Security Resilience

CWE · MITRE source

CWE-829Inclusion of Functionality from Untrusted Control Sphere

Abstraction: Base · CVEs in our corpus: 365

The product imports, requires, or includes executable functionality (such as a library) from a source that is outside of the intended control sphere.

Last updated: 16 October 2026 00:29 UTC

Cumulative inbound coverage

How completely the frameworks we cross-walk collectively cover this — the verdict is the strongest single mapping (overlapping partials are not summed); breadth shows the corroboration behind it.

Collective: partial · 12 mapping(s) from 7 framework(s): ATT&CK 6 (partial) · STIG oracle linux 8 1 (partial) · STIG oracle linux 9 1 (partial) · STIG rhel 7 1 (partial) · STIG rhel 8 1 (partial) · STIG rhel 9 1 (partial) · STIG windows 10 1 (partial)

See the full cumulative-coverage rollup →

OWASP Top 10 for Web (2025)

This weakness contributes to A08:2025 Software or Data Integrity Failures.

Control responseHuman-reviewed

Answering this weakness across the control lifecycle, from our framework cross-walks.

Prevent
Stop it (NIST 800-53 / CSF Protect)
  • SA-1 Policy and Procedures
  • SA-12 Supply Chain Protection
  • SA-13 Trustworthiness
  • SA-19 Component Authenticity
Detect
Catch it (CSF Detect / Respond)

—

Harden
Shrink the surface (DISA STIG)
  • 6 hardening rules · 6 OS baselines
Validate
Prove the fix (OWASP ASVS)
  • V14.2.3
  • V3.5.6
  • V9.1.3
  • V15.3.2

NIST 800-53 r5 controls PROPOSED for this weakness (27)AI-assisted

These are model PROPOSALS, not graded mappings. They come from controls_to_cwe_proposals, which carries no grade field at all; across the CWE pages 1,540 of 1,722 such associations (89%) have never been graded by anything. The heading said “address” until 2026-09-29, which asserted a relationship the data does not carry. Graded cross-walks are on the framework map, not here.

Showing the 14 most specific. Generic controls that address many weakness types are collapsed below.

