A.5.16 Organizational
Identity management
Structured attributes from ISO/IEC 27002:2022 — control type · CIA properties · cybersecurity concept · operational capability · security domain. What do these mean?
Mapped NIST 800-53 r5 controls (21)
Our reading (mostly llm_verified) of how this ISO control and each NIST 800-53 control relate. Not an ISO or NIST product.
Direction: ← other covers this;
→ this covers other (F/M/P = full / mostly /
partial). gov = governs / implements (a mandate, not coverage).
Why these map — rationale
- IA-2mostlycovers — A.5.16's identity management requirement (unique identification + access rights assignment) accounts for the bulk of IA-2's organizational-user identification mandate, but leaves a residual on the explicit authentication and process-association aspects that sit outside A.5.16's defined scope.
- IA-4mostlycovers — A.5.16's requirement for unique identification and appropriate access rights assignment accounts for the bulk of IA-4's identifier lifecycle (receive auth, select, assign, prevent reuse), but leaves a residual on explicit group/role/service/device identifier handling and the parameter-driven authorization step that 27002 does not detail at the same granularity.
- IA-8mostlycovers — A.5.16's identity management requirement (unique identification + access rights assignment) accounts for the bulk of IA-8's non-org user identification/authentication needs, but leaves a residual on the authentication mechanisms and processes specific to external users that IA-8 explicitly requires.
- AC-2partialcovers — A.5.16's identity management requirement (unique identification + assignment of access rights) accounts for the bulk of ac-2's account lifecycle, user/group/role/access authorization, and privilege specification; a real residual remains on ac-2's explicit account-type allow/prohibit lists, account-manager assignment, and formal approval workflows.
Aligned NIST CSF 2.0 outcomes (16)
NIST CSF 2.0 outcomes this ISO control aligns with — our analysis (mostly llm_verified).
Direction: ← other covers this;
→ this covers other (F/M/P = full / mostly /
partial). gov = governs / implements (a mandate, not coverage).
Why these map — rationale
- PR.AA-01mostlycovers — The ISO control's emphasis on unique, accountable identities, timely removal, and oversight of non-human identities directly implements the CSF outcome of managing identities and credentials for authorized users, services, and hardware.
- PR.AA-02domain mandateimplements — A.5.16's core purpose of unique identification and enabling access rights directly operationalizes the identity-proofing and binding outcome in PR.AA-02 within the access/identity domain
- PR.AA-05explicit mandateimplements — A.5.16 directly operationalizes the identity foundation required for PR.AA-05's defined/managed/enforced access permissions (unique identification + assignment of rights is the concrete technical means that gives effect to the governance outcome).
Related OWASP ASVS 5.0 requirements (12)
Application-security verification requirements (OWASP ASVS 5.0) this ISO control aligns with; links open the ASVS chapter. Our analysis (mostly llm_verified) — many ISO controls have no ASVS counterpart.
Direction: ← other covers this;
→ this covers other (F/M/P = full / mostly /
partial). gov = governs / implements (a mandate, not coverage).
Why these map — rationale
- V6.3.2fullcovers — The ISO requirement to disable or remove identities that are no longer required directly implements the ASVS mandate to ensure default or unused accounts are disabled.
Related weaknesses / CWE (2511)
Weakness classes this ISO control helps prevent or mitigate — our analysis (mostly llm_verified).
Direction: ← other covers this;
→ this covers other (F/M/P = full / mostly /
partial). gov = governs / implements (a mandate, not coverage).
Why these map — rationale
- CWE-223partialremoves — A.5.16 item (f) requires keeping records of significant events concerning the use and management of user identities and authentication information, which removes CWE-223 instances where authentication/identity events were omitted from logs (e.g., failed login attempts not recorded), but the clause's logging reach is narrow and does not cover the broader class of security-relevant information omissions such as sender IP not recorded in outgoing email or file-access attempts logged with non-canonicalized names.
