CVE-2026-115731
RCE in Puppet 8.0.0 – 8.22.2
Raw vector
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:XCVSS and EPSS are reproduced from their sources (NVD, FIRST EPSS). EPSS, Forum of Incident Response and Security Teams (FIRST), epss.first.org. Risk Priority is our own derived reading, not an NVD score.
Summary
CVE-2026-115731 is a critical-severity Code Injection (CWE-94) vulnerability in Puppet. Its CVSS base score is 9.4 (Critical).
Operationally, exploitation aligns with the MITRE ATT&CK technique Exploitation for Privilege Escalation (T1068); ranked in the top 46% of CVEs by exploit likelihood; CISA has added it to the Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog.
The strongest mitigations our analysis identified map to SA-11 (Developer Testing and Evaluation) and SI-10 (Information Input Validation) — see the control section below for these in your framework.
OWASP Top 10 for Web (2025)
Advisories
EU & UK References
- 🇪🇺 ENISA EUVD: EUVD-2026-116495
Vulnerability Data
Deserialization of untrusted data in the report-processing code of Puppet, as used by Puppet Server, in the affected releases, allows a client that holds any CA-signed agent certificate to execute arbitrary code on the Puppet Server as its service user…
more
by submitting a report containing a crafted rich-data type via PUT request. Where the certificate authority autosigns requests without strong verification, an unauthenticated network attacker can obtain such a certificate.
- CWE(s)
- KEV Date Added
- 17 November 2026
Related Threats
MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise Techniques
MITRE ATT&CK v20.0
CVEs Like This One
Affected Assets
Mitigating Controls
Control response
—
—
—
V1.3.1
Mitigating Controls (NIST 800-53 r5)
Our mappings, made for this CVE.
Developer testing and evaluation finds code paths that accept and execute externally influenced strings.
Input validation directly stops untrusted data from being used to construct executable code without neutralization.
Requiring documented secure development standards and tools enforces use of safe code-generation APIs and escaping.
Engineering principles such as safe deserialization and input sanitization structurally prevent the weakness from being introduced.
Integrity verification tools can detect malformed or tampered serialized data after the fact.
Mitigating Controls (NIST CSF 2.0)
Our mappings, derived directly from the weakness types (CWEs) cited in the NVD entry via our CWE→CSF cross-walk — links open the control.
PR.PS-06's SDLC practices directly target injection flaws via secure coding and testing (mostly), yet as a single broad outcome it leaves many code-generation specifics unaddressed (partial).
Mitigating Controls (ISO/IEC 27001:2022 Annex A)
Our mappings, derived directly from the weakness types (CWEs) cited in the NVD entry via our CWE→ISO cross-walk — links open the control.
A.8.29's programme of code review, static analysis, dynamic testing and penetration testing is the complete pre-production discovery set for code injection: eval/dynamic-execution sinks are visible to SAST, code review catches them, and penetration testing reaches the externally exploitable instances, with no nameable remainder.
Training technical teams in secure coding practices (per A.6.3's education and training guidance) helps developers avoid constructing code from untrusted input without neutralization, but the effect is a minority one because the clause mandates a general awareness/training practice rather than a specific secure-coding mechanism, and developers remain fallible.
Banning unapproved code samples and unauthenticated web services, combined with secure-coding standards and SAST, prevents the dynamic generation or inclusion of attacker-supplied code.
A.8.30 carries its effect through the secure-development practices its contract requires of the supplier (8.25 to 8.29), so it reduces ordinary software weaknesses like code injection in delivered code the way those practices do, at `partial` -- the effect depends on the supplier's faithful implementation of those practices, which is fallible, and the clause sits at its declared ceiling of `partial` on this verb.
A.8.8's reach is DISCLOSURE — it sees only instances that carry a vendor-published flaw in third-party components. CWE-94 (code injection) does surface as CVEs in some libraries and frameworks, so A.8.8 finds that minority; the bulk of code injection lives in first-party code (eval(), dynamic code generation in the organization's own application), which A.8.8 does not reach — that is the job of SAST/DAST under A.8.29.