A.5.26 Organizational
Response to information security incidents
Structured attributes from ISO/IEC 27002:2022 — control type · CIA properties · cybersecurity concept · operational capability · security domain. What do these mean?
Mapped NIST 800-53 r5 controls (23)
Our reading (mostly llm_verified) of how this ISO control and each NIST 800-53 control relate. Not an ISO or NIST product.
Direction: ← other covers this;
→ this covers other (F/M/P = full / mostly /
partial). gov = governs / implements (a mandate, not coverage).
Why these map — rationale
- IR-4mostlycovers — A.5.26's mandate for efficient/effective incident response directly accounts for the core handling lifecycle (prep/detect/analyze/contain/eradicate/recover) and coordination elements of IR-4, but leaves a residual on the explicit incorporation of lessons learned into procedures/training/tests that sits outside its primary response focus.
- IR-6mostlycovers — A.5.26's incident response process (including detection, reporting, and handling) accounts for the bulk of IR-6's internal reporting requirements, but leaves a residual on the exact external reporting destinations and parameters that IR-6 explicitly mandates.
- IR-8mostlycovers — A.5.26's mandate to ensure efficient/effective incident response (including planning elements) accounts for the bulk of IR-8's plan-development requirements, but leaves a residual on explicit high-level organizational-fit and mission-specific tailoring details not required by the ISO control.
- IR-5partialcovers — A.5.26's broad incident response process (including detection, reporting, assessment and response activities) addresses a slice of incident monitoring and documentation but leaves the bulk of ir-5's dedicated, ongoing tracking requirements outside its scope
- IR-9partialcovers — A.5.26's general incident response process covers the assignment of responsibility, identification, alerting, and isolation steps for information spillage as a specific incident type, but leaves substantial residual (e.g., spillage-specific communication channels, eradication, and recovery procedures unique to IR-9) uncovered.
Aligned NIST CSF 2.0 outcomes (29)
NIST CSF 2.0 outcomes this ISO control aligns with — our analysis (mostly llm_verified).
Direction: ← other covers this;
→ this covers other (F/M/P = full / mostly /
partial). gov = governs / implements (a mandate, not coverage).
Why these map — rationale
- RS.AN-03domain mandateimplements — A.5.26's defined purpose is to ensure an efficient and effective incident response process; performing analysis to establish what happened and the root cause (RS.AN-03) is a core operational activity that directly gives effect to that purpose within the incident-response domain.
- RS.CO-02domain mandateimplements — A.5.26's incident response process directly operationalizes notification of internal and external stakeholders as a core part of effective response
- RS.CO-03domain mandateimplements — A.5.26's incident response process directly operationalizes the sharing of incident information with stakeholders that RS.CO-03 requires; sharing is a core, named element of effective response within the incident-response domain, though the control does not cite the exact CSF outcome.
- RS.MA-01explicit mandateimplements — A.5.26's defined purpose is to ensure an efficient/effective incident response; executing the incident response plan (RS.MA-01) is exactly the operational effect that gives direct life to this governance outcome.
- RS.MA-05domain mandateimplements — A.5.26's operational response activities (including recovery initiation) give effect to the RS.MA-05 criteria within the shared incident-response domain, but the ISO control does not name or cite the specific CSF criteria.
- RS.MI-01domain mandateimplements — A.5.26's defined purpose is to ensure an efficient/effective incident response process; containment (RS.MI-01) is a core operational step that the response process directly gives effect to within the incident-management domain
Related OWASP ASVS 5.0 requirements (6)
Application-security verification requirements (OWASP ASVS 5.0) this ISO control aligns with; links open the ASVS chapter. Our analysis (mostly llm_verified) — many ISO controls have no ASVS counterpart.
Direction: ← other covers this;
→ this covers other (F/M/P = full / mostly /
partial). gov = governs / implements (a mandate, not coverage).
Related weaknesses / CWE (2401)
Weakness classes this ISO control helps prevent or mitigate — our analysis (mostly llm_verified).
Direction: ← other covers this;
→ this covers other (F/M/P = full / mostly /
partial). gov = governs / implements (a mandate, not coverage).
Why these map — rationale
- CWE-223partialfinds — A.5.26 item (j) explicitly mandates identifying weaknesses that caused, contributed to, or failed to prevent an incident, and item (i) requires post-incident root-cause analysis — both of which can surface CWE-223 when missing security-relevant information hampers an investigation; however, this finding path activates only after an incident has occurred and only when the omission is identified as a contributing weakness, leaving the bulk of latent CWE-223 instances (those that never manifest in a detected incident, or where the missing data is worked around without being flagged as a product flaw) outside the control's reach.
- CWE-248partialfinds — A.5.26 discovers weaknesses only through post-incident root-cause analysis, so it can identify an uncaught exception that actually caused or contributed to an incident, but it has no route to latent instances that have not surfaced as incidents; that is a minority.
- CWE-284partialfinds — Formal incident containment and post-incident root-cause analysis reduce the window during which improper access control flaws can be exploited and ensure discovered authorization weaknesses are corrected.
- CWE-508partialfinds — Incident-response procedures help contain and eradicate non-replicating malicious code.
- CWE-510partialfinds — Incident response can discover a trapdoor when forensic and post-incident root-cause analysis trace an incident back to the hidden code, but it only reaches the minority of latent trapdoors that are triggered and investigated, not the class as deployed.
- CWE-553partialfinds — Incident response discovers a command shell in an accessible directory only when it is traced as the cause or contributor of an incident through forensic and post-incident analysis, so it finds a minority of latent instances and not shells that have not surfaced in an incident.
- CWE-617partialfinds — A.5.26 item (j) explicitly mandates identifying vulnerabilities and weaknesses that caused or contributed to an incident, so post-incident analysis can locate the specific reachable assertion in code after a triggered DoS — but this is a reactive path that only finds instances which have already been triggered, reported, and investigated to the code level, leaving the bulk of latent CWE-617 instances (never triggered, or triggered without deep root-cause analysis) undiscovered.
Mitigated MITRE ATT&CK techniques (3153)
Adversary techniques (MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise) this ISO control helps mitigate; links open attack.mitre.org. Our analysis (mostly llm_verified).
Direction: ← other covers this;
→ this covers other (F/M/P = full / mostly /
partial). gov = governs / implements (a mandate, not coverage).
Why these map — rationale
- T1684.001fullresponds — OWNER RULING 2026-09-18, contrast pair, REVISED BY HIM FROM `mostly`. Data proposed `mostly` with the remainder 'it cannot undo what already happened'; the owner rejected that reasoning because it would require a RESPONSE control to PREVENT in order to reach `full`, which is the prevents question smuggled into the responds remainder. He then proposed reporting to customers and regulators as the true remainder, and WITHDREW that too: A.5.26 can plausibly be read to address notification (it requires communicating the incident to relevant internal and external interested parties, and coordinating with authorities and clients). With no remainder that is a missing piece of RESPONSE, the grade is `full`.
