A.8.15 Technological
Logging
Structured attributes from ISO/IEC 27002:2022 — control type · CIA properties · cybersecurity concept · operational capability · security domain. What do these mean?
Mapped NIST 800-53 r5 controls (26)
Our reading (mostly llm_verified) of how this ISO control and each NIST 800-53 control relate. Not an ISO or NIST product.
Direction: ← other covers this;
→ this covers other (F/M/P = full / mostly /
partial). gov = governs / implements (a mandate, not coverage).
Why these map — rationale
- AU-2fullcovers — A.8.15's core requirement to record events and generate evidence directly accounts for the entirety of AU-2's identification, coordination, and specification of event types for logging; nothing in the target sits outside the source.
- AU-3mostlycovers — A.8.15's requirement to record events and generate evidence (with integrity and access controls) directly accounts for the bulk of au-3's mandated content fields that establish what/when/where/source/outcome/identity, but a residual of au-3's explicit, enumerated detail-level prescription sits outside the higher-level ISO wording.
- AU-9mostlycovers — A.8.15's explicit requirements to ensure log integrity and prevent unauthorized access directly implement the core protection of audit information in AU-9, but AU-9's separate alerting-on-tampering obligation sits outside what A.8.15 records.
- AU-11partialcovers — A.8.15's purpose includes generating evidence, identifying events, and supporting investigations, which overlaps with au-11's retention-for-investigations goal, but does not address the distinct retention-duration, regulatory, or organizational requirements that form the bulk of au-11.
- AU-6partialcovers — A.8.15's broad logging purposes (record events, generate evidence, ensure integrity, prevent unauthorized access, identify events, support investigations) address only a slice of AU-6's specific requirements for ongoing review, analysis, reporting of audit records, and risk-based adjustment of that process.
- AU-8partialcovers — A.8.15's broad mandate to record events and generate evidence reaches the requirement to produce timestamps on audit records, but says nothing about clock synchronization, UTC/offset representation, or accuracy parameters that dominate au-8.
Aligned NIST CSF 2.0 outcomes (25)
NIST CSF 2.0 outcomes this ISO control aligns with — our analysis (mostly llm_verified).
Direction: ← other covers this;
→ this covers other (F/M/P = full / mostly /
partial). gov = governs / implements (a mandate, not coverage).
Why these map — rationale
- PR.PS-04fullcovers — The ISO control mandates generation and protection of event logs that capture user, system, and security-relevant activity, directly satisfying the CSF requirement to produce logs for continuous monitoring.
- DE.AE-02impliedimplements — A.8.15 logging directly supplies the raw records whose analysis is DE.AE-02; the technical logging control therefore gives operational effect to the adverse-event analysis outcome, but the link is inferential rather than named.
- DE.AE-03impliedimplements — A.8.15's logging, event identification, and investigation-support functions give operational effect to multi-source correlation within the DE.AE detection-analysis domain, but do not name correlation explicitly
- DE.CM-01domain mandateimplements — A.8.15's logging and event-identification functions give operational effect to network monitoring for adverse events within the detection domain, but do not name or exclusively perform the monitoring itself
- DE.CM-03domain mandateimplements — A.8.15's logging, integrity, and event-identification functions give direct operational effect to the monitoring of personnel activity and technology usage that DE.CM-03 requires; the link is within the detection domain but the CSF outcome does not name logging specifically.
- RS.AN-03domain mandateimplements — A.8.15's logging, integrity, and event-identification functions give direct operational effect to the incident analysis and root-cause determination required by RS.AN-03; the link is within the shared incident-response domain but RS.AN-03 does not name logging as the specific means.
Related OWASP ASVS 5.0 requirements (16)
Application-security verification requirements (OWASP ASVS 5.0) this ISO control aligns with; links open the ASVS chapter. Our analysis (mostly llm_verified) — many ISO controls have no ASVS counterpart.
Direction: ← other covers this;
→ this covers other (F/M/P = full / mostly /
partial). gov = governs / implements (a mandate, not coverage).
Related weaknesses / CWE (24)
Weakness classes this ISO control helps prevent or mitigate — our analysis (mostly llm_verified).
Direction: ← other covers this;
→ this covers other (F/M/P = full / mostly /
partial). gov = governs / implements (a mandate, not coverage).
Why these map — rationale
- CWE-223fullremoves — A.8.15 mandates the content of event logs (user IDs, system activities, dates/times, device identity, network addresses, specific security events). Applied to a system that previously omitted security-relevant information, the clause causes that information to be recorded, so the omission weakness stops being present — the same logic as the A.8.24 -> CWE-311 anchor where implementing the clause removes the absence it addresses.
- CWE-778fullblocks — Mandating comprehensive event logging with user IDs, timestamps, and access attempts directly eliminates the absence of audit trails that would otherwise allow undetected exploitation.
- CWE-223mostlyprevents — A.8.15 mandates what security-relevant information should be logged (user IDs, timestamps, network addresses, access attempts, etc.), so a system designed under a well-implemented clause would not omit that information; but the clause is a policy/guidance that requires developers and administrators to implement the logging, and what is actually recorded depends on the rigour of that implementation, leaving a nameable remainder of cases where the mandated content is not delivered.
Mitigated MITRE ATT&CK techniques (3971)
Adversary techniques (MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise) this ISO control helps mitigate; links open attack.mitre.org. Our analysis (mostly llm_verified).
Direction: ← other covers this;
→ this covers other (F/M/P = full / mostly /
partial). gov = governs / implements (a mandate, not coverage).
Why these map — rationale
- T1136.001fulldetects — A.8.15 explicitly requires logging of identity creation, modification or deletion events, and local account creation via net user /add or useradd directly produces a loggable event that falls under this requirement.
- T1003.002mostlydetects — A.8.15 logs process execution (Mimikatz, reg.exe), file access to the SAM database, registry access, and use of privileges (SYSTEM-level access required), and its log-analysis guidance covers anomalous behaviour and indicators of compromise; the bounded remainder is in-memory credential extraction that evades standard event logs without specialised security tooling.
- T1003.003mostlydetects — A.8.15 explicitly requires logging of file access (including important data files), privilege use, and process execution — all of which surface most NTDS.dit access paths (ntdsutil.exe, secretsdump.py, Volume Shadow Copy creation). The remainder is the stealthier methods: Invoke-NinjaCopy and raw disk reads can bypass standard file-access auditing, and detection depends on file-audit configuration being enabled for the NTDS path.
- T1003.005mostlydetects — A.8.15 explicitly requires logging use of utility programs, use of privileges, and files accessed — all central to T1003.005, where adversaries run tools like Mimikatz, secretsdump.py, or Linikatz with SYSTEM/sudo access to extract cached credential stores. Log analysis for anomalous behaviour further supports detection, though gaps remain where credential extraction occurs via mechanisms not generating distinctive log entries (e.g., direct registry reads on Windows without process execution telemetry).
- T1003.006mostlydetects — A.8.15's logging requirements capture the relevant events for DCSync (4662 Directory Service Access with DS-Replication-Get-Changes GUIDs, 4624 logons, network traffic to DCs on replication ports) and its analysis guidance covers SIEM rules and anomaly detection that can identify the technique; the bounded remainder is that DCSync abuses legitimate replication APIs, so without specific correlation rules the events may not be flagged as malicious.
- T1016mostlydetects — A.8.15 explicitly lists 'use of utility programs and applications' and system activities in its logging scope, so process creation events for ipconfig/ifconfig/arp/route/nbtstat and their command-line arguments are captured, and the analysis guidance (UEBA, anomaly detection, threat intelligence) is designed to surface such discovery activity as anomalous; the remainder is that legitimate admin use of the same utilities requires correlation to flag, and network device CLI discovery may sit outside the centralized logging scope.
- T1016.002mostlydetects — A.8.15 explicitly requires logging of system activities, network addresses/protocols, privilege use, configuration changes, and anomalous behaviour via SIEM/UEBA/correlation, which surfaces Wi-Fi enumeration commands, file reads (/etc/NetworkManager), netsh/wlanAPI calls, and related IOCs on Linux/Windows/macOS after they occur.
- T1018mostlydetects — A.8.15 logs the events T1018 generates — network connections, utility invocations (ping, net view, arp), and file access to hosts files — and its log-analysis clause explicitly covers identifying anomalous behaviour and indicators of compromise, so the technique is surfaced in the recorded stream; the remainder is that A.8.15 sets logging requirements rather than mandating depth, so coverage of passive discovery (local ARP cache, hosts file reads) depends on what the organization chooses to record.
- T1020mostlyresponds — A.8.15 requires log analysis, anomaly detection, correlation and explicit hand-off of suspected incidents (including outbound connections to malicious C2) into the incident management process (5.25), which directly performs the containment/eradication actions that `responds` names once automated exfiltration is underway.
- T1021mostlydetects — Recording remote-service connections, privilege escalations, and network-address details helps identify lateral-movement activity over protocols such as RDP or SMB.
- T1021.001mostlydetects — A.8.15 explicitly requires logging successful and rejected system access attempts with user IDs, dates/times, network addresses and device identity — which directly captures RDP logon events (Windows event IDs 4624/4625/1149) — and its log analysis provisions (anomalous behaviour, UEBA, threat intelligence) are designed to surface unusual RDP usage; the bounded remainder is that detection of malicious RDP depends on the analysis being performed and tuned, which the clause requires but does not guarantee.
- T1021.002mostlydetects — A.8.15 explicitly enumerates the event types that SMB admin share activity generates — successful/rejected access attempts, privilege use, file access, user IDs, network addresses and protocols — and its log analysis section covers identifying anomalous behaviour, so the framework is in place to surface T1021.002; the bounded remainder is that the clause requires configuration (audit policies, object access auditing) to actually capture these events, and default Windows configurations often do not log admin share access without explicit policy.
- T1021.004mostlydetects — A.8.15 explicitly requires logging successful and rejected system access attempts, use of privileges, and user transactions — SSH authentication events fall squarely in this scope and are among the most comprehensively logged event types (auth.log, sshd logs, Windows event logs). The bounded remainder is activity inside the encrypted SSH session, which requires separate command/keystroke logging not mandated by A.8.15.
- T1021.005mostlydetects — A.8.15 requires logging of network addresses and protocols (capturing RFB/VNC connections), successful and rejected access attempts (capturing VNC authentication), and system activities performed under the session; the log analysis section explicitly covers identifying anomalous behaviour and unusual access patterns, which would surface unauthorised or atypical VNC use, with the bounded remainder being VNC traffic that blends with legitimate remote administration and analysis rules that depend on implementation.
- T1021.007mostlydetects — A.8.15 logs successful access attempts with user IDs, timestamps, and network addresses, and its analysis clause explicitly calls for UEBA, pattern analysis, and threat intelligence — the mechanisms that surface valid-account cloud abuse. Federated authentication events and subsequent cloud activity are captured, with the bounded remainder being adversary behavior that closely mimics the legitimate user or cloud telemetry not fully integrated into the logging scope.
- T1021.008mostlydetects — A.8.15 requires logging of access attempts, privilege use, user IDs, timestamps, and network addresses — all of which T1021.008 generates through cloud API calls (CloudTrail/Activity Log) and VM session events; the control's log analysis guidance (UEBA, threat intelligence, correlation) supports identifying anomalous direct cloud VM connections, though the technique uses legitimate credentials and APIs so distinguishing malicious from authorized use requires behavioral analysis beyond raw logging.
- T1027.011mostlydetects — A.8.15 explicitly requires log analysis, anomaly detection via SIEM/UEBA/IDS rules, correlation of event logs (including successful/rejected access, privilege use, configuration changes, and alarms), and identification of indicators of compromise such as malware or probing, which surfaces fileless storage artifacts in Windows event logs, Registry-linked WMI repositories, and Linux shared-memory activity when those events are logged.
- T1033mostlydetects — A.8.15 explicitly requires logging of user/session events (logons, privileges, identities, system activities), synchronized time sources, and log analysis (including UEBA, SIEM/IDS rules, anomalous behaviour detection, and correlation) that surfaces T1033 artifacts such as whoami/w/who output, running process ownership, or active sessions as indicators of compromise.
- T1037.002mostlydetects — A.8.15 explicitly enumerates logging of configuration changes, use of privileges, use of utility programs, and file access — all of which fire when an adversary modifies com.apple.loginwindow.plist via the `defaults` utility with admin rights, and the subsequent hook execution on next login is also captured. The bounded remainder is that surfacing the technique depends on macOS logging being configured to record these specific events and on log analysis (UEBA, threat intel, predetermined rules) actually flagging the modification as anomalous rather than routine.
- T1037.003mostlydetects — A.8.15 captures the events that surface this technique: logon events with user IDs and timestamps, process execution of the script, file and resource access by it, and configuration changes to GPO/AD assignments that introduce or modify the script. Log analysis (UEBA, SIEM rules, trend analysis) is required to identify the script as anomalous. The remainder is that a logon script executing under a legitimate user's context at normal logon is not inherently anomalous in the raw logs — detection depends on the analysis layer flagging the script's behavior or its assignment as suspicious, and a script that mimics expected activity can evade it.
- T1039mostlydetects — A.8.15 explicitly requires logging of file access events, data/resource access attempts, and user activities on systems, and its analysis guidance names reviewing access to file shares — so the SMB/file-server events T1039 generates are squarely inside the logging scope; the bounded remainder is that detection depends on file-access auditing being enabled on the shares and on analysis surfacing the activity as anomalous, which an implementation may not do.
- T1046mostlydetects — A.8.15 explicitly mandates logging of network addresses and protocols, successful and rejected access attempts, and analysis via SIEM/IDS rules and pattern detection — all of which surface port and vulnerability scans in firewall, IDS and host logs. The bounded remainder is sophisticated low-and-slow scans designed to evade threshold-based detection and scans against systems not configured to log network traffic.
- T1047mostlydetects — A.8.15's enumerated event types directly cover WMI abuse — process creation of wmic.exe/wmiprvse.exe ('use of utility programs and applications', 'system activities'), WMI-Activity log entries, DCOM/WinRM network traffic on ports 135/5985/5986 ('network addresses and protocols'), and privilege use — and the log-analysis clause mandates SIEM rules, IDS signatures, UEBA and threat-intelligence correlation, all of which have established detections for T1047; the bounded remainder is in-memory WMI abuse via COM APIs that spawn no process and blend with legitimate admin activity.
- T1048mostlydetects — A.8.15 captures network addresses/protocols, file access, and DNS queries in logs and explicitly includes log analysis (UEBA, pattern analysis, checking DNS logs for outbound connections to malicious servers), which surfaces exfiltration over alternative protocols; the bounded remainder is encrypted/obfuscated channels where connection metadata is visible but content is not, and the clause sets scope rather than mandating depth of analysis.
- T1048.003mostlydetects — A.8.15 explicitly requires event logs to capture network addresses and protocols, and mandates log analysis for anomalous behaviour including outbound connections to malicious servers — both directly applicable to T1048.003's network-based exfiltration over HTTP/FTP/DNS. The bounded remainder is that detection depends on the depth of log analysis and the rules/patterns applied, which the clause requires but does not specify in detail.
- T1053mostlydetects — A.8.15 requires logging of configuration changes, system activities, and use of privileges — which captures scheduled task/job creation and modification events (e.g., Windows Task Scheduler Event IDs 4698/4702, cron entries) — and its log-analysis section explicitly covers identifying anomalous behaviour, so the technique is observable in the recorded stream and analysable against it; the remainder is that A.8.15 sets scope via topic-specific policy rather than mandating every event type, and abuse of pre-existing tasks or in-memory scheduling may not surface as a distinct log entry.
- T1053.002mostlydetects — A.8.15 explicitly lists utility program execution, privilege use, and system configuration changes as events to be logged — all directly produced by `at` invocation and scheduled task creation — and its log-analysis section (SIEM rules, UEBA, threat intelligence) covers the detection mechanisms; the bounded remainder is that detection depends on the analysis actually being performed with adequate skill and on the later scheduled execution being correlated back to the original `at` command.
- T1053.003mostlydetects — A.8.15 explicitly requires logging of configuration changes, utility program use, and file access — all of which capture cron job creation, crontab modification, and cron-spawned process execution — and its log-analysis guidance (anomalous behaviour, UEBA, pattern analysis) is designed to surface such scheduled-task abuse; the bounded remainder is implementation-dependent, since detection requires the rules and analytics to actually fire on cron-specific anomalies rather than the clause guaranteeing it.
- T1053.005mostlydetects — A.8.15 explicitly lists 'changes to system configuration' and 'use of utility programs and applications' as events to log, and Windows Task Scheduler creation/modification produces well-known event log entries (4698/4699/4700/4701/4702) that the control's log analysis section is designed to surface via SIEM rules and anomaly detection; the bounded remainder is hidden tasks (SD registry value deletion) and tasks created through channels the implementation chose not to instrument.
- T1053.006mostlydetects — A.8.15's logging scope explicitly covers 'changes to system configuration' (timer/service file creation in /etc/systemd/system/ or /usr/lib/systemd/system), 'use of utility programs' (systemctl invocations), and 'system activities' (service/timer activation in journal), and the analysis section mandates SIEM rules, IDS, UEBA and threat intelligence to identify anomalous behaviour — all of which can be configured to surface suspicious systemd timer creation. The bounded remainder is implementation-specific: user-level timers under ~/.config/systemd/user/ are less consistently monitored, and not every conformant implementation will have specific rules for systemd timer anomalies, so detection is not automatic.
- T1055.003mostlyresponds — A.8.15 requires log analysis, anomaly detection, correlation, and identification of suspected incidents (including via SIEM/IDS/UEBA) which surfaces Thread Execution Hijacking once underway for further investigation under the incident management process; this is the core of `responds` with a bounded remainder for stealthy in-memory cases that produce no observable events.
- T1055.004mostlyresponds — A.8.15's log analysis, monitoring of access attempts/privileges/security systems, anomaly detection via SIEM/UEBA/IDS correlation, and explicit tie to incident management (5.25) enable containment/eradication once APC injection is underway as an observable event.
- T1055.015mostlydetects — A.8.15 explicitly requires log analysis, SIEM/IDS rules, UEBA, anomaly detection, correlation of logs (including process, access, and security-system events), and identification of indicators of compromise such as malware or probing, which surfaces ListPlanting execution in a hijacked process; the bounded remainder is fully in-memory variations that produce no observable log artifact at all.
- T1056.002mostlydetects — A.8.15 explicitly requires log analysis and monitoring to identify anomalous behaviour, indicators of compromise, and suspected incidents (including via SIEM, UEBA, correlation, and review of access attempts, privilege use, and application activity), which surfaces GUI input capture prompts that mimic legitimate credential dialogs on Linux/macOS/Windows.
- T1057mostlydetects — A.8.15 logs process execution events (utility programs, system activities, command-line use), which captures the standard T1057 methods (tasklist, Get-Process, ps, show processes); the bounded remainder is API-based enumeration (CreateToolhelp32Snapshot) and /proc reads that may not surface as distinct execution events without deeper process-level telemetry.
- T1059mostlydetects — Logging of command interpreters, utility programs, and user transactions provides visibility into interactive or scripted adversary commands.
- T1059.001mostlydetects — A.8.15 explicitly requires logging 'use of utility programs and applications' (PowerShell qualifies) and mandates log analysis to identify anomalous behaviour, so a conformant implementation captures PowerShell process execution with user, time and command-line context; the bounded remainder is depth — Script Block Logging (4104), module logging, and decoding of obfuscated/encoded commands require configuration beyond what the clause specifies, and fileless in-memory execution leaves less in the event stream.
- T1059.009mostlydetects — A.8.15 captures the API calls themselves (user IDs, timestamps, network addresses, transactions, privilege use) and its analysis section explicitly invokes SIEM rules, UEBA, threat intelligence and trend analysis to surface anomalous behaviour — cloud API abuse leaves a structured, correlatable trail in CloudTrail/Activity Log/Audit Logs that this clause is built to consume. The remainder is the well-known shape of valid-credential abuse: API calls that look legitimate in isolation evade behavioural baselines, and the organisation's visibility depends on what the cloud provider exposes and what the topic-specific policy chooses to ingest.
- T1059.010mostlydetects — A.8.15 explicitly requires logging and analysis of system activities, privilege use, application/script execution, anomalous behaviour via SIEM/UEBA/pattern analysis, and correlation of events (including successful/failed access and process-like actions), which surfaces AHK/AutoIT script or compiled execution as an indicator of compromise on Windows.
- T1069.001mostlydetects — A.8.15 explicitly requires logging of privilege use, system access attempts, configuration changes, and identity modifications, plus mandated analysis (SIEM/UEBA/rules/threat intel/correlation) that surfaces anomalous enumeration of local groups and permission settings; the bounded remainder is stealthy in-memory or non-logged discovery that evades the defined event set.
- T1069.002mostlydetects — T1069.002 runs on the estate (LDAP/Net queries to a domain controller from a compromised host), generating process-execution, authentication, and network events that fall squarely inside A.8.15's logging scope (utility programs, access attempts, system activities); the control's log-analysis guidance with UEBA, predetermined rules and threat intelligence is what surfaces the enumeration as anomalous, with the bounded remainder being that detection depends on those analytics actually being tuned to flag group-enumeration patterns rather than the logging itself.
- T1070mostlyprevents — Centralized, tamper-protected logs make it harder for an adversary to erase or alter evidence of their actions across multiple event types.
- T1070mostlyresponds — A.8.15's protection of logs (prevent deletion/alteration by users including privileged ones, append-only/read-only mechanisms, cryptographic hashing) and its explicit identification of suspected incidents for further investigation directly engages once T1070 has begun, containing the removal by preserving evidence and enabling response actions.
- T1070.003mostlydetects — A.8.15 explicitly requires logging of file deletions and command executions, and its log-analysis section calls for SIEM rules and UEBA against anomalous behaviour — both of which surface the `history -c`, `Clear-History`, and history-file deletion events that constitute T1070.003; the bounded remainder is that the technique is designed to evade the very logs A.8.15 produces, and an implementation that omits command-history file auditing or that lets a privileged actor also clear system logs leaves a slice undetected.
- T1070.004mostlydetects — A.8.15 explicitly requires logging of file access including deletion of important data files, and its log analysis provisions (UEBA, anomaly detection, correlation) are designed to surface such activity; coverage is bounded by what the organization chooses to log and by adversaries with sufficient privilege manipulating logs, which the clause addresses but does not eliminate.
- T1070.006mostlydetects — A.8.15 explicitly requires log analysis, anomaly detection via SIEM/UEBA/patterns/threat intel, correlation of events (including file access/deletion, privilege use, config changes), and review of logs to identify indicators of compromise such as timestomping that alters timestamps to blend with legitimate files.
- T1070.009mostlydetects — A.8.15 explicitly requires log analysis, anomaly detection via SIEM/UEBA/IDS rules, correlation, and review of events (including privilege use, account changes, configuration changes, file deletions, and security system activity) to surface indicators of compromise and suspected incidents, which directly catches most T1070.009 cleanup actions on covered platforms.
- T1070.010mostlydetects — A.8.15 captures the file creation, access and system activity events that relocating malware generates (user IDs, timestamps, file paths, type of access), and its log-analysis guidance with UEBA, threat intelligence and correlation supports identifying anomalous relocation; the bounded remainder is that adversaries rename and blend payloads to look legitimate, so the events are recorded but flagging them as malicious relocation depends on the depth of analysis performed.
- T1071.001mostlydetects — A.8.15 explicitly requires logging network addresses and protocols and mandates log analysis using SIEM rules, UEBA, threat intelligence and anomaly detection, which together surface web-protocol C2 in most cases; the bounded remainder is that the technique is designed to blend with normal HTTP/S traffic, so logs capture the traffic but distinguishing C2 from legitimate use depends on the depth of analysis rules applied.
- T1074mostlydetects — A.8.15 mandates logging of file access, utility program use, and user IDs — the exact surface T1074 operates on (file creation, copying, archiving into a staging location) — and its log-analysis guidance explicitly calls for identifying anomalous behaviour and indicators of compromise, so a conformant implementation surfaces the staging activity; the bounded remainder is staging that blends with normal file operations or uses mechanisms outside the logged scope.
- T1074.001mostlydetects — A.8.15 explicitly requires logging 'files accessed and the type of access' and supports log analysis (UEBA, SIEM rules, anomaly detection) to identify unusual activity; local data staging produces file creation, copy and modification events that fall squarely within this scope, though staging via Windows Registry or native shell commands without detailed process logging can leave a thinner trail.
- T1074.002mostlydetects — A.8.15 explicitly lists file access events (creation, modification, type of access) and user IDs in its logging scope, and the analysis section covers identifying anomalous behaviour and patterns — staging data on a central system produces file-access, user-activity and system-activity records that the clause is designed to capture and interpret. The remainder is the implementation-defined scope (systems not covered, evasion of file auditing, archives that bypass standard logging) and the dependence on analysis rules actually flagging the staging pattern.
- T1078mostlydetects — Detailed logging of successful and failed access attempts, privilege use, and identity changes enables detection of unauthorized account usage.
- T1078.001mostlydetects — A.8.15 records user IDs, successful/rejected access attempts, and privilege use, and its log-analysis clause explicitly covers predetermined rules, UEBA, and threat intelligence — all of which can surface default-account activity by user ID and pattern. Detection is mostly complete but bounded by what analysis is actually configured: a single legitimate-looking login with a default credential may not trip a rule unless the organization has specifically instrumented default-account monitoring.
- T1078.003mostlydetects — A.8.15 requires logging of access attempts (successful and rejected), privilege use, file access, and identity changes — all generated by local account abuse — and includes log analysis for anomalous behaviour, so the activity surfaces in logs and can be identified; the remainder is that valid local account use produces 'successful' logon events that are hard to distinguish from legitimate activity without behavioural analysis, and the clause sets logging requirements rather than mandating specific detection mechanisms for every abuse pattern.
- T1078.004mostlydetects — A.8.15 logs the events cloud account abuse generates (access attempts, privilege use, transactions, identity changes) and explicitly prescribes the analysis mechanisms — UEBA, SIEM rules, threat intelligence correlation, anomaly detection — needed to surface valid-account misuse that authentication alone cannot flag; the remainder is the inherent difficulty of distinguishing legitimate use of real credentials from adversary use even with behavioral analysis.
- T1083mostlydetects — A.8.15 explicitly lists 'use of utility programs and applications' and 'files accessed and the type of access' as events to log, which directly captures T1083's `dir`/`ls`/`find` execution and the resulting file system traversal through process creation and file access audit records; the log analysis section (SIEM rules, UEBA, threat intelligence) provides the detection layer over those records. The bounded remainder is directory enumeration that reads only metadata without triggering file-access events, and platforms where command-line auditing is not enabled.
- T1087mostlydetects — A.8.15's logging scope explicitly captures the events account discovery generates — system activities, use of utility programs and applications, user IDs touched, dates/times — and the analysis guidance (UEBA, SIEM rules, anomaly detection against known behaviour patterns) is the mechanism that surfaces enumeration activity. The bounded remainder is methods that don't produce distinctive log events: discovery via misconfigurations that leak account data through public-facing interfaces, or reading account information from files already on disk, where the technique runs without crossing an event the clause requires to be recorded.
- T1087.001mostlydetects — A.8.15 requires logging of utility program and application use, system activities, and log analysis to identify anomalous behaviour — process execution of `net user`, `id`, `groups`, `dscl`, `esxcli` and similar enumeration commands falls squarely within that scope and would surface in process/command logs, with UEBA-style analysis flagging the pattern. The remainder is the clause's scope-setting nature: an implementation logging only network and authentication events is conformant and would miss some enumeration paths (e.g. direct reads of /etc/passwd without process telemetry), so it is not full.
- T1087.002mostlydetects — A.8.15 logs the execution of utility programs and system activities (covering `net user /domain`, `Get-ADUser`, `ldapsearch` and similar enumeration commands) with user IDs, timestamps and network addresses, and its analysis clause explicitly calls for SIEM rules, UEBA and pattern analysis that detect anomalous enumeration behaviour; the bounded remainder is implementation-specific — domain controllers without command-line auditing, adversaries blending enumeration into routine admin activity, or organisations without tuned detection rules can still miss it.
- T1087.003mostlydetects — A.8.15's logging of user IDs, system activities, and dates/times captures PowerShell execution and Exchange/Google Workspace directory queries on the organization's own estate, and its log-analysis provisions (UEBA, threat intelligence, predetermined rules) can surface anomalous enumeration against baseline admin behavior; the bounded remainder is that Get-GlobalAddressList and similar commands are legitimate admin activity, so detection depends on the analysis rules and scope the implementation chooses rather than being automatic from the clause alone.
- T1087.004mostlydetects — A.8.15 explicitly requires logging of identity-related events including creation, modification or deletion of identities, and its log analysis guidance covers reviewing access attempts and correlating logs to identify anomalous behaviour, which surfaces cloud account enumeration queries; the remainder is that detection depends on the cloud provider's logging granularity and the organization's SIEM correlation rules being configured to ingest and alert on those specific API calls.
- T1090mostlydetects — A.8.15 captures network addresses and protocols in event logs and its analysis guidance specifically calls out checking DNS logs for outbound connections to malicious C2 servers and using UEBA / traffic-pattern analysis to surface anomalous behaviour, which is the core mechanism for surfacing proxy-based C2; the bounded remainder is sophisticated proxy use through legitimate CDNs or chained trusted-path proxies designed to blend with normal traffic.
- T1098mostlydetects — A.8.15 explicitly enumerates 'creation, modification or deletion of identities' and 'changes to system configuration' as events to be logged, and its log-analysis section requires identifying anomalous behaviour and indicators of compromise — both directly applicable to T1098's account and permission manipulation; the bounded remainder is manipulation that occurs through channels not covered by the standard event-log scope (e.g., cloud IdP APIs or third-party SaaS whose logs the clause does not mandate).
- T1098.001mostlydetects — A.8.15 mandates logging of identity-related events (creation, modification or deletion of identities; use of privileges) and includes log analysis with SIEM rules, UEBA and threat intelligence correlation; cloud control-plane API calls that add credentials (CreateKeyPair, CreateAccessKey, app password creation, service principal credential addition) are recorded in CloudTrail/Activity Log/Audit Log streams and are detectable through the analysis activities A.8.15 prescribes, with the remainder being environments where cloud audit logging is misconfigured or disabled and cases where the adversary uses a highly privileged identity that masks the action as routine.
- T1098.003mostlydetects — A.8.15 explicitly lists 'creation, modification or deletion of identities', 'use of privileges', 'changes to system configuration', and 'transactions executed by users in applications' as events to be logged — IAM policy changes and role assignments in cloud platforms fall squarely within these categories and are captured by CloudTrail, Azure Activity Log, and O365 audit logs. The control also mandates log analysis to identify anomalous behaviour, which would surface unusual role additions. The bounded remainder is that detection depends on the analysis being configured with rules or expertise tuned to this specific pattern, and sophisticated adversaries using legitimate-looking API calls may evade the analytical layer.
- T1098.004mostlydetects — A.8.15 explicitly requires logging of file access (including modifications to authorized_keys), configuration changes (sshd_config), and use of privileges, and includes log analysis for anomalous behaviour — the primary vectors of T1098.004 are well-covered; the bounded remainder is cloud-API modifications whose visibility depends on platform integration and privileged adversaries tampering with logs on systems under their direct control.
- T1098.007mostlydetects — A.8.15 explicitly lists 'creation, modification or deletion of identities', 'changes to system configuration', 'use of privileges', and 'use of utility programs and applications' as events to be logged — all of which T1098.007 generates via net localgroup, net group, and usermod — and the log analysis guidance covers identifying anomalous behaviour and indicators of compromise through SIEM rules, UEBA, and threat intelligence; the bounded remainder is that detection depends on the implementation actually configuring these event sources and analysis rules, since the clause sets requirements rather than mandating specific detection mechanisms.
