Security Resilience

CWE · MITRE source

CWE-296Improper Following of a Certificate's Chain of Trust

Abstraction: Base · CVEs in our corpus: 19

The product does not follow, or incorrectly follows, the chain of trust for a certificate back to a trusted root certificate.

There are several ways in which the chain of trust might be broken, including but not limited to:

Last updated: 20 November 2026 08:24 UTC

Cumulative inbound coverage

How completely the frameworks we cross-walk collectively cover this — the verdict is the strongest single mapping (overlapping partials are not summed); breadth shows the corroboration behind it.

Collective: full · 23 mapping(s) from 8 framework(s): ATT&CK 9 (partial) · ISO_IEC_27002_2022 5 (mostly) · 4 (mostly) · STIG oracle linux 8 1 (full) · STIG rhel 8 1 (full) · STIG oracle linux 9 1 (mostly) · STIG rhel 9 1 (mostly) · 800-53 1 (mostly)

See the full cumulative-coverage rollup →

OWASP Top 10 for Web (2025)

This weakness contributes to A04:2025 Cryptographic Failures.

Control responseHuman-reviewed

Answering this weakness across the control lifecycle, from our framework cross-walks.

Prevent
Stop it (NIST 800-53 / CSF Protect)
  • SC-17 Public Key Infrastructure Certificates
  • PR.AA-03
  • PR.AA-04
  • PR.DS-02
Detect
Catch it (CSF Detect / Respond)

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Harden
Shrink the surface (DISA STIG)
  • 12 hardening rules · 5 OS baselines
Validate
Prove the fix (OWASP ASVS)

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Our mappings

NIST 800-53 r5 controls PROPOSED for this weakness (1)

These are model PROPOSALS, not graded mappings. They come from controls_to_cwe_proposals, which carries no grade field at all; across the CWE pages 1,540 of 1,722 such associations (89%) have never been graded by anything. The heading said “address” until 2026-09-29, which asserted a relationship the data does not carry. Graded cross-walks are on the framework map, not here.

Control Title Family Why it addresses this CWE
SC-17Public Key Infrastructure CertificatesSCgraded mostly Requires only approved trust anchors in stores, ensuring proper chain-of-trust validation rather than arbitrary or incomplete paths.
Our mappings

MITRE ATT&CK techniques this weakness enables

Our own two-way CWE↔ATT&CK cross-walk — a direct mapping with no public source (the CWE→CAPEC→ATT&CK chain leaves most top weaknesses, incl. XSS and SQLi, mapped to nothing).

Direction: ← other covers this; → this covers other (F/M/P = full / mostly / partial). gov = governs / implements (a mandate, not coverage).

Top CVEs of this weakness type, ranked by Risk Priority

CVE Risk CVSS EPSS Published
CVE-2025-48057 7.39.80.00462025-05-27
CVE-2019-3890 6.38.10.00992019-08-01
CVE-2021-23155 6.39.00.00482021-11-18
CVE-2026-27134 6.18.10.00382026-02-21
CVE-2025-1146 6.08.10.00262025-02-12
CVE-2026-24066 6.08.40.00122026-06-10
CVE-2019-3762 5.97.50.00652020-03-18
CVE-2021-23162 5.97.70.00422021-11-18
CVE-2021-1566 5.87.40.00672021-06-16
CVE-2021-44532 5.45.30.10362022-02-24
CVE-2026-44852 5.47.20.00442026-05-12
CVE-2026-33779 4.86.50.00122026-04-09
CVE-2026-271334.45.90.00202026-02-20
CVE-2025-22459 4.04.80.00392025-04-08
CVE-2026-42789 4.04.80.00382026-05-27
CVE-2025-10539 3.84.80.00182026-04-28
CVE-2024-43196 3.64.30.00242025-02-20
CVE-2026-73542 3.13.70.00182026-08-20