Raw vector
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:NCVSS and EPSS are reproduced from their sources (NVD, FIRST EPSS). EPSS, Forum of Incident Response and Security Teams (FIRST), epss.first.org. Risk Priority is our own derived reading, not an NVD score.
Summary
CVE-2026-106399 is a low-severity Out-of-bounds Read (CWE-125) vulnerability in Google Chrome. Its CVSS base score is 3.3 (Low).
Operationally, exploitation aligns with the MITRE ATT&CK technique Endpoint Denial of Service (T1499); ranked at the 0.8th percentile by exploit likelihood (below the median); it is not currently listed in the CISA KEV catalog.
The strongest mitigations our analysis identified map to SA-11 (Developer Testing and Evaluation) and SA-8 (Security and Privacy Engineering Principles) — see the control section below for these in your framework.
EU & UK References
- 🇪🇺 ENISA EUVD: EUVD-2026-93615
Vulnerability Data
Out of bounds read in Skia in Google Chrome prior to 155.0.8059.39 allowed a local attacker leveraging social engineering to potentially read memory via a crafted file. (Chromium security severity: Low)
- CWE(s)
Related Threats
MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise Techniques
MITRE ATT&CK v20.0
CVEs Like This One
Affected Assets
Mitigating Controls
Mitigating Controls (NIST 800-53 r5)
Our mappings, made for this CVE.
Developer testing and evaluation directly finds out-of-bounds read flaws through static analysis, fuzzing, and dynamic bounds checks.
Secure engineering principles require bounds checking and memory-safe constructs that stop out-of-bounds reads from being introduced.
Input validation rejects malformed indices or lengths that would otherwise cause reads outside buffer bounds.
Mitigating Controls (NIST CSF 2.0)
Our mappings, derived directly from the weakness types (CWEs) cited in the NVD entry via our CWE→CSF cross-walk — links open the control.
Secure-development practices such as bounds checking and memory-safe languages directly prevent out-of-bounds reads.
Vulnerability scanning and recording can discover instances of out-of-bounds reads after code is deployed.
Routine patching replaces vulnerable code containing out-of-bounds read flaws.
Mitigating Controls (ISO/IEC 27001:2022 Annex A)
Our mappings, derived directly from the weakness types (CWEs) cited in the NVD entry via our CWE→ISO cross-walk — links open the control.
Security testing in development and acceptance includes fuzzing and static analysis that detect out-of-bounds read defects before release.
A.5.26's post-incident root cause analysis (item i) and vulnerability identification (item j) explicitly aim to find the specific weakness that caused an incident, so OOB reads that triggered observable incidents (crashes, data leaks) are identified through forensic and root-cause work; however, only a minority of latent OOB reads in deployed code cause observable incidents, leaving the bulk of the class outside this incident-driven reach.
A.6.3's education and training of technical teams can raise developer awareness of memory-safety practices (bounds checking, length validation) and reduce some out-of-bounds read introductions, but training is fallible and the strongest controls for this implementation-phase defect are secure coding (A.8.28) and security testing (A.8.29), so the effect is a minority one.
Secure coding standards explicitly forbid unsafe pointer arithmetic and mandate bounds-checked reads, eliminating CWE-125.
A.8.8's reach is DISCLOSURE — it surfaces OOB reads only where they appear as published CVEs in third-party components in the asset inventory. CWE-125 commonly surfaces as CVEs (Heartbleed, kernel/IP-stack bugs), so a real share is found, but first-party OOB reads and un-disclosed instances are outside the clause's reach, capping the rung at `partial`.