- T1105mostlydetects — A.8.15 explicitly requires logging of network addresses/protocols, system activities, use of utility programs, file access, and DNS queries — all of which T1105 generates (outbound connections, process executions like curl/wget/PowerShell, file creation, DNS lookups). The clause's log-analysis section further covers identifying anomalous outbound connections and indicators of compromise. The bounded remainder is variants that blend with legitimate activity (e.g., cloud-sync transfers, built-in tools used in normal-looking ways) where logging captures the events but analysis may not flag them without additional context.
- T1110.001mostlydetects — A.8.15 explicitly mandates logging 'successful and rejected system access attempts' and includes log analysis to identify 'unusual activity or anomalous behaviour,' which is precisely the signal password guessing produces (repeated failed authentications); the bounded remainder is distributed or low-and-slow guessing that stays below threshold-based detection rules and guessing against systems whose authentication events are not forwarded to the logging scope.
- T1110.003mostlydetects — A.8.15 explicitly requires logging rejected access attempts and includes log analysis (UEBA, trend analysis, correlation) to identify anomalous behaviour — password spraying produces exactly the pattern of one password tried against many accounts that the analysis section is designed to surface. The `mostly` (not `full`) remainder is the technique's own evasion: adversaries throttle attempts to stay below alerting thresholds and prefer LDAP/Kerberos which generate less visible events than Windows 4625.
- T1110.004mostlydetects — A.8.15 explicitly requires logging of successful and rejected system access attempts, which is the primary artifact credential stuffing produces (numerous failed authentications, potential lockouts), and its log-analysis section covers identifying anomalous behaviour patterns; detection is mostly complete but depends on the analysis being configured to surface the credential-stuffing pattern rather than being automatic from the logging alone.
- T1112mostlydetects — A.8.15 explicitly enumerates 'changes to system configuration' as an event type to be considered for logging, and registry modifications are a canonical example of configuration changes that Windows event logs and Sysmon routinely capture; a conformant implementation will largely surface T1112, with the bounded remainder being implementations that log authentication and access events but not configuration-change detail, which the clause's 'should be considered' language permits.
- T1114.002mostlydetects — A.8.15 requires logging of successful access attempts, use of privileges, files accessed and network addresses — all directly relevant to mailbox access on Exchange/Office 365/Google Workspace — and its log analysis guidance explicitly covers identifying anomalous behaviour via UEBA, threat intelligence and pattern analysis, which is the detection path for credential-based email collection; the bounded remainder is implementation gaps where mailbox auditing is not enabled or analysis is not performed.
- T1114.003mostlydetects — A.8.15's guidance explicitly covers configuration changes, use of privileges, and transactions in applications, which encompass mailbox rule creation/modification events typically captured in Exchange audit logs and mail flow logs; the technique produces observable artifacts (rule creation, outbound forwarding to external recipients) that log analysis can surface, but the MAPI-based hidden rule technique is a documented evasion that can bypass normal logging, and the clause sets scope by organizational determination rather than mandating mail-server-specific instrumentation.
- T1115mostlydetects — A.8.15 explicitly requires logging of system activities, privilege use, application transactions, successful/rejected access attempts, and anomalous behaviour via log analysis (SIEM/UEBA/IDS rules, pattern analysis, threat intel, DNS logs, usage reports); clipboard collection or monitoring/replacement is observable in process, command-line, or file-activity logs on all three platforms and surfaces as anomalous in analysis.
- T1119mostlydetects — A.8.15 logs the events that surface automated collection — file access events (item f), system activities, use of utility programs and applications, and network connections — and its analysis section explicitly covers identifying anomalous behaviour and patterns (UEBA, trend analysis) that bulk automated access produces; the remainder is cloud-API and SaaS-based collection that uses legitimate service interfaces and may not generate distinguishable log signatures from normal activity.
- T1120mostlydetects — A.8.15 explicitly requires logging, protection, and analysis of events including system activities, device identities, use of utilities/applications, privilege use, configuration changes, and anomalous behaviour via SIEM/UEBA/correlation, which surfaces T1120's reconnaissance actions on Linux/macOS/Windows systems.
- T1127.002mostlydetects — A.8.15 explicitly requires logging, protection, and analysis of events including successful/rejected access attempts, privilege use, application/utility execution, system configuration changes, and anomalous behaviour via SIEM/UEBA/correlation, which surfaces ClickOnce abuse (e.g. dfshim.dll via rundll32, startup folder placement, or child of DFSVC.EXE) as an indicator of compromise.
- T1127.003mostlydetects — A.8.15 explicitly requires log analysis and monitoring to identify anomalous behaviour, indicators of compromise, and security events (including use of utilities, system activities, and application transactions), which surfaces JamPlus abuse when it produces observable log artifacts on Windows systems.
- T1133mostlydetects — A.8.15 explicitly covers logging of successful and rejected access attempts, network addresses and protocols, and configuration changes — all of which T1133 produces at the VPN gateway, remote service portal, or exposed API. Log analysis (SIEM rules, UEBA, anomaly detection) is in scope and surfaces unusual external access patterns. The remainder is adversary use of legitimate credentials from a plausible location/time, where the log shows a 'successful' authentication that mimics normal behaviour and may not trip an alert without strong UEBA tuning.
- T1134.002mostlydetects — A.8.15 mandates logging of user IDs, system activities, use of privileges, and successful/rejected access attempts — all of which capture process creation with a token (Event 4688 with token info, privilege use, logon events) — and its analysis guidance (UEBA, SIEM rules, anomaly detection) supports surfacing the technique; the remainder is that detection depends on the analysis rules actually being tuned to token anomalies and on implementations that capture token elevation details.
- T1136mostlydetects — A.8.15 explicitly lists 'creation, modification or deletion of identities' among the events to be logged, and requires log analysis to identify anomalous behaviour including unusual account creation; account creation on local systems, domains, and cloud tenants is squarely within the control's scope, with the bounded remainder being gaps in logging coverage or analysis effectiveness for accounts created through mechanisms outside the logged set.
- T1136.002mostlydetects — A.8.15 explicitly lists 'creation, modification or deletion of identities' as an event to be logged, and domain account creation in Active Directory generates exactly this kind of log record (with user IDs, timestamps, system identifiers); the control's log-analysis guidance further requires identifying anomalous behaviour, so a conformant implementation surfaces T1136.002. The remainder is that the clause sets requirements rather than mandating real-time alerting or universal coverage — the topic-specific policy determines which systems log, and a legitimate admin creating accounts produces the same record, so distinguishing malicious from authorised creation depends on the analysis performed.
- T1136.003mostlydetects — A.8.15 explicitly lists 'creation, modification or deletion of identities' among events to be logged, and cloud account creation in the victim's tenant produces identity-creation log entries (CloudTrail, Azure AD, GCP audit logs) that the clause's analysis activities — UEBA, threat intelligence correlation, SIEM rules — can surface as anomalous; the remainder is that a creation event using stolen or legitimate-looking credentials may not trip a rule without specific detection content, and A.8.15 sets requirements rather than mandating the analysis depth that catches it.
- T1137.003mostlydetects — A.8.15 explicitly requires logging of application transactions, privilege use, system activities, configuration changes and identity creation/modification plus SIEM/UEBA-driven log analysis to surface anomalous behaviour and indicators of compromise; this directly surfaces the mailbox form registration and the subsequent form-triggered execution on mail receipt.
- T1137.004mostlydetects — A.8.15 explicitly requires logging of successful/rejected access attempts, privilege use, application transactions, configuration changes, identity creation/modification, and anomalous behaviour via log analysis (including SIEM/UEBA rules, pattern analysis, and correlation), which surfaces the addition of a malicious Outlook Home Page and its execution on folder load as an information security event.
- T1137.005mostlydetects — A.8.15 explicitly requires log analysis and monitoring to identify anomalous behaviour, indicators of compromise, and suspected incidents (including via SIEM, UEBA, correlation, and review of access/use events), which surfaces the creation or triggering of malicious Outlook rules as an information security event.
- T1137.006mostlydetects — A.8.15 explicitly requires logging of application transactions, privilege use, system activities, configuration changes, identity creation/modification, and anomalous behaviour via log analysis (SIEM/UEBA/IDS rules, threat intel, correlation), which surfaces Office add-in persistence mechanisms (e.g. registry changes, add-in loading on startup) once present on Windows/Office systems.
- T1187mostlydetects — A.8.15 logs the events T1187 generates — outbound SMB/WebDAV connections to external servers, authentication attempts, file access on .SCF/.LNK files, and DNS resolutions — and its analysis clause explicitly covers SIEM rules, UEBA, threat intelligence, and correlation to identify anomalous behaviour such as outbound connections to malicious servers; the technique is not invisible, but detection depends on having appropriate correlation rules and analysis configured rather than being automatic from the logs alone.
- T1190mostlydetects — A.8.15's purpose explicitly includes identifying information security events, and its log-analysis guidance covers anomalous behaviour and indicators of compromise; web server, application, authentication and IDS logs would capture T1190 exploitation attempts and post-exploitation activity (access attempts, config changes, privilege use, file access, IDS alarms), with the bounded remainder being zero-day exploits that produce no observable log entries and exploits that evade logging.
- T1197mostlydetects — A.8.15 requires logging of system activities, utility program use, and application transactions, and BITS client operations generate Windows Event Log entries (job creation, transfer, completion) that fall squarely within these categories; the clause's log-analysis section explicitly calls for SIEM rules, UEBA, and threat-intelligence correlation, all of which have known signatures for anomalous BITS usage. The remainder is the implementation dependency: BITS is designed to be low-bandwidth and background, and detecting malicious BITS jobs requires the logging scope and analytic rules to actually cover BITS-client events rather than treating them as routine system noise.
- T1210mostlydetects — A.8.15 logs network connections, authentication attempts (successful and rejected), process execution, file access, and configuration changes — all of which surround and follow a remote service exploitation. The exploitation moment itself (the vulnerability trigger) may not be directly visible, but the network arrival, auth events, code execution, and post-exploitation activity are within logging scope, and log analysis (UEBA, SIEM rules, threat intel) is designed to surface anomalous behaviour consistent with exploitation.
- T1213mostlydetects — A.8.15 explicitly requires log analysis, anomaly detection via SIEM/UEBA/IDS rules, correlation, and review of access attempts, configuration changes, privilege use, and alarms to surface indicators of compromise including repository access and data exfiltration patterns.
- T1213.006mostlydetects — A.8.15 requires logging of data/resource access attempts, transactions, and file access — database queries fall squarely within these categories — and its log-analysis clause (UEBA, pattern analysis, correlation) is the mechanism that surfaces anomalous query volumes or patterns indicative of data mining; the bounded remainder is queries executed under legitimate credentials that match expected behaviour, which no logging regime flags.
- T1216.001mostlydetects — A.8.15 explicitly requires logging, protection, and analysis of events including system activities, use of privileges, utility programs/applications, successful/rejected access attempts, and anomalous behaviour via SIEM/UEBA/threat intel correlation, which surfaces PubPrn.vbs abuse (a signed script proxying remote execution) as an indicator of compromise; the bounded remainder is that some stealthy or non-logged invocations may evade detection.
- T1216.002mostlydetects — A.8.15's logging requirements (system activities, use of utility programs and applications, details of relevant events including command-line arguments) capture the wscript.exe invocation of SyncAppvPublishingServer.vbs and the PowerShell payload through process execution logs and script block logging; the bounded remainder is that the technique uses a legitimate Microsoft-signed binary and the malicious intent is only visible if command-line auditing and PowerShell module/script-block logging are enabled, which the clause requires but does not universally mandate at depth.
- T1217mostlydetects — A.8.15 explicitly requires log analysis and monitoring to identify anomalous behaviour and indicators of compromise, which directly surfaces browser enumeration activity (e.g. via file-access, process, or privilege-use logs) once it occurs on the monitored estate.
- T1218.003mostlydetects — A.8.15's logging scope covers process execution (CMSTP.exe invocation), command-line arguments, file access (INF/DLL loading), and network connections to remote servers, and its analysis framework explicitly invokes SIEM rules, UEBA, and threat intelligence — all of which surface CMSTP abuse; the bounded remainder is that CMSTP is a legitimate Microsoft-signed binary, so detection depends on behavioral correlation rules the clause does not mandate.
- T1218.004mostlydetects — A.8.15 explicitly requires logging 'use of utility programs and applications' and 'system activities' with dates, times, user IDs and details, which captures InstallUtil execution including command-line arguments; the log-analysis section requires identifying anomalous behaviour via SIEM rules, UEBA and threat intelligence, so a signed Microsoft binary being invoked from an unusual parent process or path is detectable. The remainder is that InstallUtil is a legitimate signed utility, so detection depends on the analysis rules actually configured rather than being automatic from the logging alone.
- T1218.005mostlydetects — A.8.15 explicitly requires logging of utility program use, network addresses/protocols, and process activities, and its analysis guidance covers SIEM/IDS correlation — mshta.exe spawning, its command-line arguments, and outbound fetches all fall squarely in this scope and are routinely surfaced by the clause's mechanisms; the bounded remainder is configurations that omit process command-line auditing or in-memory inline-script execution that leaves no file artifact.
- T1218.007mostlydetects — A.8.15 explicitly lists logging of 'use of utility programs and applications' and system activities with user IDs, timestamps, and network addresses, which captures msiexec.exe execution and its MSI/DLL payloads; the clause's log-analysis guidance (anomalous behaviour, UEBA, threat intelligence) supports identifying abuse, with the bounded remainder being that detection depends on the organization's chosen log scope and whether process command-line arguments are captured.
- T1218.010mostlydetects — A.8.15's logging scope covers process execution, command-line arguments, and network activity, which captures Regsvr32 invocations including URL-based scriptlet loads; log analysis (also within A.8.15) can identify anomalous usage, but the technique is explicitly designed to blend with normal Regsvr32 operations and bypass allowlists, so detection depends on analysis depth and command-line auditing being enabled.
- T1218.013mostlydetects — A.8.15 explicitly requires logging of process activities, privilege use, system changes, and anomalous behaviour via SIEM/UEBA/IDS correlation plus specific monitoring of access attempts and outbound connections, which surfaces mavinject.exe abuse (a signed binary performing DLL/import injection) as an anomalous or suspicious event.
- T1218.014mostlydetects — A.8.15 logs system activities, utility program use, file access, and configuration changes—all of which T1218.014 generates (mmc.exe process execution, .msc file creation, CLSID registry modifications)—and its log analysis scope (SIEM rules, UEBA, threat intelligence) is designed to surface such anomalous behavior, though abuse of a signed Microsoft binary can evade behavioral detection in implementations with limited command-line auditing or analysis depth.
- T1218.015mostlydetects — A.8.15 explicitly requires log analysis, anomaly detection via SIEM/UEBA/IDS rules, correlation of events (including process activity, privilege use, application execution, and child-process patterns), and identification of indicators of compromise such as malware or probing, which surfaces Electron abuse (e.g. anomalous child processes from teams.exe/chrome.exe or planted JS) in monitored environments.
- T1219mostlydetects — A.8.15's logging scope covers the events T1219 generates (authentication, network connections with addresses/protocols, user IDs, system activities, files accessed) and its log-analysis section explicitly includes SIEM rules, UEBA, threat intelligence and correlation needed to flag legitimate remote-access tools used anomalously; the remainder is built-in tools (e.g. Chrome Remote Desktop) and encrypted channels where the recorded events look like normal activity even after analysis.
- T1219.002mostlydetects — A.8.15 captures the artifacts of remote desktop software use — process execution, network connections, DNS queries, user IDs, and session times — and its log-analysis guidance (UEBA, DNS-log review for malicious servers, threat intelligence, correlation) directly supports identifying anomalous RMM tool usage; the remainder is that the software is legitimate and detection depends on behavioral baselines and active analysis rather than signatures.
- T1222.001mostlydetects — A.8.15 explicitly requires logging of privilege use, system configuration changes, file access/deletion, and anomalous behaviour via log analysis (SIEM/UEBA/rules/threat intel), which surfaces Windows DACL permission modifications performed by icacls/takeown/PowerShell as security events or indicators of compromise.
- T1484mostlydetects — A.8.15 explicitly lists 'changes to system configuration,' 'use of privileges,' and 'creation, modification or deletion of identities' as in-scope events, and GPO/tenant policy modifications generate directory service change events (e.g., Windows Event ID 5136/5137) that the control's logging and analysis provisions are designed to capture; the bounded remainder is the technique's documented evasion pattern of temporary modification followed by reversion, which can defeat real-time detection even when the change event itself is recorded.
- T1484.001mostlydetects — A.8.15's logging requirements capture the events that indicate GPO modifications — directory service object changes (event 5136/5137), file modifications in SYSVOL, and use of privileges all fall under its enumerated event categories (configuration changes, privilege use, file access) — and its log analysis section explicitly supports identifying anomalous behaviour, but the control provides the recording and analysis infrastructure rather than mandating specific detection rules, so whether a given modification is flagged as malicious depends on the SIEM/analysis implementation.
- T1485.001mostlydetects — A.8.15 explicitly requires log analysis, monitoring of configuration changes, alarms from access control, correlation of logs (including physical), UEBA, SIEM/IDS rules, and identification of anomalous activity or indicators of compromise such as probing; these surface lifecycle policy modifications and bulk-deletion events on IaaS buckets when they generate observable logs or alarms.
- T1486mostlydetects — A.8.15's log analysis guidance explicitly covers identifying malware infection and anomalous activity like mass file encryption, and its event logging scope includes file access and deletion, but detection depends on log coverage and analysis rules being configured to surface the specific encryption behavior.
- T1489mostlydetects — A.8.15 captures service state changes through system activity logs, configuration change logs, and privilege use logs, and its log analysis section explicitly covers identifying anomalous behavior; service stops generate well-known event records (Windows Service Control Manager events, syslog, cloud audit logs like CloudTrail for DisableAPIServiceAccess), but the clause itself flags that privileged users can manipulate logs and that some service stops may appear legitimate, leaving a bounded remainder.
- T1490mostlydetects — A.8.15 logs the constituent events of T1490 — process execution of vssadmin/wmic/wbadmin/bcdedit, configuration changes, file deletions, and use of privileges are all enumerated in the clause's event list, and the log-analysis section (SIEM rules, UEBA, threat intelligence) is built to surface them as anomalous. It is not `full` because detection depends on specific audit policies being enabled (e.g. process auditing, file-deletion auditing on shadow stores) and on rules being tuned to this technique, and some actions by privileged users can appear legitimate in raw logs without the analytic layer.
- T1491.001mostlydetects — A.8.15 logs file modifications, configuration changes, and access events that internal defacement necessarily produces (website edits, login banner changes, wallpaper replacement), and its log-analysis guidance covers identifying anomalous activity; the bounded remainder is defacement performed by actors who have already subverted logging on the affected system or via channels outside the logged scope.
- T1496mostlydetects — A.8.15's required log content (system activities, network addresses, process execution, resource use) and its analysis requirements (UEBA, trend analysis, DNS log checking for malicious connections, correlation) directly cover the main indicators of resource hijacking — anomalous processes, outbound connections to mining pools or proxy networks, and unusual resource consumption patterns; the bounded remainder is low-and-slow or browser-based variants that stay within logged scope but evade the analysis thresholds an organization sets.
- T1496.001mostlydetects — A.8.15 captures process execution, network connections, resource use and applies log analysis including UEBA and trend analysis to surface anomalous behaviour; compute hijacking leaves substantial traces (mining processes, outbound connections to pools, sustained resource consumption) that fall squarely within the clause's logging and analysis scope, with the bounded remainder being low-and-slow or container-based variants designed to blend with normal activity.
- T1496.002mostlydetects — A.8.15's log analysis section explicitly contemplates checking DNS logs for outbound connections to malicious servers (including botnet C2), UEBA comparing network traffic to anomalous behaviour, and trend analysis — all of which directly surface bandwidth hijacking via botnet participation, proxyware C2, or scanning-driven outbound volume. The bounded remainder is stealthy proxyjacking designed to mimic normal traffic and torrenting that blends into background P2P, where the clause's guidance is necessary but not sufficient.
- T1498mostlydetects — A.8.15's logging and log analysis scope explicitly covers network addresses/protocols, anomalous behaviour detection via SIEM rules and UEBA-style pattern analysis, and correlation of logs — all of which surface a network DoS as anomalous traffic volume and connection patterns. The remainder is that event logs capture discrete events rather than continuous volumetric data, so a pure bandwidth-exhaustion DoS may be only partially visible in the logs themselves and depends on the analysis layer to flag the anomaly.
- T1498.001mostlydetects — A.8.15 requires event logs to capture network addresses and protocols, access attempts, and resource use, and mandates log analysis to identify anomalous behaviour and indicators of compromise using SIEM rules, UEBA, and trend analysis — a direct network flood produces massive volumes of such log entries and would surface as an anomaly under that analysis. The remainder is that A.8.15 sets the logging and analysis framework rather than mandating specific volumetric or flow-based detection, so what is detected depends on which logs the implementation captures and how the analysis is configured.
- T1498.002mostlydetects — A.8.15 explicitly requires logging of network addresses and protocols, log analysis for anomalous behaviour and traffic-pattern comparison, and DNS-log review — all of which surface a reflection amplification flood as a volume anomaly with characteristic protocol signatures from many reflector sources. The remainder is that A.8.15 defines the recording and analysis infrastructure rather than mandating real-time alerting thresholds, so detection depends on the analysis being performed against the captured logs.
- T1499mostlydetects — A.8.15 records system activities, resource access, alarms from intrusion detection systems, and explicitly requires log analysis to identify anomalous behaviour and indicators of compromise — endpoint DoS leaves traces in resource exhaustion patterns, crash events, failed access attempts, and network traffic anomalies that logging captures and analysis surfaces; the bounded remainder is short-duration or vulnerability-exploiting crashes that may not generate sufficient log signal before service is lost.
- T1499.001mostlydetects — A.8.15 requires logging of network addresses and protocols and includes log analysis to identify anomalous behaviour and indicators of compromise, so SYN/ACK floods producing abnormal traffic volumes and connection-state patterns would surface in the logs and be identifiable through analysis; the bounded remainder is that detection depends on log analysis actually being performed and on the logging pipeline not being overwhelmed by the flood itself.
- T1499.002mostlydetects — A.8.15 captures the volumetric traffic of a service exhaustion flood in its event logs (network addresses, protocols, timestamps, access attempts) and its log-analysis guidance explicitly covers identifying anomalous behaviour and unusual activity, so the attack is detectable from the records the clause produces; the remainder is that logging is the substrate — detection depends on the analysis being performed and on what is logged, and SSL renegotiation attacks or low-and-slow variants can be harder to surface from logs alone.
- T1499.003mostlydetects — A.8.15 logs access attempts, network activity, and system events, and its log analysis section explicitly calls for UEBA, pattern analysis, and identification of anomalous behavior — repeated requests to resource-intensive features produce exactly the kind of access-pattern and traffic-volume anomalies the clause is designed to surface. The bounded remainder is that resource exhaustion itself (CPU, memory saturation) is not directly captured in standard event logs unless the application or infrastructure specifically instruments it, so the impact side of the technique can be inferred rather than observed.
- T1505mostlydetects — A.8.15 explicitly requires logging of file access (including creation/modification), configuration changes, privilege use, and identity changes — all of which T1505's component installation produces — and its log-analysis section requires identifying anomalous behaviour and indicators of compromise; the bounded remainder is that detection depends on the analysis rules in place and that some installations using legitimate-looking mechanisms can evade them.
- T1505.001mostlydetects — A.8.15 explicitly requires logging of privilege use, configuration changes, system activities, application transactions, and anomalous behaviour via SIEM/UEBA/threat-intelligence-driven analysis, which surfaces malicious stored-procedure creation, modification, or invocation (including xp_cmdshell or CLR abuse) after it occurs.
- T1505.002mostlydetects — A.8.15 explicitly requires logging of system activities, privilege use, configuration changes, application transactions, and anomalous behaviour analysis (including via SIEM/UEBA/threat intel), which surfaces registration and invocation of a malicious Exchange transport agent as an information security event.
- T1505.004mostlydetects — A.8.15 explicitly requires logging of system activities, privilege use, configuration changes, application transactions, security system activation, and anomalous behaviour via log analysis (SIEM/UEBA/IDS rules, threat intel, DNS logs, usage reports), which surfaces installation and use of malicious IIS components/modules on a Windows web server.
- T1505.005mostlydetects — A.8.15 explicitly requires logging and analysis of system activities, privilege use, configuration changes, service-related events, alarms from access control/IDS, and anomalous behaviour via SIEM/UEBA/correlation, which surfaces the Registry modification, DLL replacement, and resulting RDP/terminal service anomalies on Windows.
- T1526mostlydetects — A.8.15's logging captures the API calls, authentication events, and tool executions associated with cloud service enumeration (covered by 'transactions executed by users in applications' and 'use of utility programs and applications'), and its log analysis guidance — SIEM rules, UEBA, threat intelligence, and review of access attempts to protected resources — supports detection of anomalous enumeration patterns; the bounded remainder is adversary use of legitimate credentials making activity appear normal and dependence on proper analysis-tool configuration.
- T1529mostlydetects — A.8.15 records system activities, dates/times, user IDs and privilege use — a shutdown/reboot command or API call generates exactly these log entries, and the clause's log-analysis guidance (anomalous behaviour, UEBA, correlation) surfaces unexpected shutdowns. The bounded remainder is the cases where the adversary tampers with logs (the clause's own protection guidance acknowledges this risk) or the system fails before the event is written.
- T1530mostlydetects — A.8.15 requires logging of access attempts, resource access, and API transactions, and mandates log analysis including DNS checks and correlation to identify anomalous behaviour, which surfaces unauthorized data access from cloud storage; the remainder is that detection depends on the cloud provider's logging being enabled and ingested, which the control can require but not guarantee.
- T1531mostlydetects — A.8.15 explicitly requires logging of identity creation, modification and deletion (item i), use of privileges (item d), use of utility programs (item e), and configuration changes (item c) — all of which T1531 produces via Net, Set-LocalUser, Set-ADAccountPassword, passwd, esxcli or Group Policy. Log analysis requirements then surface the anomalous activity. The remainder is the bounded case where a privileged adversary tampers with the logs themselves, which A.8.15's protection clauses address but cannot guarantee.
- T1543.001mostlydetects — A.8.15 explicitly requires logging of 'changes to system configuration' and 'files accessed and the type of access,' which captures the creation/modification of .plist files in LaunchAgents directories, and its log-analysis requirements (anomalous behaviour, UEBA, threat intelligence) are designed to surface such persistence activity; the bounded remainder is that legitimate software also installs Launch Agents, so distinguishing malicious from benign requires the correlation and analysis the clause mandates but does not guarantee every implementation performs.
- T1543.002mostlydetects — A.8.15's logging framework covers the observable events of systemd service persistence — file creation/modification in systemd directories (event category f), configuration changes (c), privilege use (d), and utility program invocation via systemctl (e) — and its log-analysis guidance (anomalous behaviour, UEBA, threat intelligence, SIEM rules) provides the means to surface them; the bounded remainder is systemd generators and symlink-based evasion that may not register as standard file-modification or configuration-change events under typical implementations.
- T1543.003mostlydetects — A.8.15 explicitly requires logging of system configuration changes, privilege use, and file access — all of which T1543.003 generates (registry modifications, service installation events like Event ID 7045, driver file creation, SYSTEM-context execution), and the clause's log-analysis guidance covers identifying anomalous behaviour; the bounded remainder is the technique's anti-detection features (masqueraded service names, hidden services via SDDL, BYOVD with signed drivers) that can evade even well-instrumented logging.
- T1543.004mostlydetects — A.8.15 explicitly requires logging changes to system configuration, use of privileges, and file access events — all of which Launch Daemon creation/modification generates (plist file writes in /Library/LaunchDaemons/, elevated privilege use, process execution at load) — and mandates log analysis to identify anomalous behaviour and indicators of compromise; the bounded remainder is cases where disguised daemon names evade analysis rules or where log integrity protections fail against a privileged adversary.
- T1546.001mostlydetects — A.8.15 explicitly requires logging of system activities, privilege use, configuration changes, file access/deletion, and anomalous behaviour via SIEM/UEBA/correlation, which surfaces Registry modifications and suspicious file-association handlers after they occur.
- T1546.002mostlydetects — A.8.15 explicitly requires logging of user activities, privilege use, configuration changes, alarms, security system activation, and anomalous behaviour via log analysis (including UEBA, SIEM rules, and correlation), which surfaces screensaver-based persistence (registry tampering and PE execution on inactivity) once it occurs.
- T1546.003mostlydetects — A.8.15 explicitly requires logging of utility program use (mofcomp.exe), system activities, configuration changes, and process execution — all of which generate log artifacts for WMI subscription creation and execution via WmiPrvSe.exe, and the log analysis section mandates identifying anomalous behaviour; the bounded remainder is that WMI-Activity/Operational logging is not default-enabled and detection depends on analyst knowledge of the subscription pattern.
- T1546.008mostlydetects — A.8.15 explicitly requires logging of successful/rejected access attempts, privilege use, system configuration changes, alarms from access control systems, security system activation, and log analysis (with SIEM/IDS/UEBA rules, anomalous behaviour detection, and correlation) that surfaces indicators of the binary replacement, registry changes, or unexpected SYSTEM-level execution at the login screen.
- T1546.012mostlydetects — A.8.15 explicitly requires logging of configuration changes (which IFEO registry modifications are) and process creation/use of utility programs, and its log-analysis clause requires identifying anomalous behaviour through correlation and pattern analysis; the bounded remainder is that surfacing IFEO injection depends on the depth of registry telemetry and analysis the implementation actually performs, which the clause sets as a requirement rather than mandating universally.
- T1546.014mostlydetects — A.8.15 explicitly requires logging of events including successful/rejected access attempts, privilege use, system configuration changes, identity creation/modification, and alarms from access control systems, plus analysis via SIEM/IDS/UEBA rules and correlation to identify anomalous behaviour and indicators of compromise; this surfaces emond rule installation and triggered actions on macOS (a named subset of the technique), with the bounded remainder being stealthy rule placement that evades the specific monitored event types or analysis scope.
- T1546.017mostlydetects — A.8.15 explicitly requires logging of system activities, privilege use, configuration changes, file accesses, security system activation, and anomalous behaviour via SIEM/UEBA/correlation, which surfaces udev rule modifications (privileged file writes in /etc/udev/rules.d etc.) and the resulting anomalous executions; the bounded remainder is stealthy in-memory or non-logged rule triggers that evade the listed monitoring scope.
- T1546.018mostlydetects — A.8.15 explicitly requires logging of system activities, privilege use, configuration changes, file accesses, security-system activation, identity creation/modification, and anomalous behaviour via SIEM/UEBA/threat-intelligence-driven analysis, all of which surface Python startup-hook abuse when it executes on monitored systems.
- T1547mostlydetects — A.8.15 explicitly requires logging 'changes to system configuration' and 'creation, modification or deletion of identities' — the exact events T1547 produces (registry run keys, startup folder writes, scheduled task creation, authentication package modifications) — and mandates log analysis with SIEM rules, UEBA and threat intelligence to identify anomalous behaviour; the bounded remainder is kernel-level or otherwise out-of-scope autostart mechanisms that evade standard configuration-change logging.