- T1001.002mostlyresponds — Steganographic C2 runs on compromised estate systems, so A.5.26's procedure engages meaningfully: containment of affected systems (a), eradication of the implant, logging (d), communication (e), closure (g), root-cause analysis (i), and weakness identification (j) all apply. The ceiling is `mostly` by construction because A.5.26 excludes assessment (A.5.25) and evidence collection/forensics (A.5.28), both of which are central to dissecting steganographic payloads.
- T1003mostlyresponds — T1003 is a post-compromise technique that has executed on the estate, so A.5.26's response activities engage: containing affected systems, forensic analysis of dumped credentials, post-incident root-cause analysis, identifying the weaknesses that enabled the dump, and closing/recording the incident. The ceiling is `mostly` because A.5.26 excludes assessment (A.5.25) and evidence collection (A.5.28), so two named parts of response are not performed by this clause.
- T1003.001mostlyresponds — LSASS credential dumping produces a real event on the estate (memory access, dump artifacts, suspicious process activity) that A.5.26's procedure can engage: containment of the affected host, eradication of the attacker's foothold, invalidation of harvested credentials, forensic analysis, root-cause work, and vulnerability identification all apply. The grade is `mostly` and not `full` because A.5.26 excludes assessment/determination of incident (A.5.25) and evidence collection (A.5.28), which is the declared ceiling for this clause on `responds`.
- T1003.002mostlyresponds — T1003.002 executes on the estate (SYSTEM-level access to a Windows host, real artifacts in memory and registry), so A.5.26's procedure has genuine objects to act on — containment of the affected host, logging, communication, coordination, closure, root-cause analysis, and identifying the weaknesses that enabled SYSTEM access. The same ceiling as the T1486 and T1566 anchors applies: A.5.26 excludes assessment (A.5.25) and evidence collection (A.5.28), so it cannot answer `responds` completely.
- T1003.003mostlyresponds — T1003.003 occurs on the estate (domain controllers) and produces a real incident A.5.26's procedure can be entered for — containment of the affected DC, escalation, logging, communication, root-cause analysis, and weakness identification all engage. The grade is capped at `mostly` by the clause's own scope: A.5.26 excludes assessment (A.5.25) and evidence collection/forensics (A.5.28), so two parts of response are performed elsewhere.
- T1003.004mostlyresponds — T1003.004 executes on the estate (SYSTEM-level credential extraction leaves observable artifacts and a real incident), so A.5.26's procedure engages across containment of the affected host, credential rotation communication, escalation, logging, coordination, closure, forensic analysis, post-incident root cause, and vulnerability management; the grade is capped at `mostly` by the owner's ceiling rule because A.5.26 excludes assessment (A.5.25) and evidence collection (A.5.28), which are real parts of responding to a credential-dumping incident.
- T1003.005mostlyresponds — Cached credential extraction runs on the estate (registry/SSSD access, tool execution) and produces an observable incident A.5.26's procedure engages with — containment of the affected system, logging, communication, forensic analysis, post-incident root-cause work, and vulnerability identification all apply — but the clause excludes assessment (A.5.25) and evidence collection (A.5.28), so it cannot reach `full`.
- T1003.006mostlyresponds — DCSync executes on the estate (replication requests against a DC, credential hashes exfiltrated), so A.5.26's procedure engages across containment, eradication, escalation, logging, communication, closure, forensics, root-cause analysis and weakness identification; the grade is `mostly` and not `full` because A.5.26 excludes assessment (A.5.25) and evidence collection (A.5.28) by construction, which is the declared ceiling on this cell.
- T1003.007mostlyresponds — The technique has executed on the estate (credential dumping from /proc leaves observable artifacts and an affected system), so containment, eradication, communication, post-incident root-cause analysis and vulnerability identification all engage; the same ceiling as T1486 applies because A.5.26 excludes assessment (A.5.25) and evidence collection (A.5.28) by its own scope.
- T1003.008mostlyresponds — T1003.008 runs on the estate — the adversary reads /etc/passwd and /etc/shadow on a compromised Linux system — so there is a real affected system to contain, real evidence to collect, real forensics to perform, and real root-cause work to do, engaging most of A.5.26's ten activities; the same ceiling as T1486 applies because A.5.26 excludes assessment (A.5.25) and the detailed evidence-collection procedures (A.5.28).
- T1005mostlyresponds — The procedure manages the containment and eradication of the local collection activity once underway, but reaches mostly rather than full because the clause explicitly excludes the assessment and evidence-collection phases of response.
- T1006mostlyresponds — T1006 executes on the compromised host (direct volume reads/writes against the organization's own drives), so there is a real on-estate event A.5.26's procedure can be entered for: containment of the affected system, eradication of the access path, forensic analysis of volume-level artifacts, post-incident root cause and weakness identification all engage; the ceiling is `mostly` because A.5.26 excludes assessment (A.5.25) and evidence collection (A.5.28) by construction.
- T1011mostlyresponds — T1011 executes on the estate — data leaves from the organization's own systems over an alternative medium — so there are affected systems to contain, evidence to collect, vulnerabilities to identify, and a real incident to close, engaging most of A.5.26's ten activities; the ceiling is `mostly` because A.5.26 excludes assessment (A.5.25) and evidence collection (A.5.28), and `full` is unreachable on this cell by construction.
- T1014mostlyresponds — A rootkit executes on the estate, so there is a real incident to respond to: affected systems to contain (a), escalation (c), logging (d), communication (e), coordination (f), closure (g), post-incident root-cause analysis (i), and vulnerability management (j) all engage; the grade is `mostly` and not `full` for the same reason as the T1486 anchor — A.5.26 excludes assessment (A.5.25) and evidence collection/forensics (A.5.28), and rootkit forensics is precisely the kind of work that lives in 5.28.
- T1020mostlyresponds — Automated exfiltration is an active on-estate event with affected systems to contain, evidence to log, root cause to identify, and vulnerabilities to manage — engaging most of A.5.26's response activities; the same ceiling as T1486 applies because A.5.26 excludes assessment (A.5.25) and evidence collection (A.5.28).
- T1020.001mostlyresponds — Traffic duplication modifies configuration on the estate (network devices or cloud infrastructure), so there is a real event A.5.26's procedure can be entered for: containment isolates the affected device and removes the malicious mirroring config, eradication removes the adversary's access that enabled the change, and the administrative follow-up tasks (logging, communicating, coordinating, closing, root cause, vulnerability management) all engage; the ceiling is `mostly` because A.5.26 excludes assessment (A.5.25) and evidence collection (A.5.28), and data already mirrored before containment cannot be recovered by responding.
- T1021mostlyresponds — T1021 is an on-estate technique — the adversary is logging into systems via SSH/RDP/VNC — so all ten A.5.26 activities engage: containing affected systems, logging, forensics, post-incident root cause, identifying the weaknesses that allowed the remote access, and closing the incident. The grade is `mostly` and not `full` for the same reason as the T1486/T1566/T1078 anchors: A.5.26 excludes assessment (A.5.25) and evidence collection (A.5.28), which is the declared ceiling on this cell.