- CWE-287partialblocks — Mandating segregated approval and oversight for non-human identities reduces the chance that weak or orphaned credentials can be exploited for unauthorized authentication.
- CWE-778partialblocks — A.5.16 item (f) requires records to be kept of significant events concerning the use and management of user identities and authentication information, which mandates logging for a defined slice of security-critical events and so blocks the weakness for identity-related attacks; the remainder — all other security-critical events (configuration changes, data access, privilege use, etc.) — is outside the clause's logging scope and the weakness stays exploitable there.
- CWE-778partialremoves — A.5.16(f) mandates that records be kept of significant events concerning the use and management of user identities and authentication information, so applying it to a system that previously omitted such records removes the insufficient-logging weakness for that specific subset of events (failed logins, identity lifecycle events). CWE-778 is broader than identity/authentication events — it also covers configuration changes, data access, request logging, and other security-critical telemetry — and A.5.16 does not reach those, so the remainder is nameable and the effect is a minority of the class.
Mitigated MITRE ATT&CK techniques (2692)
Adversary techniques (MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise) this ISO control helps mitigate; links open attack.mitre.org. Our analysis (mostly llm_verified).
Direction: ← other covers this;
→ this covers other (F/M/P = full / mostly /
partial). gov = governs / implements (a mandate, not coverage).
Why these map — rationale
- T1078mostlyprevents — Enforcing one-to-one identity-to-person mapping, timely disabling of unused accounts, and prohibiting duplicate identities directly reduces the pool of valid credentials an adversary can discover or abuse for unauthorized access.
- T1021partialprevents — A.5.16's lifecycle management (timely disabling/removal of unused identities, approval for shared accounts, no duplicate identities) reduces the pool of valid accounts an adversary can compromise to use remote services, but it does not prevent the technique itself: once an adversary holds valid credentials, identity management does not stop them from authenticating to SSH, RDP, VNC or other remote services.
- T1021.004partialprevents — A.5.16 prevents a slice of T1021.004 by removing stale and orphaned identities and requiring approval for shared ones, so accounts that no longer exist or were never authorized cannot be used to SSH; however, the technique runs against any currently valid credential (compromised, insider, or legitimately held), and A.5.16 does not address the SSH service itself, key trust, or authentication strength, so the bulk of the technique remains reachable.
- T1021.008partialprevents — Identity management prevents some instances through timely disabling of unused identities (clause d), segregated approval for non-human entities (clause c), and restriction of shared identities (clause b), but the technique specifically uses valid, authorized accounts to access cloud VMs, and identity management is what creates and maintains those accounts rather than blocking their use — the core prevention against an actively-used valid account comes from access control and authentication strength, not identity lifecycle management.
- T1078.001partialprevents — A.5.16's provisions (d) for timely disabling/removal of identities no longer required and (c) for segregated approval and ongoing oversight of non-human entities directly bear on default accounts, but the control manages identity lifecycle generally rather than specifically targeting default accounts; the actual disabling of built-in defaults and changing of default passwords is more squarely A.8.9 configuration management, leaving A.5.16's contribution as a slice of the prevention.
- T1078.002partialprevents — A.5.16 prevents abuse of stale/orphaned domain accounts through timely disabling and removal, limits shared and unapproved non-human identities, and avoids duplicate identities — but it does not prevent an adversary from stealing valid, currently-authorised domain credentials via credential dumping or password reuse and using them, which is the core of T1078.002.
- T1078.003partialprevents — A.5.16's lifecycle controls — especially (d) timely removal of unused identities, (b) restriction of shared identities, and (c) independent oversight of non-human entities — reduce the local-account attack surface by eliminating stale, orphaned, or unjustified accounts, but the control does not remove the local accounts an organization legitimately needs, and it does nothing to stop an adversary from obtaining and abusing credentials of those active accounts.