- T1547.001mostlydetects — A.8.15 explicitly requires logging of system configuration changes and file access events, which directly covers registry run key modifications and startup folder additions; the control also includes log analysis guidance for identifying anomalous behaviour. The technique is squarely within scope, but detection depends on log analysis being performed and on the specific registry keys being instrumented, leaving a bounded remainder.
- T1547.004mostlydetects — A.8.15 explicitly includes 'changes to system configuration' in its logging scope, which captures registry modifications to Winlogon keys, and its log-analysis guidance (SIEM/IDS rules, UEBA, threat intelligence) supports detecting these as anomalous; the bounded remainder is that specific detection rules for Winlogon persistence are not mandated, so an implementation logging but not analysing for this pattern would be conformant yet miss it.
- T1547.007mostlydetects — A.8.15 explicitly requires logging of login events, privilege use, application execution, configuration changes and anomalous behaviour, plus analysis via SIEM/UEBA/threat intel to surface indicators of compromise such as a malicious plist modification for auto-reopen; this directly surfaces the technique on macOS where the relevant events are in scope, with only a bounded remainder (e.g. fully offline or non-correlated cases) left unaddressed.
- T1547.010mostlydetects — A.8.15 explicitly requires logging of 'changes to system configuration' (covering the Print\Monitors registry modification), 'use of utility programs' (covering the AddMonitor API call), and 'files accessed' (covering the DLL placement), plus log analysis to identify anomalous behaviour; the bounded remainder is that detection depends on the specific audit policies being enabled (registry, process, file auditing) and the analysis actually surfacing the pattern, which the clause requires but does not guarantee.
- T1547.013mostlydetects — A.8.15 explicitly requires logging of user activities, privilege use, system configuration changes, application execution, and anomalous behaviour via log analysis (including UEBA, SIEM, and correlation), which surfaces XDG Autostart modifications or the resulting malicious execution at login on Linux systems; the bounded remainder is stealthy or non-logged cases that evade the prescribed events and analysis.
- T1547.014mostlydetects — A.8.15 explicitly requires logging of 'changes to system configuration' (which covers Registry modifications to Active Setup keys) and process execution at logon, and its log-analysis requirements (SIEM rules, UEBA, anomaly detection) are designed to surface such persistence mechanisms; the bounded remainder is that A.8.15 does not mandate Registry auditing specifically, so an implementation without it is still conformant and would miss the Registry write itself.
- T1547.015mostlydetects — A.8.15 explicitly requires logging of successful/rejected access attempts, privilege use, system configuration changes, application launches, and anomalous behaviour via log analysis (SIEM/UEBA/threat intel/correlation), which surfaces the addition or execution of a login item at user login on macOS.
- T1548mostlydetects — A.8.15 explicitly lists logging of privilege use, configuration changes, access attempts, and identity modifications — the events that surface T1548 — and its log-analysis guidance (SIEM rules, UEBA, threat intelligence, anomaly detection) is built to identify indicators of compromise; the remainder is that logging records and guides analysis but does not itself perform real-time detection, which depends on the analysis being executed.
- T1548.001mostlydetects — A.8.15 explicitly requires logging and analysis of privilege use, system activities, configuration changes, and anomalous behaviour (including via SIEM/UEBA/correlation), which surfaces setuid/setgid abuse both when the bits are set on binaries and when they are later executed.
- T1548.003mostlydetects — A.8.15 explicitly requires logging of privilege use, configuration changes (sudoers modifications), and log analysis for anomalous behaviour — all of which surface sudo caching abuse. Sudo invocations and /etc/sudoers edits leave traces, and the analysis section calls for UEBA-style pattern detection. The remainder is the abuse of cached credentials within timestamp_timeout, which is designed to look like legitimate sudo use and requires correlation beyond mere event capture.
- T1548.004mostlydetects — A.8.15 explicitly requires log analysis and monitoring to identify anomalous behaviour, indicators of compromise, privilege use, and security events (including use of privileges, system access attempts, and alarms), which surfaces the credential-prompt and elevated-execution behaviour described in T1548.004; the remainder is events on unmonitored macOS endpoints or before analysis rules are tuned.
- T1548.006mostlydetects — A.8.15 explicitly requires logging and analysis of system activities, privilege use, configuration changes, security system activation, and anomalous behaviour (including via SIEM/UEBA/correlation), which surfaces TCC database manipulation or inherited elevated permissions as an information security event
- T1550mostlydetects — A.8.15 logs authentication events (user IDs, timestamps, network addresses, access attempts) and provides analysis guidance including SIEM rules, UEBA, and correlation — use of alternate auth material produces authentication events that are captured and can be flagged as anomalous through these mechanisms; the bounded remainder is uses that perfectly mimic legitimate authentication (well-crafted pass-the-hash, valid Kerberos ticket reuse) where the log entry alone cannot distinguish adversary from owner without additional context.
- T1552.003mostlydetects — A.8.15 explicitly requires logging of shell-relevant events (user IDs, system activities, commands executed via utility programs/applications, privilege use, file accesses including history files) plus log analysis/monitoring for anomalous behaviour and indicators of compromise, which surfaces an adversary searching or exfiltrating a shell history file; the named remainder is that passive log analysis does not guarantee real-time detection of every stealthy read.
- T1552.004mostlydetects — A.8.15 explicitly requires log analysis and monitoring to identify anomalous behaviour and indicators of compromise, including review of file access (especially important files), privilege use, system activities, and correlation with threat intelligence — which surfaces adversaries searching for or accessing private key files on the estate.
- T1552.005mostlydetects — A.8.15's logging scope covers network addresses and protocols, access attempts, and process activity, and its log-analysis section explicitly calls out identifying anomalous behaviour and indicators of compromise — connections to 169.254.169.254, SSRF-bearing proxy requests, and curl/wget-style process execution all fall within that scope and are surfaced by standard SIEM/IDS rules. The remainder is implementation-dependent: organisations that scope logging narrowly (e.g., authentication-only) or whose logging pipeline misses in-memory or kernel-level access will not see every instance, so it is not `full`.
- T1553.004mostlydetects — A.8.15 explicitly requires logging of system configuration changes, use of utility programs, and file access — all of which are produced by root certificate installation (e.g., the `security add-trusted-cert` command, keychain modification, trust store change). Log analysis for anomalous behaviour further supports detection. The remainder is the bounded case where an adversary with sufficient privilege tampers with logs or where an implementation omits the relevant event types.
- T1553.006mostlydetects — A.8.15 explicitly requires log analysis and monitoring to identify anomalous behaviour, indicators of compromise, and specific events such as changes to system configuration, use of privileges, and activation/deactivation of security systems; these directly surface the policy-modification commands, registry changes, and reboot artifacts named in T1553.006, with the bounded remainder being kernel-memory edits that may evade standard logging.
- T1555.001mostlydetects — A.8.15 explicitly requires log analysis, anomaly detection via SIEM/UEBA/IDS rules, correlation of logs (including successful/rejected access, privilege use, system changes), and identification of indicators of compromise such as probing or malware, which surfaces Keychain dumping via the security command or direct file reads on macOS.
- T1555.004mostlydetects — A.8.15 mandates logging of privileged use, file access, and security system events, and requires log analysis to identify anomalous behaviour including indicators of compromise, which would surface the API calls, tool execution, and file reads characteristic of credential dumping from the Windows Credential Manager.
- T1556mostlydetects — A.8.15 logs authentication events, system configuration changes, file access, and process activity, and its log-analysis clause (UEBA, threat intelligence correlation, anomaly detection) is well-suited to surface modifications to authentication components like PAM modules, SAM, or LSASS; the bounded remainder is in-memory credential extraction that does not produce log entries by default, and stealthy modifications that evade the predetermined rules the clause relies on.
- T1556.006mostlydetects — A.8.15's logging scope explicitly covers configuration changes, identity creation/modification/deletion, file access, and use of privileges — all of which T1556.006 produces when adversaries modify MFA settings, patch MFA programs, edit the hosts file, or alter conditional access policies; log analysis is also in scope, so the events are both recorded and interpretable, with the bounded remainder being subtle abuse of legitimate features (e.g. excluding a user from a conditional access policy) that may not surface as anomalies without deeper correlation.
- T1556.009mostlydetects — A.8.15 explicitly requires log analysis, anomaly detection via SIEM/UEBA/IDS rules, correlation of logs (including access attempts, privilege use, configuration changes and security system activation), and identification of suspected incidents such as probing — all of which surface modification or disablement of conditional access policies when those actions generate observable events on the monitored identity or IAM systems.
- T1557mostlydetects — A.8.15 explicitly requires log analysis, anomaly detection via SIEM/IDS/UEBA/threat intel, correlation of logs (including DNS, network, access attempts, and physical events), and identification of indicators like probing or malware that surface AiTM behaviors such as DNS manipulation, ARP spoofing, or anomalous traffic flows.
- T1557.001mostlydetects — A.8.15 requires logging of network addresses/protocols, access attempts, and DNS-related events, and its analysis guidance explicitly calls for checking DNS logs, correlating logs, and identifying anomalous behaviour — all of which surface the LLMNR/NBT-NS/mDNS traffic, the authentication attempts to adversary systems, and the relay events that T1557.001 produces; the bounded remainder is that the technique exploits legitimate name-resolution protocols, so detection depends on the correlation and anomaly analysis being performed rather than on log creation alone.
- T1558mostlydetects — A.8.15's logging requirements capture Kerberos authentication events (TGT/TGS requests at 4768/4769, pre-auth failures at 4771) and its analysis requirements (SIEM rules, UEBA, threat intelligence, pattern analysis) enable detection of most Kerberos attacks including Kerberoasting, AS-REP roasting, and pass-the-ticket, but well-crafted golden/silver tickets with valid encryption keys and some advanced variants can evade detection, and effectiveness depends on proper configuration of what is logged and analyzed.
- T1559mostlydetects — A.8.15 explicitly requires logging, protection, and analysis of events including system activities, privilege use, process/resource access attempts, anomalous behaviour via SIEM/UEBA/IDS correlation, and indicators of compromise, which surfaces IPC abuse (e.g. anomalous COM/DDE/sockets/pipes activity) in monitored environments.
- T1559.003mostlydetects — A.8.15 explicitly requires logging of system activities, privilege use, configuration changes, application transactions, alarms, and anomalous behaviour via SIEM/IDS/UEBA rules plus correlation, which surfaces XPC service abuse (including malicious requests to root daemons and improper validation) as an information security event or indicator of compromise on macOS.
- T1561mostlydetects — A.8.15 explicitly requires logging of file access and deletion (including important data files), system activities, use of privileges, utility programs, and configuration changes — all of which a disk wipe generates extensively at the file-system level — and its log-analysis guidance (SIEM rules, UEBA, threat intelligence, anomaly detection) is designed to surface such mass-deletion patterns; the bounded remainder is raw disk writes that bypass the file system (e.g., MBR wipes, direct sector overwrites) which may not produce typical file-access log entries before the damage is done.
- T1561.001mostlydetects — A.8.15 explicitly requires logging of file access and deletion, use of utility programs, use of privileges, and system configuration changes — all of which a disk content wipe generates in volume (mass file deletions, RawDisk driver loading, privilege escalation, anomalous I/O patterns), and the log-analysis guidance is built to surface such anomalous behaviour as indicators of compromise; the bounded remainder is direct hardware-level access that bypasses the OS-mediated event stream and cases where the adversary tampers with or overwrites the logs themselves.
- T1561.002mostlydetects — A.8.15 explicitly requires logging of system activities, privilege use, configuration changes, security system activation/deactivation, and anomalous behaviour via SIEM/UEBA/threat-intelligence analysis, which surfaces disk-structure-wipe indicators (MBR/partition corruption, format commands, boot failures) after the fact; the named remainder is pre-compromise adversary reconnaissance or execution on unmonitored/offline systems.
- T1563.002mostlydetects — A.8.15 mandates logging of the event categories RDP hijacking touches — process creation of tscon.exe (utility programs/applications), session reattachment (system activities), and the in-session activity under the original user ID — and requires log analysis including UEBA and anomaly detection, so the technique leaves traces the control is designed to surface; the bounded remainder is cases where the adversary manipulates logs, analysis fails to flag activity that mimics the legitimate user, or correlation is incomplete.
- T1564.002mostlydetects — A.8.15 explicitly requires logging user creation/modification/deletion (i) and configuration changes (c), which are the core events of T1564.002 across all three platforms (dscl/plist on macOS, registry edits on Windows, gsettings on Linux). The clause's log-analysis framework — predetermined rules, behaviour patterns, trend analysis — is designed to surface such anomalous activity. The bounded remainder is that detecting the *hidden* aspect specifically requires correlating the user-creation event with the attribute-setting event and knowing the hiding patterns, which not every implementation will configure.
- T1564.003mostlydetects — A.8.15 explicitly requires logging of system activities, privilege use, process/application execution, configuration changes, and anomalous behaviour via log analysis (SIEM/UEBA/threat intel/correlation), which surfaces hidden-window techniques (e.g. -WindowStyle Hidden, plist/UIElement, hidden desktop, off-screen registry edits) once they execute on monitored systems.
- T1564.008mostlydetects — A.8.15 explicitly requires log analysis, anomaly detection via SIEM/IDS/UEBA/threat intel, correlation of logs (including successful/rejected access, privilege use, config changes, alarms), and identification of suspected incidents such as probing or malware — which surfaces the creation or effect of malicious email-hiding rules as anomalous mailbox or mail-flow activity.
- T1565.001mostlydetects — A.8.15 explicitly requires logging of file access events including deletion of important data files, plus configuration changes, privilege use, and log analysis for anomalous behaviour — all of which surface stored data manipulation in most cases; the bounded remainder is subtle in-place modifications that do not trigger distinct access events or that occur through legitimate channels without integrity monitoring.
- T1567.002mostlydetects — A.8.15 captures the network addresses, DNS queries, and file-access events that T1567.002 leaves behind, and its analysis guidance explicitly covers checking DNS logs for outbound connections to malicious servers and using UEBA/SIEM rules to identify anomalous behaviour — cloud-storage exfiltration is a textbook detection use case for this clause; the bounded remainder is encrypted traffic content and the dependence on specific detection rules being configured.
- T1568.002mostlydetects — A.8.15 explicitly calls out checking DNS logs to identify outbound connections to malicious servers including botnet C2, and its log-analysis guidance (UEBA, threat intelligence, pattern analysis, SIEM rules) is the mechanism that surfaces DGA's characteristic burst of algorithmically generated domain queries; the bounded remainder is that detection depends on the analytical capability deployed and some sophisticated DGAs evade pattern-based detection.
- T1569.002mostlydetects — A.8.15's logging scope explicitly covers system configuration changes (service creation/modification), privilege use, and process execution — all of which T1569.002 generates (Event ID 7045 for service installation, 4688 for process creation with command-line auditing, security log entries for privilege use). The log analysis section requires SIEM/IDS/UEBA-style correlation against anomalous behaviour, which surfaces service-control-manager abuse. The bounded remainder is that detection depends on the analysis rules actually being configured to flag this pattern and on logs being centrally collected and retained.
- T1569.003mostlydetects — A.8.15 explicitly requires logging system activities, use of utility programs, configuration changes, and privilege use, and mandates log analysis (including UEBA and threat intelligence) to identify anomalous behaviour — systemctl invocations fall squarely into these categories and would be surfaced. The bounded remainder is that detection depends on the implementation's depth of instrumentation and on log integrity, which the clause requires but cannot guarantee against a privileged adversary manipulating the very logs that would expose them.
- T1570mostlydetects — A.8.15 explicitly logs file access events, network addresses/protocols, successful and rejected resource access attempts, and use of file sharing — all of which T1570 generates when tools move between systems via SMB, RDP, scp, rsync, etc.; the clause's log-analysis section (UEBA, SIEM rules, correlation) is designed to surface anomalous lateral movement, so the technique is broadly observable, with the bounded remainder being that detection requires the analysis to actually be performed and tuned to lateral-transfer patterns.
- T1571mostlydetects — A.8.15 requires logging of network addresses and protocols, and its log analysis guidance explicitly includes checking DNS logs for outbound connections to malicious servers and correlating logs for accurate analysis, which surfaces non-standard port usage; the remainder is that detection depends on the organization implementing the specified log analysis procedures and correlation rules.
- T1572mostlydetects — A.8.15 captures network addresses and protocols, requires logging of access attempts and resource use, and its analysis section explicitly calls for DNS log review, anomaly/UEBA comparison, threat intelligence correlation, and SIEM rules — all of which surface tunneling indicators (unusual encapsulations, DoH to suspicious resolvers, anomalous outbound patterns). The bounded remainder is the technique's design goal: encrypted tunnel payloads are opaque to log content, and well-crafted tunneling that mimics legitimate traffic can evade pattern-based detection.
- T1574.004mostlydetects — A.8.15 explicitly requires logging of system activities, privilege use, process/file access, security system events, and log analysis (with SIEM/UEBA/IDS rules, anomalous behaviour detection, and correlation) that surfaces dylib loading anomalies or unexpected library loads on macOS, though it does not guarantee coverage of every possible weak-link or @rpath hijack variant.
- T1574.005mostlydetects — A.8.15 explicitly requires log analysis and monitoring to identify anomalous behaviour, indicators of compromise, and suspected incidents (including via SIEM, UEBA, correlation, and review of access attempts, privilege use, system changes, and file operations), which surfaces the file-permission abuse and binary replacement during installer execution on Windows.
- T1574.006mostlydetects — A.8.15 explicitly requires log analysis and monitoring for anomalous behaviour, indicators of compromise, and correlation of events (including process, library, privilege-use and configuration-change logs), which surfaces dynamic-linker hijacking once it occurs.
- T1574.010mostlydetects — A.8.15 explicitly requires logging and analysis of privilege use, system configuration changes, service-related events, anomalous behaviour via SIEM/UEBA/IDS correlation, and indicators of compromise, which surfaces the hijacking of service binaries running at elevated (e.g. SYSTEM) permissions.
- T1574.011mostlydetects — A.8.15 explicitly requires logging and analysis of system activities, privilege use, configuration changes, service-related events, and anomalous behaviour (including via SIEM/UEBA/correlation), which surfaces Registry permission abuse and hijacked service paths when they trigger or are reviewed.
- T1578mostlydetects — A.8.15's enumerated event types — configuration changes, use of privileges, transactions, identity creation/modification/deletion — directly map to cloud compute infrastructure modifications, and cloud providers' audit logs (CloudTrail, Azure Activity Log) are standard sources that fall within the clause's logging scope; the log-analysis section further requires identifying anomalous behaviour via SIEM rules and pattern analysis, which surfaces these modifications. The bounded remainder is implementation: organisations must actually ingest cloud control-plane logs into the logging scope, and modifications via means outside logged channels (e.g. compromised provider-side tooling) would not be captured.
- T1578.003mostlydetects — A.8.15 explicitly requires logging, protection, and analysis of events including system activities, privilege use, configuration changes, resource access/deletion, alarms, and anomalous behaviour via SIEM/UEBA/threat intel, which surfaces the deletion of a cloud instance (and its forensic loss) as an indicator of compromise or incident.
- T1578.005mostlydetects — A.8.15 explicitly requires log analysis, anomaly detection via SIEM/UEBA/threat intel, and monitoring of configuration changes, privilege use, system activities and resource-access events that surface modifications to quotas, policies, VM sizes or region settings; the bounded remainder is stealthy or pre-compromise changes that produce no observable event on the victim estate.
- T1595mostlydetects — Active scanning produces network traffic that hits the organization's perimeter and is captured in the event logs A.8.15 mandates (network addresses, protocols, timestamps, access attempts), and the clause's log-analysis guidance — SIEM/IDS rules, UEBA, threat intelligence, correlation — is purpose-built to surface this anomalous activity; the bounded remainder is stealthy or low-and-slow scanning that stays below detection thresholds or targets systems outside the logging scope.
- T1599mostlydetects — A.8.15 explicitly requires log analysis and monitoring to identify anomalous behaviour, indicators of compromise, and suspected incidents (including via SIEM, UEBA, DNS logs, traffic patterns, and correlation), which surfaces boundary device compromise and unauthorized traffic bridging as detectable events on the network perimeter.
- T1613mostlydetects — A.8.15 explicitly requires log analysis, anomaly detection via SIEM/IDS/UEBA/threat intel, and specific monitoring of events (including container-relevant ones such as system activities, privilege use, configuration changes, resource access, and physical monitoring) that surface T1613 indicators like anomalous API queries or dashboard access in container environments.
- T1621mostlydetects — A.8.15 explicitly requires logging successful and rejected access attempts and use of privileges, and its log-analysis guidance targets anomalous behaviour and unusual activity — the repeated authentication attempts and the MFA-fatigue pattern of bursts followed by an unexpected success are exactly the artifacts the clause is built to capture and surface, with the bounded remainder being that some MFA-push events live in the IdP's logs rather than the target system's.
- T1647mostlydetects — A.8.15 explicitly requires logging of system activities, privilege use, configuration changes, file accesses/deletions, security system activation, and log analysis (with SIEM/UEBA/threat intel) that surfaces anomalous plist modifications as indicators of compromise or incidents.
- T1651mostlydetects — A.8.15 mandates logging of user IDs, system activities, privilege use, and 'transactions executed by users in applications' — which captures cloud management service invocations and the resulting VM-side execution — and requires log analysis with UEBA, threat intelligence, and anomaly detection to identify suspected incidents; the bounded remainder is implementation-dependent gaps where cloud audit trails are not in scope or behavioral analysis fails to flag legitimate-looking admin activity.
- T1653mostlydetects — A.8.15 explicitly requires logging and analysis of system activities, privilege use, configuration changes, alarms, security-system activation/deactivation, and anomalous behaviour (including via SIEM/UEBA/correlation), which surfaces abuse of powercfg, altered timeouts, deleted shutdown files, or prevented hibernation as security events or indicators of compromise
- T1671mostlydetects — A.8.15 requires logging of identity creation/modification (service principals), configuration changes, transactions in applications (OAuth consent grants), and access attempts — all of which generate events in SaaS audit logs when T1671 is executed; the analysis section explicitly calls for identifying anomalous behaviour and indicators of compromise via SIEM rules and UEBA. The remainder is that legitimate-looking OAuth integrations and token-based access can evade pattern-based detection without specific tuning.
- T1673mostlydetects — A.8.15 logs system activities, use of utility programs and applications, and transactions executed by users — all of which capture CLI commands like `esxcli vm process list` or `vim-cmd vmsvc/getallvms` and vCenter GUI access, and the log analysis section explicitly identifies anomalous behaviour as indicators of compromise; detection is not full because identifying the enumeration as anomalous depends on analysis rules being configured to flag VM discovery specifically, and the activity can blend with legitimate administrative use.
- T1680mostlydetects — A.8.15 explicitly requires logging and analysis of system activities, privilege use, configuration changes, resource access attempts, and anomalous behaviour (including via SIEM/UEBA/correlation), which surfaces the commands, CLI calls and API invocations used in T1680 across its platforms; the named remainder is pre-compromise discovery on third-party IaaS infrastructure outside the organization's logging scope.
- T1684.002mostlydetects — A.8.15 explicitly requires log analysis, anomaly detection via SIEM/IDS/UEBA/threat intel, correlation of logs (including DNS, access attempts, and physical events), and identification of suspected incidents such as probing or malware, which surfaces spoofed emails that produce observable artifacts in mail logs, headers, authentication failures, or anomalous sending patterns.
- T1685.002mostlydetects — A.8.15 explicitly requires log analysis, anomaly detection via SIEM/IDS/UEBA/threat intel, correlation, and identification of suspected incidents (e.g. probing), which surfaces the disable/modify action when it affects observable events or leaves detectable gaps.
- T1685.005mostlydetects — A.8.15 explicitly addresses log protection against deletion and tampering, requires logging of process/command execution and privilege use (which captures wevtutil and PowerShell clearing commands), and mandates log analysis to identify anomalous behaviour — the clearing action itself and the resulting gaps are detectable through these mechanisms. The bounded remainder is the gap when the recommended protection techniques (cryptographic hashing, append-only storage) are not implemented, allowing clearing to succeed without tamper-evidence.
- T1685.006mostlydetects — A.8.15 explicitly addresses log file deletion as something to protect against via append-only storage, cryptographic hashing, and log analysis that identifies anomalous behaviour; the clause's own guidance names a bounded remainder — privileged users with direct control over the processing facility can still potentially manipulate logs — which prevents `full`.
- T1686mostlydetects — A.8.15 explicitly lists configuration changes, activation/deactivation of security systems (firewalls are security systems), and use of privileges as events to be logged, and its log analysis section requires identifying anomalous behaviour and indicators of compromise; however, detection depends on the analysis being performed effectively and adversaries with sufficient privileges may tamper with logs, so it does not reach full.
- T1686.001mostlydetects — A.8.15 explicitly requires logging of configuration changes, use of privileges, and activation/deactivation of security systems — all of which capture cloud firewall modifications through cloud audit logs (e.g., CloudTrail, Azure Activity Log) — and its log-analysis clause covers identifying anomalous behaviour indicative of compromise; the bounded remainder is logging being disabled or tampered with by the adversary, which the clause's own protection guidance acknowledges.
- T1686.002mostlydetects — A.8.15 explicitly requires logging of 'changes to system configuration,' 'use of privileges,' and 'activation and de-activation of security systems' — all of which cover firewall rule modifications, ACL changes, and disabling of network device firewalls when network devices are in logging scope. The technique occurs on the organization's own devices, giving a vantage point. The bounded remainder is that adversaries may disable logging on the compromised device as part of the attack, and host networking configuration changes (a sub-technique variant) may fall outside the network device logging scope.
- T1686.003mostlydetects — A.8.15 explicitly requires logging of 'changes to system configuration' and 'activation and de-activation of security systems' — both directly cover firewall rule/profile modifications and firewall state changes via netsh, PowerShell, or registry. The log analysis section requires identifying anomalous behaviour and suspected security incidents, so the events would be surfaced. Remainder: adversaries with privileges sufficient to also tamper with logs (the control addresses but does not eliminate this), and modifications through GUI paths that may produce less distinctive log entries than command-line mechanisms.
- T1001partialdetects — A.8.15's log analysis (SIEM rules, UEBA, threat intelligence correlation, DNS log review) can surface some obfuscated C2 through statistical anomalies or known patterns, but T1001 is specifically engineered to make traffic look normal — steganography, junk data in legitimate protocols, and protocol impersonation evade the very anomaly-detection mechanisms logging relies on, so detection is a slice rather than a bounded remainder of a working mechanism.
- T1001.001partialdetects — A.8.15 captures network traffic logs and its analysis section includes UEBA, pattern analysis, and threat intelligence that can surface anomalous C2 traffic volumes or patterns junk data produces, but T1001.001 is specifically engineered to defeat trivial decoding and traffic analysis, so detection depends on the depth of analysis rather than being inherent to logging itself.
- T1001.002partialdetects — A.8.15's log analysis guidance covers anomaly detection and correlation, but steganography is designed to evade network-level inspection by hiding C2 in legitimate-looking traffic, so detection depends on deep content analysis that the clause's scope does not mandate.
- T1001.003partialdetects — A.8.15's logging and log analysis (UEBA, threat intelligence, pattern analysis, SIEM rules, DNS log review) can surface some impersonation through behavioral anomalies, certificate irregularities, or known-malicious infrastructure, but the technique is specifically designed to make C2 traffic blend with legitimate traffic, so the bulk of well-crafted impersonation evades the analysis the clause mandates.
- T1003partialdetects — Recording privileged utility execution, file access, and system configuration changes can reveal attempts to dump credentials from memory or registry stores.
- T1003.001partialdetects — A.8.15 explicitly enumerates logging of utility program use (procdump, rundll32+comsvcs.dll), file access (lsass.exe handle, dump file creation), and configuration changes (SSP registry keys), all of which surface LSASS credential dumping; the bounded remainder is pure in-memory extraction that triggers none of these logged events.
- T1003.004partialdetects — A.8.15 requires logging of access attempts, privilege use, and system activities, plus analysis for anomalous behaviour; SYSTEM-level access to the LSA secrets registry hive and credential-dumping tool activity (Mimikatz, etc.) generate registry access, process access and privilege-use events that a conformant logging implementation captures and analyses. The bounded remainder is configurations where registry/process auditing is not enabled for the SECURITY hive, and evasion techniques that suppress or bypass the relevant event sources.
- T1003.007partialdetects — A.8.15's log analysis guidance covers SIEM/IDS rules and UEBA anomaly detection that can surface credential access patterns, but proc filesystem reads occur entirely within process memory and leave no system-call or file-access log artifact by default, so detection depends on whether the organization has deployed endpoint instrumentation beyond the clause's own logging scope.
- T1003.008partialdetects — A.8.15's logging scope explicitly includes file access events and privilege use, so reading /etc/passwd and /etc/shadow is observable where audit rules cover those files; however, the clause sets requirements ('as applicable', 'should be considered') rather than mandating the specific file-access instrumentation, and an attacker with root can tamper with logs despite the protection guidance, so detection is a slice of conformant implementations rather than a bounded remainder of a mechanism that mostly works.
- T1005partialdetects — A.8.15 explicitly requires logging of 'files accessed and the type of access' plus user IDs, system activities, and access attempts, which directly covers the file-system and configuration-file access that is the core of T1005; log analysis with UEBA, anomaly detection and threat intelligence further surfaces unusual local collection. The bounded remainder is process-memory access and any collection that occurs through channels the organization's logging scope does not instrument.
- T1006partialdetects — A.8.15 logs system activities, utility execution (vssadmin, esentutl, wbadmin), and use of privileges, which surfaces much of T1006's typical execution path, but the technique is explicitly designed to bypass file system monitoring by reading raw volume sectors, so the file-access layer of logging is evaded and only the surrounding system activity is caught.
- T1007partialdetects — A.8.15's logging scope explicitly covers 'use of utility programs and applications' and 'system activities,' which captures commands like `sc query` and `tasklist /svc` when process-execution/command-line logging is enabled, and its analysis section names SIEM rules and UEBA as techniques for surfacing anomalous behaviour; however, the clause sets requirements ('should be considered') rather than mandating specific instrumentation depth, so an implementation logging only authentication and configuration changes is fully conformant and sees nothing of this technique.
- T1008partialdetects — A.8.15's log analysis guidance explicitly covers DNS log review for outbound connections to malicious servers and correlation of logs for anomaly detection, which can surface fallback channel activity, but the control's scope is determined by business and security requirements rather than mandating the depth of network telemetry needed to catch every protocol switch.
- T1010partialdetects — A.8.15's log analysis guidance covers reviewing access attempts and correlating logs, which can surface the enumeration commands that precede window discovery, but the technique's primary execution—querying the window manager—does not inherently generate a loggable event on most platforms, so detection depends on whether the specific enumeration method leaves an audit trail.
- T1011partialdetects — A.8.15's host-level event logs (system activities, network addresses and protocols, device identity) can capture some alternative-medium exfiltration attempts when endpoints log local network connections, but the technique is specifically designed to use mediums not routed through the enterprise network, and the clause's analysis guidance is enterprise-centric (DNS, firewall, SIEM), so detection is a slice rather than comprehensive.
- T1011.001partialdetects — A.8.15's logging scope is organization-determined and heavily oriented toward network events, user activities, and system access; Bluetooth radio activity and file transfers over Bluetooth are typically outside the default logging set, so a fully conformant implementation may capture file-access and system-activity indicators but miss the Bluetooth channel itself, leaving the technique's core mechanism unobserved.
- T1012partialdetects — A.8.15 can surface registry queries through process creation logging and command-line auditing, but the clause determines scope rather than mandating instrumentation depth, so an implementation logging only the events it explicitly lists may miss registry interaction entirely.