- T1021.001mostlyresponds — A.5.26's procedure engages directly against an active RDP session: containment (disconnecting sessions, isolating affected systems, disabling compromised accounts), escalation, logging, communication, closure, post-incident root-cause analysis, and vulnerability identification all apply. The ceiling is `mostly` because A.5.26 excludes assessment (A.5.25) and evidence collection (A.5.28), the same structural reason the owner ruled on the T1078 sibling anchor.
- T1021.002mostlyresponds — T1021.002 is an active lateral-movement technique on the estate that A.5.26's procedure engages: containing affected systems (isolate hosts, block SMB), logging, escalation, communication, coordination, closure, forensics, root-cause analysis and vulnerability identification all apply. The ceiling is `mostly` because A.5.26 excludes assessment (A.5.25) and evidence collection (A.5.28), so two parts of response are performed by other clauses.
- T1021.003mostlyresponds — DCOM lateral movement executes on the estate with real affected systems to contain, real artifacts (compromised accounts, malicious processes) to eradicate, and real evidence to log and analyze, so A.5.26's procedure engages most response activities (containment, logging, communication, closure, root cause, vulnerability identification); the ceiling is `mostly` because A.5.26 excludes assessment (A.5.25) and evidence collection (A.5.28) by construction.
- T1021.004mostlyresponds — SSH lateral movement is a post-compromise technique that runs on the estate, so A.5.26's procedure engages: containment (isolate affected hosts, disable SSH, revoke keys), eradication (remove adversary access), logging, forensics, root-cause analysis, and weakness identification all apply. The same ceiling as T1486 holds — A.5.26 excludes assessment (A.5.25) and evidence collection (A.5.28), so it cannot answer `responds` completely.
- T1021.005mostlyresponds — A.5.26's response procedure engages against an active VNC session: containment (disconnect the session, isolate the affected system), eradication (revoke the credentials, remove VNC access), logging, escalation, communication, closure, post-incident root-cause analysis, and weakness identification all apply. The ceiling is `mostly` by construction — A.5.26 excludes evidence collection (b) and forensic analysis (h), which are A.5.28's scope — the same ceiling the owner ruled for A.5.26 vs T1078, and T1021.005 is the same shape of technique (active remote session using valid accounts).
- T1021.006mostlyresponds — WinRM lateral movement using valid accounts produces observable events on the estate (authentication logs, WinRM service activity, command execution), so all ten A.5.26 activities engage — containment of affected systems, evidence collection, escalation, logging, communication, coordination, closure, forensics, root-cause analysis, and weakness identification — and the grade reaches the ISO `responds` ceiling of `mostly` because A.5.26 excludes assessment (A.5.25) and evidence collection (A.5.28), mirroring the T1078 anchor.
- T1021.007mostlyresponds — T1021.007 is a post-compromise technique with real estate to respond to: cloud sessions can be revoked, federated credentials disabled, malicious cloud configurations removed, and cloud provider logs collected. A.5.26's ten activities engage broadly (containment, logging, communication, coordination with cloud providers, forensics, root cause, vulnerability identification). The ceiling is the same as on T1078: A.5.26 excludes assessment (A.5.25) and evidence collection (A.5.28), so `full` is unreachable by construction and `mostly` is the top rung.
- T1021.008mostlyresponds — T1021.008 is a technique that has executed — the adversary is logged into the cloud VM — so A.5.26's containment (revoking credentials, isolating the VM), eradication, logging, communication, closure and root-cause activities all engage against it; the ceiling is `mostly` because A.5.26 excludes assessment (A.5.25) and evidence collection (A.5.28), per the owner's ruling on this clause.
- T1025mostlyresponds — T1025 executes on the estate — the adversary is reading removable media on a compromised system — so there is a real incident A.5.26's procedure can be entered for: the compromised host can be contained (a), evidence of what was accessed collected (b, h), escalation triggered if sensitive data was exposed (c), activities logged (d), breach notification assessed (e, f), the incident closed and recorded (g), root cause analysed (i), and the weakness that allowed the compromise identified (j). The ceiling is `mostly` by construction: A.5.26 excludes assessment (A.5.25) and evidence collection (A.5.28), so no ISO clause reaches `full` on `responds`.
- T1027.006mostlyresponds — HTML smuggling delivers a payload that executes on the victim machine, producing an incident A.5.26's procedure engages for; containment, logging, communication, post-incident analysis and weakness identification all apply once the smuggled payload runs, with the ceiling at `mostly` because A.5.26 excludes assessment (A.5.25) and evidence collection (A.5.28).
- T1027.017mostlyresponds — SVG smuggling executes on the estate when a user opens the file — the script runs, payloads may download, and there is a real affected endpoint to contain, evidence to collect, and artifacts to eradicate, so most of A.5.26's activities engage; the ceiling is `mostly` by construction because A.5.26 excludes assessment (A.5.25) and evidence collection proper (A.5.28).
- T1036.001mostlyresponds — Invalid code signatures are files placed on the estate, so the technique has executed and there are real systems to contain, files to eradicate, and evidence to log — A.5.26's response activities (a, d, e, g, h, i, j) all engage; the ceiling is `mostly` because A.5.26 excludes assessment (A.5.25) and evidence collection (A.5.28), the same structural remainder that caps T1486 and T1566.
- T1036.004mostlyresponds — The technique executes on the estate (a masqueraded task/service is created on a system), producing a real incident A.5.26's procedure can engage on: containment of the affected system, logging, escalation, communication, coordination, closure, root-cause analysis, and weakness identification all apply. The named remainder is the same one that caps every A.5.26 cell — evidence collection (b) and forensic analysis (h) are excluded by the clause and live in A.5.28 — so the ceiling is `mostly`.
- T1037mostlyresponds — T1037 has executed and left real artifacts (malicious init/logon scripts) on the estate, so A.5.26's procedure engages on containment, eradication, forensic analysis, root-cause analysis and weakness identification; the ceiling is `mostly` by construction because A.5.26 excludes assessment (A.5.25) and evidence collection (A.5.28).
- T1037.001mostlyresponds — T1037.001 leaves an observable artifact on the estate (the UserInitMprLogonScript registry key and the script it points to), so A.5.26's procedure engages: containment of the affected system, eradication of the script and registry entry, forensic analysis, post-incident root cause, vulnerability identification, logging, escalation, communication and closure. The grade is `mostly` and not `full` because A.5.26 excludes assessment (A.5.25) and evidence collection (A.5.28), so it cannot answer `responds` completely for any technique.
- T1037.002mostlyresponds — The login hook executes on the estate (a macOS plist is modified), so there is a real affected system to contain, a malicious artifact to eradicate, and evidence to analyze — engaging most of A.5.26's response activities. The grade is `mostly` and not `full` for the same reason as the T1486 anchor: A.5.26 excludes assessment/determination of an incident (A.5.25) and evidence collection (A.5.28).