- T1078.004partialprevents — A.5.16 prevents specific abuse vectors within T1078.004 — stale/orphaned cloud accounts via timely disabling (d), over-privileged non-human identities via segregated approval (c), and shared cloud accounts via dedicated approval (b) — but does not prevent the general technique of an adversary using a valid cloud account they have obtained credentials for, which is governed by authentication (A.8.5) and awareness (A.6.3) controls rather than identity lifecycle management.
- T1098.005partialprevents — A.5.16(c) requires non-human entity identities (devices) to be subject to segregated approval and independent ongoing oversight, and (f) requires records of significant identity events — both directly address unauthorized device registration. However, A.5.16 is a process/governance control that mandates the policy rather than technically enforcing it, and T1098.005 specifically exploits MFA self-enrollment flows that may bypass the identity management process (e.g., enrolling a first device with only stolen credentials), so the prevention depends on faithful implementation integrating with the MFA/device management systems.
- T1110.003partialprevents — A.5.16 reduces the attack surface for password spraying by removing dormant/orphaned identities (clause d) and limiting shared identities (clause b), which are common spray targets, but it does not address authentication strength, lockout policies, or the active user accounts that remain valid targets — the technique still runs and can still succeed against those accounts.
- T1133partialprevents — A.5.16 prevents abuse of T1133 along the credentialed path by ensuring identities are uniquely assigned, properly approved, and disabled/removed when no longer required, which closes off stale-account and orphaned-credential vectors; however, the technique also runs through exposed unauthenticated services (Docker/Kubernetes APIs, RDP without auth) and adversary-installed access mechanisms (Tor hidden services via ShadowLink), none of which identity management reaches.
- T1136partialprevents — A.5.16's approval requirements (especially (c) for non-human entities with independent oversight) and mandatory logging of identity events (f) constrain unauthorized account creation, but the control is a process framework that does not technically block an adversary with sufficient access from creating accounts through paths that bypass approval or by compromising the approval authority itself.
- T1586partialprevents — A.5.16's identity lifecycle rules (unique binding, timely disable/remove, segregated oversight, change handling, and third-party trust vetting) stop many compromise vectors such as stale/shared accounts, duplicate personas, and unvetted external credentials, but leave open purchase of valid credentials, insider sales, and post-compromise persona development.
- T1671partialprevents — A.5.16(c) requires approval and ongoing oversight for non-human entities, which can constrain unauthorized OAuth application/service principal creation, but the control does not address OAuth consent grants specifically, cannot prevent co-option of legitimate existing integrations, and T1671 explicitly notes integrations can persist after the originating user identity is disabled — a gap A.5.16(d) does not close.
Prevented OWASP Web Top 10 (2025) risks (6)
OWASP Web Top 10 (2025) risk categories this ISO control helps prevent or mitigate — our analysis (mostly llm_verified).
Direction: ← other covers this;
→ this covers other (F/M/P = full / mostly /
partial). gov = governs / implements (a mandate, not coverage).
Why these map — rationale
- A07mostlyblocks — A.5.16's core processes for unique single-entity identities, timely disable/remove, segregated non-human oversight, and change handling directly block the dominant authentication-failure root causes (weak identity binding, orphaned accounts, duplicate IDs, hijackable shared creds) that enable the listed attacks; the remainder is implementation bugs in the downstream auth mechanisms themselves (e.g. flawed reset or session logic) that live in A.5.17.
Control IDs, short titles and the structured attribute table (control type, CIA properties, cybersecurity-concept, operational capability, security domain) are facts from ISO/IEC 27001:2022 Annex A / ISO/IEC 27002:2022. The full implementation guidance prose lives in ISO/IEC 27002:2022 — not reproduced here. Cross-walks to NIST 800-53, NIST CSF 2.0, OWASP ASVS, CWE, MITRE ATT&CK and OWASP Web Top 10 are our own analysis (mostly llm_verified), not an ISO, NIST, MITRE or OWASP product — how ours compare.