- T1014partialdetects — A.8.15's log analysis, UEBA, DNS-log review, SIEM correlation and threat-intelligence inputs can surface some rootkit indicators (outbound C2, behavioural anomalies, configuration drift), but the technique's core mechanism — intercepting and modifying OS API calls that supply system information — is specifically designed to evade the OS-level event logging the control primarily describes, and the clause's own guidance on protecting against 'alterations to message types that are recorded' acknowledges this evasion surface.
- T1016.001partialdetects — A.8.15 logs network addresses and protocols, and its analysis guidance specifically calls out checking DNS logs for outbound connections and reviewing access attempts to protected resources — ping, tracert, and HTTP GET requests all generate network and DNS log entries that surface this technique; the bounded remainder is that some connectivity checks blend into normal traffic and require the analysis rules (SIEM/UEBA) the clause only requires to exist, not to fire on every instance.
- T1020partialdetects — A.8.15's log analysis guidance covers reviewing access attempts, DNS logs, and correlating logs to identify anomalous behaviour, which can surface automated exfiltration patterns, but the control determines logging scope rather than mandating the specific exfiltration telemetry (e.g., full packet capture) needed for complete detection.
- T1020.001partialdetects — A.8.15 explicitly requires logging of configuration changes, use of privileges, and network addresses/protocols — all of which would record the enabling actions for traffic mirroring (device config changes, cloud API calls, firmware modifications). However, the actual silent duplication of traffic to adversary-controlled destinations is not directly visible in standard event logs; detecting that requires correlating the logged config change with anomalous network flows, which A.8.15's analysis guidance supports but does not guarantee.
- T1021partialresponds — A.8.15's log analysis, anomaly detection, correlation, and explicit tie to feeding suspected incidents into the 5.25 incident management process enable response (containment/eradication) once remote-service logins via valid accounts are underway; partial because the control only surfaces the event and hands it off, with no containment/eradication actions inside A.8.15 itself, and because many T1021 sub-techniques (e.g., SaaS/IaaS federation, ARD abuse) leave limited or no detectable log footprint on the organization's estate.
- T1021.003partialdetects — A.8.15's log analysis guidance explicitly covers reviewing access attempts, correlating logs, and identifying anomalous behaviour, which can surface DCOM lateral movement, but the control determines logging scope rather than mandating the specific host-level telemetry (e.g., process creation with specific CLSIDs) needed for reliable detection, so what is caught is a slice the implementer chose.
- T1021.005partialresponds — A.8.15 requires log analysis, anomaly detection, correlation, and identification of suspected incidents (including probing or unauthorized access) to feed the incident management process (5.25); this surfaces and enables response to VNC abuse by a valid account once underway, but the clause itself performs none of the containment/eradication steps that define the core of `responds` on the event lane.
- T1021.006partialdetects — A.8.15 requires logging of access attempts (successful and rejected), network addresses and protocols, use of privileges, and transactions executed by users — all of which WinRM activity generates (authentication events 4624/4625, WinRM-specific logs, network connections, commands run). The analysis section adds SIEM rules, UEBA, and threat intelligence to surface anomalous remote-management patterns. The bounded remainder is that legitimate WinRM use looks similar to malicious use, so detection depends on behavioral baselines and the depth of the analysis implementation rather than being guaranteed by the clause.
- T1025partialdetects — A.8.15 requires logging of file access events and supports log analysis for anomalous behaviour, which can surface access to removable media, but the control determines logging scope rather than mandating specific instrumentation for removable media access, so detection depends on implementation choices.
- T1027partialdetects — A.8.15's logging of file access, process execution, and network events, combined with its log analysis provisions (UEBA, pattern analysis, threat intelligence, indicators of compromise), can surface behavioral indicators of obfuscation such as unusual file types, decode-then-execute patterns, and anomalous command structures; however, T1027 is specifically designed to evade detection, and the clause's scope is set by what the organization chooses to log and analyze, leaving a bounded remainder of obfuscation that produces no observable log artifact.
- T1027.002partialdetects — A.8.15 captures file creation/modification events, process execution, and system activities that can indicate packing, and its analysis guidance explicitly covers predetermined rules (SIEM/IDS signatures), UEBA, and indicators of compromise — so known packers and behaviourally anomalous packed binaries are within reach; however, the technique is specifically designed to evade signature-based detection, custom packers leave no known artifacts, and in-memory decompression generates few log events, so what is caught is a slice determined by the analysis rules applied rather than a bounded remainder of a mechanism that mostly works.
- T1027.004partialdetects — A.8.15's log analysis guidance covers DNS logs, SIEM rules, and threat intelligence correlation, which can surface the subsequent compilation or execution of the delivered source code, but the control does not mandate the deep file-content inspection or endpoint instrumentation needed to detect the uncompiled payload at the point of delivery.
- T1027.006partialdetects — A.8.15 captures the surrounding events (HTML download in web/proxy logs, browser process execution, file creation in Downloads, subsequent outbound connections in DNS logs) and its log-analysis clause is built to surface anomalous behaviour from those records, but the technique is specifically engineered to make the HTML file look benign — the smuggling itself is only visible through content inspection of the file, which logging does not perform, so what is detected is the activity envelope rather than the technique.
- T1027.007partialdetects — A.8.15's logging scope includes 'system activities' and 'use of utility programs and applications,' which can capture process execution, image loads (LoadLibrary), and API resolution calls at runtime — but the control sets scope through a topic-specific policy rather than mandating the host-level instrumentation (e.g., Sysmon Event ID 7/10, ETW traces) needed to see in-process dynamic API resolution, so a conformant implementation logging only network or application-layer events sees nothing of this technique.
- T1027.009partialdetects — A.8.15 logs process creation, file access, network connections and utility use, so when an embedded payload executes it generates events the logging system captures and that SIEM/UEBA analysis can flag as anomalous — but logging does not inspect file contents to detect the embedding itself, so what is caught is the execution footprint rather than the concealment technique.
- T1027.010partialdetects — A.8.15 logs command execution events and includes analysis (UEBA, pattern analysis, predetermined rules) that can surface some obfuscated commands through anomalous character usage, encoding patterns, or behavioral deviations, but T1027.010 is specifically engineered to evade signature and behavioral detection, so what is caught is a slice rather than the bulk.
- T1027.012partialdetects — A.8.15 explicitly requires log analysis and monitoring to identify anomalous behaviour, indicators of compromise, unusual activity in logs (including file access, system activities, and external connections), and correlation with threat intelligence, which surfaces LNK icon smuggling when it triggers observable events such as malicious downloads or execution; however, the technique can occur entirely in benign-looking local LNK metadata with no guaranteed log artifact, especially pre-compromise or without specific SIEM/UEBA rules.
- T1027.013partialdetects — A.8.15 records file access, creation and modification events (item f) and supports log analysis with UEBA and threat intelligence, so the *act* of writing or staging an obfuscated artifact leaves a trail; however, the technique is specifically designed to make encrypted/encoded content look like normal data at rest, and logging does not inspect file content, so the obfuscation itself is not surfaced — only the surrounding activity, which is a slice rather than the technique.
- T1027.014partialdetects — A.8.15 logs process execution, file access, and network connections, and its analysis guidance includes UEBA and anomaly detection that could surface unusual behavior, but polymorphic code is specifically engineered to evade signature- and pattern-based detection by mutating with each execution, so the logs capture activity artifacts while reliably identifying the polymorphic nature remains difficult.
- T1027.015partialdetects — A.8.15 logs process execution of compression tools (7z, gzip, etc.) and file creation events, and SIEM/UEBA correlation can flag anomalous compression patterns, but the technique's core — malicious content hidden inside archives, concatenated ZIPs, or compressed shellcode in registry keys — is a content-level property that logs do not see; what is detected is the wrapper activity, not the obfuscation itself.
- T1027.017partialdetects — A.8.15's logging and log-analysis infrastructure captures the network connections, file access, and DNS queries that result from SVG smuggling's payload execution, and its correlation/threat-intelligence guidance supports identifying the C2 stage; however, the technique is specifically designed to evade content filters by hiding payloads inside a file type treated as an image, and standard system logs do not inspect SVG content or reliably record browser-context JavaScript execution, so the malicious delivery itself often passes unflagged.
- T1027.018partialdetects — A.8.15 captures downstream events from the technique's execution (process runs, network connections, file access) and its log-analysis clause with SIEM rules, UEBA, and threat intelligence can surface anomalous patterns, but the technique is specifically designed to evade basic static and visual analysis by hiding payloads in non-printing Unicode characters within file content — a content-inspection problem that standard event logging does not perform, so only a slice of the technique's footprint is observable through logs.
- T1029partialdetects — A.8.15's log analysis guidance covers reviewing DNS logs for outbound connections to malicious servers and correlating logs for analysis, which can surface the exfiltration event once it occurs, but the scheduling itself is a timing decision made by the adversary and is not directly observable in logs, leaving the detection of the scheduling pattern dependent on analyst skill and correlation rather than a guaranteed capture.
- T1030partialdetects — A.8.15 logs the underlying events (file accesses, network connections, DNS queries) and its analysis section explicitly mandates UEBA, trend/pattern analysis and correlation — exactly the mechanisms that can surface chunked exfiltration that stays below size thresholds. But T1030 is purpose-built to evade threshold alerts, and the clause sets analysis capability rather than mandating the depth of UEBA or pattern detection, so an implementation meeting A.8.15 with rule-based thresholds alone sees nothing of the technique.
- T1036partialdetects — A.8.15 logs the events masquerading produces — file access, service/task creation, identity changes, execution of utilities, configuration changes — and its analysis layer (SIEM rules, UEBA, threat intelligence, anomaly detection) can surface renamed binaries behaving anomalously or services created with names matching legitimate ones; however, masquerading is specifically designed to evade observation, and pure metadata manipulation or file renaming without subsequent execution leaves little in standard event logs to catch, so detection is a slice rather than a bounded remainder of a working mechanism.
- T1036.001partialdetects — A.8.15 captures events from security systems (AV/IDS alerts, file access events) and requires log analysis with threat intelligence and IDS signatures, so invalid code signature detections from endpoint tools can be logged and surfaced; however, the clause sets the scope of what is logged via topic-specific policy rather than mandating code signature validation or its logging, so an implementation logging only access events without security-tool alerts would be conformant and see nothing of T1036.001.
- T1036.002partialdetects — A.8.15 logs file access events including the actual filename stored on the filesystem, which would contain the non-printing RTLO character, and requires log analysis for anomalous behaviour — so the raw data and the analytical requirement are present. However, detection requires specific knowledge of the RTLO technique and analysis tooling that flags Unicode control characters in filenames; standard anomaly detection does not automatically surface it, and the clause sets scope rather than mandating this specific detection.
- T1036.003partialdetects — A.8.15 logs file access events (including renames) and process executions, and its analysis provisions cover anomalous behaviour and threat intelligence, so the raw data and analytical framework exist to surface renamed utilities — but the technique is specifically designed to evade by making the renamed binary look legitimate, and detection depends on implementation depth (file-integrity monitoring, LOLBAS-style rules, path-anomaly analysis) that the clause does not mandate.
- T1036.004partialdetects — A.8.15 logs task/service creation events (under 'changes to system configuration' and 'creation, modification or deletion of identities') and the analysis guidance explicitly calls for comparing against known behaviour patterns, UEBA, and threat intelligence — which is exactly what surfaces a masqueraded name. The bounded remainder is sophisticated masquerading that perfectly mimics a legitimate task/service name and slips past pattern matching without specific threat intel or behavioural baselining.
- T1036.005partialdetects — A.8.15 logs the events that could surface masquerading (file creation, registry modifications, process execution) and its log-analysis clause explicitly covers identifying anomalous behaviour via UEBA, predetermined rules and threat intelligence, so the mechanism is in scope; but T1036.005 is purpose-built to make those log entries look identical to legitimate ones, and detection depends on baselines, allowlists or behavioural correlation that the clause does not mandate — a perfectly mimicked resource produces a log line indistinguishable from the real one.
- T1036.006partialdetects — A.8.15 logs the relevant events — file execution, application launch, user ID, and the filename including any trailing space — and its analysis framework (SIEM rules, threat intelligence, anomalous behaviour detection) can be configured to surface the masquerading, but the clause sets scope and analysis capability rather than mandating specific rules for filename-extension mismatches, so detection depends on implementation choices.
- T1036.007partialdetects — A.8.15 logs file access and system activities including process execution, so the full filename (e.g., Evil.txt.exe) and the .exe execution are captured in logs that the control's analysis layer can review for anomalous patterns; however, detecting the masquerading specifically requires file-system auditing to be enabled and analysis rules that flag double extensions, neither of which the clause mandates, so what is caught is a slice dependent on implementation choices rather than a bounded remainder of a mechanism that mostly works.
- T1036.008partialdetects — A.8.15 logs file access events, process execution, and system activities that can be analyzed for indicators of masquerade files (e.g., a .jpg being executed as code), but the clause does not mandate logging file signatures/magic bytes or the file-type-vs-extension validation needed to fully detect T1036.008; the detection depends on additional analysis beyond what the logging scope specifies.
- T1036.009partialdetects — A.8.15's logging of system activities, process creation events with PIDs, and its log analysis provisions (UEBA, pattern analysis, correlation) provide the mechanism to surface broken process trees — e.g., processes adopted by init (PID 1) or detached via daemon syscall — but the technique is specifically designed to evade parent-child analysis, and A.8.15 sets scope by organizational determination rather than mandating process-tree telemetry, so detection depends on what is logged and how it is analyzed.
- T1036.010partialdetects — A.8.15 mandates logging of identity creation events (clause i) and provides analysis guidance including UEBA and pattern analysis that could surface a new account whose name mimics a legitimate one, but the masquerading pattern is not directly visible in the raw log — detecting it requires the analysis layer to be configured to compare new account names against existing baselines, which is an implementation choice the clause does not mandate.
- T1036.011partialdetects — A.8.15's logging of system activities (process execution with full command lines via auditd-class mechanisms) and its analysis layer (UEBA, anomaly detection, threat intelligence) can surface the discrepancy between the original argv captured at exec() and the spoofed /proc/cmdline, plus behavioral anomalies inconsistent with the claimed process name; however, the technique is specifically designed to defeat simple process-listing inspection, and A.8.15 sets scope by implementation rather than mandating process-creation command-line capture or argv-integrity monitoring, so detection is a slice rather than a bounded remainder of a mechanism that mostly works.
- T1036.012partialdetects — A.8.15 explicitly requires log analysis, anomaly detection via SIEM/IDS/UEBA/pattern analysis, and monitoring of network traffic, DNS logs, and access attempts that surface spoofed or anomalous browser fingerprints and crafted User-Agent strings as indicators of compromise.
- T1037partialdetects — A.8.15 explicitly requires logging of system activities, changes to system configuration, use of utility programs, files accessed, and creation/modification of identities — all of which T1037's boot/logon script execution generates. The log analysis section mandates identifying anomalous behaviour and correlating logs, which surfaces persistence scripts that deviate from baseline. The remainder is the technique's design to blend with legitimate administrative scripts and implementation variance in what is actually logged across the diverse platforms (ESXi, Linux, macOS, Network Devices, Windows).
- T1037.001partialdetects — A.8.15's scope explicitly covers configuration changes (registry modifications to UserInitMprLogonScript), use of utility programs (script execution), and logon events, and mandates analysis via SIEM rules, UEBA and threat intelligence — so the events are captured and analysable. But the technique is designed to blend with legitimate logon-script behaviour, and A.8.15 sets requirements for analysis rather than mandating specific detection rules for this registry key, so identification depends on the implementation's rule set and anomaly baselines.
- T1037.004partialdetects — A.8.15 requires logging of system activities, configuration changes, and use of privileges, which would capture modifications to RC scripts, but the clause determines scope rather than mandating specific file-integrity monitoring, so an implementation logging only the events listed in its guidance may miss a direct file write that does not traverse a logged system call.
- T1037.005partialdetects — A.8.15 explicitly requires logging of 'changes to system configuration,' 'use of utility programs and applications,' and 'files accessed and the type of access,' which would surface startup item creation in /Library/StartupItems and execution at boot, but the clause sets event categories rather than mandating specific instrumentation depth (e.g., file integrity monitoring on that path), so an implementation focused on network and access logs could be conformant and miss the initial file creation — the detection is a slice of what the implementer chose to instrument.
- T1040partialdetects — A.8.15 logs system events that can surface indicators of network sniffing — interface entering promiscuous mode, packet-capture tool execution, anomalous outbound volumes during exfiltration of captured data — but the core passive capture itself generates no loggable event on the victim's systems because the traffic flows normally, so what is caught is a slice of the technique's lifecycle rather than the technique itself.
- T1041partialdetects — A.8.15 mandates logging of network addresses/protocols, file access, and system activities, plus analysis via UEBA, pattern analysis, and threat intelligence — all of which surface C2-channel exfiltration through anomalous volumes, unusual file access preceding transfer, and known C2 patterns. The bounded remainder is that the technique is designed to blend with normal C2 traffic, so detection depends on analysis depth the clause sets as scope rather than mandates as mechanism.
- T1047partialresponds — A.8.15 requires log analysis, anomaly detection, correlation, and identification of suspected incidents (including via SIEM/IDS rules and UEBA) that can surface WMI abuse in flight for further investigation under the incident management process, but does not itself contain or eradicate the actor's foothold or the technique once underway.
- T1048partialresponds — A.8.15's log analysis, correlation, anomalous-behaviour detection and explicit tie to the incident-management process (5.25) let responders contain/eradicate an exfiltration event once underway, but only for the subset of T1048 activity that produces observable logs (most alternate-protocol exfil is designed to blend with or avoid logging, and the control itself does not act on the exfiltration channel or remove the actor's foothold).
- T1048.001partialdetects — A.8.15 explicitly requires log analysis, anomaly detection via SIEM/UEBA/threat intel, correlation of logs (including network activity, DNS, and outbound connections to malicious servers), and identification of indicators of compromise such as probing or unusual data flows, which surfaces symmetric-encrypted exfiltration when it produces observable network or application events.
- T1048.002partialdetects — A.8.15's log analysis guidance explicitly covers behavioural and pattern-based detection (UEBA, trend analysis, DNS log review, correlation) which is exactly the mechanism that surfaces encrypted exfiltration through metadata such as volume, destination, timing and process-to-network associations; the bounded remainder is the content-blindness inherent to asymmetric encryption, which prevents confirming what was sent but does not prevent detecting that an anomalous transfer occurred.
- T1049partialdetects — A.8.15 explicitly lists 'use of utility programs and applications' among events to consider for logging, which covers the primary mechanism of T1049 (running netstat, lsof, net session, etc.), and 'files accessed and the type of access' would catch variants that read /proc/net/ directly; however, the clause uses 'should be considered' rather than mandating process-execution auditing, and several variants — built-in shell features, network device CLIs, and cloud provider API calls — fall outside the explicitly enumerated log types, so an implementation fully conformant with A.8.15 can still miss a slice of the technique.
- T1052partialdetects — A.8.15's logging requirements (file access events, device identity, system activities) and log analysis capabilities (UEBA, anomaly detection) can surface physical medium exfiltration when USB/removable media events are within the logging scope the organization defines, but the clause sets scope by purpose rather than mandating specific instrumentation for removable media — an implementation logging only authentication and configuration events is fully conformant and would miss file copies to USB drives.
- T1052.001partialdetects — A.8.15's logging requirements include device identity and file access events that could capture USB exfiltration, and mandates log analysis for anomalous behaviour, but does not specifically require USB device auditing or removable-media file-access logging — an implementation logging only the listed general categories without configuring USB-specific auditing is fully conformant and may miss the technique, so detection is a slice the implementer chooses rather than a bounded remainder of a working mechanism.
- T1053.002partialresponds — A.8.15 requires log analysis, anomaly detection, correlation, and feeding suspected incidents (e.g. via alarms, privilege use, configuration changes, or scheduled-task-like events) into the incident management process (5.25), which performs containment/eradication once the technique is underway; this is genuine but only a slice because the control's logging/analysis surface does not observably engage every at-abuse vector (e.g. silent local escalation or non-logged startup tasks).
- T1053.007partialdetects — A.8.15's logging scope (set by the topic-specific policy) covers the events this technique produces — API calls creating CronJobs, privilege use, configuration changes, container execution — and log analysis with predetermined rules can surface anomalous scheduling activity, but the clause determines scope through policy rather than mandating instrumentation depth for container orchestration, so an implementation logging only traditional infrastructure is fully conformant and sees nothing of Kubernetes API activity.
- T1055partialdetects — A.8.15's logging requirements (system activities, utility program use, SIEM/IDS rules, UEBA, log correlation) provide infrastructure that can surface process injection through process creation events, anomalous API calls, and behavioral analysis, but the clause sets scope rather than mandating the specific process-level instrumentation (e.g., Sysmon process access events, handle operations, memory allocation telemetry) needed to catch an in-memory technique masked under a legitimate process; a conformant implementation logging only authentication and access events would miss it entirely.
- T1055.001partialdetects — A.8.15 requires logging of system activities, use of privileges, and alarms from security systems, and mandates log analysis for anomalous behaviour including SIEM/IDS rules and UEBA, which can surface DLL injection where host instrumentation is in scope, but the clause determines logging scope rather than mandating the deep process-level telemetry needed to observe in-process injection, so detection is a slice the implementer chose rather than a bounded remainder of a mechanism that mostly works.
- T1055.002partialdetects — A.8.15 provides logging infrastructure and analysis capabilities (SIEM, UEBA, IDS integration, correlation) that can surface PE injection when process-level events such as CreateRemoteThread or WriteProcessMemory are captured, but the control determines scope rather than mandating the specific instrumentation depth needed to reliably catch in-process injection — an implementation logging only authentication and file-access events is fully conformant and sees nothing of this technique.
- T1055.003partialdetects — A.8.15's log analysis section (SIEM rules, UEBA, threat intelligence, correlation) provides a framework that can surface thread execution hijacking via the API calls it generates (SuspendThread, VirtualAllocEx, WriteProcessMemory, SetThreadContext, ResumeThread), but the clause sets scope and analysis requirements rather than mandating the specific process-level telemetry needed to catch in-process injection — an implementation logging only network and application-layer events is fully conformant and sees nothing of this technique.
- T1055.004partialdetects — A.8.15's logging captures process creation events, thread manipulation, and API call traces that log analysis (with SIEM/UEBA rules and threat intelligence) can correlate into indicators of APC injection, but the technique is specifically designed to evade process-based defenses and standard Windows event logging does not record all the relevant API calls (OpenThread, QueueUserAPC) or memory writes by default, so detection depends on what the implementation chooses to instrument.
- T1055.005partialdetects — A.8.15 logging captures observable effects of TLS callback injection (process creation, thread activity, subsequent file and network actions) and its log-analysis provisions (UEBA, threat intelligence, anomaly rules) can surface the technique in flight, but the specific TLS callback manipulation is a memory-level operation designed to evade process-based defenses and is not directly recorded by standard event logs; the clause sets scope and analysis expectations rather than mandating the instrumentation depth needed to see the injection itself, leaving a bounded remainder analogous to the A.8.16 vs T1055 anchor.
- T1055.008partialdetects — A.8.15 requires logging system activities and analysing them for anomalous behaviour via predetermined rules and UEBA, which can surface ptrace-based injection when auditd or equivalent syscall telemetry is in scope; however, the clause sets a general logging framework rather than mandating ptrace-specific audit rules, so a conformant implementation logging only network or application-layer events would miss this in-process technique entirely.
- T1055.009partialdetects — A.8.15's logging requirements cover file access events, use of utility programs (dd), and system activities, which can capture /proc filesystem reads/writes and the dd execution that proc memory injection relies on; however, the clause sets scope and requirements rather than mandating specific instrumentation depth (e.g., auditd rules on /proc/[pid]/mem or syscall auditing of process_vm_writev), and the technique is explicitly designed to evade process-based detection by running in a legitimate process context, so what is caught is a slice determined by implementation choices rather than a bounded remainder of a mechanism that mostly works.
- T1055.011partialdetects — A.8.15's logging scope (system activities, API usage, process access, SIEM/UEBA analysis) can surface EWM injection where instrumentation captures the relevant API calls and memory operations, but the technique is specifically designed to evade detection by avoiding WriteProcessMemory/CreateRemoteThread, and the clause sets scope rather than mandating the specific telemetry needed to reliably observe in-process injection.
- T1055.012partialdetects — A.8.15's log analysis provisions (UEBA, SIEM rules, IDS signatures, anomaly detection) can surface process hollowing indicators such as suspicious CreateProcess flags, memory unmapping, and cross-process writes, but the clause sets scope rather than mandating the process-level telemetry needed to reliably catch this in-memory technique.
- T1055.013partialdetects — A.8.15 explicitly requires log analysis and monitoring to identify anomalous behaviour, indicators of compromise, and security events (including via SIEM, UEBA, correlation, and review of system activities, process creation, privilege use, and file operations), which surfaces in-process execution anomalies like doppelgänging even though the technique itself is fileless and avoids certain monitored APIs.
- T1055.014partialdetects — A.8.15's logging scope (syscalls, process activities, file access, privilege use) can surface indicators of VDSO hijacking such as anomalous open/mmap calls and library loads, but the technique is specifically designed to evade detection by executing within a legitimate process's address space, and the clause sets logging requirements rather than mandating the syscall-level or memory-protection instrumentation needed to reliably catch in-memory vdso manipulation.
- T1055.015partialresponds — A.8.15's log analysis, anomaly detection, SIEM/IDS correlation, and incident identification explicitly surface ListPlanting once it runs inside a legitimate process (via unusual list-view messages, callback execution, or behavioral deviations), feeding the 5.25 incident process for containment/eradication; the named remainder is fully in-memory variants that produce no observable log events at all.
- T1056partialdetects — A.8.15's log analysis covers unusual activity and anomalous behaviour, and input capture via API hooking or credential prompts can surface in process creation, module loads, or access patterns within the logged event types, but the control determines scope rather than mandating the host instrumentation depth needed to observe in-process hooking, so detection is a slice the implementer chose rather than a bounded remainder of a mechanism that mostly works.
- T1056.001partialdetects — A.8.15 logs configuration changes, use of utility programs, file access, and driver/service installation, which can surface keylogger persistence indicators (custom drivers, registry modifications, dropped files), but the core keystroke-interception activity — API hooking, hardware buffer reads — is largely in-process and produces no log events of its own, so what is detected is a slice of installation/persistence rather than the technique itself.
- T1056.003partialdetects — A.8.15's logging and analysis requirements can surface web portal capture through web server logs showing the injected script, DNS logs revealing outbound connections to attacker infrastructure, and authentication patterns (e.g., repeated logins, anomalous timing) flagged by UEBA-style analysis — but detection depends on the implementation having the right log sources and analysis rules in place, and the technique is designed to be transparent to users who still successfully authenticate.
- T1056.004partialdetects — A.8.15 logs system activities, DLL/library loads, process events and use of utilities, and its log-analysis clause covers UEBA, SIEM rules and behavioural baselining — so some indicators of API hooking (suspicious library loads via LD_PRELOAD/DYLD_INSERT_LIBRARIES, anomalous process telemetry, IAT modifications where host-level telemetry is in scope) are reachable; but the clause sets logging requirements rather than mandating the in-process instrumentation depth needed to see hook installation, so a fully conformant implementation logging only authentication and access events sees nothing of the technique, matching the same shape as A.8.16 vs T1055.
- T1059partialresponds — A.8.15's log analysis, anomaly detection, SIEM/IDS correlation and explicit tie to the 5.25 incident management process let responders contain/eradicate an in-flight interpreter abuse once it is logged and flagged, but the control itself performs none of the containment or eradication actions and many T1059 executions (especially non-interactive or short-lived) produce no observable event for response.
- T1059.002partialdetects — A.8.15 requires logging of process creation and command-line arguments, which surfaces osascript execution, but AppleScripts executed via NSAppleScript or OSAScript from within a binary do not necessarily generate a distinct process or command-line log entry, leaving a nameable gap.
- T1059.003partialdetects — A.8.15 explicitly lists 'use of utility programs and applications' and 'system activities' as events to log, and requires analysis for anomalous behaviour, so a conformant implementation will record cmd.exe invocations and can detect anomalous shell use; however, the clause sets the logging and analysis framework rather than mandating process-creation auditing with command-line capture or specific detection rules, so an implementation that logs only authentication and access events is fully conformant and sees nothing of the shell execution itself.
- T1059.004partialdetects — A.8.15 explicitly covers logging of system activities, use of utility programs and applications, process execution, and file access — all of which Unix shell commands generate extensively through auditd, syslog, shell history, and process accounting; the analysis clause further requires identifying anomalous behaviour, which shell execution patterns are well-suited to surface, though the clause sets requirements rather than mandating universal instrumentation depth, so shell activity on systems outside logging scope or evasion via stripped-down BusyBox environments remains a bounded remainder.
- T1059.005partialdetects — A.8.15 logs process creation (wscript.exe/cscript.exe/Office), command-line arguments, file access, registry modifications, and network connections generated by VB/VBA/VBScript execution, and its log-analysis clause covers SIEM rules, UEBA and signature-based detection of these patterns; the bounded remainder is fileless or in-memory VB execution that produces fewer traditional log artifacts.
- T1059.006partialdetects — A.8.15 requires logging of system activities, use of utility programs, and alarms from security systems, and its log analysis clause explicitly covers SIEM rules, IDS signatures, and correlation to identify anomalous behaviour, so Python execution that triggers a security tool alert or matches a SIEM rule is detected; the extent is partial because the clause determines scope rather than mandating instrumentation depth, and an implementation logging only network and application layers is fully conformant and sees nothing of an in-process Python interpreter execution.
- T1059.007partialdetects — A.8.15 logs process execution of script interpreters (node, wscript, cscript, osascript) and supports UEBA-style analysis that can flag anomalous JS execution patterns, but browser-based JavaScript execution and in-memory JIT compilation largely leave no log artifact the clause's mechanism captures, and the clause sets scope by organizational policy rather than mandating the specific telemetry needed.
- T1059.008partialdetects — A.8.15 requires logging of system activities, configuration changes, and use of utilities, which would capture CLI commands executed on a network device, but the control's scope is determined by the organization's topic-specific policy rather than mandating universal device-level command logging, so detection is a slice the implementer chooses rather than a bounded remainder of a mechanism that mostly works.
- T1059.011partialdetects — A.8.15 captures process execution, command-line arguments, file access and network connections that Lua abuse would generate, and its log-analysis section (SIEM rules, UEBA, threat intelligence, correlation) is built to surface anomalous interpreter use; however, the clause sets logging requirements rather than mandating detection coverage, embedded Lua execution via lua_State may not produce standard process events, and legitimate Lua use makes signature-based detection a slice rather than a closure.
- T1059.012partialdetects — A.8.15's log analysis guidance covers reviewing access attempts and correlating logs to identify anomalous behaviour, which can surface hypervisor CLI misuse, but the control determines logging scope rather than mandating hypervisor-level instrumentation, so detection depends on whether the implementer chose to log those commands.
- T1059.013partialdetects — A.8.15's logging of system activities, use of utilities, and transactions would capture container CLI/API invocations (docker, kubectl, API calls) if configured to do so, but the clause sets scope by implementation rather than mandating container-specific audit logging, and many deployments lack Kubernetes audit logging or Docker daemon logging, leaving a slice of the technique observable rather than the bulk.