- T1037.003mostlyresponds — T1037.003 is post-compromise persistence already executing on the estate, so A.5.26's procedure engages: containment (remove the script from GPO/AD, isolate affected systems), eradication of the persistence artifact, escalation, logging, communication, coordination, closure, forensic analysis, root-cause analysis, and weakness identification all apply. The ceiling is `mostly` because A.5.26 excludes assessment (A.5.25) and evidence collection (A.5.28) by construction, the same ceiling the owner ruled for T1486, T1078 and T1566.
- T1037.004mostlyresponds — RC script modification is a post-compromise event on the estate: the modified file is an artifact, the affected system can be contained, evidence collected, forensics and root-cause analysis performed, and the weakness that allowed unauthorized modification identified — engaging activities (a), (b), (d), (e), (g), (h), (i), (j). The ceiling is `mostly` by construction: A.5.26 excludes assessment (A.5.25) and evidence collection (A.5.28), and crisis/BCP escalation (c) is unlikely to engage for a single persistence mechanism.
- T1037.005mostlyresponds — The startup item has already executed and persistence is established, so there is a real event A.5.26's procedure can be entered for: containment of the affected macOS system, eradication of the startup item, forensic analysis, post-incident root-cause work, and closure all engage. The ceiling is `mostly` by construction because A.5.26 excludes assessment (A.5.25) and evidence collection (A.5.28), which are named parts of response.
- T1039mostlyresponds — Same ruling as the T1486 and T1078 anchors: A.5.26 engages containment of the compromised host, eradication of the foothold, communication, closure, root-cause analysis and vulnerability identification against an on-estate collection technique, but excludes assessment (A.5.25) and evidence collection (A.5.28), so it cannot answer `responds` completely.
- T1041mostlyresponds — T1041 produces a real event on the estate — the compromised host is communicating over a C2 channel the organization can observe and contain — so containment (cutting the C2 channel), evidence handling, logging, communication, closure, root-cause analysis and vulnerability management all engage; the ceiling is `mostly` because A.5.26 excludes assessment (A.5.25) and evidence collection (A.5.28), the same construction that caps A.5.26 against T1486 and T1566.
- T1047mostlyresponds — T1047 runs on the estate (WMI abuse produces observable events, affected systems, evidence in logs, and forensic artifacts), so A.5.26's procedure engages: containment of affected systems, eradication of WMI-based persistence, logging, communication, coordination, closure, forensic analysis, root-cause analysis, and vulnerability identification all have real objects. The grade is `mostly` and not `full` for the same reason as the T1486 anchor: A.5.26 excludes assessment of whether an event is an incident (A.5.25) and evidence collection (A.5.28), so two named parts of response sit outside the clause by construction.
- T1048mostlyresponds — A.5.26's procedure engages containment of the exfiltrating system, blocking the alternate channel, escalation, logging, communication (including data-breach notification), coordination, closure, post-incident root-cause analysis, and vulnerability management against T1048, but the clause excludes assessment (A.5.25) and evidence collection (A.5.28), which is the same structural ceiling that bounds its grade against T1486.
- T1048.001mostlyresponds — A.5.26's procedure engages for exfiltration incidents — containment of affected systems, blocking the exfiltration channel, communication, coordination with authorities, post-incident analysis and vulnerability identification are all real response activities against T1048.001 — but the clause excludes assessment (A.5.25) and evidence collection (A.5.28), which is the same ceiling that places A.5.26 at `mostly` against T1486 and T1566.
- T1048.002mostlyresponds — A.5.26's procedure engages broadly once exfiltration is known: containment of affected systems to stop further loss, logging, communication, coordination, closure, forensic analysis, post-incident root-cause analysis, and identifying the weaknesses that enabled the channel. The named remainder is the same as on T1486 — A.5.26 excludes assessment (A.5.25) and evidence collection (A.5.28) — so the ceiling is `mostly` rather than `full`.
- T1048.003mostlyresponds — A.5.26's response activities apply to exfiltration: ongoing data loss can be contained, the foothold/channel eradicated, the incident logged, communicated, coordinated with authorities and potentially the receiving party, closed, and analysed for root cause and contributing weaknesses. The bounded remainder is the same as on T1486: A.5.26 excludes assessment (A.5.25) and evidence collection (A.5.28), so it cannot answer `responds` completely.
- T1052mostlyresponds — The procedure manages the containment and eradication of the exfiltration event on the estate, but is capped at mostly because the clause explicitly excludes assessment and evidence collection.
- T1052.001mostlyresponds — The USB exfiltration leaves a real event on the estate — a connected device, file-copy artifacts, system logs — so A.5.26's procedure engages: the affected system can be isolated (a), evidence and forensics apply (b, h), logging, communication, coordination, closure, root-cause and vulnerability management all engage (d, e, f, g, i, j). The grade is `mostly` for the same structural reason as the T1486 anchor: A.5.26 excludes assessment of whether an event is an incident (A.5.25) and evidence collection (A.5.28), so no technique reaches `full` on this cell.
- T1053mostlyresponds — T1053 creates a real artifact on the estate (the scheduled task itself) that A.5.26's procedure can contain, eradicate, log, communicate, and forensically analyze — the core of `responds` is engaged, unlike pre-compromise techniques where nothing touches the estate. The ceiling is `mostly` for the same reason as T1486: A.5.26 excludes assessment (A.5.25) and evidence collection (A.5.28), so no ISO clause reaches `full` on `responds` by construction.
- T1053.002mostlyresponds — T1053.002 runs on the estate (scheduled jobs, WMI traces, at logs are observable and containable), so A.5.26's procedure engages across containment, eradication, logging, communication, closure, root-cause and weakness management; the ceiling is `mostly` by construction because A.5.26 excludes assessment (A.5.25) and evidence collection (A.5.28).
- T1053.003mostlyresponds — Cron-based persistence executes on the estate and produces real artifacts (crontab entries, running jobs, affected systems), so A.5.26's procedure engages across containment, evidence handling, logging, forensic analysis, root-cause analysis and vulnerability management; the grade is the clause's declared ceiling because A.5.26 excludes assessment (A.5.25) and evidence collection (A.5.28).
- T1053.005mostlyresponds — A malicious scheduled task is a real event on the estate that A.5.26's procedure can be entered for: containment (deleting the task, isolating the host), eradication, logging, forensic analysis, post-incident root cause, and weakness identification all engage. The bounded remainder is the clause's own scope — A.5.26 excludes assessment (A.5.25) and evidence collection (A.5.28), so it cannot answer `responds` completely for any technique, and `mostly` is the ceiling this cell reaches.
- T1053.006mostlyresponds — The technique runs on the estate (malicious .timer/.service files on Linux systems), so containment (disabling the timer, isolating affected hosts) and eradication (removing the persistence mechanism) are real response actions, and most of A.5.26's ten activities engage; the ceiling is `mostly` because A.5.26 excludes assessment (A.5.25) and evidence collection (A.5.28) by construction.
- T1053.007mostlyresponds — The technique executes on the organization's own infrastructure (Kubernetes cluster), producing real affected systems (malicious pods/nodes), real evidence (CronJob specs, pod logs, audit trails), and a real artifact to eradicate (the CronJob), so A.5.26's procedure engages across containment, eradication, logging, communication, closure, forensics, root-cause analysis and vulnerability identification; the remainder is the same ceiling as T1486 — A.5.26 excludes assessment (A.5.25) and evidence collection (A.5.28), capping the grade at `mostly`.
