Raw vector
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:NSummary
CVE-2026-45315 is a high-severity Cross-site Scripting (CWE-79) vulnerability in Openwebui Open Webui. Its CVSS base score is 8.7 (High).
Operationally, exploitation aligns with the MITRE ATT&CK technique Double File Extension (T1036.007); ranked at the 8th percentile by exploit likelihood (below the median); it is not currently listed in the CISA KEV catalog; a public proof-of-concept is referenced.
This vulnerability is AI-related — categorised as LLM Application Platforms; in the Privacy and Disclosure risk domain.
The strongest mitigations our analysis identified map to SA-11 (Developer Testing and Evaluation) and SI-10 (Information Input Validation) — see the control section below for these in your framework.
OWASP Top 10 for Web (2025)
EU & UK References
- 🇪🇺 ENISA EUVD: EUVD-2026-30656
Vulnerability Data
Open WebUI is a self-hosted artificial intelligence platform designed to operate entirely offline. Prior to 0.9.3, the audio transcription upload endpoint takes the file extension from the user-supplied filename and saves the file under CACHE_DIR/audio/transcriptions/.. The /cache/{path} route serves these…
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files via FileResponse, which sets Content-Type from the on-disk extension and emits no Content-Disposition. A verified user with the default-on chat.stt permission can upload a polyglot WAV+HTML file named pwn.html and trick any other user into opening the resulting URL — the response comes back as text/html and any embedded <script> runs in the Open WebUI origin. This vulnerability is fixed in 0.9.3.
- CWE(s)
AI Security AnalysisAI
- AI Category
- LLM Application Platforms
- Risk Domain
- Privacy and Disclosure
- OWASP Top 10 for LLMs 2025
- None mapped
- Classification Reason
- Matched keywords: artificial intelligence, open webui
Related Threats
MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise Techniques
CVEs Like This One
Affected Assets
Mitigating Controls
Control response
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V5.1.1V1.1.2V1.3.2
Mitigating Controls (NIST 800-53 r5) AI
Developer testing and evaluation can discover missing or incorrect input neutralization through targeted web-application tests.
Input validation directly enforces neutralization of untrusted data before it reaches web output generation.
Output filtering can catch or sanitize unneutralized script content before it is served to users.
Malicious-code protection at entry points blocks dangerous file types from being accepted and executed.
Least functionality restricts the file types and automatic processing capabilities the system will accept.
Mobile-code controls define, authorize, and block unacceptable uploaded code before automatic processing occurs.
Mitigating Controls (NIST CSF 2.0) AI
Derived directly from the weakness types (CWEs) cited in the NVD entry via our AI-authored CWE→CSF cross-walk (authority under review) — links open the control.
Restricting execution of unauthorized software directly blocks dangerous uploaded files from running.
Secure SDLC practices directly target introduction of XSS via coding standards/testing (mostly), yet the single broad outcome leaves many specific neutralization vectors unaddressed (partial).
Hardened configuration baselines can enforce allowed file types and processing rules.
Patching and EOL replacement can remediate known XSS instances in libraries or frameworks (partial) but do nothing to enforce input neutralization in application code (none).
Mitigating Controls (ISO/IEC 27001:2022 Annex A) AI
Derived directly from the weakness types (CWEs) cited in the NVD entry via our AI-authored CWE→ISO cross-walk (authority under review) — links open the control.
Secure-coding testing and automated code-analysis tools are applied to detect improper neutralization of script-related content during web-page generation.
Knowledge exchange on emerging attack techniques and patches reduces the likelihood that cross-site scripting flaws remain unaddressed in deployed applications.
Operational indicators of compromise for web-application attacks can be incorporated into WAF or input-filtering rules, lowering the likelihood that unsanitized data reaches the browser.
Restricting software installation can limit dangerous file types but does not enforce content-based validation.
Web filtering can block risky file extensions but does not address server-side file handling logic.
Requiring language-specific secure-coding standards and automated scanning during the SDLC catches missing output encoding or improper neutralization of untrusted data before the software reaches production.