- T1068partialdetects — A.8.15's logging of process creation, privilege use, driver loads, and system configuration changes, combined with its log analysis for anomalous behaviour and indicators of compromise, can surface artifacts of privilege escalation exploitation (e.g., sudden privilege assignment, BYOVD driver loads, unexpected process behaviour), but the exploitation itself — memory corruption and code execution — is not directly observable in standard logs, and detection depends on which events the implementation chooses to record.
- T1069partialdetects — A.8.15 requires logging of privilege use and identity changes, which can surface permission group enumeration, but the clause determines scope rather than mandating instrumentation depth, so an implementation logging only the events it lists may miss OS-level discovery commands.
- T1069.003partialdetects — A.8.15 requires logging of access attempts, use of privileges, and application transactions — cloud audit logs (CloudTrail, Azure AD, GCP Audit) recording the API calls fall squarely in scope — and its analysis clause mandates UEBA, threat intelligence, and anomaly detection that can surface enumeration patterns; the bounded remainder is that valid-credential enumeration can blend with normal user behavior and detection quality depends on baseline maturity.
- T1070partialdetects — A.8.15's log analysis provisions can surface the anomalous absence or alteration of log entries that T1070 creates, but the control's own protection measures (append-only, cryptographic hashing) are what prevent the deletion in the first place, and detection through analysis of what remains is inherently a partial view of the event.
- T1070.005partialdetects — A.8.15 explicitly requires logging of utility program use (Net.exe), system activities, user IDs, and timestamps — all of which capture the `net use /delete` command execution — and its log-analysis guidance (SIEM rules, UEBA, anomalous behaviour) supports identifying the cleanup as suspicious; the bounded remainder is that detection depends on active log analysis being performed and on logs not having been tampered with before review.
- T1070.007partialdetects — A.8.15 logs configuration changes, file deletions and registry modifications, and its log-integrity protections (append-only, cryptographic hashing) surface tampering with logs themselves, so the act of clearing connection history and modifying firewall/proxy settings leaves observable traces; however, the connection-history artifacts (RDP cache files, registry values under Terminal Server Client) are application-specific storage outside the event-log scope, and a sophisticated adversary clearing them may not generate the events A.8.15 captures, leaving a bounded remainder.
- T1070.008partialdetects — A.8.15's logging scope covers file deletions, use of utility programs/applications, and changes to system configuration — events that would surface mailbox export/delete operations and the tools used — and its log-analysis guidance (SIEM rules, UEBA, correlation) is the mechanism by which those events become detections; however, the technique is explicitly anti-forensic (clearing mailbox data, mail application logs, and metadata to remove evidence), and A.8.15's effectiveness depends on whether mail-application events are actually brought into scope and whether the adversary can also tamper with the logs that recorded the deletion, so what is caught is a slice rather than the bulk.
- T1071partialdetects — A.8.15's logging captures network addresses and protocols, and its log-analysis guidance explicitly names DNS-log checks for outbound connections to malicious servers, UEBA against known behaviour patterns, SIEM/IDS rules, and threat-intelligence correlation — all directly applicable to surfacing T1071 C2 in HTTP, DNS, SMTP and SMB; the remainder is the technique's core property of blending with legitimate traffic, which no logging regime fully eliminates.
- T1071.001partialresponds — A.8.15 requires log analysis, anomaly detection via SIEM/IDS/UEBA/correlation, and feeding suspected incidents (e.g. probing, C2) into the 5.25 incident management process for containment/eradication once underway; this engages the core of `responds` for in-band web C2 but is only a slice because the control's mechanism is passive logging/analysis rather than active containment and many T1071.001 implementations (e.g. encrypted HTTPS blending, non-malicious-looking patterns) produce no detectable event.
- T1071.002partialdetects — A.8.15 logs network addresses and protocols (capturing the file transfer traffic) and its log-analysis clause explicitly covers UEBA, threat intelligence, and pattern analysis to identify anomalous behaviour, which can surface C2 embedded in SMB/FTP traffic; the bounded remainder is that the technique is designed to blend in with common file transfer traffic, and encrypted variants (FTPS) limit content visibility.
- T1071.003partialdetects — A.8.15 logs network addresses and protocols (mail traffic is captured) and its analysis section explicitly calls for UEBA, threat intelligence, SIEM rules and correlation to surface anomalous behaviour, so the mechanism is in place; but T1071.003 is defined by blending in with normal SMTP/IMAP/POP3 traffic, and the clause sets up the infrastructure for detection rather than mandating the specific rules or behavioural baselines that would actually flag it, leaving a named remainder of mail-protocol C2 that looks like ordinary mail flow.
- T1071.003partialresponds — A.8.15's log analysis, correlation, anomaly detection (including DNS, UEBA, SIEM/IDS rules) and incident identification can surface mail-protocol C2 once underway as part of response, but the control's core is logging/analysis rather than containment/eradication and many stealthy embeddings go unseen
- T1071.004partialresponds — A.8.15 requires log analysis (including DNS logs for outbound connections to malicious C2 servers) plus correlation and incident identification to respond to suspected events once underway; this directly engages the DNS-tunneling technique when observed in logs, but leaves the core containment/eradication steps to the separate incident-management process (5.25) and does not act on every variant (e.g., infrequent beacons or non-malicious-domain C2).
- T1071.005partialdetects — A.8.15 logs network addresses and protocols and requires analysis for anomalous behaviour, providing a mechanism that can surface pub/sub C2 traffic, but T1071.005 is specifically designed to blend in with legitimate traffic of the same protocol, so detection depends on whether the protocol is in normal use and on the depth of behavioural analysis — the clause sets the requirement rather than mandating the depth.
- T1071.005partialresponds — A.8.15's log analysis, anomaly detection via SIEM/UEBA/correlation, and incident identification explicitly feed into the 5.25 incident management process that contains and eradicates an active pub/sub C2 channel once underway, but this is only a slice (monitoring/analysis handoff) while core containment/eradication lives in the separate incident response control.
- T1072partialdetects — A.8.15 requires logging of system activities, use of privileges, and changes to system configuration, which would capture the execution of commands through a software deployment tool, but the clause determines scope rather than mandating specific instrumentation depth, so an implementation logging only a subset of the listed events is fully conformant and may miss the technique.
- T1074partialresponds — A.8.15's log analysis, anomaly detection, correlation, and incident identification (e.g. via SIEM/UEBA/threat intel) surface staging activity once underway as part of the incident management process, but this is only a slice of the technique's mechanics (local file ops, archiving, cloud instance staging) with no containment or eradication named in the control.
- T1078.002partialdetects — A.8.15 logs authentication events (user IDs, timestamps, source addresses) and explicitly includes analysis guidance — UEBA, pattern analysis, SIEM rules, threat intelligence — that can surface anomalous use of valid domain credentials; however, the technique's core challenge is that the authentications succeed legitimately, so detection depends on behavioural baselines and analysis depth that the clause guides but does not mandate, leaving a conformant logging-only implementation that records the events without flagging the abuse.
- T1078.004partialresponds — A.8.15's log analysis, anomaly detection, and explicit tie to feeding suspected incidents into the 5.25 incident management process constitute a genuine response action once the T1078.004 account abuse is underway, but only for the subset of techniques whose artifacts appear in the listed events and logs; many stealthy or credential-only uses (e.g. pivoting via assumed roles or long-lived Additional Cloud Credentials) leave no observable event inside the clause's scope.
- T1080partialdetects — A.8.15 explicitly requires logging and analysis of file access/deletion, configuration changes, privilege use, utility/app execution, alarms from access controls, and anomalous behaviour via SIEM/UEBA/correlation to identify indicators of compromise such as tainted shared content or directory-share pivots.
- T1082partialdetects — A.8.15 explicitly requires logging of system activities, use of utility programs and applications, and access attempts — which directly covers T1082's main vectors (systeminfo, systemsetup, show version, cloud API calls). The analysis section requires identifying anomalous behavior via SIEM rules, UEBA and threat intelligence, so discovery commands that deviate from baseline are surfaced. The bounded remainder is discovery executed through legitimate-looking API calls or built-in tools used by privileged users in normal admin workflows, which can blend in without tuned detection rules.
- T1090.001partialdetects — A.8.15 captures network addresses, protocols, and system activities in logs and prescribes analysis including UEBA and correlation that can surface anomalous internal-to-internal traffic patterns indicative of proxy redirection, but T1090.001 is explicitly designed to ride over trusted communications paths (e.g., SMB) and blend in with normal environment traffic, so detection depends on the depth of analysis actually performed and is not assured by the logging framework alone.
- T1090.002partialdetects — A.8.15 captures the outbound connections to the external proxy (network addresses/protocols are explicitly in scope) and its log-analysis clause names threat intelligence, UEBA, and DNS-log review as detection mechanisms, so the artifacts are observable on the estate; however, the proxy is chosen to resemble legitimate traffic and detection depends on implementation choices about which destinations are flagged, what threat intel is applied, and whether anomaly baselines are tuned — none of which the clause mandates.
- T1090.003partialdetects — A.8.15 captures the last-hop proxy traffic in network logs and its analysis clauses (threat intelligence, UEBA, known-bad IP lists, DNS log review) can surface indicators of proxy use such as Tor exit nodes, but the technique is specifically designed so the multi-hop chain is opaque to the defender — only the last hop is visible, and identifying that it is a chain rather than a single proxy requires correlation and analysis beyond what general logging guarantees.
- T1090.004partialdetects — A.8.15 explicitly requires log analysis and monitoring for anomalous behaviour, including DNS logs for outbound connections to malicious C2 servers, UEBA, trend/pattern analysis, and correlation of events; domain fronting produces observable anomalies in HTTPS/TLS traffic patterns, SNI/Host mismatches (where logged), or unusual CDN routing that can be surfaced by these mechanisms, but many implementations (and the clause's own scope) leave real gaps in deep TLS inspection or coverage of all fronted flows.
- T1091partialdetects — A.8.15's log analysis guidance covers reviewing access attempts and correlating logs, which can surface the Autorun execution and file writes from removable media, but the control's scope is determined by organizational requirements rather than mandating the specific endpoint telemetry needed to fully capture this technique.
- T1092partialdetects — A.8.15 logs USB device insertion events, file access on removable media, user IDs and timestamps — the raw artifacts of T1092 are within its scope. However, the technique is specifically designed for disconnected/air-gapped networks where centralized logging infrastructure is often absent, and the C2 nature of the file transfer (commands vs. ordinary files) requires cross-system correlation and analysis that the clause does not guarantee, leaving the semantic detection of the C2 channel as a bounded remainder.
- T1095partialdetects — A.8.15 explicitly requires log analysis, anomaly detection via SIEM/IDS/UEBA/threat intel, DNS outbound checks for C2, correlation of events, and review of network activity patterns, which surfaces most non-application-layer C2 (ICMP, UDP, SOCKS, VMCI) once it generates observable events; the bounded remainder is traffic that produces no logs at all or occurs entirely outside monitored scope (e.g., pre-compromise VMCI inside the hypervisor).
- T1098.002partialdetects — A.8.15 requires log analysis and monitoring to identify anomalous behaviour and suspected incidents (including privilege use, configuration changes, and mailbox-related events via SIEM/UEBA/correlation), which surfaces T1098.002 after it occurs; partial because the control's scope and detection efficacy depend on what is chosen for logging/analysis and many delegate-permission changes (especially in third-party cloud services) can be configured to evade or fall outside the monitored events.
- T1098.004partialresponds — A.8.15 requires log analysis and monitoring to identify anomalous behaviour (including privilege-use, config changes, and access attempts) that can represent indicators of compromise, and to feed suspected incidents into the incident-management process (5.25); this surfaces T1098.004 once it has run on covered platforms but does not contain or eradicate it, and physical/privileged-user log protections plus the clause's scope-setting nature leave a named remainder of unmodified or unmonitored authorized_keys files.
- T1098.005partialdetects — Device registration events are captured in MFA/IdP/device-management audit logs that A.8.15's logging requirements cover (user IDs, timestamps, device identity, network addresses, identity-creation events), and the clause's log-analysis requirements — including UEBA against known behaviour patterns and correlation across logs — provide a framework that can surface anomalous device enrollments; however, the technique is designed to look legitimate using compromised credentials, first-device self-enrollment may bypass additional authentication signals, and A.8.15 sets analysis requirements rather than mandating specific detection rules for this technique, so detection is a slice dependent on implementation rather than a bounded remainder of a working mechanism.
- T1098.006partialdetects — A.8.15 explicitly requires logging of privilege use, role/identity changes, configuration changes, and anomalous behaviour via SIEM/UEBA/correlation, which surfaces the addition of roles or bindings after the fact.
- T1102partialdetects — A.8.15's log analysis guidance explicitly covers DNS log review for outbound connections to malicious servers and correlation of logs for anomaly detection, which can surface C2 traffic to legitimate web services, but the technique's use of standard HTTPS to common cloud platforms makes it indistinguishable from normal business traffic without deep packet inspection that logging alone does not provide.
- T1102.001partialdetects — A.8.15 requires log analysis and monitoring to identify anomalous behaviour and indicators of compromise (including outbound connections to malicious servers via DNS logs and correlation), which can surface dead-drop resolver activity when it produces observable network or log artefacts; however, the technique's use of common legitimate services (Google/Twitter) blends into expected noise, many implementations lack the specific UEBA/threat-intel rules to flag obfuscated resolvers, and pre-compromise external Web-service registration is invisible to organisational logs.
- T1102.002partialdetects — A.8.15's log analysis guidance covers DNS log review for outbound connections to malicious servers and correlation of logs, which can surface the anomalous web service traffic patterns of bidirectional C2, but the technique's use of legitimate, encrypted services and expected noise means detection depends heavily on the specific monitoring scope and analytical capability implemented, not a guaranteed outcome.
- T1102.003partialdetects — A.8.15 explicitly requires log analysis, anomaly detection via SIEM/UEBA/threat intel, DNS log review for C2 connections to malicious servers, correlation of events, and identification of indicators like probing or malware that map to one-way C2 over web services, covering the observable network and behavioral artifacts on the organization's estate.
- T1104partialdetects — A.8.15 explicitly covers DNS log checking for outbound connections to C2 servers, correlation of logs across systems, and UEBA-style anomaly analysis — all directly applicable to surfacing the staged callback pattern. The technique is designed to obfuscate through separate infrastructure and fallback channels, so detection depends on correlation depth and threat-intel integration that the clause mandates but does not guarantee, leaving a bounded remainder.
- T1106partialdetects — A.8.15 logs the observable effects of native API usage (process creation, file access, network connections, system activities) and its log-analysis section supports identifying anomalous behaviour via SIEM rules and UEBA, but the API calls themselves are in-process and not directly captured without specific syscall-level auditing; the clause sets scope by what the organization chooses to log, so a conformant implementation logging only high-level events sees the technique's effects but not the calls themselves.
- T1110partialdetects — Systematic logging of rejected access attempts and authentication events supports detection of password-guessing or spraying campaigns.
- T1110.004partialresponds — A.8.15 requires log analysis and correlation to identify suspected incidents (e.g. probing of firewalls, anomalous access attempts) once underway and feed them into the incident management process (5.25), which performs containment/eradication; this engages the core of `responds` for the authentication-failure and probing slice of credential stuffing but leaves the bulk (successful overlap logins that do not trigger alarms or anomalies) untouched.
- T1111partialdetects — A.8.15 logs authentication attempts, system activities, and file/process events that can surface keylogger installation and anomalous MFA-authenticated sessions via SIEM/UEBA analysis, but the interception itself — SMS-provider compromise, out-of-band token capture, or seed/algorithm theft — happens outside the organization's logged estate, so a meaningful slice of the technique is not directly observable in logs.
- T1113partialdetects — A.8.15 logs process execution, file creation, and network activity, which can surface screen-capture utilities running, screenshot files being written, or exfiltration of captured images; however, the core act of reading display memory via API calls like CopyFromScreen produces no enumerated event type (no access attempt, no configuration change, no file access in the traditional sense), so the technique's central mechanism is not directly observable and detection depends on side effects the implementation chooses to log.
- T1114partialdetects — A.8.15's log analysis guidance explicitly covers reviewing access attempts to protected resources and correlating logs, which can surface anomalous email access patterns, but the control determines logging scope rather than mandating the specific email-server telemetry that would make detection mostly complete.
- T1114.001partialdetects — A.8.15's logging of file access events, process activity, and user IDs can surface local email collection if file-system auditing is configured for .ost/.pst paths and the analysis layer correlates the access pattern, but the clause sets requirements rather than mandating that specific instrumentation, and an adversary reading Outlook data files through the application itself may produce events indistinguishable from normal mail client operation.
- T1114.003partialresponds — A.8.15 requires log analysis and correlation (including of successful/unsuccessful access, privilege use, configuration changes, and anomalous behaviour) to identify suspected incidents such as this rule creation, then hands them to the incident management process; this matches the `responds` verb once the technique is underway, but only a slice of the attack (the detectable logging surface) is covered while hidden rules, transport rules, and post-forwarding exfiltration sit outside what the logging facility itself can contain or eradicate.
- T1119partialresponds — A.8.15 requires log analysis and correlation (including of file-access, privilege-use, configuration-change and anomalous-behaviour events) to identify and hand off suspected incidents for the incident-management process (5.25); once T1119 has run, those logs supply the evidence that lets responders contain/eradicate the collection activity, but the control itself performs none of the containment or eradication steps and many T1119 variants (especially cloud-API/ETL) leave no detectable log trail under the clause's listed events.
- T1123partialdetects — A.8.15's logging scope (device access, file access, use of utility programs/applications, network connections) can capture some indicators of audio capture — particularly the audio file written to disk, the process invoking audio APIs, and any exfiltration — but the core capture activity (a process opening the microphone device) is not in the default event set the clause enumerates, and whether device-access auditing is enabled depends on the topic-specific policy the clause requires rather than on the clause itself, leaving the in-process capture largely unobserved by a conformant baseline.
- T1124partialdetects — A.8.15 requires logging of 'system activities' and 'use of utility programs and applications,' which would capture T1124's commands (net time, w32tm /tz, systemsetup -gettimezone, etc.) when process/command-line auditing is enabled; however, the clause sets logging requirements with 'as applicable' and 'should consider' qualifiers rather than mandating process-execution auditing, so a conformant implementation focused on authentication and configuration-change logs would miss the technique.
- T1125partialdetects — A.8.15's logging scope covers the side effects of T1125 — file access events when video/image files are written to disk (item f), process execution of the capturing script or malware (item e), and network connections for later exfiltration — but the core action (camera/peripheral device activation) is not in the standard event list, so detection depends on which of these side-effect categories the implementation instruments, leaving a bounded remainder.
- T1127partialdetects — A.8.15 explicitly mandates logging 'use of utility programs and applications' and 'system activities', which captures the execution chain of T1127 (developer utility spawning malicious payloads), and its log-analysis section calls for identifying anomalous behaviour against known patterns using threat intelligence — but detection depends on the analysis rules actually configured and on whether process-execution telemetry with command-line arguments is in scope, so a fully conformant implementation focused only on access events would see little of this technique.
- T1127.001partialdetects — A.8.15 captures process execution, command-line, file access and network events that surface MSBuild abuse, and its log-analysis guidance (SIEM rules, UEBA, threat intelligence, correlation) supports detection; however, the clause sets logging/analysis requirements rather than mandating specific detection rules, so what is caught depends on implementation scope — similar to the A.8.16 vs T1055 `partial` shape.
- T1129partialdetects — A.8.15 requires logging, protection, and analysis of events including system activities, privilege use, process loading (via shared modules/DLLs/SOs), anomalous behaviour, and indicators of compromise, which surfaces T1129 when it triggers observable events; however, many in-memory module loads (especially stealthy or non-anomalous ones) produce no detectable log or anomaly within the clause's scope.
- T1132partialdetects — A.8.15 explicitly requires log analysis, anomaly detection via SIEM/IDS/UEBA/threat intel, and monitoring of network/DNS/activity patterns that can surface encoded C2 traffic as anomalous; this is genuine detection but only a slice, as the control does not mandate instrumentation depth or coverage of all encoding variants and many encoded payloads remain indistinguishable from legitimate traffic without additional specific tooling.
- T1132.001partialdetects — A.8.15 explicitly requires log analysis, anomaly detection via SIEM/IDS/UEBA/threat intel, and specific monitoring of network traffic/DNS/outbound connections to malicious C2, which surfaces standard encoding (Base64, etc.) in C2 traffic as anomalous; the remainder is non-network or fully obfuscated cases outside the monitored scope.
- T1132.002partialdetects — A.8.15 explicitly requires log analysis and monitoring to identify anomalous behaviour, indicators of compromise, and unusual network activity (including DNS and outbound connections), which surfaces non-standard encoding in C2 traffic as an observable deviation; this is a genuine but minority slice because the control's scope is limited to what is logged, analyzed per defined procedures, and correlated within the organization's estate, leaving many encoding variants, non-monitored channels, and pre-analysis evasion outside its reach.
- T1134partialdetects — A.8.15 requires logging of privileged operations and log analysis for anomalous behaviour, which can surface token manipulation events like unexpected privilege escalation, but the technique's in-memory nature and the control's scope-determined logging depth mean detection is a slice the implementer chooses rather than a bounded remainder of a mechanism that mostly works.
- T1134.001partialdetects — A.8.15's logging of 'use of privileges' and 'system activities' plus its UEBA/SIEM analysis framework can surface token manipulation events (e.g., DuplicateToken, ImpersonateLoggedOnUser) when the right Windows audit policies are enabled and correlated, but the clause sets a logging framework rather than mandating the specific token-level audit events, so detection depends on implementation choices the clause does not require.
- T1134.003partialdetects — A.8.15's log analysis guidance covers reviewing access attempts and correlating logs, which can surface the anomalous logon event that Make and Impersonate Token creates, but the technique's in-memory token manipulation itself leaves no log entry, so what is detected is a slice of the technique's observable footprint.
- T1134.004partialdetects — A.8.15 logs process creation events (system activities, use of utilities) with PPID information, and its analysis guidance (UEBA, pattern analysis, predetermined rules) can surface some anomalous parent-child relationships, but the technique is specifically designed to make the recorded PPID appear legitimate in the very logs A.8.15 produces, and the clause does not mandate the deeper instrumentation (full token/call-chain capture) needed to reliably distinguish a spoofed parent from a genuine one.
- T1134.005partialdetects — A.8.15 explicitly lists 'creation, modification or deletion of identities' as events to be logged, and SID-History Injection modifies the sIDHistory attribute on an AD object, so the event is in scope and captured. However, detection requires the analysis layer (SIEM rules, UEBA, threat intelligence) to flag the attribute change as anomalous, and the technique is relatively obscure — a conformant baseline implementation logs the event but may not surface it as a security incident without specific detection content.
- T1135partialdetects — A.8.15's logging requirements capture T1135 through multiple log types: process execution (net view/net share commands), network connections (SMB traffic), and access attempts to shared resources on both source and target systems, with log analysis requirements to identify anomalous reconnaissance behavior; the bounded remainder is that detection depends on the analysis being actively performed and on the specific implementation's depth of behavioral correlation.
- T1136partialresponds — A.8.15 requires log analysis and correlation to identify suspected incidents (including account creation events) and feed them into the incident management process (5.25) for response, but the control itself performs only detection/analysis and hands off containment/eradication, leaving the core response actions to another control.
- T1137partialdetects — A.8.15's log analysis guidance explicitly covers reviewing access attempts, DNS logs, and correlating logs to identify anomalous behaviour, which can surface the execution of Office startup persistence mechanisms, but the control's scope is determined by what the organization chooses to log and analyse, so detection is a slice the implementer selects rather than a bounded remainder of a mechanism that mostly works.
- T1137.001partialdetects — A.8.15's logging scope explicitly includes file access events, configuration changes, and process activities that would surface template file modifications (Normal.dotm/Personal.xlsb), GlobalDotName registry changes, and Office macro execution, and the clause includes log analysis guidance for anomalous behaviour; however, the clause sets what SHOULD be logged rather than mandating instrumentation of user-appdata template paths or specific registry keys, so an implementation logging only a subset of categories is fully conformant yet sees nothing of this technique.
- T1137.002partialdetects — A.8.15's log analysis guidance covers reviewing access attempts, system configuration changes, and anomalous behaviour, which can surface the Registry key creation and DLL load events this technique produces, but the control determines logging scope through a topic-specific policy rather than mandating Registry-level instrumentation, so detection depends on what the implementer chose to log.
- T1140partialdetects — A.8.15's log analysis guidance explicitly covers reviewing access attempts, DNS logs, and correlating events to identify anomalous behaviour, which can surface the execution of deobfuscation tools like certutil, but the control's scope is determined by business and security requirements rather than mandating the depth of endpoint instrumentation needed to catch every in-memory or script-based decode.
- T1176partialdetects — A.8.15 requires log analysis and monitoring to identify anomalous behaviour and indicators of compromise (including via UEBA, SIEM, IDS rules, and correlation of events such as privilege use, configuration changes, and application activity), which surfaces malicious or abused extensions once installed and active; it does not cover pre-install marketplace scanning or the full set of stealthy extension behaviours that leave no observable event.
- T1176.001partialdetects — A.8.15's logging requirements capture raw events relevant to browser extension abuse — file modifications to Preferences/Secure Preferences files, process execution of the browser, network connections and DNS queries from extensions, and registry changes — and its log analysis section explicitly calls out checking DNS logs for malicious outbound connections and correlating logs for anomalous behaviour. However, the clause sets scope rather than mandating instrumentation depth: an implementation logging only basic access events is fully conformant and sees nothing of the in-browser malicious activity (form-data theft, page manipulation, silent preference-file installs), and the technique's stealth aspects blend with normal browser traffic, so what is caught is a slice rather than the bulk with a bounded remainder.
- T1176.002partialdetects — A.8.15's logging scope covers system activities, use of utility programs and applications, file access, and network addresses/protocols, and its log-analysis guidance (SIEM rules, UEBA, threat intelligence) could surface anomalous behaviour from a malicious IDE extension. However, the clause sets requirements rather than mandating instrumentation depth: a conformant baseline that logs only access attempts, configuration changes and privilege use may capture little of an extension's in-IDE execution, and the clause does not require process-level telemetry, file-integrity monitoring on extension directories, or IDE-specific logs — so detection is a slice the implementer chooses, not a bounded remainder of a mechanism that mostly works.
- T1185partialdetects — A.8.15's logging and analysis guidance captures the network and access aspects of browser session hijacking (DNS logs to C2, intranet resource access, privilege use, UEBA against anomalous browser behaviour), but the core process injection into the browser is a process-level event whose visibility depends on what the implementation chooses to log — a baseline logging scope fully conformant with A.8.15 can miss the in-process hijack itself, mirroring the A.8.16 vs T1055 `partial` shape.
- T1189partialdetects — A.8.15's log analysis guidance explicitly covers reviewing access attempts, DNS logs for malicious connections, and correlating logs to identify incidents like malware infection, which can surface the post-exploitation artifacts of a drive-by compromise, but the initial browser exploit execution may occur before logging scope captures it.
- T1199partialdetects — A.8.15 requires log analysis and monitoring (SIEM/UEBA/IDS correlation, anomalous behaviour review, DNS logs for C2, physical logs) that can surface post-breach use of a trusted third-party account or connection, but the technique's upstream acquisition and initial abuse of the external relationship often occurs outside the organization's estate and observable logs.
- T1200partialdetects — A.8.15's logging of device identity, network addresses, system activities, and configuration changes can surface some hardware additions through their digital footprints (USB enumeration events, new MAC addresses, DHCP leases, new system entries), but the physical act of introduction is not itself a logged event, and many variants — DMA attacks, covert keystroke-injection devices, passive network taps — are designed to leave no log trail until they are already being abused.
- T1201partialdetects — A.8.15's log analysis guidance covers reviewing access attempts and correlating logs, which can surface the system queries used for password policy discovery, but the control determines logging scope rather than mandating universal instrumentation, so detection depends on whether the specific query commands are within the implemented log sources.
- T1202partialdetects — A.8.15 explicitly requires logging 'use of utility programs and applications' and includes an analysis framework (SIEM rules, UEBA, threat intelligence) that would capture the process executions of Forfiles, pcalua.exe, Scriptrunner.exe and similar utilities abused in T1202, but the technique is specifically designed to subvert detection by using legitimate Windows binaries, so identifying the abuse as indirect command execution rather than benign utility use depends on behavioral rules and analysis depth chosen at implementation — the clause sets the logging and analysis scope but does not mandate the specific detection logic that would surface this stealth technique.
- T1203partialdetects — A.8.15's log analysis covers unusual activity and anomalous behaviour from predetermined rules, threat intelligence, and correlation, which can surface exploitation attempts, but the clause determines scope rather than mandating instrumentation depth, so an implementation logging only network and application layers is fully conformant and sees nothing of a client-side exploit that succeeds without generating a loggable event.
- T1203partialresponds — A.8.15's log analysis, anomaly detection, correlation, and explicit tie to feeding suspected incidents into the 5.25 incident management process enable response actions once client-exploitation events are underway, but only for the detectable post-exploitation artifacts (e.g. anomalous access, alarms, configuration changes) rather than the exploit delivery or code-execution step itself.
- T1204partialdetects — A.8.15 logs user actions and can record the execution event itself, but the technique's success depends on a user's deliberate action which logging observes after the fact rather than intercepting, and the control's scope is determined by what the organization chooses to log rather than mandating instrumentation depth.
- T1204.001partialdetects — A.8.15 explicitly requires log analysis, anomaly detection via SIEM/IDS/UEBA/threat intel, and monitoring of access attempts, DNS, and correlated events that surface the user click, follow-on execution, or indicators of the resulting compromise.
- T1204.002partialdetects — A.8.15's log analysis guidance covers reviewing access attempts and correlating logs to identify incidents, which can surface the execution of a malicious file, but the control determines logging scope rather than mandating the endpoint instrumentation depth needed to capture every user-initiated execution.
- T1204.003partialdetects — A.8.15's log analysis guidance covers reviewing access attempts, DNS logs, and correlating logs to identify anomalous behaviour, which can surface the deployment of a malicious image, but detection depends on the organization's chosen logging scope and analysis procedures rather than being guaranteed by the control's requirements.
- T1204.004partialdetects — A.8.15 explicitly requires log analysis, anomaly detection via SIEM/IDS/UEBA/threat intel, and monitoring of access attempts, configuration changes, privilege use, and suspicious activity that surfaces the social-engineering-triggered execution step of T1204.004; the named remainder is the pre-execution social-engineering delivery (e.g. the phishing lure or fake CAPTCHA page itself) which leaves no system log until the paste occurs.
- T1204.005partialdetects — A.8.15's log analysis covers DNS logs for outbound connections to malicious servers and correlation of anomalous behaviour, which can surface the post-installation activity of a malicious library, but the installation event itself is a user action indistinguishable from legitimate library installation in logs without additional context.
- T1205partialdetects — A.8.15's log analysis guidance explicitly covers checking DNS logs for outbound connections to malicious servers and correlating logs for anomaly detection, which can surface the crafted packet sequences or magic-value triggers of traffic signaling, but the technique's design to blend with legitimate traffic and the control's scope being set by organizational requirements leave a substantial remainder of implementations that would not instrument deeply enough to catch it.
- T1205.001partialdetects — A.8.15 requires logging of network addresses/protocols and successful/rejected access attempts, and its log-analysis clause covers anomalous behaviour patterns, so the sequential connection attempts to closed ports that constitute port knocking are observable in network logs and amenable to correlation. However, the clause sets requirements rather than mandating that every SYN to a closed port be recorded or that the specific port-knocking signature be analysed, and port knocking is designed to blend with background noise — so what is detected is a slice that depends on configuration and analytic depth, not a bounded remainder of a mechanism that mostly works.