- T1055mostlyresponds — A.5.26's procedure engages containment, eradication, forensic analysis, root-cause analysis and vulnerability management against process injection once it is detected, but the clause excludes assessment (A.5.25) and evidence collection (A.5.28), which caps the grade at `mostly` by construction — the same ceiling the owner ruled for T1486 and T1078.
- T1055.001mostlyresponds — DLL injection runs on the estate (Windows processes), producing affected systems to contain, evidence to collect, artifacts to eradicate, and root cause to identify — engaging most of A.5.26's ten activities. The ceiling is `mostly` because A.5.26 excludes assessment (A.5.25) and evidence collection (A.5.28), so it cannot reach `full` for any technique by construction.
- T1055.002mostlyresponds — PE injection runs on the estate, so A.5.26's procedure engages for containment, eradication, logging, communication, root-cause analysis and weakness management; the named remainder is the same as on T1486/T1078/T1566 — A.5.26 excludes assessment (A.5.25) and evidence collection (A.5.28), so it cannot answer `responds` completely.
- T1055.003mostlyresponds — Thread Execution Hijacking runs on the estate (a process is hijacked in memory), so there is a real event A.5.26's procedure can be entered for: the hijacked process can be contained, the response logged, forensic analysis performed (memory forensics is directly relevant), root cause identified, and the underlying vulnerability managed. The grade is `mostly` and not `full` by the clause's own ceiling: A.5.26 excludes assessment (A.5.25) and evidence collection (A.5.28), so two named parts of response are not performed by this control regardless of technique.
- T1055.004mostlyresponds — APC injection runs on the estate (a Windows process is affected, memory and thread state are real artifacts), so most of A.5.26's ten activities engage — containment of the affected host, evidence collection, logging, forensic analysis of the injected process, root-cause analysis, and vulnerability management; the ceiling is `mostly` because A.5.26 excludes assessment (A.5.25) and evidence collection (A.5.28), the same construction that caps every ISO `responds` grade.
- T1055.005mostlyresponds — The technique has executed on the estate (code running in another process's address space), and A.5.26's procedure engages with most response activities — containment of the affected system, forensic analysis (h), post-incident root-cause analysis (i), logging, communication, coordination, closure, and vulnerability identification (j) — with the same named remainder as the T1486 anchor: the clause itself excludes assessment of whether an event is an incident (A.5.25) and evidence collection (A.5.28).
- T1055.008mostlyresponds — Ptrace injection runs on a Linux system on the estate, so A.5.26's procedure engages for containment, logging, communication, closure, forensics, root-cause analysis and vulnerability management; the ceiling is `mostly` by construction because A.5.26 excludes assessment (A.5.25) and evidence collection (A.5.28), the same named remainder that caps every A.5.26 `responds` grade.
- T1055.009mostlyresponds — T1055.009 has executed (code runs in another process's address space), so A.5.26's procedure is entered and engages containment of the affected host, logging, communication, coordination, closure, forensic analysis of the /proc artifacts, root-cause analysis, and vulnerability management; the ceiling is `mostly` because A.5.26 excludes assessment (A.5.25) and evidence collection (A.5.28) by construction, so no ISO clause reaches `full` on `responds`.
- T1055.011mostlyresponds — The technique has executed (code is running in the context of another process), so A.5.26's response procedure engages: containment of the affected process/host, eradication of the injected code, forensic analysis, root-cause analysis, and vulnerability management are all real response activities. The grade is `mostly` and not `full` for the same reason as the T1486 and T1078 anchors: A.5.26 excludes assessment of whether the event is an incident (A.5.25) and evidence collection (A.5.28), so two parts of response are performed elsewhere.
- T1055.012mostlyresponds — Process hollowing has executed and is observable on the estate, so A.5.26's procedure engages: containment of the affected system, forensic analysis (h), post-incident root-cause work (i), logging (d), escalation (c), and weakness identification (j) all apply. The same ceiling as the T1486 anchor holds — A.5.26 excludes assessment (A.5.25) and evidence collection (A.5.28), so it cannot reach `full`.
- T1055.013mostlyresponds — T1055.013 executes on the estate (malicious code runs in a live process), so A.5.26's response procedure engages for containment, logging, communication, forensic analysis, root-cause analysis and vulnerability identification; the ceiling is `mostly` because A.5.26 excludes assessment (A.5.25) and evidence collection (A.5.28), which is the same named remainder that caps every post-compromise technique on this cell.
- T1055.014mostlyresponds — VDSO hijacking executes on the estate — code runs in the context of a live process, so there is a real event A.5.26's procedure can be entered for: the affected process can be contained (a), the incident logged and communicated (d, e), escalated (c), closed and recorded (g), root-caused (i), and the underlying weakness managed (j). The ceiling is `mostly` by construction: A.5.26 excludes evidence collection and forensic analysis (A.5.28) and assessment (A.5.25), so two named parts of response are absent regardless of how completely the rest engages.
- T1055.015mostlyresponds — T1055.015 executes on the estate (in a process on the organization's systems), producing a real incident with affected systems to contain, memory artifacts to eradicate, and forensic evidence to analyse — A.5.26's procedure engages across containment, eradication, logging, communication, forensic analysis, post-incident root cause and vulnerability identification; the ceiling is `mostly` because A.5.26 excludes assessment of whether an event is an incident (A.5.25) and evidence collection (A.5.28) by its own scope, the same construction that caps every ISO `responds` grade at `mostly`.
- T1056mostlyresponds — A.5.26 provides the procedure to contain affected systems and eradicate the input capture mechanism once underway, but reaches mostly rather than full because the clause explicitly excludes assessment and evidence collection.
- T1056.001mostlyresponds — An active keylogger on the estate is a real, ongoing incident that engages A.5.26's core response activities — containment of the affected system, eradication of the keylogger, forensic analysis, post-incident root cause, and identification of the weakness that allowed installation — so the verb holds; the ceiling is `mostly` because A.5.26 excludes assessment (A.5.25) and evidence collection (A.5.28) by construction, the same ceiling that bounds its grade against T1486.
- T1056.002mostlyresponds — Once the GUI prompt has captured credentials, there is a real incident on the estate: the affected workstation can be contained, the spoofing process and its delivery chain yield evidence, the compromised credentials can be revoked and the incident escalated, and root-cause and vulnerability analysis apply. A.5.26 reaches `mostly` and not `full` by construction because it excludes assessment (A.5.25) and evidence collection (A.5.28), which is the same ceiling the owner ruled for T1486 and T1566.
- T1056.003mostlyresponds — The compromised portal is an on-estate event with most of A.5.26's activities engaging — containment of the affected portal, communication to users whose credentials were captured, forensic analysis of how the portal was compromised, root-cause work, and vulnerability management — but the clause excludes assessment (A.5.25) and evidence collection (A.5.28) by construction, capping the grade at `mostly`.
