 (2025) risk categories this ISO control helps prevent or mitigate — our analysis (mostly llm_verified).
Direction: ← other covers this;
→ this covers other (F/M/P = full / mostly /
partial). gov = governs / implements (a mandate, not coverage).
Control IDs, short titles and the structured attribute table (control type, CIA properties, cybersecurity-concept, operational capability, security domain) are facts from ISO/IEC 27001:2022 Annex A / ISO/IEC 27002:2022. The full implementation guidance prose lives in ISO/IEC 27002:2022 — not reproduced here. Cross-walks to NIST 800-53, NIST CSF 2.0, OWASP ASVS, CWE, MITRE ATT&CK and OWASP Web Top 10 are our own analysis (mostly llm_verified), not an ISO, NIST, MITRE or OWASP product — how ours compare.