- T1205.002partialdetects — A.8.15 logs system activities, utility program use, and network addresses/protocols, which can surface process execution of libpcap/Winpcap tools and the crafted trigger packet, but the technique is explicitly designed for stealth — raw socket filter installation via setsockopt/SO_ATTACH_FILTER leaves 'limited visibility into raw socket usage' and low CPU overhead, so the core installation step is not reliably captured by standard event logs.
- T1207partialdetects — A.8.15's logging captures peripheral events (initial nTDSDSA object creation, network traffic to/from the rogue DC, replication patterns) that SIEM correlation and UEBA might surface, but T1207 is explicitly designed to bypass system logging and security monitors, with actions on the rogue DC potentially not reported to sensors and replication metadata alterable to obstruct forensic analysis.
- T1211partialdetects — A.8.15 requires log analysis to identify unusual activity and indicators of compromise, but T1211 specifically targets vulnerabilities in logging pipelines and security tools to evade audit trails, so detection is possible only where the exploited vulnerability is outside the logging scope or the anomalous gap itself is noticed, not where the adversary successfully suppresses the log entry.
- T1212partialdetects — A.8.15 logs authentication events, system activities, and access attempts, and its analysis layer (SIEM rules, IDS signatures, UEBA, threat intelligence) can surface exploitation attempts and the credential use that follows, but the actual exploitation step of a software vulnerability often produces no distinctive log entry when it succeeds — the activity looks legitimate — so detection depends on what the implementation chooses to instrument and on whether the exploit triggers an observable anomaly, leaving a bounded remainder of successful exploits that evade logging entirely.
- T1213.001partialdetects — A.8.15's log analysis guidance explicitly covers reviewing access attempts to protected resources and correlating logs for anomaly detection, which can surface unauthorized access to a Confluence repository, but the control's scope is determined by what the organization chooses to log and monitor rather than mandating universal coverage of every SaaS application.
- T1213.002partialdetects — A.8.15 explicitly requires log analysis, anomaly detection via SIEM/UEBA/IDS rules, correlation of logs (including access attempts, configuration changes, privilege use, and file access/deletion on resources like SharePoint), and identification of indicators of compromise such as probing or unusual activity, which surfaces the technique when it generates observable events on monitored systems.
- T1213.003partialdetects — A.8.15's log analysis guidance covers reviewing access attempts to protected resources and correlating logs for anomaly detection, which can surface unusual access to code repositories, but the control's scope is determined by organizational requirements rather than mandating repository-level instrumentation, so detection is a chosen slice rather than a bounded remainder.
- T1213.004partialdetects — A.8.15 requires logging of data/resource access attempts, files accessed, privilege use, and application transactions, plus analysis for anomalous behaviour — so CRM queries and bulk record access generate logs that can be correlated and analysed. The remainder is the SaaS boundary (CRM logs may sit with the provider and outside the organisation's logging scope) and the valid-credential problem (mining via legitimate-looking queries requires UEBA-style analysis the clause mandates but does not guarantee is configured for this pattern).
- T1213.005partialdetects — A.8.15 captures access events to messaging platforms (user IDs, timestamps, network addresses) and supports behavioral analysis (UEBA, anomaly detection) that could surface unusual message-access patterns, but the core technique—reading chat messages with valid credentials—is authorized activity that logging does not inherently flag as malicious.
- T1216partialdetects — A.8.15 requires logging of system activities, use of utilities, and alarms from security systems, which can surface the execution of a signed script proxying a malicious file, but the control determines scope rather than mandating the depth of instrumentation needed to distinguish proxied execution from legitimate script use, so what is caught is a slice the implementer chose.
- T1218partialdetects — A.8.15 logs system activities, use of utility programs and applications, and network addresses — directly capturing the process creation, binary identity, user, and command-line artifacts that T1218 produces — and its log-analysis section explicitly covers identifying anomalous behaviour and indicators of compromise, which is the mechanism by which proxy execution of a legitimate binary is surfaced; the bounded remainder is that detection depends on the analysis rules and correlation configured (e.g. specific LOLBAS signatures, parent/child process relationships), which the clause requires but does not prescribe.
- T1218.001partialdetects — A.8.15's log analysis guidance covers reviewing access attempts, DNS logs, and correlating logs to identify anomalous behaviour, which can surface hh.exe spawning or unusual CHM file access, but the control determines logging scope rather than mandating the host-level instrumentation depth needed to catch every in-memory payload execution.
- T1218.002partialdetects — A.8.15's listed events include process execution ('use of utility programs and applications'), registry modifications ('changes to system configuration'), and file access, which would capture control.exe invocation, .cpl file loading, and HKCU registry writes — but the clause sets scope via organization-determined logging policy rather than mandating the specific instrumentation needed, so a conformant implementation logging only network/auth events would see nothing of this in-process abuse.
- T1218.008partialdetects — A.8.15 logs system activities, use of utility programs, and process execution, and its log-analysis guidance (SIEM rules, UEBA, threat intelligence) can surface odbcconf.exe abuse, but the clause sets scope by what the organization chooses to log and which rules it maintains — a baseline that captures process creation does not by itself flag the REGSVR flag abuse, so detection is a slice rather than a bounded remainder of a working mechanism.
- T1218.009partialdetects — A.8.15 logs process execution events (system activities, use of utility programs and applications, command-line arguments via user IDs and timestamps) and its log-analysis clause explicitly covers SIEM rules, UEBA, threat intelligence and behavioural baselining — all of which can surface Regsvcs/Regasm abuse; the bounded remainder is that the binaries are Microsoft-signed and trusted, so detection depends on specific rules or behavioural analytics being configured rather than being automatic from logging alone.
- T1218.011partialdetects — A.8.15 requires logging of process execution, system activities, command lines and DLL loads, and its analysis clause (SIEM rules, UEBA, threat intelligence) is designed to surface anomalous behaviour including proxy-execution patterns; rundll32 invocations with unusual arguments, script-execution syntax or unsigned DLL loads are within the logged and analysable surface, though the allowlist/false-positive problem the technique explicitly exploits and the clause's scope-setting rather than rule-mandating nature leave a bounded remainder.
- T1218.012partialdetects — A.8.15 requires logging of process creation and command-line arguments, which would capture verclsid.exe execution with its /S /C {CLSID} parameters, but the control determines scope rather than mandating specific instrumentation depth, so an implementation logging only the events listed in its guidance may miss the anomalous CLSID reference that distinguishes abuse from legitimate shell extension verification.
- T1218.013partialresponds — A.8.15's log analysis, anomaly detection, correlation, and incident identification steps (including physical logs and SIEM/IDS rules) surface mavinject.exe abuse once underway as part of the incident management process, but the control's mechanism is observation and does not itself contain or eradicate the running injection.
- T1218.014partialresponds — A.8.15's log analysis, correlation, anomalous-behaviour detection and explicit tie to the incident-management process (5.25) let responders contain/eradicate an MMC-abuse event once it is underway and logged; the remainder is that the control supplies only detection-plus-hand-off, not the containment/eradication actions themselves, and many MMC executions (e.g. wbadmin catalog deletion) produce no observable event until after impact.
- T1219.001partialdetects — A.8.15 captures the network connections, process execution, file access, and authentication events that IDE tunneling produces, and its log-analysis clauses (SIEM, UEBA, threat intelligence) provide the mechanism for surfacing anomalous behaviour — but the technique is explicitly designed to blend with legitimate developer workflows using standard SSH and authenticated IDE sessions, so whether the activity is flagged as malicious depends on the depth of analysis and the indicators available, not on the control's coverage of the event surface.
- T1219.003partialdetects — A.8.15's log analysis guidance covers reviewing access attempts and correlating logs, which can surface anomalous remote access hardware connections, but the control's scope is determined by implementation and may not mandate the depth of host telemetry needed to distinguish hardware-based remote access from legitimate use.
- T1220partialdetects — A.8.15's logging scope explicitly covers process execution (system activities, use of utility programs and applications), file access, and network connections — all of which surface T1220's wrapper indicators (msxsl.exe invocation, wmic.exe with /FORMAT switch, XSL file access, remote fetches). However, the clause sets categories of events to log rather than mandating instrumentation depth: an implementation logging process names without command-line auditing, or omitting file-access telemetry, is fully conformant and would miss the distinguishing arguments; the actual XSL script execution itself is not directly logged, only the host process that loads it.
- T1221partialdetects — A.8.15 logs the events template injection produces — outbound network requests to remote URLs when documents load, file access on the template, process execution of the fetched payload, and DNS resolutions — and its log-analysis guidance covers correlating these to identify anomalous behaviour, but the technique is explicitly designed to evade static detection (no VBA/script indicators until after fetch), and A.8.15 sets scope rather than mandating the specific telemetry or signatures needed to surface template injection reliably, so what is caught is a slice the implementer chose.
- T1222partialdetects — A.8.15's log analysis guidance explicitly covers reviewing access attempts to protected resources and correlating logs, which can surface permission changes, but the control determines logging scope rather than mandating the specific file-system audit policies that would capture every such modification.
- T1222.002partialdetects — A.8.15's log analysis guidance explicitly covers reviewing access attempts and changes to system configuration, which would surface chmod/chown events if those events are logged, but the control determines logging scope rather than mandating that every file permission change be captured, so detection is a slice the implementer chooses.
- T1480partialdetects — Logging captures some downstream artifacts of guardrail activity (process executions that pass the check, file/share/IP lookups the guardrail performs, anomalous crash patterns on systems that fail the check) but the core mechanism — the in-process conditional check against environment-specific values — is internal to adversary code and produces no distinct log event of its own.
- T1482partialdetects — A.8.15 captures the relevant events in logs (LDAP queries to domain controllers, Nltest process execution, network addresses, user IDs) and its log-analysis guidance explicitly covers identifying anomalous behaviour and indicators of compromise, so the mechanism is in place; however, domain trust enumeration uses standard admin tools and APIs that blend with legitimate activity, and surfacing it requires specific correlation rules rather than the logging baseline alone, leaving a bounded remainder.
- T1484.001partialresponds — A.8.15 requires log analysis and correlation (including of configuration changes, privilege use, and security-system events) to identify suspected incidents for further investigation under the incident-management process; this surfaces and hands off a realized GPO-modification event but does not itself contain or eradicate it.
- T1484.002partialdetects — A.8.15 explicitly requires logging of configuration changes, identity creation/modification/deletion, and privilege use — all of which generate log entries when trust relationships are modified (e.g., AD domain trust events, Azure AD federation changes). The control's log analysis guidance (SIEM rules, UEBA, threat intelligence, correlation) supports identifying these as anomalous, and the control's stated purpose includes identifying information security events. The bounded remainder is that detection depends on the depth of analysis implementation and on the specific identity platform's audit logging being in scope.
- T1491partialdetects — A.8.15 requires log analysis and monitoring to identify anomalous behaviour and suspected incidents (including via SIEM/IDS/UEBA rules, pattern analysis, and correlation of access/configuration changes), which surfaces defacement after it occurs on monitored systems; it does not cover all platforms/vectors or pre-empt the act itself.
- T1491.002partialdetects — A.8.15 logs file access and modifications, configuration changes, user IDs, and access attempts on the organization's own systems, and its log analysis component identifies anomalous activity — so defacement of an externally-facing website the organization owns leaves a trail (unauthorized file changes, privilege use, configuration changes) that analysis surfaces. The remainder is that detection depends on active log review and that an attacker using legitimate credentials or modifying content through approved channels may not produce obviously anomalous log entries.
- T1495partialdetects — A.8.15's event logs can capture indirect indicators of firmware corruption — firmware update tool execution, configuration changes, post-corruption boot failures and system errors, and anomalous patterns surfaced through log analysis — but the actual flash-memory write typically occurs below the OS logging layer the clause specifies, so the core event is not directly recorded.
- T1496.004partialdetects — A.8.15's logging and log-analysis requirements (including SIEM rules, UEBA, and correlation) can surface cloud service hijacking when the victim organization integrates cloud-provider audit logs and analyzes them for anomalous API usage, volume spikes, or unusual service invocation patterns under their own identity; however, the activity occurs on the SaaS provider's infrastructure, so detection depends on log integration and analysis depth that the clause does not mandate, and adversary activity that mimics normal usage patterns or occurs outside the logged scope is not caught.
- T1497partialdetects — A.8.15 logging can capture artifacts of sandbox-evasion checks (process enumeration, registry/file queries, utility execution) and log analysis with UEBA or threat intelligence could surface anomalous patterns, but T1497 is specifically designed to evade exactly these monitoring systems — the adversary checks for the tools that produce the logs, may disengage if found, and uses sleep timers and behavioral mimicry that look like normal activity, so generic logging without tuned detection rules misses most of the technique.
- T1497.001partialdetects — A.8.15 logs the underlying events that VME checks generate — WMI calls, PowerShell execution, registry queries, file enumeration are all within its logging scope — but identifying these as virtualization/sandbox evasion specifically requires SIEM rules, threat intelligence, or UEBA correlation that the clause enables but does not mandate, and the checks are designed to resemble benign system information gathering.
- T1497.002partialdetects — A.8.15's logging scope includes file access and process activity, which captures the raw events of malware performing user-activity checks (reading browser history, cache, counting files), and the technique runs on the estate so there is a vantage point; however, the checks are specifically designed to mimic benign system behavior, and surfacing them as malicious requires the analysis layer (UEBA, correlation, trend analysis) that A.8.15 enables but does not guarantee, leaving a bounded remainder of cases where the technique blends with normal activity.
- T1499.004partialdetects — A.8.15 requires log analysis and monitoring to identify anomalous behaviour, indicators of compromise, and security events (including crashes, resource exhaustion, or exploitation patterns via SIEM/UEBA/correlation), which surfaces this DoS technique in flight on the organization's estate; partial because the control's scope is limited to what is logged/analyzed per policy (e.g. no guarantee of coverage for all zero-day exploits, physical-only vectors, or unmonitored systems).
- T1505.003partialdetects — A.8.15 logs the events a web shell generates — file creation/modification in web directories, HTTP requests with network addresses, process execution from the web server context, and outbound connections — and its analysis clause explicitly calls for SIEM rules, UEBA, threat intelligence and correlation to surface anomalous behaviour, which is how web shells are typically caught. The bounded remainder is web shells that blend into normal web traffic in environments where file-integrity events are not in scope and where no signature or behavioural baseline flags the activity.
- T1505.006partialdetects — A.8.15's logging requirements capture the installation events (privileged esxcli use, configuration changes, utility program execution), but the ongoing execution of the malicious VIB payload on boot and the masquerading via XML descriptor modification are less visible in standard logs, leaving a meaningful slice of the technique's persistence mechanism undetected.
- T1518partialdetects — A.8.15 requires logging system activities, use of utility programs, and file access, and its analysis clause targets anomalous behaviour — process execution and command-line activity from software discovery fall inside that scope, but the clause sets requirements rather than mandating command-line auditing depth, and discovery using built-in tools (wmic, PowerShell, registry queries) blends with normal admin activity unless specific process telemetry and behavioural baselines are configured.
- T1518.001partialdetects — A.8.15's log analysis guidance explicitly covers reviewing access attempts and correlating logs to identify anomalous behaviour, which can surface the system queries and API calls characteristic of security software discovery, but the control determines logging scope rather than mandating the specific process-level telemetry that would catch every instance.
- T1518.002partialdetects — A.8.15 logs system activities and use of utility programs, which captures the execution of discovery commands (reg query, dir, Tasklist, netsh), and its log-analysis guidance with predetermined rules and UEBA enables detection of anomalous discovery behavior; however, the commands are common administrative tools that blend with normal activity, and the clause sets the logging/analysis framework without mandating specific detection rules for backup software discovery, so what is caught is a slice dependent on implementation choices rather than a bounded remainder of a mechanism that mostly works.
- T1525partialdetects — A.8.15 covers logging of configuration changes, privilege use, and file access — events that would capture image registry modifications and the API calls used to implant backdoored images — and includes log analysis for anomalous behaviour, but it is a general logging control whose scope is set by the organization; it does not specifically mandate cloud-provider audit log ingestion or container registry integrity checks, so detection depends on implementation choices about whether cloud control-plane events fall inside the logging perimeter.
- T1528partialdetects — A.8.15 logging captures downstream observables of token theft — OAuth consent grants, API calls made with stolen tokens, IMDS token requests, and anomalous access patterns detectable via UEBA — but the actual theft of a token from a compromised container's memory or from a CI/CD secret store does not itself generate a log event, leaving the in-memory exfiltration half of the technique unobserved by the logs the clause mandates.
- T1534partialdetects — A.8.15's logging of system activities, network addresses, access attempts, and its log-analysis requirements (UEBA, threat intelligence, DNS log review) can surface indicators of internal spearphishing — anomalous send patterns from a compromised account, recipient connections to suspicious external infrastructure, and credential-capture events — but the clause sets scope rather than mandating universal instrumentation depth, and the social-engineering content of the messages themselves is not what logging detects.
- T1535partialdetects — A.8.15's logging and log-analysis mechanism can detect cloud resource creation in unused regions if logs are configured to cover all regions (including unused ones) and analyzed for anomalous activity, but the technique specifically exploits configurations where such logging is absent, and the clause leaves regional scope to the organization's determination rather than mandating universal coverage.
- T1537partialdetects — A.8.15 captures the relevant events (API calls, user IDs, file access, privilege use, configuration changes) that constitute T1537, and its analysis framework (UEBA, threat intelligence, pattern analysis) can surface anomalous cloud-to-cloud transfers, but the technique is explicitly designed to use legitimate cloud provider APIs and internal address space to blend into normal activity, so detection depends on whether cloud audit logs are integrated and whether analysis rules are tuned to this pattern — a slice rather than a bounded remainder of a working mechanism.
- T1538partialdetects — A.8.15's log analysis covers reviewing access attempts and correlating logs, which can surface dashboard access with stolen credentials, but the technique's use of a legitimate GUI with valid credentials makes it indistinguishable from normal admin activity without additional context the control does not mandate.
- T1539partialdetects — A.8.15's logging of file access, process activity, and network connections can surface indicators of cookie theft (browser cookie-store access, anomalous outbound connections to AitM proxies, unusual process reads of browser memory), and its log-analysis guidance with UEBA and threat intelligence supports identifying these patterns, but the clause sets scope by organizational requirements rather than mandating browser-cookie or in-process instrumentation, so vectors like direct memory reads or encrypted AitM traffic leave a slice rather than the bulk visible.
- T1542.001partialdetects — A.8.15's logging scope is OS-level events (access attempts, configuration changes, utility program use, security system activations), which can capture peripheral indicators of firmware modification such as the flashing tool invoked or firmware configuration changes, but the core write to BIOS/UEFI occurs below the OS where standard logging does not reach, and the technique is explicitly designed to evade OS-level detection.
- T1542.002partialdetects — A.8.15 logging can capture peripheral indicators of component firmware compromise (use of flashing utilities, configuration changes, anomalous network traffic from the device, IDS/SIEM rules), but the technique is explicitly designed to evade host software-based defenses and integrity checks, and the core firmware modification itself occurs below the OS level where A.8.15's event logging primarily operates.
- T1542.003partialdetects — A.8.15 logging can capture some indicators of bootkit activity — installation actions like boot sector modifications may surface as 'changes to system configuration' or 'files accessed' events, and post-boot anomalies can be flagged through SIEM rules, UEBA, and threat intelligence — but the technique's defining characteristic is execution below the OS, before the logging infrastructure is active, so the core mechanism is not logged.
- T1542.004partialdetects — A.8.15 logging on network devices can capture peripheral indicators such as TFTP transfers, unexpected reboots, configuration changes, and use of privileges, but the core ROMMONkit technique operates at the firmware/boot-loader layer below the OS logging surface, and the technique is explicitly described as 'difficult to detect' — once ROMMON is compromised, the logging infrastructure itself can be subverted, so what is observed is a slice of peripheral activity rather than the firmware replacement itself.
- T1542.005partialdetects — A.8.15's logging scope covers configuration changes, network addresses/protocols, and use of privileges, so the configuration manipulation step (pointing the device at a malicious TFTP server) and the resulting TFTP traffic are observable in device and network logs and amenable to the clause's log-analysis activities; however, the actual TFTP boot and image loading occur at a low level during device startup where device-side logging is often sparse, and identifying the transfer as malicious depends on correlation with threat intelligence or known-bad indicators rather than the logs themselves, leaving the core image-load step largely undetected.
- T1543partialdetects — Creation or modification of system services and processes is captured in configuration-change and privilege-use logs, exposing persistence mechanisms.
- T1543.005partialdetects — A.8.15's log analysis, monitoring of system activities/privilege use/configuration changes/resource access, and anomaly detection (SIEM/UEBA/IDS correlation) can surface container service modifications or anomalous DaemonSet/pod deployments after they occur, but this is only a slice — the clause does not mandate coverage of container-specific artifacts, Kubernetes control-plane events, or out-of-scope physical/third-party logs, and detection depends on what the implementer chooses to log/analyze.
- T1546partialdetects — A.8.15's log analysis guidance covers event-triggered execution artifacts like scheduled task creation and WMI subscription changes, but detection depends on the organization's chosen logging scope and analysis procedures rather than a mandated instrumentation depth.
- T1546.004partialdetects — A.8.15 requires logging of configuration changes and file access, which would capture modifications to shell config files like ~/.bashrc and /etc/profile, and log analysis with UEBA could surface anomalous shell behavior; however, the clause sets scope rather than mandating file integrity monitoring or specific alerting on shell config modifications, so detection depends on implementation choices about which files and which analysis rules are in scope.
- T1546.005partialdetects — A.8.15 captures process execution (utility/application use) and configuration changes, so trap command invocations and the resulting handler executions leave log traces; however, the trap command is a legitimate shell feature, and identifying its use as malicious persistence requires the log analysis A.8.15 describes but does not guarantee — the evidence is present but the determination is scope- and analysis-dependent.
- T1546.006partialdetects — A.8.15's log analysis guidance covers reviewing access attempts, DNS logs, and correlating logs to identify indicators of compromise, which can surface the execution of a modified binary loading a malicious dylib, but the control's scope is determined by implementation choices rather than mandating the specific host-level instrumentation needed to capture the LC_LOAD_DYLIB modification event itself.
- T1546.007partialdetects — A.8.15's logging requirements cover configuration changes (registry modifications at HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Netsh) and utility program execution (netsh.exe), both of which are observable in standard Windows event logs if registry and process auditing are enabled; however, the actual DLL load triggered by netsh.exe requires deeper process-level instrumentation (e.g., Sysmon DLL load events) that A.8.15 does not mandate, and the clause sets scope by organizational determination rather than prescribing instrumentation depth.
- T1546.008partialresponds — A.8.15 requires log analysis and monitoring to identify anomalous behaviour and suspected incidents (e.g. via SIEM/UEBA/correlation of access, privilege-use, configuration changes and security-system events), which surfaces T1546.008 once the binary/registry change or key-triggered execution occurs and hands it to incident response; it does not contain or eradicate the persistence itself.
- T1546.009partialdetects — A.8.15's logging of configuration changes (registry modifications to AppCertDLLs), process activities, and file access provides the raw events needed to detect this technique, and its log analysis framework (SIEM rules, anomaly detection, threat intelligence) supports identifying the pattern; however, the clause sets scope by organizational determination rather than mandating the specific process/DLL-load telemetry that surfaces the injection itself, so detection is a slice of what a conformant implementation chooses to instrument.
- T1546.010partialdetects — A.8.15 explicitly requires logging of 'changes to system configuration' (which covers the AppInit_DLLs registry modification), process activities, and use of privileges, and mandates log analysis for anomalous behaviour and known patterns — AppInit DLLs loading into every user32.dll process is highly anomalous and the registry write is a configuration change. The remainder is implementation-dependent: detecting this technique specifically requires Sysmon-style DLL load events (Event ID 7) and registry audit policies that go beyond the baseline the clause specifies, so it is not `full`.
- T1546.011partialdetects — A.8.15's log analysis covers monitoring for anomalous behaviour and reviewing access attempts, which can surface shim installation or execution artifacts, but the control's scope is determined by business and security requirements rather than mandating the deep host instrumentation needed to reliably catch in-process shim hooking.
- T1546.013partialdetects — A.8.15's log analysis guidance explicitly covers reviewing access attempts, correlating logs, and identifying anomalous behaviour, which can surface the execution of a malicious PowerShell profile script, but the control determines logging scope rather than mandating the host-level instrumentation depth needed to capture every profile modification and execution.
- T1546.015partialdetects — A.8.15 explicitly lists 'changes to system configuration' as an event type to log, and COM hijacking requires Registry modifications that fall under that category, so the relevant events are within the logging scope; however, the clause sets the requirement rather than mandating registry-audit depth or COM-specific correlation, and a conformant implementation logging only a subset of configuration changes would miss the technique, leaving a bounded remainder similar to the A.8.16/T1055 anchor.
- T1546.016partialdetects — A.8.15's log analysis guidance covers reviewing access attempts and correlating logs, which can surface anomalous installer script execution, but the control determines logging scope rather than mandating the deep process-level telemetry needed to reliably catch installer package abuse, so detection is a slice the implementer chooses.
- T1546.016partialresponds — A.8.15's log analysis, anomaly detection, correlation, and incident identification (e.g. via SIEM/IDS rules, UEBA, and review of access/configuration changes) surface the post-install execution or privilege-elevating script once it runs, feeding the 5.25 incident process, but this is only a slice of the technique's full surface (pre-install, non-logged installer actions, or non-anomalous legitimate packages).
- T1547.002partialdetects — A.8.15 explicitly requires logging of 'changes to system configuration' (covering the registry modification to LSA Authentication Packages) and 'use of utility programs and applications' (covering the DLL load at boot), and mandates log analysis for anomalous behaviour — but the clause sets scope and analysis requirements rather than mandating specific detection rules for this technique, so what is caught depends on implementation choices, mirroring the A.8.16 vs T1055 `partial` shape.
- T1547.003partialdetects — A.8.15's log analysis guidance covers reviewing system configuration changes and use of privileges, which would capture the registry modification required for this technique, but the control's scope is determined by organizational requirements rather than mandating specific registry auditing depth.
- T1547.004partialresponds — A.8.15 requires log analysis and correlation (including of successful/rejected access, privilege use, configuration changes, and alarms) to identify and investigate suspected incidents once they occur, which engages the core of `responds` for a Winlogon persistence artifact that would appear in those logs; it does not itself contain or eradicate the DLL/registry change.
- T1547.005partialdetects — A.8.15 explicitly lists 'changes to system configuration' among events to be logged, and the SSP technique's primary indicator — modification of the Security Packages registry keys — is a configuration change; however, the clause sets the requirement and the event categories rather than mandating registry-level or DLL-load instrumentation depth, so detection depends on implementation choices about what to capture and how to analyze it.
- T1547.006partialdetects — A.8.15 explicitly enumerates logging of privilege use, configuration changes, and utility program use — all of which capture kernel module loading — and includes log analysis for anomalous behaviour, but the technique is specifically designed to evade this control (LKM rootkits include log tampering as a core feature) and Ring 0 access can bypass the clause's tamper protections, so what is detected depends on implementation depth rather than being a bounded remainder of a working mechanism.
- T1547.008partialdetects — A.8.15 requires logging of system configuration changes, use of privileges, and security system deactivations, which can surface LSASS driver modifications, but the clause determines scope rather than mandating host-level instrumentation depth, so an implementation logging only the listed event types without deep process telemetry is fully conformant and may miss the in-memory loading of a malicious driver.
- T1547.009partialdetects — A.8.15's logging scope covers file access events (creation/modification of shortcuts), system configuration changes, and process execution with user IDs and timestamps, and its analysis guidance (SIEM rules, UEBA, anomalous behaviour) provides the framework to surface shortcut modifications in startup folders; however, the clause sets logging requirements rather than mandating specific instrumentation of startup-folder file events or detection rules for shortcut abuse, so an implementation logging only network and application-layer events is fully conformant and sees nothing of this technique.
- T1547.012partialdetects — A.8.15's logging requirements capture the registry modifications to Print Processors keys, the use of SeLoadDriverPrivilege, and the spoolsv.exe DLL load events, and its log-analysis clause requires identifying anomalous behaviour and indicators of compromise — but the technique is observable only where registry auditing, process-load telemetry and privilege-use logging are actually enabled, and A.8.15 sets scope rather than mandating those specific audit policies, so what is caught is a slice of the events the technique produces.
- T1548.002partialdetects — A.8.15 logs process creation, privilege use, and file access events that can surface indicators of UAC bypass (e.g., auto-elevated COM objects, file writes to protected directories), but the technique abuses legitimate signed Windows binaries and auto-elevation mechanisms, so the bypass itself is not directly recorded — detection requires specific correlation rules and behavioural analysis that go beyond what the logging clause mandates, and many implementations will lack the depth to catch it.
- T1548.003partialresponds — A.8.15's log analysis, correlation, and incident-identification steps (including alarms, privilege use, configuration changes, and suspected incidents) enable response actions once sudo-caching or sudoers abuse is underway, but the control only surfaces the event and hands it off; it performs neither containment nor eradication itself.
- T1548.005partialdetects — A.8.15's log analysis guidance explicitly covers reviewing access attempts and correlating logs to identify anomalous behaviour, which can surface the use of temporary elevated access, but the technique's stealth—where logs may not clarify when role impersonation is taking place—leaves a nameable remainder that prevents full detection.
- T1550.001partialdetects — A.8.15 logs transactions, access attempts, and use of privileges, which captures the API call activity generated by token abuse, but the technique is explicitly designed to align with legitimate workflows and bypass intuitive detection, so the logs are present while the identification of malicious use depends on the analysis layer (UEBA, threat intel, anomaly rules) that the clause describes but does not guarantee.
- T1550.001partialresponds — A.8.15 requires log analysis, anomaly detection, correlation and identification of suspected incidents (including via SIEM/UEBA/threat intel) which can surface token abuse as an in-flight or post-compromise event, but its core is logging/analysis rather than the containment/eradication actions that define `responds` on this lane, leaving most of the incident-handling response outside its scope.
- T1550.002partialdetects — A.8.15 logs authentication events (successful access attempts, privilege use, network addresses) and includes analysis with UEBA, SIEM rules and threat intelligence — all of which can surface PtH indicators like NTLM Type 3 logons, lateral movement patterns and anomalous use of admin hashes. But PtH uses valid credentials and produces events that look like normal authentication, so detection depends on analysis depth the clause enables but does not mandate; a conformant implementation that logs but does not run PtH-specific correlation catches a slice, not the bulk.
- T1550.003partialdetects — A.8.15's log analysis guidance explicitly covers reviewing access attempts and correlating logs to identify anomalies, which can surface the use of a stolen ticket, but the control's scope is determined by implementation choices rather than mandating the specific Kerberos log instrumentation needed for comprehensive detection.
- T1550.004partialdetects — A.8.15's UEBA, IP/device logging, and behavioural-analysis clauses can surface cookie reuse through anomalous location, device fingerprint, or activity patterns, but the session appears legitimate to the web application and a conformant baseline that logs only access events without behavioural correlation sees nothing of the theft — detection is a slice of what the clause enables, not a bounded remainder of a mechanism that mostly works.
- T1550.004partialresponds — A.8.15 requires log analysis and monitoring to identify anomalous behaviour and suspected incidents (e.g. via SIEM/UEBA/correlation), which surfaces the use of a stolen session cookie once it occurs and feeds the incident response process; this is genuine response but only a slice, as the control does not itself contain/eradicate the active session or actor.