- T1056.004mostlyresponds — The technique runs on the estate (hooking into processes on your systems), so A.5.26's response activities have real objects: containment of the affected system, forensic analysis of the hooking mechanism, root-cause analysis of how the malicious code arrived, vulnerability management, and post-incident communication all engage; the ceiling is `mostly` because the clause excludes assessment (A.5.25) and evidence collection (A.5.28), which is the declared ceiling on this cell.
- T1059mostlyresponds — T1059 executes on the estate and produces real events A.5.26's procedure engages — containment of affected systems, logging, forensic analysis, post-incident root-cause work, and vulnerability management all apply; the ceiling is `mostly` because A.5.26 excludes assessment (A.5.25) and evidence collection (A.5.28) by construction.
- T1059.001mostlyresponds — PowerShell execution is a post-compromise technique that runs on the estate, producing observable artifacts and affected systems that A.5.26's procedure can contain, eradicate, log, communicate, and close; the ceiling is `mostly` because A.5.26 excludes assessment (A.5.25) and evidence collection (A.5.28), matching the pattern of T1078 and T1566.
- T1059.002mostlyresponds — AppleScript execution runs on macOS systems within the estate, producing affected systems to contain, evidence to log, and a full response procedure to engage — the same shape as T1486 and T1566, which the owner graded `mostly`; the bounded remainder is A.5.26's own exclusion of assessment (A.5.25) and evidence collection (A.5.28).
- T1059.003mostlyresponds — T1059.003 runs on the estate and produces an observable event (process creation, command-line telemetry) that A.5.26's procedure can be entered for; containment of the affected system, logging, communication, coordination, closure, forensics, post-incident analysis and vulnerability management all engage, but the clause excludes assessment (A.5.25) and evidence collection (A.5.28), so the verb reaches the same ceiling as on T1486.
- T1059.004mostlyresponds — A.5.26's procedure engages for Unix shell execution on the estate — containment of affected systems, logging, communication, closure, forensics, root-cause analysis and vulnerability management all apply — but the clause excludes assessment (A.5.25) and evidence collection (A.5.28), so it cannot answer `responds` completely, matching the ceiling the owner ruled for A.5.26 on post-compromise techniques.
- T1059.005mostlyresponds — A.5.26's procedure engages once VB execution is observed on the estate — containment of affected systems, logging, forensic analysis of the script, root-cause analysis, and weakness identification all apply; the ceiling is `mostly` because A.5.26 excludes assessment (A.5.25) and evidence collection (A.5.28), the same construction that caps every ISO `responds` grade.
- T1059.006mostlyresponds — Python execution runs on the estate and produces real artifacts (processes, scripts, files) that A.5.26's procedure can contain, eradicate, log, forensically analyse and close — but the clause structurally excludes assessment (A.5.25) and evidence collection (A.5.28), so it cannot answer `responds` completely, matching the ceiling reached at T1486 and T1566.
- T1059.007mostlyresponds — JavaScript execution is an active technique that has run, and A.5.26's procedure engages for it: containment of affected systems (a), logging (d), communication (e), coordination (f), closure (g), forensic analysis (h), post-incident root-cause work (i), and weakness identification (j) all apply. The ceiling is `mostly` because A.5.26 excludes assessment (A.5.25) and evidence collection (A.5.28) by construction, so it cannot answer `responds` completely for any technique.
- T1059.008mostlyresponds — T1059.008 is an active on-estate compromise where the network device is affected and can be contained, logged, escalated, forensically analysed, and closed under A.5.26's procedure, but the clause excludes assessment (A.5.25) and evidence collection (A.5.28), preventing a `full` grade — the same ceiling the owner ruled for T1486 and T1566.
- T1059.009mostlyresponds — Cloud API abuse executes on the estate (in the tenant), so A.5.26's procedure engages: containment (revoke tokens, isolate affected resources), eradication (remove malicious configurations), logging, communication, coordination, closure, forensics, root cause, and vulnerability management all apply. The ceiling is `mostly` by construction because A.5.26 excludes assessment (A.5.25) and evidence collection (A.5.28), the same ceiling that holds for T1486 and T1566.
- T1059.010mostlyresponds — T1059.010 is a post-compromise execution technique that runs on a Windows system, producing an event A.5.26's procedure can engage for: containment of the affected system, logging, communication, coordination, closure, post-incident root-cause analysis, and identifying the weaknesses that allowed the script to execute. The grade is `mostly` and not `full` for the same reason as the T1486 anchor: A.5.26 excludes assessment/determining whether an event is an incident (A.5.25) and evidence collection (A.5.28), so two parts of response are out of scope by construction.
- T1059.011mostlyresponds — Lua execution runs on the estate with real affected systems to contain and artifacts (scripts, modified interpreters) to eradicate, so the response procedure engages across most of its activities; the ceiling is `mostly` by construction because A.5.26 excludes assessment (A.5.25) and evidence collection (A.5.28) as separate clauses.
- T1059.012mostlyresponds — A.5.26 provides the procedure to contain and eradicate malicious hypervisor CLI execution once underway, but reaches mostly rather than full because the clause explicitly excludes the assessment and evidence collection phases of response.
- T1059.013mostlyresponds — T1059.013 executes on the estate (Docker daemon, Kubernetes API), producing a real incident A.5.26's procedure engages for: containment of affected containers/clusters, logging, communication, coordination, closure, forensics, root-cause analysis, and vulnerability management all apply. The ceiling is `mostly` because A.5.26 excludes assessment (A.5.25) and evidence collection (A.5.28) by construction, so no ISO clause reaches `full` on `responds`.
- T1068mostlyresponds — T1068 executes on the estate (the adversary exploits a vulnerability on a system), so A.5.26's response activities engage: containment of the affected system, forensic analysis of the exploit, post-incident root-cause analysis, and identifying/managing the underlying vulnerability (item j is directly on point). The grade is `mostly` and not `full` for the same reason as the T1486 and T1078 anchors: A.5.26 excludes assessment/determining whether an event is an incident (A.5.25) and excludes evidence collection (A.5.28), so it cannot answer `responds` completely for any technique by construction.
- T1070mostlyresponds — T1070 runs on the estate (logs, command history, file metadata are modified on the organization's systems), so there is a real event A.5.26's procedure can be entered for, and containment, escalation, logging of response activities, communication, coordination, closure, post-incident root-cause analysis, and weakness identification all engage; the named remainder is the same ceiling that applies to every technique on this cell -- A.5.26 excludes assessment (A.5.25) and evidence collection/forensics (A.5.28), both of which are particularly relevant to an indicator-removal technique but are not this clause's to perform.
- T1070.004mostlyresponds — T1070.004 occurs on the estate (adversary deleting files on organizational systems), so A.5.26's procedure has real objects to engage: containment if deletion is ongoing, logging, communication, coordination, closure, post-incident root-cause analysis, and vulnerability identification all apply. The grade is `mostly` and not `full` for the same reason as the T1486 anchor: A.5.26 excludes assessment (A.5.25) and evidence collection/forensic analysis (A.5.28) — and for file deletion specifically, the evidence-collection exclusion is the more salient gap because the technique's whole purpose is destroying the artifacts that activity would collect. The files already deleted are also not restored by responding, which is the boundary with `recovers`.
