Cyber Resilience

CWE · MITRE source

CWE-441Unintended Proxy or Intermediary ('Confused Deputy')

Abstraction: Class · CVEs in our corpus: 94

The product receives a request, message, or directive from an upstream component, but the product does not sufficiently preserve the original source of the request before forwarding the request to an external actor that is outside of the product's control sphere. This causes the product to appear to be the source of the request, leading it to act as a proxy or other intermediary between the upstream component and the external actor.

If an attacker cannot directly contact a target, but the product has access to the target, then the attacker can send a request to the product and have it be forwarded to the target. The request would appear to be coming from the product's system, not the attacker's system. As a result, the attacker can bypass access controls (such as firewalls) or hide the source of malicious requests, since the requests would not be coming directly from the attacker. Since proxy functionality and message-forwarding often serve a legitimate purpose, this issue only becomes a vulnerability when:

Last updated: 04 July 2026 00:28 UTC

Cumulative inbound coverage

How completely the frameworks we cross-walk collectively cover this — the verdict is the strongest single mapping (overlapping partials are not summed); breadth shows the corroboration behind it.

Collective: mostly · 8 mapping(s) from 4 framework(s): ASVS 5.0 3 (mostly) · CAPEC 2 (partial) · ATT&CK 2 (partial) · OWASP-Web 1 (partial)

See the full cumulative-coverage rollup →

OWASP Top 10 for Web (2025)

This weakness contributes to A01:2025 Broken Access Control.

NIST 800-53 r5 controls that address this weakness (1)AI

Control Title Family Why it addresses this CWE
SC-32System PartitioningSCMitigates confused deputy risks by ensuring distinct privilege domains so one partition cannot unintentionally act on behalf of another.

MITRE ATT&CK techniques this weakness enables

Our own two-way CWE↔ATT&CK cross-walk — a direct mapping with no public source (the CWE→CAPEC→ATT&CK chain leaves most top weaknesses, incl. XSS and SQLi, mapped to nothing). Drafted by Grok and spot-checked by Claude Opus 4.8.

Direction: other covers this; this covers other (F/M/P = full / mostly / partial).

Top CVEs of this weakness type, ranked by Risk Priority

CVE Risk CVSS EPSS Published
CVE-2015-29477.09.10.01502017-04-13
CVE-2021-200427.09.80.02662021-12-08
CVE-2025-253067.09.30.00172025-03-10
CVE-2025-641237.09.80.00272026-01-02
CVE-2025-62718 UPD7.09.90.01192026-04-09
CVE-2026-399067.010.00.00692026-04-14
CVE-2026-237517.09.80.00882026-04-23
CVE-2026-73817.09.10.00442026-04-29
CVE-2019-39246.07.50.15702019-02-20
CVE-2020-54126.06.50.10212020-08-07
CVE-2025-47269 UPD6.08.30.34272025-05-09
CVE-2020-262625.57.20.01282021-01-13
CVE-2021-327835.58.50.01152021-07-23
CVE-2022-393615.58.80.00972022-10-26
CVE-2023-401115.57.80.00092024-02-15
CVE-2024-313195.57.80.00172024-07-09
CVE-2024-301285.58.60.00372024-09-25
CVE-2025-22416 UPD5.57.80.00082025-09-02
CVE-2025-22418 UPD5.57.80.00082025-09-02
CVE-2025-26452 UPD5.57.80.00082025-09-04
CVE-2025-22441 UPD5.57.30.00102025-09-04
CVE-2025-26454 UPD5.57.80.00092025-09-04
CVE-2025-32321 UPD5.57.80.00082025-09-04
CVE-2025-32324 UPD5.57.80.00092025-09-04
CVE-2025-32326 UPD5.57.80.00082025-09-04