- T1552partialdetects — A.8.15 can surface the access to credential files through file-access logging and anomaly analysis, but the technique's core act—searching for and obtaining insecurely stored credentials—often occurs through legitimate-looking file reads that blend into normal system activity, leaving a bounded remainder of undetected access.
- T1552.001partialdetects — A.8.15 explicitly requires logging of file access events and includes log analysis to identify anomalous behaviour, so the raw events of an adversary reading credential files are captured and can be surfaced through UEBA or pattern analysis; however, detection depends on which files are configured for access auditing and whether the analysis is tuned to recognise credential-file access patterns, leaving a bounded remainder where unmonitored files or unsophisticated analysis miss the technique.
- T1552.002partialdetects — A.8.15's scope covers system activities, use of utility programs, and file/resource access, so `reg query` execution and registry key enumeration are observable where process execution logging and registry auditing are configured; the clause sets logging requirements rather than mandating the specific Windows audit policies (process tracking, registry access auditing) needed to surface every instance, so detection is a slice of the technique's footprint rather than comprehensive.
- T1552.006partialdetects — A.8.15 logs file share access to SYSVOL, reads of XML files, and execution of utility programs like Get-GPPPassword, and its log analysis guidance covers identifying anomalous behaviour, but the technique deliberately uses legitimate domain-user access paths so the events are captured without being inherently flagged; detection depends on specific analysis rules targeting GPP file access or known decryption tool execution, which the clause permits but does not mandate.
- T1552.007partialdetects — A.8.15 requires logging of system activities, access attempts, and privilege use, and its log analysis guidance explicitly covers reviewing access to protected resources and correlating logs to identify incidents, but detecting Container API credential gathering depends on whether the container environment's API calls are within the organization's determined logging scope, which the clause leaves to the organization to decide rather than mandating.
- T1552.008partialdetects — A.8.15's enumerated events (access attempts, use of privileges, files accessed, transactions in applications) can capture some vectors of T1552.008 — admin portal access to chat services, endpoint file access to chat databases, and API calls from compromised integration tools — but the core activity of reading existing chat messages for embedded credentials is largely invisible to standard system logging, which records events rather than content reads.
- T1553partialdetects — A.8.15 logs the supporting actions of T1553 — registry modifications, file/directory permission changes, and certificate operations fall under 'changes to system configuration' and 'use of privileges' — and its log-analysis guidance (UEBA, SIEM rules, threat intelligence) can surface anomalous patterns, but the trust subversion itself (e.g., a properly signed malicious binary executing) often looks legitimate in logs, and what is captured depends on the topic-specific policy's scope.
- T1553.001partialdetects — A.8.15 captures process execution events, file attribute modifications (xattr changes), and Gatekeeper's own decisions in macOS unified logs, but the technique is specifically designed to evade these checks — bypasses via USB, network shares, or curl may never set the quarantine flag so Gatekeeper is never invoked and no Gatekeeper-specific log entry is produced, and logic-error bypasses (e.g., writing into already-opened applications) leave execution events that look routine without correlation to identify them as subversion.
- T1553.002partialdetects — A.8.15 can log on-target artifacts of code signing — execution of the signed binary (system activity), installation of the certificate (configuration/identity change), and use of signing tools if signing occurs on the estate — but the core mechanism (acquiring or creating certificates at a CA, signing the binary) happens on adversary infrastructure and produces no log event the control can capture.
- T1553.003partialdetects — A.8.15's log analysis covers registry changes and DLL loads that SIP hijacking produces, but the technique's core tampering occurs in memory and registry keys that may fall outside the logging scope an organization determines, leaving a slice detected rather than the bulk.
- T1553.005partialdetects — A.8.15 captures the surrounding events — the download of a container file from the Internet, the extraction/mounting operation (logged as file system activity and use of utility programs), and the subsequent execution of the extracted payload — and its log-analysis section explicitly covers correlating these sequences to identify anomalous behaviour indicative of compromise; however, the MOTW bypass itself (the absence of the Zone.Identifier ADS on extracted contents) is a file-system property that no log directly records, so detection requires inference from correlated events rather than a direct observation of the bypass.
- T1554partialdetects — A.8.15 logs file access events (including deletions), configuration changes, and privilege use — all of which can surface a binary modification — and its log-analysis clause covers anomalous behaviour, but the control records events rather than mandating file-integrity monitoring or hash comparison, so a backdoor patched into a legitimate binary (IAT hooking, entry-point patching) is not inherently detected without additional analysis mechanisms the clause does not require.
- T1555partialdetects — A.8.15 requires logging of system activities, access attempts, and privilege use, which can surface credential access from password stores, but the clause determines scope rather than mandating instrumentation depth, so an implementation logging only network and application layers is fully conformant and sees nothing of local credential store access.
- T1555.002partialdetects — A.8.15's log analysis guidance covers reviewing access attempts and correlating logs, which can surface the privileged access and memory scanning activity associated with T1555.002, but the technique's in-memory nature means the specific credential extraction event itself is not directly logged, leaving a significant observable gap.
- T1555.003partialdetects — A.8.15 logs file access, process execution, and privilege use, which would capture the file reads, database queries, and decryption API calls central to T1555.003, and its log-analysis guidance (UEBA, threat intelligence, anomaly detection) provides the means to surface them; however, the clause sets scope by applicability rather than mandating instrumentation of browser credential stores specifically, and memory-scraping variants (Mimikittenz-style) plus legitimate API usage produce far weaker signals, so detection is a slice of the technique rather than a bounded remainder of a working mechanism.
- T1555.005partialdetects — A.8.15 logging can record failed authentication attempts against the password manager (catching brute force), file access to the database, and process activity, but the core technique of extracting credentials from memory after the vault is unlocked is largely invisible to standard event logging — the in-memory read leaves no log artifact unless specific process-level instrumentation is in scope, which A.8.15 does not mandate.
- T1555.006partialdetects — A.8.15 requires logging access attempts, use of privileges, and analysis for anomalous behaviour; API calls to cloud secrets managers (get-secret-value, etc.) are inherently captured in cloud audit logs with user IDs, timestamps, source IPs and resource identifiers, and the clause's log-analysis guidance (UEBA, threat intelligence, predetermined rules) supports detecting anomalous secret-retrieval patterns. The bounded remainder is that detection depends on effective analysis implementation and that adversaries using valid high-privileged credentials can produce requests that blend with legitimate activity.
- T1556partialresponds — A.8.15's log analysis, anomaly detection, and incident identification (e.g. via SIEM/UEBA/correlation) surface T1556 once it has run and feed the 5.25 incident management process for containment/eradication, but the control's core is recording/monitoring rather than active response actions and many T1556 variants (esp. on IaaS/SaaS/identity providers) leave no detectable log artifact at all
- T1556.001partialdetects — A.8.15 captures successful authentication events (4624s) on the domain controller and includes log analysis with UEBA/SIEM rules that could flag anomalous authentication patterns indicative of skeleton-key use, but the core technique—in-memory patching of LSASS—is not directly logged, and the backdoor authentications appear as normal successful logons absent behavioral analysis.
- T1556.002partialdetects — A.8.15's log analysis guidance covers reviewing access attempts and correlating logs, which can surface the registration of a malicious DLL or anomalous authentication patterns, but the control's scope is determined by implementation and does not mandate the specific host-level instrumentation needed to detect the DLL registration itself.
- T1556.003partialdetects — A.8.15 explicitly requires logging of configuration changes (PAM file modifications) and authentication events (backdoor usage), and its log-analysis section mandates UEBA and threat-intelligence-driven anomaly detection that would surface credential-theft patterns; the bounded remainder is implementations that log authentication events but omit file-integrity monitoring on /etc/pam.d/, missing the modification itself while still catching its effects.
- T1556.004partialdetects — A.8.15 can log peripheral indicators — configuration changes to the system image, privilege use, and file access — but the implanted code intercepts authentication BEFORE normal logging occurs, so successful backdoor authentications bypass the log stream entirely, and an adversary with the access needed to patch the system image typically controls the device's own logs as the clause itself acknowledges.
- T1556.005partialdetects — A.8.15's log analysis covers reviewing access attempts and correlating logs to identify anomalous behaviour, which can surface the configuration change that enables reversible encryption, but the control does not mandate monitoring of Active Directory schema attributes specifically, so detection depends on whether the implementer includes that attribute in scope.
- T1556.007partialdetects — A.8.15 explicitly requires log analysis, anomaly detection via SIEM/UEBA/IDS rules, correlation of logs (including successful/rejected access, privilege use, config changes, and identity creation/modification), and identification of indicators of compromise such as probing or backdoors, which surfaces the on-premises/cloud authentication tampering and credential-harvesting artifacts of T1556.007; the remainder is purely cloud-side modifications that leave no on-premises log trail.
- T1556.008partialdetects — A.8.15's logging scope covers registry configuration changes and DLL loading events (items c and e in the events-to-log list), and the log analysis section explicitly calls for SIEM rules and threat intelligence correlation, so a registered malicious network provider DLL leaves artifacts in the log stream that competent analysis can surface; however, the core credential-capture activity occurs in memory between mpnotify.exe and the DLL and produces no direct log event, and A.8.15 sets the logging and analysis framework without mandating specific detection rules for this technique, so what is caught is a slice dependent on the analysis implementation rather than a bounded remainder of a mechanism that mostly works.
- T1557.002partialdetects — A.8.15's logging framework captures network addresses and protocols and its analysis layer explicitly requires anomaly detection, UEBA, and SIEM/IDS rules against known behaviour patterns — gratuitous ARPs, MAC/IP mismatches and MITM traffic patterns are detectable through these mechanisms. ARP-specific events are not in the enumerated 'events to log' list, so detection depends on network telemetry being in scope and on the analysis rules actually targeting ARP anomalies, leaving a bounded remainder.
- T1557.003partialdetects — A.8.15's logging and analysis framework (network addresses/protocols, predetermined SIEM/IDS rules, behaviour-pattern analysis) can surface DHCP spoofing indicators such as multiple DHCP servers or unexpected OFFER messages, but the clause sets requirements rather than mandating DHCP-specific traffic capture or DHCP-snooping instrumentation, so a conformant implementation that omits DHCP-server or network-level DHCP logging sees nothing of the rogue server's activity.
- T1557.004partialdetects — A.8.15's log analysis can surface anomalous connections to a rogue AP after the fact, but the control's scope is the organization's own systems and networks, so it cannot observe the adversary's broadcast or the victim's initial connection to the evil twin itself.
- T1558.001partialdetects — A.8.15's logging of access attempts, system activities, and analysis for anomalous behaviour provides the framework to surface golden ticket usage via Kerberos event logs (e.g. 4769) and UEBA on ticket characteristics, but forged TGTs are cryptographically valid and designed to be stealthy, so detection depends on implementation choices (Kerberos audit policy, ticket-anomaly analysis) that the clause does not mandate.
- T1558.002partialdetects — A.8.15 provides the logging substrate (service authentication events, user IDs, network addresses, UEBA, threat intelligence correlation) that can surface silver ticket abuse through behavioral anomalies, but the forged TGS is cryptographically valid and bypasses the KDC, so the events logged at the target service appear as legitimate authentications; A.8.15 does not mandate the Kerberos-specific telemetry (ticket characteristics, encryption-type anomalies) needed to reliably distinguish forged service tickets from genuine ones.
- T1558.003partialdetects — A.8.15 logs and analyzes Kerberos TGS request events such as anomalous RC4 service ticket requests on domain controllers, but the offline brute-force cracking and any passive network sniffing of captured tickets occur outside the log’s visible estate, so detection covers only part of the technique.
- T1558.003partialresponds — A.8.15 requires log analysis, anomaly detection, correlation and identification of suspected incidents (including probing or malware) to feed the incident management process (5.25); this surfaces Kerberoasting TGS requests or anomalous SPN activity once underway for containment/eradication, but the core technique (offline cracking of captured hashes) leaves no live event on the estate and many instances go undetected until after credential use.
- T1558.004partialdetects — A.8.15's log analysis guidance explicitly covers reviewing access attempts and correlating logs to identify anomalies, which can surface the AS-REQ traffic pattern of AS-REP Roasting, but the technique's core credential material extraction and offline cracking occur outside the logged environment, leaving a substantial unobservable remainder.
- T1558.005partialdetects — A.8.15's logging framework can capture file access to ccache files (under 'files accessed and the type of access') and execution of credential tools like klist/Kekeo (under 'system activities' and process telemetry), and log analysis is meant to identify anomalous behaviour — but surfacing T1558.005 specifically requires file-access auditing on /tmp and process-execution logging configured for credential utilities, neither of which the clause mandates; the technique is a quiet file read that the default logging scope may not reach.
- T1559.001partialdetects — A.8.15 captures process creation, file access, configuration changes and other events that COM execution generates, and its log-analysis guidance (UEBA, threat intelligence, SIEM rules) supports detection; however, COM is a heavily-used legitimate Windows mechanism, so distinguishing malicious COM abuse from benign COM activity requires specific correlation and pattern rules that the clause does not mandate, leaving a bounded remainder where the events are recorded but the technique is not surfaced as malicious.
- T1559.001partialresponds — A.8.15's log analysis, anomaly detection, correlation, and explicit tie-in to incident identification/investigation (5.25) enable response actions once COM-based execution is underway and logged; partial because many COM abuse vectors (in-process, fileless, or pre-compromise) produce no observable event for the logging facility to act on.
- T1559.002partialdetects — A.8.15 requires logging of system activities, use of utility programs, and alarms from security systems, and its log analysis clause mandates correlation and review for anomalous behaviour, so DDE execution via Office or CSV files can surface in process-creation and application logs where those are collected; the clause determines scope rather than mandating instrumentation depth, so an implementation logging only network and access events is fully conformant and sees nothing of an in-process DDE invocation.
- T1560partialdetects — A.8.15's log analysis guidance covers reviewing access attempts, DNS logs, and correlating logs to identify anomalous behaviour, which can surface the use of archiving utilities or unusual encryption activity prior to exfiltration, but the control determines logging scope rather than mandating the specific file-access or process-creation telemetry that would make detection mostly reliable.
- T1560.001partialdetects — A.8.15 requires log analysis and monitoring (including of utility use, file access/deletion, system activities, and anomalous behaviour via SIEM/UEBA/threat intel) that can surface the use of archiving utilities like tar/zip/7-Zip during collection, but this is limited to events that generate observable logs and does not guarantee detection of all instances or variants (e.g. obfuscated or non-logged use).
- T1560.002partialdetects — A.8.15 logs file access events, process execution, and use of utility programs/applications, which surface side effects of archiving (many files read in sequence, archive file created, process activity), but the specific library call (zlib, libzip, rarfile linked into custom code) is an in-process operation that standard event logging does not directly observe — the technique is inferred from behavioral patterns in logs rather than directly recorded.
- T1560.003partialdetects — A.8.15 logs file access, process execution and system activities, so the I/O footprint of a custom archiver (mass file reads, new high-entropy file creation, process spawn) is captured; however, the technique is specifically designed to evade signature-based detection by using custom XOR/stream ciphers with no external library references, and the clause sets logging requirements without mandating the behavioural or entropy analysis depth needed to surface the custom method as archival rather than ordinary I/O.
- T1563partialdetects — A.8.15's log analysis guidance covers reviewing access attempts and correlating logs, which can surface session hijacking through anomalies like concurrent sessions or unusual activity, but the control determines scope rather than mandating the specific telemetry depth needed to reliably catch in-session hijacking.
- T1563.001partialdetects — SSH hijacking reuses an existing authenticated session, so the takeover itself produces no new authentication event to log; however, A.8.15's UEBA, file-access logging, and command/system-activity records can surface anomalous behaviour from the hijacked session, and log correlation can flag activity inconsistent with the legitimate user's pattern — a slice of the technique, not the hijack event itself.
- T1564partialdetects — Logging captures some artifact-hiding actions (account creation, privilege use, configuration changes, file access) and A.8.15's log analysis with UEBA and anomaly detection can surface suspicious patterns, but T1564 is specifically designed to evade detection — hidden files, alternate data streams, hidden services and similar techniques often produce no log events by design, so what is caught is a slice rather than the bulk.
- T1564.001partialdetects — A.8.15's logging requirements (file access events, configuration changes, log analysis for anomalous behaviour) can surface hidden-file activity when file-system auditing captures attribute changes and rename events, but the clause sets scope rather than mandating that specific telemetry — an implementation logging only the enumerated access events without attribute-change auditing is fully conformant and sees nothing of the hiding act, and the technique is explicitly designed to evade detection.
- T1564.004partialdetects — A.8.15's logging and analysis framework can surface T1564.004 indirectly through file-access logs, network connections from hidden payloads, and anomaly-based analysis (UEBA, threat intelligence), but the technique is specifically designed to evade standard logging and A.8.15 does not mandate NTFS-attribute-specific instrumentation, so ADS creation and the hidden data itself often go unrecorded.
- T1564.005partialdetects — A.8.15 logs file access events, configuration changes, privilege use, and supports anomaly/UEBA analysis that can surface indicators of a hidden file system (unusual disk activity, reserved-space usage, boot-record changes, anomalous system calls), but the technique is specifically designed to conceal file I/O from security tools, so much of the activity bypasses standard file-access logging and what is caught is a slice rather than the bulk.
- T1564.006partialdetects — A.8.15 logs process execution, file creation, network connections and configuration changes at the host level, which can surface the launch of a VM (vmware-vmx, qemu, VirtualBox binaries, .vmx/.vmdk files, bridged-adapter traffic with mismatched IP/hostname) and feed UEBA/SIEM correlation; however, the technique is explicitly designed to evade host-based monitoring, so activity INSIDE the virtual instance — the core of the technique — is invisible to host logs, and ESXi VMs created via /bin/vmx are hidden from typical administrative visibility.
- T1564.007partialdetects — A.8.15 logs file access/modification events and application execution, which would record the document being opened and the stomping action as a file write, but it does not perform content analysis comparing VBA source code to p-code, so the specific technique — hiding malicious p-code behind benign source — is not directly surfaced; the logs provide investigative context rather than detection of the technique itself.
- T1564.009partialdetects — A.8.15 logs file access, process execution, and utility program use, which would capture events related to resource fork abuse (file modifications, code execution, xattr/ls commands), but the technique is specifically designed for evasion by hiding code in resource forks, and standard logging does not specifically surface the resource fork abuse as a distinct event — detection is indirect, similar to the A.8.16 vs T1055 anchor.
- T1564.010partialdetects — A.8.15 logging captures process creation events with command-line arguments, but T1564.010 is specifically designed to evade this by patching the PEB after the initial log entry — either spawning with benign arguments and overwriting before resume, or spawning with malicious arguments and overwriting to benign before subsequent analysis. Log analysis (UEBA, correlation) can catch some instances where behaviour diverges from logged arguments, but the technique's core mechanism defeats argument-based logging by construction.
- T1564.011partialdetects — A.8.15's log analysis guidance covers anomalous behaviour and process execution patterns, but T1564.011's mechanism hides from process interrupt signals without necessarily generating a distinct loggable event, so detection depends on correlating indirect indicators rather than directly observing the evasion itself.
- T1564.012partialdetects — A.8.15 logs file access events (including creation in excluded paths) and its analysis guidance covers identifying anomalous behaviour and correlating logs, so the raw events are captured and can be surfaced as the technique; however, files placed in AV-excluded paths are routinely legitimate, the technique is specifically designed to blend with trusted activity, and identifying it as malicious requires correlation and analysis rather than being inherent in the log record itself.
- T1564.013partialdetects — A.8.15 can log the `mount` command execution (privileged operation, system activity, configuration change) and the analysis layer (UEBA, threat intelligence, correlation) can flag anomalous bind-mount activity, but the technique is specifically designed to evade native utilities by overlaying a benign /proc, and standard logging does not inherently surface the hiding effect on process metadata — detection requires the analysis capabilities A.8.15 describes, not just the recording.
- T1564.014partialdetects — A.8.15's logging scope captures process execution of `xattr`/`setfattr`/`getfattr` utilities, the subsequent loader/payload execution, and any network callbacks, but the core hiding act — writing payload data into extended attributes — is specifically designed to evade standard file-access and integrity logging because the file content and hash appear unchanged; detection depends on whether process command-line auditing is enabled, which the clause does not mandate.
- T1565partialdetects — A.8.15's log analysis guidance covers detecting anomalous behaviour and indicators of compromise, but data manipulation within an application's own logic may not generate a distinct log event that the control's prescribed logging scope captures, leaving a gap.
- T1565.002partialdetects — A.8.15's logging scope (network addresses/protocols, system activities, file access, SIEM/IDS rules, anomaly correlation) surfaces indicators around transmitted-data manipulation — anomalous network paths, process-level interception utilities, configuration changes enabling MITM — but standard logs capture metadata rather than payload integrity, so the manipulation itself is not directly observable and detection depends on what the implementation chooses to instrument.
- T1565.003partialdetects — A.8.15 requires log analysis (including SIEM/UEBA rules, anomalous behaviour detection, and correlation of access/config/privilege events) that can surface runtime data manipulation when it produces observable indicators in logs, but the technique's core binary modification or in-memory alteration often leaves no log artefact until downstream effects appear, and the clause's scope is limited to events the organization has chosen to log.
- T1566partialdetects — A.8.15 requires log analysis and monitoring to identify anomalous behaviour and suspected incidents (e.g. reviewing access attempts, correlating logs, UEBA, checking for malicious outbound), which surfaces phishing delivery and follow-on activity once it reaches the estate; it does not observe pre-delivery adversary acquisition or external infrastructure.
- T1566.001partialdetects — A.8.15's log analysis provisions can surface anomalous email gateway events, attachment sandboxing results, and endpoint execution logs that indicate a spearphishing attachment, but the control's scope is determined by organizational requirements rather than mandating the specific instrumentation depth needed to catch every instance, leaving a nameable remainder where the attachment evades the configured logging scope.
- T1566.002partialdetects — A.8.15's log analysis guidance explicitly covers reviewing DNS logs for outbound connections to malicious servers and correlating logs for incident analysis, which can surface the post-click callback or payload retrieval, but the control does not inspect the email or the link itself before the user interacts with it, leaving the initial delivery and the user's decision to click outside its observable scope.
- T1566.003partialdetects — A.8.15 logging can detect downstream indicators of T1566.003 — outbound DNS/network connections to malicious infrastructure, endpoint execution of payloads, and anomalous user activity on work systems — but the spearphishing communication itself occurs on third-party services (personal webmail, social media) outside enterprise logging scope, so the social engineering step that defines the technique is not observable.
- T1567partialdetects — A.8.15's log analysis guidance explicitly covers reviewing DNS logs for outbound connections to malicious servers and correlating logs for analysis, which can surface exfiltration to a known-bad web service, but the control's scope is determined by business and security requirements rather than mandating full traffic inspection, so detection reaches only the slice the implementer chooses to monitor.
- T1567.001partialdetects — A.8.15 requires log analysis and monitoring (including DNS, outbound connections, anomalous behaviour, UEBA, and correlation) that can surface exfiltration to a code repo via API/HTTPS as unusual activity or an indicator of compromise, but this is a slice dependent on what the organization chooses to log/monitor rather than a bounded remainder, and many shapes (e.g. covert use of a popular internal repo) remain unseen.
- T1567.002partialresponds — A.8.15 requires log analysis, anomaly detection, correlation, and identification of suspected incidents (including outbound connections and unusual activity) to feed the incident management process (5.25); this surfaces and enables response to exfiltration once underway, but the clause itself performs none of the containment/eradication actions that define the core of `responds` on this lane.
- T1567.003partialdetects — A.8.15 requires log analysis and monitoring (including DNS, outbound connections to malicious servers, UEBA, SIEM/IDS rules, and correlation) that can surface anomalous exfiltration to known text storage sites like Pastebin as an indicator of compromise; this is a genuine but minority slice of the technique because the control depends on what the organization has chosen to log/monitor and on threat intel for the specific sites, leaving many stealthy or novel uses undetected.
- T1567.004partialdetects — A.8.15 requires log analysis and monitoring (including DNS, outbound connections to malicious servers, anomalous behaviour, UEBA, SIEM/IDS rules, and correlation) that can surface webhook exfiltration when it produces observable events in logs, but the control's scope is limited to the organization's own estate and many webhook deliveries (especially to external SaaS like Discord/Slack) can blend with normal HTTPS traffic without triggering the listed indicators.
- T1568partialdetects — A.8.15's log analysis guidance explicitly covers DNS log review for outbound connections to malicious servers and correlation with threat intelligence, which can surface the algorithmically-generated domains or IPs used by dynamic resolution, but the technique's evasion-by-design means some resolutions will blend with legitimate traffic or use protocols outside the logged scope.
- T1568.001partialdetects — A.8.15 explicitly requires log analysis and monitoring to identify anomalous behaviour including outbound connections to malicious C2 servers via DNS logs, which directly surfaces the rapidly changing IPs and short-TTL resolutions characteristic of Fast Flux DNS.
- T1568.001partialresponds — A.8.15's log analysis and monitoring explicitly cover DNS logs for outbound connections to malicious C2 servers (including flux patterns via correlation, UEBA, threat intel and SIEM/IDS rules), enabling incident identification and hand-off to 5.25 response; this is genuine response once the technique is underway, but only a slice (DNS-focused detection and follow-up) while the control does not contain/eradicate the flux infrastructure itself.
- T1568.003partialdetects — A.8.15's log analysis guidance explicitly includes checking DNS logs for outbound connections to malicious servers, which can surface the DNS queries that carry the calculated values, but the calculation itself occurs in-memory on the endpoint and the resulting C2 traffic uses non-standard ports that may fall outside the logging scope determined by business requirements.
- T1569partialdetects — Logging service-creation events and the execution of system utilities reveals attempts to abuse legitimate services for code execution.
- T1569.001partialdetects — A.8.15 explicitly lists 'use of utility programs and applications' and 'changes to system configuration' among events to log, which directly covers launchctl execution and Launch Agent/Daemon loading on macOS; the clause's log-analysis guidance (SIEM rules, UEBA, threat intelligence) supports surfacing this activity, with the remainder being implementation depth and adversary evasion of logging.
- T1573partialdetects — A.8.15 explicitly requires log analysis and monitoring to identify anomalous behaviour, indicators of compromise, and suspected incidents (including via SIEM, UEBA, DNS logs, and correlation), which surfaces encrypted C2 channels when they produce observable anomalies; however, well-implemented encryption per the technique often evades detection in standard logs, limiting coverage to a slice rather than a bounded remainder.
- T1573.001partialdetects — A.8.15 explicitly requires log analysis and monitoring to identify anomalous behaviour, indicators of compromise, and events such as outbound connections to malicious C2 servers (via DNS logs, UEBA, SIEM, etc.), which surfaces many symmetric-C2 implementations once they produce observable traffic patterns; it does not instrument or surface the cryptography itself when the algorithm is used only for concealment inside otherwise-allowed channels.
- T1573.002partialdetects — A.8.15 requires log analysis and monitoring (including DNS, network traffic patterns, UEBA, SIEM/IDS rules, and correlation) that can surface anomalous C2 using asymmetric crypto (e.g. unusual TLS handshakes or outbound connections), but this is limited to observable artifacts after the fact and does not cover all implementations or pre-encryption behaviors.
- T1574partialdetects — A.8.15's log analysis guidance covers monitoring for anomalous behaviour and correlating logs, which can surface indicators of execution flow hijacking, but the control determines logging scope rather than mandating the deep host instrumentation needed to observe every sub-technique of T1574.
- T1574.001partialdetects — A.8.15's logging requirements (file access events, configuration changes, use of utility programs) and its mandated analysis layer (SIEM, IDS, UEBA, threat intelligence, anomalous-behaviour detection) provide the infrastructure that can surface DLL hijacking through planted files, registry modifications and unusual load patterns, but the clause sets scope rather than mandating instrumentation depth — a conformant implementation logging only network or access events would miss the technique entirely, and DLL hijacking is explicitly designed to evade defenses by riding legitimate processes.
- T1574.007partialdetects — A.8.15 explicitly requires logging configuration changes (PATH modification), file access events, and use of utility programs, and its log analysis section calls for identifying anomalous behaviour via UEBA and correlation — all of which can surface T1574.007. But the clause sets logging requirements rather than mandating the specific instrumentation depth (e.g. process execution logs with full paths, file-creation monitoring on PATH directories) needed to reliably catch a malicious binary placed without an explicit PATH edit, so a conformant-but-shallow implementation can miss it.
- T1574.008partialdetects — A.8.15's logging scope covers the events that would surface this technique — file creation in the target directory (item f), use of utility programs (item e), and process execution with path information — and its log-analysis clause (UEBA, pattern analysis, predetermined rules) is the mechanism that would identify the anomalous execution path. But the clause sets scope and analysis requirements rather than mandating the specific instrumentation (file auditing on application directories, full-path process logging, rules correlating dropped file to subsequent execution) needed to catch search-order hijacking reliably, so detection is a slice of well-configured implementations rather than a property of the control itself.
- T1574.009partialdetects — A.8.15's logging requirements capture the artifacts T1574.009 leaves (file creation in directories, service configuration changes, process execution of unexpected binaries) and its log-analysis section mandates SIEM rules, UEBA and threat-intel-driven correlation, but detection depends on implementation choices — which directories have file-access logging enabled, whether process-execution telemetry is captured, and whether correlation rules for unquoted-path hijacking are configured — so the clause supports detection without guaranteeing it.
- T1574.012partialdetects — A.8.15's logging scope covers the artifacts COR_PROFILER leaves (registry modifications to set the environment variable, process creation, DLL loads, system activity) and its analysis section explicitly invokes threat intelligence, predetermined rules, and UEBA — all of which can surface this technique — but the clause sets requirements rather than mandating specific instrumentation, so an implementation logging only basic events is fully conformant and would miss the technique's specific indicators.
- T1574.013partialdetects — A.8.15's logging of system activities, process access events, and log analysis for anomalous behaviour (UEBA, SIEM rules) can surface some artifacts of KernelCallbackTable hijacking (e.g. WriteProcessMemory calls, cross-process access, anomalous callback invocations), but the technique is explicitly designed to evade detection by masking execution under a legitimate GUI process, and A.8.15 sets scope via the organization's logging policy rather than mandating the memory-level instrumentation that would catch it reliably.
- T1574.014partialdetects — A.8.15 explicitly requires logging 'changes to system configuration' (which catches .config file tampering) and 'system activities' / 'files accessed', and its log-analysis guidance covers anomaly detection that could surface unusual .NET runtime behavior; however, the actual in-process assembly loading that defines the technique is not mandated by the clause's event list, so detection depends on whether process-level instrumentation is in scope — a slice rather than a bounded remainder of a working mechanism.
- T1578.001partialdetects — A.8.15's log analysis guidance covers reviewing access attempts and correlating logs, which can surface the anomalous creation of a snapshot, but the control's scope is determined by implementation choices rather than mandating cloud API telemetry, so detection is a slice the implementer chose.
- T1578.002partialdetects — A.8.15's log analysis guidance covers cloud API calls and instance creation events, but detection depends on whether the organization has configured cloud audit logging and integrated it into their SIEM, which the control recommends but does not mandate universally.
- T1578.004partialdetects — A.8.15's logging scope covers cloud management API calls (falling under 'transactions executed by users in applications' and 'use of privileges') and VM lifecycle events, so snapshot restoration via cloud APIs is loggable and detectable when the organization's policy includes them; however, ephemeral storage resets on stop/restart are normal cloud behavior that may not generate distinctive log entries, and the clause's scope is policy-determined rather than mandating cloud-control-plane instrumentation depth.