- T1070.005mostlyresponds — T1070.005 executes on the estate (net use /delete leaves Windows and SMB log artifacts), so there are affected systems to contain, response activities to log, root cause to analyse, and weaknesses to identify — engaging most of A.5.26's ten activities. The ceiling is `mostly` because A.5.26 excludes assessment (A.5.25) and evidence collection/forensics (A.5.28), the same construction that caps A.5.26 against T1486 and T1566.
- T1070.008mostlyresponds — T1070.008 is an in-progress technique (adversary clearing mailbox data after gaining access), so A.5.26's procedure engages: containment of the affected mail server (a), escalation (c), logging (d), communication (e), coordination (f), closure (g), post-incident root-cause analysis (i), and vulnerability identification (j). The named remainder is the parts A.5.26 excludes — evidence collection (b) and forensic analysis (h), both delegated to A.5.28 — which are particularly relevant here because the technique is specifically anti-forensic, but the core of `responds` (contain and eradicate once underway) is fully present, so the ceiling `mostly` holds.
- T1070.010mostlyresponds — T1070.010 is post-compromise and operates on the estate: the affected system can be contained, the relocated malware copies can be eradicated, and forensics/root-cause analysis engage. A.5.26's ceiling of `mostly` applies because the clause excludes assessment (A.5.25) and the substance of evidence collection (A.5.28), even though it references them.
- T1071.002mostlyresponds — T1071.002 C2 traffic traverses the organization's network and the affected systems are on the estate, so A.5.26's procedure engages: containing compromised hosts, blocking the protocol channel, logging, escalation, communication, coordination, closure, forensics, post-incident root-cause analysis, and identifying the weaknesses that let the C2 persist; the ceiling is `mostly` by construction because A.5.26 excludes assessment (A.5.25) and evidence collection (A.5.28), and the technique is an active, ongoing event rather than a pre-compromise reconnaissance touch.
- T1071.003mostlyresponds — T1071.003 is an ongoing C2 channel over mail protocols that is observable in mail traffic and can be contained (block the channel, isolate affected systems, coordinate with email providers), so most of A.5.26's ten activities engage -- containment, escalation, logging, communication, coordination, closure, forensics, root cause and vulnerability management all apply; the same named remainder as the T1486 anchor applies, since A.5.26 excludes assessment (A.5.25) and evidence collection (A.5.28).
- T1071.004mostlyresponds — DNS C2 is an active, ongoing technique with a real affected system (the infected host making beaconing queries) and observable artifacts (DNS logs, query patterns), so most of A.5.26's response activities engage — containment of the beaconing host, blocking/sinkholing the malicious domain, escalation, logging, communication, closure, post-incident root-cause analysis, and identifying the weaknesses that let the tunneling succeed; the ceiling is `mostly` by construction because A.5.26 excludes assessment (A.5.25) and evidence collection/forensics (A.5.28), both of which are real parts of responding to a covert C2 channel.
- T1072mostlyresponds — T1072 runs on the estate — the adversary abuses the deployment tool to push code and move laterally across endpoints — so A.5.26's procedure engages across containment of the affected deployment server and endpoints, logging, communication, coordination, closure, forensics, post-incident root-cause analysis, and identifying the weaknesses that allowed the abuse; the grade is capped at `mostly` by the clause's own scope, which excludes assessment (A.5.25) and evidence collection (A.5.28).
- T1074.001mostlyresponds — Local data staging happens on the estate and produces real artifacts (the staging directory, the staged files, the affected system), so most of A.5.26's ten activities engage: containment of the system to prevent the imminent exfiltration, evidence handling, logging, communication, forensic analysis of the staging location, root-cause analysis of how access was gained, and closure. The ceiling is `mostly` by construction — A.5.26 excludes assessment (A.5.25) and evidence collection (A.5.28), the same named remainder that caps the T1486 anchor.
- T1074.002mostlyresponds — The procedure manages the containment of the staging system and eradication of the staged data once the incident is underway, but reaches mostly rather than full because the clause explicitly excludes the assessment and evidence collection phases of response.
- T1078mostlyresponds — A.5.26 explicitly requires a designated competent team to contain, eradicate, log, escalate, communicate and formally close an information security incident once it is underway, which matches the `responds` verb against an adversary abusing valid accounts.
- T1078mostlyprevents — A.5.26's incident response procedures (containment, escalation, forensic analysis, root-cause identification, and explicit management of the vulnerabilities/weaknesses that caused/contributed/failed to prevent the incident) stop the adversary from successfully abusing the valid account for Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation or Defense Evasion once the compromise is known.
- T1078mostlyrecovers — A.5.26 requires incident response that includes containment, eradication of the actor's foothold, formal closure after successful addressing, and post-incident root-cause analysis that explicitly identifies and manages the vulnerabilities/weaknesses (including failed controls) that enabled the credential abuse, thereby restoring the security posture after the T1078 event.
- T1078.001mostlyresponds — Default account abuse produces an observable event on the estate (authentication logs, anomalous access) that A.5.26's response procedure can act on — containment of affected systems, evidence collection, escalation, logging, communication, forensic analysis, root-cause analysis, and managing the underlying weakness (the default account itself) all engage. The ceiling is `mostly` because A.5.26 excludes assessment (A.5.25) and evidence collection (A.5.28), matching the owner-graded A.5.26 vs T1078 anchor.
- T1078.002mostlyresponds — Same clause, same verb, same structural argument as the A.5.26 vs T1078 anchor: A.5.26 engages containment, escalation, logging, communication, coordination, closure, forensics, root-cause analysis and weakness identification against a compromised domain account, but excludes assessment (A.5.25) and evidence collection (A.5.28), so it cannot answer `responds` completely.
- T1078.003mostlyresponds — Local account abuse produces an observable event on the estate (credential use, lateral movement, privilege escalation) that A.5.26's procedure can engage with across containment, escalation, logging, communication, closure, root-cause analysis and weakness identification; the same ceiling as the T1078 anchor applies because A.5.26 excludes assessment (A.5.25) and evidence collection/forensics (A.5.28).
- T1078.004mostlyresponds — Cloud account abuse is an active incident on the organization's estate with real systems to contain (disable compromised accounts, revoke credentials, revoke session tokens) and real artifacts to eradicate (additional cloud credentials, role assumption policies). A.5.26's activities (a, c, d, e, f, g, i, j) all engage; only (b) evidence collection and (h) forensic analysis are excluded by A.5.28, which is the same ceiling that bounds the parent T1078 anchor at `mostly`.
- T1080mostlyresponds — Taint shared content produces a real event on the estate — modified files on shared storage, execution on systems that opened them, lateral movement indicators — so A.5.26's procedure engages across containment, evidence handling, logging, communication, forensics, root-cause analysis and vulnerability management; the same ceiling as T1486 applies because A.5.26 excludes assessment (A.5.25) and evidence collection (A.5.28), preventing `full`.