Control Title Family Why it addresses this CWE
SR-3Supply Chain Controls and ProcessesSRgraded partial Requiring vetted sources and controls for system components prevents inclusion of functionality obtained from untrusted control spheres.
SR-4ProvenanceSRgraded mostly Documenting component provenance ensures functionality is only included from verified, trusted control spheres rather than untrusted ones.
SA-1Policy and ProceduresSAProcedures can mandate supply-chain vetting and restrictions on functionality obtained from untrusted third-party or external control spheres.
SA-12Supply Chain ProtectionSARequires use of trusted sources and provenance tracking, tangibly limiting inclusion of functionality from untrusted control spheres.
SA-13TrustworthinessSALimits inclusion of functionality from untrusted sources through supply-chain and component trustworthiness evaluation before integration.
SR-1Policy and ProceduresSRSupply chain policy and procedures require vetting of external components and suppliers, directly reducing the likelihood of incorporating functionality from untrusted sources.
SC-18Mobile CodeSCDefining acceptable mobile code technologies and authorizing their use prevents inclusion of functionality from untrusted control spheres.
SC-29HeterogeneitySCDiversity of sources and implementations limits the blast radius when functionality is drawn from untrusted control spheres.
SC-35External Malicious Code IdentificationSCExternal identification of malicious code makes inclusion of functionality from untrusted network sources substantially harder to perform undetected.
CM-8System Component InventoryCMThe inventory process requires identifying and recording the origin of all components, making inclusion of functionality from untrusted control spheres easier to detect during reviews.
MA-3Maintenance ToolsMARequiring approval and monitoring of maintenance tools prevents inclusion and execution of functionality obtained from untrusted sources.
MP-7Media UseMPUnowned portable devices represent untrusted control spheres; the prohibition prevents inclusion of functionality or data from such sources.
PM-30Supply Chain Risk Management StrategyPMStrategy mandates assessment of third-party components and suppliers, directly reducing inclusion of functionality from untrusted control spheres.
SI-3Malicious Code ProtectionSIDetects and prevents inclusion of malicious functionality downloaded from untrusted control spheres.
Show 13 more broadly-applicable controls
SA-19Component AuthenticitySAMandates acquisition only from trusted suppliers and verified authentic sources, reducing inclusion of functionality from untrusted control spheres.
SA-20Customized Development of Critical ComponentsSAReimplementing critical components avoids pulling in functionality from untrusted external control spheres.
SA-4Acquisition ProcessSAAllocation of supply-chain risk management responsibilities and vetting of the development/operational environment reduce inclusion of functionality from untrusted control spheres.
SA-6Software Usage RestrictionsSASoftware usage restrictions limit inclusion of code obtained from untrusted or non-contracted control spheres.
SA-7User-installed SoftwareSAPrevents inclusion of code or functionality obtained from an untrusted user or external source.
SA-9External System ServicesSADefining oversight, roles, and compliance monitoring for external services directly mitigates risks of including functionality from an untrusted control sphere.
SR-10Inspection of Systems or ComponentsSRInspection can detect malicious functionality that was included from an untrusted sphere through tampering or supply-chain attack.
SR-11Component AuthenticitySRAnti-counterfeit procedures directly block inclusion of components originating from untrusted supply-chain actors.
SR-2Supply Chain Risk Management PlanSRThe control directly mandates assessment and mitigation of risks from external suppliers, reducing inclusion of functionality from untrusted control spheres.
SR-5Acquisition Strategies, Tools, and MethodsSRProcurement methods and contract requirements can mandate use of vetted, controlled sources instead of arbitrary third-party or untrusted control spheres.
SR-6Supplier Assessments and ReviewsSRSupplier assessments directly reduce the likelihood of incorporating functionality from untrusted third-party control spheres.
SR-8Notification AgreementsSRAgreements establish channels for suppliers to report integrity or compromise issues in included third-party functionality, shrinking the window for exploitation.
SC-44Detonation ChambersSCIsolated execution prevents functionality from an untrusted sphere from affecting the real environment, allowing safe behavioral inspection.

Top CVEs of this weakness type, ranked by Risk Priority

CVE Risk CVSS EPSS Published
CVE-2018-17246 9.99.80.82252018-12-20
CVE-2026-0770 KEV 9.99.80.63012026-01-23
CVE-2025-32463 KEV 9.29.30.55502025-06-30
CVE-2024-38476 9.19.80.41612024-07-01
CVE-2020-16152 9.09.80.35522021-11-14
CVE-2023-2249 8.98.80.60812023-06-09
CVE-2024-57628.78.10.71602024-08-21
CVE-2010-2076 8.29.80.09792010-08-19
CVE-2018-7422 8.27.50.62252018-03-19
CVE-2004-0030 8.19.80.07352004-01-20
CVE-2004-0285 8.19.80.07792004-11-23
CVE-2020-3794 8.19.80.07142020-03-25
CVE-2022-1161 8.010.00.05212022-04-11
CVE-2019-13589 7.99.80.04352019-07-14
CVE-2020-4561 7.910.00.02942021-06-01
CVE-2017-5397 7.89.80.03762018-06-11
CVE-2012-4919 7.89.80.02862020-01-22
CVE-2021-21804 7.89.80.03702021-07-16
CVE-2017-1376 7.79.80.02632017-08-29
CVE-2020-8128 7.79.80.02692020-02-14
CVE-2020-25414 7.79.80.02032021-06-17
CVE-2026-443597.610.00.01802026-07-20
CVE-2021-41037 7.510.00.00852022-07-08
CVE-2023-4488 7.59.80.01092023-10-20
CVE-2025-70974 7.510.00.00762026-01-09