- T1580partialdetects — A.8.15 requires log analysis and monitoring (including of successful/failed access, privilege use, configuration changes, and anomalous behaviour via SIEM/UEBA/threat intel) that can surface cloud discovery API calls or unusual enumeration by a compromised account; this is a genuine but minority slice of T1580 activity, which also occurs via legitimate CLI/tools without triggering logs or via pre-compromise reconnaissance outside the organization's estate.
- T1584.002partialdetects — A.8.15 explicitly requires log analysis, anomaly detection via SIEM/IDS/UEBA, DNS log review for outbound connections to malicious C2 servers, and correlation to identify suspected incidents such as probing or malware, which surfaces post-compromise use or alteration of a compromised third-party DNS server; it is only partial because the control's scope is set by organizational requirements and does not mandate universal DNS-specific instrumentation or detection of silent pre-compromise subdomain creation.
- T1584.005partialdetects — A.8.15 requires log analysis and monitoring (including DNS logs for C2, anomalous outbound connections, UEBA, threat intel) that can surface botnet-related activity or IOCs once systems are compromised and the botnet is in use; this is genuine detection but only a slice, as the technique's core (adversary compromise/build/takeover of third-party systems on PRE platforms) occurs entirely outside the organization's estate and visibility.
- T1590partialdetects — A.8.15 logs access attempts, network addresses/protocols, and analyses logs for anomalous behaviour, so the on-estate portion of T1590 (active scanning, phishing for information) leaves traces in access and network logs. The off-estate portion (WHOIS, passive DNS, search open technical databases) produces no event on the victim's systems to log, so detection is a slice of the technique rather than the whole.
- T1590.002partialdetects — A.8.15 logging can detect DNS zone transfers (AXFR) against the victim's own DNS server, which the technique explicitly names as one method, and the clause itself calls out DNS log review; however, the bulk of T1590.002 — passive DNS lookups, public record queries, and third-party database searches — occurs entirely off the victim's estate and produces no event the control can record.
- T1590.004partialdetects — A.8.15 logging captures active scanning attempts (network addresses, access attempts, IDS/IPS alarms) that reveal network topology, and log analysis with SIEM rules and UEBA can surface anomalous reconnaissance patterns; however, the technique also encompasses passive collection from open sources and victim-owned websites where nothing touches the organization's estate to be logged.
- T1590.006partialdetects — Active scanning for network security appliances touches the estate and generates logs (firewall, IDS, network device logs of probes and scans), but the technique can also be executed entirely passively via public sources, victim-owned websites, open technical databases, and phishing for information — none of which leave traces in the organization's logs, so only a slice of the technique is observable.
- T1592partialdetects — A.8.15 logs access attempts, network addresses/protocols, and IDS/SIEM exceptions, so the on-estate portion of T1592 (active scanning that touches the perimeter, phishing-for-information that elicits user interaction, outbound connections to adversary infrastructure) leaves observable log records; the off-estate portion (passive OSINT via social media, search of victim-owned websites, user-agent harvesting from adversary-controlled sites) generates no event on the organization's systems and is therefore not logged.
- T1592.004partialdetects — A.8.15 logging surfaces the vectors that touch the estate (active scanning connections, phishing emails, visits to adversary-compromised sites) but not the public-source gathering (job postings, network maps, resumes) and does not necessarily reveal that client configuration data was the specific target of the observed activity.
- T1595partialresponds — A.8.15's log analysis and monitoring explicitly surface scanning/probing events (e.g. firewall probes, DNS logs for outbound C2, anomalous access attempts) once underway and feed them into incident response (5.25), but this is only a slice: pre-compromise external scanning often leaves no detectable artifact on the victim estate until after the fact, and the control's core is logging rather than active containment/eradication.
- T1595.001partialdetects — A.8.15 requires log analysis and specific monitoring (e.g. reviewing access attempts to protected resources, checking DNS logs for malicious outbound, correlating logs) that can surface scanning of the organization's own IP blocks once it reaches monitored estate, but the technique occurs entirely pre-compromise on external/public ranges with no guaranteed internal footprint or event on the organization's systems.
- T1595.001partialresponds — A.8.15 requires analysis of logs (including network/DNS/IDS events) to identify and investigate suspected incidents such as probing of firewalls; this engages the administrative/follow-up half of incident response (evidence collection, root cause, recording) once the pre-compromise scan produces observable artifacts on the estate, but containment/eradication is empty as the scan itself is not an intrusion.
- T1595.002partialdetects — A.8.15 requires log analysis and monitoring (including of access attempts, alarms, network connections to malicious servers, and correlation with threat intelligence) that can surface vulnerability scanning activity once it reaches the organization's estate, but the technique occurs pre-compromise on external infrastructure with no guaranteed observable artifact on the monitored domain.
- T1595.003partialdetects — A.8.15 explicitly requires log analysis, anomaly detection via SIEM/IDS/UEBA rules and patterns, DNS log review for malicious outbound connections, correlation of logs, and identification of probing or suspected incidents, which surfaces wordlist scanning activity on the organization's infrastructure.
- T1596.001partialdetects — A.8.15 can record and analyze direct DNS queries against the organization’s own nameservers, but passive DNS and third-party repository queries occur outside the organization’s vantage, leaving only a slice of the technique detectable.
- T1598partialdetects — A.8.15 logs inbound mail, access attempts, DNS resolutions and outbound connections, and its analysis clause explicitly covers correlating logs against threat intelligence and identifying anomalous behaviour, so artifacts of T1598 (the message arriving, the user clicking, the credential submission to an external site) are within the logging scope; however, the technique's social-engineering core — a user voluntarily replying by email or calling a phone number — produces no log signal the clause mandates, and detection of the rest depends on what the implementation chooses to log and feed into analysis, so the coverage is a slice rather than the bulk.
- T1598.003partialdetects — A.8.15's log analysis guidance explicitly covers reviewing access attempts and correlating logs to identify incidents, which can surface the credential harvesting that follows a clicked link, but the control does not mandate the email gateway or endpoint instrumentation that would detect the link delivery itself, leaving a nameable gap.
- T1599.001partialdetects — A.8.15 explicitly requires log analysis and monitoring of events including configuration changes, use of privileges, network activity, anomalous behaviour, DNS logs for outbound connections to malicious infrastructure, and correlation with threat intelligence — all of which surface malicious NAT modifications on boundary devices once they occur.
- T1600partialdetects — A.8.15 explicitly lists configuration changes and use of privileges as events to be logged, and log analysis with SIEM/UEBA rules is meant to surface anomalous behaviour, so crypto-weakening actions on network devices (config changes, image modification, privilege use) leave log traces that can be detected — but extent is partial because the technique targets network devices whose logging scope and depth are implementation-dependent, and subtle manipulations (e.g. reducing key space) may not produce entries distinctive enough for the analysis rules in place to flag.
- T1600.001partialdetects — A.8.15's log analysis guidance covers reviewing configuration changes and correlating logs to identify anomalous behaviour, which can surface a key-size reduction on a network device, but the control determines logging scope rather than mandating device-configuration instrumentation, so detection depends on whether the implementer chose to log those changes.
- T1600.002partialdetects — A.8.15 explicitly requires logging of configuration changes, which would capture the disablement of hardware crypto on a network device, but the scope is organization-determined and the adversary controlling the device may suppress or alter the logs being emitted, so detection is a slice rather than a bounded remainder of a working mechanism.
- T1601partialdetects — A.8.15's logging of file access, configuration changes and system activities can surface OS image modifications on network devices (e.g. via syslog or integrity monitoring), but the technique can occur in memory at runtime without generating file-system events, and the clause sets logging scope rather than mandating instrumentation depth on embedded devices whose native logging is often limited.
- T1601.001partialdetects — A.8.15's logging of configuration changes, file access, and privilege use can surface the storage-based variant (image file transfers via TFTP/FTP/SCP, boot configuration changes), but in-memory patching via debug commands or boot loader manipulation is largely invisible to standard network device logs, and an adversary with administrative access can tamper with the very logs that would record the activity.
- T1601.002partialdetects — A.8.15's logging requirements would capture the file replacement, configuration change, and reboot events that constitute the downgrade, but the technique specifically targets network devices, which typically have limited logging capabilities and less centralized log analysis than general-purpose systems; detection also depends on rules being in place to flag an OS image replacement as anomalous, and a privileged actor performing the downgrade may not appear as an unauthorized access event.
- T1602partialdetects — A.8.15 logs access attempts, network addresses, system activities and use of utility programs, so SNMP queries and configuration-repository accesses on the organization's own network devices leave observable traces; however, the clause sets logging requirements rather than mandating instrumentation depth, and read access to configuration data via protocols like SNMP is often not comprehensively logged by default, leaving a bounded remainder.
- T1602.001partialdetects — A.8.15's logging requirements (access attempts, network addresses/protocols, device identity) and its log-analysis provisions for anomalous behaviour would surface SNMP MIB queries on managed devices, but the clause sets a framework rather than mandating SNMP-specific instrumentation depth — whether MIB reads are recorded depends on device configuration and the scope of analysis chosen, so detection is a slice rather than a bounded remainder of a mechanism that mostly works.
- T1602.002partialdetects — A.8.15 requires logging of access attempts, file access, and configuration changes, which can surface SNMP queries, Smart Install activity, and configuration exports from network devices — but the clause sets scope and depth by organizational determination rather than mandating instrumentation of network devices, so an implementation logging only servers is fully conformant and sees nothing of a config dump on a router or switch.
- T1606partialdetects — A.8.15's log analysis guidance explicitly covers reviewing access attempts to protected resources and correlating logs, which can surface anomalous use of forged credentials, but the control's scope is determined by organizational requirements rather than mandating the specific telemetry needed to distinguish forged from legitimate tokens in all cases.
- T1606partialresponds — A.8.15 requires log analysis and correlation (including of access attempts, privilege use, configuration changes, alarms, and anomalous behaviour) to identify suspected incidents such as probing or unauthorized access, which feeds the incident response process (5.25) once forgery has occurred; it does not contain or eradicate the forged credential or actor once the technique is underway.
- T1606.001partialdetects — A.8.15 requires log analysis and monitoring (SIEM/UEBA/IDS rules, anomalous behaviour detection, correlation of access attempts and events) that can surface forged-cookie use after the fact when it triggers observable logs or anomalies, but the control's scope is limited to events on the organization's own estate and does not guarantee detection of all forgery vectors (especially SaaS-side or pre-authentication generation).
- T1606.002partialdetects — A.8.15 explicitly requires log analysis, anomaly detection via SIEM/UEBA/IDS rules, correlation of logs (including successful/rejected access, privilege use, identity changes, and security system events), and identification of indicators of compromise such as probing or anomalous behavior, which surfaces forged SAML token usage across the technique's platforms and post-authentication effects.
- T1609partialdetects — A.8.15 requires logging of system activities, access attempts, use of privileges, and transactions — container administration commands via Docker daemon, Kubernetes API server, or kubelet generate audit logs (user IDs, timestamps, commands) that fall within this scope, and the clause's log-analysis guidance explicitly covers identifying anomalous behaviour and indicators of compromise; partial because the clause sets scope rather than mandating instrumentation of container orchestration platforms, so an implementation that does not extend logging to the container control plane is fully conformant and sees nothing of this technique.
- T1610partialdetects — A.8.15 requires log analysis and monitoring to identify anomalous behaviour and security events (including container deployment via privileged/vulnerable images, workload changes, or unusual API/activity), but this is limited to events that generate observable logs within the organization's estate and does not cover all adversary means of deploying containers (e.g. external image builds or pre-compromise registry activity).
- T1611partialdetects — A.8.15 captures many events associated with container escape — privileged operations, mount/bind operations, system calls (unshare, keyctl), configuration changes, use of utility programs, and identity changes are all in its logging scope, and its log-analysis clause is explicitly designed to surface anomalous behaviour. However, the control sets requirements on what to log rather than mandating specific detection rules, and escapes via kernel exploits or vulnerabilities that do not generate clear log entries can evade the recorded set, so detection is a slice rather than a bounded remainder of a working mechanism.
- T1612partialdetects — A.8.15's logging scope (system activities, network addresses/protocols, file access, privileged operations) and its log-analysis guidance (SIEM rules, UEBA, DNS-log review for malicious connections, correlation) can surface the Docker API build request, the registry pull, the on-host build process, and the C2 fetch — but the clause sets scope by topic-specific policy rather than mandating container/daemon telemetry, and the technique is explicitly designed to minimise suspicious indicators (vanilla base image, local registry), so detection depends on what the organisation chooses to instrument and analyse.
- T1614partialdetects — A.8.15's logging scope catches the network-based vectors of T1614 — outbound DNS/HTTP to geolocation services and cloud metadata endpoint queries appear in the network-address and protocol logs the clause mandates — but local system checks (GetLocaleInfoW, time zone, keyboard layout, language settings) generate no log entry unless process-level auditing is added beyond what the clause requires, so a conformant implementation sees only a slice of the technique.
- T1614.001partialdetects — A.8.15's log analysis guidance covers reviewing access attempts and correlating logs, which can surface registry queries and API calls indicative of system language discovery, but the control determines logging scope rather than mandating the deep endpoint instrumentation needed to capture every such query, leaving a slice the implementer chooses.
- T1615partialdetects — A.8.15 explicitly lists logging of 'use of utility programs and applications' and process activities, which captures `gpresult` execution (Event ID 4688) and PowerShell cmdlet invocation (4104/4103), and its log-analysis clause covers predetermined rules and UEBA against such activity; the bounded remainder is implementation-dependent — process-command-line auditing and PowerShell Script Block logging must be enabled for the specific artifacts to surface, and a baseline-conformant logging policy that omits these still satisfies A.8.15.
- T1619partialdetects — A.8.15's log analysis guidance explicitly covers reviewing access attempts to protected resources and correlating logs, which can surface cloud storage enumeration API calls, but the control's scope is determined by organizational requirements rather than mandating cloud API logging, so detection depends on implementation choices.
- T1620partialdetects — A.8.15's logging infrastructure captures process execution events, security system alerts (AV/IDS), and network connection logs that can surface indicators of reflective loading, and its analysis capabilities (SIEM, UEBA, threat intelligence) can identify anomalous behaviour; however, the technique is explicitly designed to evade process-based detection by allocating and executing payloads directly in process memory without creating files or new processes, and A.8.15 does not mandate the specific in-memory telemetry needed to observe the core reflective-loading mechanism.
- T1622partialdetects — A.8.15 logging captures some downstream observables of debugger evasion (process termination, altered network behaviour, anomalous file access such as /proc/self/status reads) but does not record the in-process API checks (IsDebuggerPresent, NtQueryInformationProcess, PEB flag reads) that constitute the technique's core mechanism; detection depends on the implementer configuring specific rules for these indirect indicators rather than the clause mandating them.
- T1648partialdetects — A.8.15 explicitly requires logging of transactions in applications, configuration changes, privilege use, and identity changes — all categories that capture serverless function creation, invocation, and IAM role assignments in cloud environments — and its log-analysis section mandates SIEM rules, UEBA, and threat-intelligence integration to surface anomalous behaviour; the bounded remainder is serverless execution designed to look like legitimate cloud activity and organizations that have not configured cloud-native audit logging (CloudTrail/CloudWatch/Power Automate audit) to the depth the clause expects.
- T1649partialdetects — A.8.15's logging scope covers file access, privilege use, configuration changes, and identity-related events, so certificate theft from stores and certificate enrollment requests leave loggable traces that analysis (SIEM/UEBA per the clause) can surface; however, forgery via compromised root/subordinate CA keys produces signatures indistinguishable from legitimate CA operation, and in-memory theft via crypto APIs is not guaranteed to be captured, leaving a bounded remainder the logging cannot reach.
- T1652partialdetects — A.8.15's logging scope explicitly covers 'use of utility programs and applications' and system activities, so execution of driverquery.exe, lsmod, modinfo, or EnumDeviceDrivers() calls would be recorded in process execution and registry access logs; however, device driver discovery is low-noise reconnaissance that looks like normal administrative activity, and without specific detection rules, signatures, or UEBA baselines flagging it as anomalous, the logs merely capture the event without identifying it as malicious — detection depends on the analysis layer being configured to surface this specific reconnaissance pattern.
- T1654partialdetects — A.8.15 captures the events generated by log enumeration (file access to log files, process executions like wevtutil.exe/PowerShell, network connections to adversary infrastructure, SIEM queries) and its log-analysis section explicitly requires identifying anomalous activity and indicators of compromise, so the technique is within the control's detection scope; however, detection depends on what is configured to be logged and on analysis being actively performed, and the clause's primary purpose is recording and protecting logs rather than mandating specific detection rules for this technique, leaving a bounded remainder.
- T1657partialdetects — A.8.15's logging records access to financial systems, transactions, privilege use, and email activity, and its log-analysis guidance (anomaly detection, UEBA, trend analysis) can surface indicators of unauthorized transfers, BEC patterns, and ransomware precursors; however, financial theft is fundamentally an outcome often confirmed externally (bank notifications, victim reports, reconciliation), and many vectors — cryptocurrency wallet compromise, off-channel extortion demands, social engineering that succeeds without system-level artifacts — leave no in-scope log trail, so detection is a slice rather than comprehensive.
- T1659partialdetects — A.8.15 logs network addresses, protocols, DNS, and access attempts, and its analysis section calls for correlating logs and checking DNS for malicious connections — so some content injection is observable where it traverses the organisation's own network and produces anomalous patterns. The remainder is the technique's design: injection often occurs upstream (ISP, lawful-interception-style channels, compromised transit infrastructure) where the organisation has no logging vantage point, and the injected content is crafted to race or substitute for legitimate server responses, so it does not announce itself in the logs the way a failed access or configuration change would.
- T1665partialdetects — A.8.15 captures events that can indicate hidden C2 infrastructure (DNS queries to masked domains, proxy/VPN egress, anomalous traffic patterns) and its analysis clauses (UEBA, threat intelligence, DNS log review) can surface some indicators, but T1665 is specifically designed to make those events appear normal in logs — filtering defensive-tool traffic, IP spoofing into victim ranges, and domain masking at the registrar level evade exactly this kind of logging-based detection, so what is caught is a slice rather than the technique's core mechanism.
- T1666partialdetects — A.8.15 requires log analysis, anomaly detection via SIEM/UEBA/threat intel, and explicit review of successful/unsuccessful access attempts, privilege use, configuration changes, and identity creation/modification — all of which surface the API calls and hierarchy alterations named in T1666 after they occur, but only where those events are both logged and fall inside the organization's chosen analysis scope (e.g. not adversary-created external subscriptions or severed accounts that generate no victim logs).
- T1667partialdetects — A.8.15's mail server logs and log-analysis provisions (UEBA, anomalous behaviour, trend analysis) can surface the inbound volume flood that is the technique's primary effect, but the orchestration (spam-list signups, external senders) and the social-engineering follow-up (vishing) happen off-estate and leave no log trace, so detection covers the symptom rather than the attack.
- T1668partialdetects — A.8.15's log analysis guidance covers reviewing configuration changes, privilege use, and anomalous behaviour, which can surface the artifacts of exclusive control actions like patching or disabling services, but the technique's stealthy nature and the control's scope-determined implementation mean detection is a slice rather than a bounded remainder.
- T1669partialdetects — A.8.15 captures Wi-Fi authentication events, device identities, network addresses and access attempts through access point/RADIUS logs, and its log-analysis guidance covers anomalous behaviour — so a wireless connection by an adversary is recorded and can be surfaced. The remainder is the technique's open-network exploitation and physical-proximity positioning, which generate little or no 'rejected access' signal, and the dual-homed third-party bridge, which produces no event on the target estate until the actual connection lands.
- T1674partialdetects — Logging captures the downstream effects of input injection — commands launched, scripts executed, files accessed, USB device connections — but not the keystroke simulation itself, and GUI-only uses of the technique (browsing, viewing) may generate little to no log signal.
- T1675partialdetects — A.8.15 requires logging of system activities, access attempts, privilege use, and configuration changes, and mandates analysis for anomalous behaviour — ESXi admin API calls and VMware Tools daemon activity would fall under several of these categories if ESXi hosts are within logging scope. The extent is partial rather than mostly because the control sets requirements and scope rather than mandating ESXi-specific instrumentation depth: an implementation that excludes hypervisor infrastructure from its logging scope is fully conformant with A.8.15 and sees nothing of this technique, mirroring the A.8.16/T1055 anchor's reasoning.
- T1677partialdetects — A.8.15's log analysis guidance covers reviewing access attempts, correlating logs, and identifying anomalous behaviour, which can surface the configuration changes and unusual build commands of a poisoned pipeline, but the technique's core manipulation occurs within a SaaS CI/CD platform where the organization's logging scope may not reach the pipeline's internal execution details.
- T1678partialdetects — A.8.15 records the delay mechanisms themselves (sleep commands, scheduled task creation, process execution timing) and its log-analysis guidance covers pattern and trend analysis that can surface timing anomalies, but T1678 is specifically engineered to make the delayed activity blend with benign behavior, so the logging captures the mechanism without reliably surfacing the intent.
- T1684partialdetects — A.8.15 explicitly requires log analysis, anomaly detection via SIEM/UEBA/IDS rules, correlation, and review of access attempts, alarms, privilege use, and suspicious activity to identify indicators of compromise and security events, which surfaces social engineering once the prompted user action (e.g. credential disclosure, MFA change, or malicious execution) produces observable logs.
- T1684.001partialdetects — A.8.15 captures technical artifacts that can indicate impersonation (email header discrepancies, sender IP anomalies, authentication patterns, DNS lookups for lookalike domains), and its log-analysis guidance covers anomalous behaviour, but the core deception — a person being persuaded by a trusted-seeming identity — is not directly observable in logs, and impersonation via compromised legitimate accounts leaves no distinctive artifacts.
- T1685partialdetects — A.8.15's log analysis guidance covers reviewing logs for anomalous behaviour and correlating events, which can surface indicators of tool tampering, but the control's primary mechanism is recording events rather than actively detecting the disabling of its own recording mechanisms in real time.
- T1685.001partialdetects — A.8.15 explicitly addresses protection against 'alterations to message types recorded,' 'log files being edited or deleted,' and 'failure to record events,' and its log-analysis and monitoring clauses can surface anomalous patterns or service-state changes — but the technique is specifically designed to defeat the primary logging mechanism, and the control does not mandate the secondary telemetry (centralized SIEM, file-integrity monitoring on registry keys, service-state monitoring) that would actually catch a successful EventLog disablement, so detection depends on implementation choices the clause permits but does not require.
- T1685.001partialprevents — A.8.15's protection measures (append-only/read-only files, cryptographic hashing, preventing privileged users from deleting or deactivating logs of their own activities) directly counter log-file manipulation and tampering, but the technique also disables the EventLog service, modifies registry keys, and uses auditpol to disable auditing — actions the clause's protections do not reach, so the technique can still execute even where the clause is fully implemented.
- T1685.002partialprevents — A.8.15's requirements to protect logs against deletion/deactivation, unauthorized changes, failure to record, and overwriting (via append-only, hashing, etc.) plus mandatory logging of access attempts, privilege use, and config changes directly stop many of the described modifications and bypasses, but the control is silent on cloud-specific integrations, licensing, or command-level toggles and cannot reach an adversary who already holds sufficient privileges to alter the logging configuration itself.
- T1685.003partialdetects — A.8.15 logs process creation, file modifications, service state changes, and configuration changes — the underlying artifacts a UI-spoofing attack must produce (e.g., the spoofing process, altered UI binaries, disabled security services) — and its log-analysis guidance covers anomaly and correlation-based detection; however, the technique is explicitly designed to defeat this layer by presenting false 'healthy' status, and if the logging agent itself is impaired or the analyst relies on the spoofed UI rather than raw logs, detection fails, leaving a meaningful remainder.
- T1685.004partialdetects — A.8.15's log analysis and protection guidance can surface tampering with auditd configuration or daemon status, but the control's detection scope is determined by implementation choices rather than mandating specific kernel-level instrumentation, so what is caught is a slice the implementer chose.
- T1685.005partialprevents — A.8.15's protection mechanisms (append-only storage, remote/centralized logging, preventing privileged users from deleting their own logs) can prevent the loss of evidence when an adversary clears local Windows Event Logs, but the technique itself can still be executed — the adversary can still run `wevtutil cl` or delete .evtx files locally, so the act is not stopped even when its purpose (hiding activity) is partially defeated.
- T1685.007partialdetects — A.8.15's log analysis guidance covers SIEM rules, IDS signatures, and UEBA anomaly detection that can surface the downstream effects of impaired defenses (missing alerts, aborted analysis, anomalous tool behavior), but the technique's core mechanism—prompt injection into an LLM's reasoning—occurs inside a model's inference where traditional logging has no visibility, leaving a nameable gap.
- T1687partialdetects — A.8.15 logs configuration changes, activation/deactivation of security systems, privilege use, and process termination — all observable indicators of T1687 — and its integrity protections (hashing, append-only) mean the attack on logging itself can leave traces; however, the technique is specifically designed to disable or impair the very mechanisms that would record it, so successful exploitation that terminates logging before the event is captured, or cloud/SaaS exploitation outside the logging scope, goes undetected.
- T1688partialdetects — A.8.15 requires logging of system configuration changes and analysis of anomalous behaviour, which can surface the BCD modifications and registry changes that force a safe mode boot, but the control's scope is determined by the organization's topic-specific policy rather than mandating the depth of host instrumentation needed to see every boot-mode alteration.
- T1689partialdetects — A.8.15's log analysis covers anomalous behaviour and configuration changes, so a downgrade that alters system configuration or produces unusual process execution is within scope, but the technique's stealthiest forms (e.g., in-memory version switching without a logged configuration change) leave no mandatory log event, making detection a slice rather than a bounded remainder.
- T1690partialdetects — A.8.15 requires logging of configuration changes, use of utilities, and activation/deactivation of security systems, which can capture the act of disabling command history logging (e.g., HISTFILE changes, PSReadLine option changes, `no logging` on network devices). However, the technique specifically targets logging evasion, so the actual commands run after logging is disabled are not captured, and detection depends on the implementation actually instrumenting these specific configuration changes.
- T1696partialdetects — A.8.15's log analysis can surface anomalous patterns of CAPTCHA-solving activity (e.g., rapid-fire solves, unusual timing) but the evasion itself occurs outside the logged estate, so detection is inferential and not direct.
- T1696.001partialdetects — A.8.15 logs the access attempts and form submissions that follow CAPTCHA solving, and its log-analysis guidance (UEBA, pattern analysis, anomaly detection) can surface bot-like behaviour from those records, but the CAPTCHA-solving act itself runs on the adversary's side and is not directly observable — detection is inferred from access patterns rather than recorded as the technique.
- T1696.002partialdetects — A.8.15 logs access attempts, network addresses, and user/session identifiers on the organization's SaaS estate where the CAPTCHA bypass occurs, and its log-analysis guidance covers behavioural anomaly detection; however, the control sets logging requirements rather than mandating CAPTCHA-specific detection, and a successful bypass may leave no obvious 'failed CAPTCHA' artifact, so detection depends on what is implemented and analysed.
- T1697partialdetects — A.8.15's log analysis guidance covers reviewing access attempts and correlating logs, which can surface anomalous use of an ASP after it is stolen, but the theft itself occurs outside the logging scope (social engineering or compromise of a third-party system), so detection is a slice of the technique's lifecycle.
- T1698partialdetects — A.8.15's log analysis guidance covers DNS logs for outbound connections to malicious servers and correlation of logs for anomaly detection, which can surface the downstream effects of an indirect prompt injection (e.g., the LLM making unexpected network requests), but the injection itself occurs in content processed by the LLM and is not directly observable in standard system or network logs.
- T1699partialdetects — A.8.15's logging of 'transactions executed by users in applications' and its analysis framework (predetermined rules, UEBA, threat intelligence) can surface prompt-injection attempts if LLM interactions fall within logging scope and detection rules are configured, but the clause is general and does not mandate LLM-specific instrumentation or prompt-content analysis, so what is caught is a slice determined by implementation rather than a bounded remainder of a mechanism that mostly works.
- T1700partialdetects — A.8.15 logging captures the exfiltration portion of T1700 — the AI agent's tool calls, file accesses, and outbound network connections to external services are within the clause's logging scope (DNS logs, access attempts, resource use) and would surface anomalous data movement through SIEM/UEBA analysis. However, the prompt injection trigger and the AI's reasoning for acting on it are not directly observable in standard event logs; the technique's AI-specific vector can look like sanctioned agent activity unless AI interaction logging is explicitly in scope, which A.8.15 does not mandate.
Prevented OWASP Web Top 10 (2025) risks (21)
OWASP Web Top 10 (2025) risk categories this ISO control helps prevent or mitigate — our analysis (mostly llm_verified).
Direction: ← other covers this;
→ this covers other (F/M/P = full / mostly /
partial). gov = governs / implements (a mandate, not coverage).
Why these map — rationale
- A01partialfinds — A.8.15 explicitly requires log analysis, SIEM/IDS/UEBA rules, anomaly detection, and correlation to surface suspected incidents including access-control violations (e.g. rejected attempts, privilege use, configuration changes), but this is post-facto discovery only and does not cover design-time or code-level access-control defects such as path traversal, IDOR or CSRF that never reach logs.
- A02partialfinds — A.8.15 explicitly requires log analysis (with SIEM/IDS/UEBA/threat-intel rules, anomaly detection, DNS/firewall review, correlation) that surfaces misconfigurations as security events or indicators of compromise, but this is only one slice of the broad A02 class (e.g. it catches runtime symptoms of weak defaults or exposed surfaces but does not discover static config flaws like unhardened framework defaults or cloud IAM gaps before they are exercised).
- A05partialfinds — A.8.15 explicitly requires log analysis, SIEM/IDS/UEBA rules, anomaly detection, and correlation to identify security events and indicators of compromise, which surfaces many injection attempts (e.g. probing, anomalous queries, outbound C2) after they occur; it does not discover injection flaws in code or untriggered weaknesses.
- A07partialfinds — A.8.15 explicitly requires log analysis, anomaly detection via SIEM/UEBA/IDS rules, correlation, and review of access attempts (including successful/failed logons and privilege use) to surface suspected incidents, which discovers many authentication failures such as brute-force or anomalous credential use; it does not discover design defects like weak reset flows or flawed session management that are not expressed in observable events.
- A08partialfinds — A.8.15's log analysis and monitoring sections surface anomalous activity, indicators of compromise, and suspected incidents that can include integrity failures (e.g. unsigned updates or CI/CD anomalies via correlated logs, UEBA, or threat intel), but this is indirect, post-facto, and limited to detectable events rather than systematically finding the class's core weaknesses like insecure deserialization.
- A10partialfinds — A.8.15 explicitly requires log analysis (including SIEM/IDS/UEBA rules, anomaly detection, trend analysis, and correlation of events such as access attempts, configuration changes, and alarms) to identify unusual activity or indicators of compromise that can represent mishandled exceptions or logic-flaw errors, but this is only one slice of the broad A10 class (e.g., it surfaces runtime leaks or fail-open states via logs but does not inspect code for inconsistent error paths or fail-open auth design).
Control IDs, short titles and the structured attribute table (control type, CIA properties, cybersecurity-concept, operational capability, security domain) are facts from ISO/IEC 27001:2022 Annex A / ISO/IEC 27002:2022. The full implementation guidance prose lives in ISO/IEC 27002:2022 — not reproduced here. Cross-walks to NIST 800-53, NIST CSF 2.0, OWASP ASVS, CWE, MITRE ATT&CK and OWASP Web Top 10 are our own analysis (mostly llm_verified), not an ISO, NIST, MITRE or OWASP product — how ours compare.