Raw vector
CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:HSummary
CVE-2026-50365 is a high-severity Improper Authentication (CWE-287) vulnerability in Microsoft Windows 10 21H2. Its CVSS base score is 8.0 (High).
Operationally, exploitation aligns with the MITRE ATT&CK technique Exploitation for Privilege Escalation (T1068); ranked at the 37th percentile by exploit likelihood (below the median); it is not currently listed in the CISA KEV catalog.
The strongest mitigations our analysis identified map to AC-3 (Access Enforcement) and IA-9 (Service Identification and Authentication) — see the control section below for these in your framework.
OWASP Top 10 for Web (2025)
EU & UK References
- 🇪🇺 ENISA EUVD: EUVD-2026-43944
Vulnerability Data
Improper authentication in Windows RPC API allows an unauthorized attacker to elevate privileges over an adjacent network.
- CWE(s)
Related Threats
MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise TechniquesAI
Why these techniques?
Improper authentication in Windows RPC directly enables remote exploitation for privilege escalation (T1068) via remote services (T1210).
CVEs Like This One
Affected Assets
Mitigating Controls
Control response
Mitigating Controls (NIST 800-53 r5) AI
Directly enforces authentication checks on RPC API calls to block unauthorized privilege escalation.
Requires the Windows RPC service to properly identify and authenticate clients before granting access.
Restricts network traffic from adjacent networks to the RPC endpoint, limiting the attack surface.
Mitigating Controls (NIST CSF 2.0) AI
Derived directly from the weakness types (CWEs) cited in the NVD entry via our AI-authored CWE→CSF cross-walk (authority under review) — links open the control.
PR.AA-03 directly enforces authentication mechanisms that eliminate most improper-authentication defects, yet CWE-287 spans additional vectors (missing checks, flawed protocols, session handling) that one control does not fully close.
PR.AA-04 directly enables verification of identity assertions (mostly preventing CWE-287 in that scope) yet leaves many other authentication failure modes unaddressed (only partial prevention overall).
PR.AA-01 supplies and governs credentials/tokens that authentication relies on, removing some weak-credential cases, yet leaves verification logic, missing checks, and protocol flaws untouched.
PR.AA-02 ensures valid enrollment and unique credential binding, which reduces some improper-auth risks at issuance time but leaves runtime claim verification untouched, so each direction only partially addresses the other.
PR.PS-01 can enforce auth-related settings via hardened baselines and default reviews, blocking some config-based instances of CWE-287, yet leaves code-level auth flaws untouched so neither direction reaches mostly.
Patching/maintenance can remediate some known auth vulnerabilities after deployment (partial forward) but does not address the design or implementation of authentication logic itself (none reverse).
Mitigating Controls (ISO/IEC 27001:2022 Annex A) AI
Derived directly from the weakness types (CWEs) cited in the NVD entry via our AI-authored CWE→ISO cross-walk (authority under review) — links open the control.
Requiring authentication methods whose strength matches the sensitivity of the data and mandating multi-factor authentication directly blocks attempts to access resources without proving identity.
Verifying user identity before issuing replacement credentials and forcing changes after compromise reduces the likelihood that authentication bypass can be achieved through stolen or weak credentials.
Mandating segregated approval and oversight for non-human identities reduces the chance that weak or orphaned credentials can be exploited for unauthorized authentication.
Requiring authentication mechanisms and technical parameters for secure connections ensures that network services verify user identity before granting access, preventing exploitation of missing or weak authentication.
Security requirements specified early and verified through testing drive the consistent implementation of authentication mechanisms, decreasing the likelihood that authentication steps are omitted or incorrectly applied.
Defining the required level of trust in entity identity and the authentication mechanisms to achieve it ensures that authentication is explicitly addressed rather than omitted.