CVE-2026-44310
Raw vector
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:LSummary
CVE-2026-44310 is a medium-severity Improper Validation of Array Index (CWE-129) vulnerability. Its CVSS base score is 5.4 (Medium).
Operationally, exploitation aligns with the MITRE ATT&CK technique Exploitation for Privilege Escalation (T1068); ranked at the 2th percentile by exploit likelihood (below the median); it is not currently listed in the CISA KEV catalog.
The strongest mitigations our analysis identified map to SA-11 (Developer Testing and Evaluation) — see the control section below for these in your framework.
OWASP Top 10 for Web (2025)
EU & UK References
- 🇪🇺 ENISA EUVD: EUVD-2026-30564
Vulnerability Data
Gitsign is a keyless Sigstore to signing tool for Git commits with your a GitHub / OIDC identity. From 0.4.0 to before 0.15.0, CertVerifier.Verify() in pkg/git/verifier.go unconditionally dereferences certs[0] after sd.GetCertificates() without checking the slice length. A CMS/PKCS7 signed message…
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with an empty certificate set is a structurally valid DER payload; GetCertificates() returns an empty slice with no error, causing an immediate index-out-of-range panic. On the gitsign --verify code path (the GPG-compatible mode invoked by git verify-commit), the panic is silently recovered by internal/io/streams.go's Wrap() function, which returns nil instead of an error. main.go then exits with code 0, causing exit-code-only verification callers to interpret the failed verification as success. This vulnerability is fixed in 0.15.0.
- CWE(s)
Related Threats
MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise Techniques
CVEs Like This One
Affected Assets
Mitigating Controls
Mitigating Controls (NIST 800-53 r5) AI
Developer testing and evaluation will surface code paths that detect errors yet perform no subsequent action.
Mitigating Controls (NIST CSF 2.0) AI
Derived directly from the weakness types (CWEs) cited in the NVD entry via our AI-authored CWE→CSF cross-walk (authority under review) — links open the control.
Declaring incidents when criteria are met forces action on detected errors; eliminating the weakness helps but does not define the criteria themselves.
Secure SDLC practices directly require input validation and bounds checking that prevent improper array indexing.
Triaging and validating reports compels follow-up on detections; removing the weakness supports but does not replace triage processes.
Analysis of detected events directly counters ignoring them, but does not guarantee every error condition is covered.
Monitoring produces detections, yet supplies no requirement to act on them.
Generating logs enables later action but does not enforce handling of each error condition.
Mitigating Controls (ISO/IEC 27001:2022 Annex A) AI
Derived directly from the weakness types (CWEs) cited in the NVD entry via our AI-authored CWE→ISO cross-walk (authority under review) — links open the control.
Security testing in development can detect out-of-bounds array access but does not prevent the weakness by itself.
Logging captures error conditions but does not guarantee subsequent handling or remediation.
Monitoring activities can detect errors, yet without defined response procedures the weakness persists.
Secure development lifecycle mandates input validation and bounds checking that directly prevents improper array indexing.
Application security requirements include validation of untrusted input used for indexing or addressing memory structures.
Secure architecture principles encourage defensive coding patterns that reduce index-related vulnerabilities.