- T1090mostlyresponds — The proxy runs on the estate (compromised host or network device), so containment of the affected system and eradication of the proxy tool/configuration are real response actions; evidence collection, logging, communication, closure, forensics, root-cause analysis and weakness identification all engage. The bounded remainder is the adversary's external C2 infrastructure, which the response cannot reach — analogous to the T1486 anchor's structure, with A.5.26's own exclusions (assessment in A.5.25, evidence collection in A.5.28) preventing `full`.
- T1090.001mostlyresponds — T1090.001 executes on the estate — internal systems are actively being used as proxies, producing observable traffic, processes and logs that A.5.26's procedure can be entered for. Containment of the proxying systems, eradication of the proxy tools, forensic analysis of the C2 path, post-incident root-cause work and vulnerability identification all engage. The grade is `mostly` and not `full` for the same reason as the T1486 anchor: A.5.26 excludes assessment (A.5.25) and evidence collection (A.5.28), so it cannot answer `responds` completely for any technique.
- T1091mostlyresponds — T1091 executes on the estate — removable media is inserted, malware runs, systems are infected — so there is a real affected system to contain, evidence to collect (the media, autorun artifacts, infected endpoints), and vulnerabilities to address (j). All ten activities engage to a meaningful degree, and the technique's lateral-movement mechanic gives the procedure a clear object to work on, placing it on the same rung as T1486 rather than the pre-compromise `none`/`partial` band.
- T1092mostlyresponds — The technique has executed on the estate — both systems are compromised and removable media is being used as a C2 channel between them, producing real artifacts (the media itself, file transfers, compromised hosts) that A.5.26's procedure can act on: containment of affected systems, forensic analysis of the media, logging, post-incident root-cause analysis, and vulnerability identification all engage. The `mostly` ceiling is the same structural one A.5.26 carries against T1486: the clause excludes assessment (A.5.25) and evidence collection (A.5.28), so it cannot answer `responds` completely for any technique.
- T1098mostlyresponds — Account manipulation produces real artifacts on the estate (compromised accounts, modified permissions) that A.5.26's procedure can contain, eradicate, log, communicate, and close; the same ceiling as T1486 applies because A.5.26 structurally excludes assessment (A.5.25) and evidence collection (A.5.28), so it cannot reach `full` regardless of technique.
- T1098.001mostlyresponds — The technique runs on the organization's estate (cloud APIs called against the tenant), producing real artifacts to contain (added credentials, compromised account) and eradicate, real evidence in CloudTrail/Azure audit logs, and a real root cause to identify (how the adversary gained permissions to add credentials); A.5.26 covers containment, eradication, logging, communication, closure, forensics, root-cause analysis and vulnerability management for this technique, with the named ceiling remainder being assessment (A.5.25) and evidence collection (A.5.28), which the clause itself excludes.
- T1098.002mostlyresponds — T1098.002 executes on the organization's own estate (mailbox permission grants are logged and observable), so A.5.26's procedure engages meaningfully: containment by revoking the malicious delegate permissions, evidence collection from audit logs, forensics, root-cause analysis of how the adversary obtained the rights to grant permissions, and vulnerability management all apply. The grade is capped at `mostly` by the clause's own construction — A.5.26 excludes assessment (A.5.25) and evidence collection (A.5.28), so no ISO clause can reach `full` on `responds`.
- T1098.003mostlyresponds — The technique modifies IAM policies and roles within the victim's cloud tenant, so there are real affected systems to contain (revoke added roles, disable compromised accounts), evidence to collect (CloudTrail/audit logs), and artifacts to eradicate — engaging most of A.5.26's ten activities. The grade is `mostly` and not `full` because A.5.26 excludes assessment (A.5.25) and evidence collection (A.5.28) by construction, which is the declared ceiling on this cell.
- T1098.004mostlyresponds — T1098.004 is a post-compromise technique that runs on the estate (modified authorized_keys files on victim hosts), so there is a real event to contain, evidence to collect, and an artifact (the rogue key entry) to eradicate — A.5.26's procedure engages across containment, logging, communication, closure, forensics, root-cause analysis and weakness identification. The ceiling is `mostly` by construction: A.5.26 excludes assessment (A.5.25) and evidence collection (A.5.28), so no ISO clause can answer `responds` completely for any technique.
- T1098.005mostlyresponds — Device registration leaves observable artifacts (MFA/IdP logs, Entra ID audit trails) that A.5.26's procedure acts on: containing by revoking the registered device, collecting evidence of the enrollment, forensic analysis of how it occurred, root-cause analysis of the credential compromise that enabled it, and identifying the self-enrollment weakness — engaging most of the ten activities. The ceiling is the same as for T1078: A.5.26 excludes assessment (A.5.25) and evidence collection (A.5.28), so `full` is unreachable by construction.
- T1098.006mostlyresponds — T1098.006 is a post-compromise, on-estate event (modified RoleBinding/ClusterRoleBinding on the organization's Kubernetes cluster) that A.5.26's procedure can act on: containment by revoking the malicious binding and removing the compromised account, eradication by restoring proper RBAC state, plus logging, communication, root-cause analysis, and weakness identification all engage. The grade is `mostly` and not `full` for the same construction reason as the T1486 and T1078 anchors: A.5.26 excludes assessment/determination of incident (A.5.25) and evidence collection (A.5.28), so it cannot answer `responds` completely for any technique.
- T1098.007mostlyresponds — T1098.007 executes on the estate (group membership is modified on systems the adversary controls), so A.5.26's procedure engages for containment of the foothold, eradication of the unauthorized group additions, logging, forensic analysis, root-cause analysis, and identifying the weaknesses that allowed the manipulation; the ceiling is `mostly` because A.5.26 excludes assessment (A.5.25) and evidence collection (A.5.28) by construction.
- T1102mostlyresponds — T1102 runs on a compromised system within the estate, so A.5.26's containment, eradication, logging, communication, closure, post-incident analysis and vulnerability-identification activities all engage against the implant and the host using the web service for C2; the bounded remainder is the assessment (A.5.25) and evidence-collection (A.5.28) parts that A.5.26 excludes by construction, which caps the grade at `mostly`.
- T1102.002mostlyresponds — T1102.002 is a post-compromise technique whose C2 traffic traverses the estate, so A.5.26's response procedure engages: containment of the affected system, logging, escalation, communication, closure, forensic analysis, post-incident root-cause work, and vulnerability management all apply. The grade is the same ceiling A.5.26 reaches against T1486 — `mostly` because the clause excludes assessment/determination of whether an event is an incident (A.5.25) and evidence collection (A.5.28), two named parts of response it does not perform.
- T1102.003mostlyresponds — The technique has executed: a compromised system on the estate is using a legitimate web service as a one-way C2 channel, so there is a real affected system to contain, a real incident to escalate, log, communicate, coordinate, close, perform root-cause analysis on, and identify contributing vulnerabilities. A.5.26's bounded remainder is the same as on T1486: assessment (A.5.25) and evidence collection/forensics (A.5.28) are excluded by the clause's own scope, so the ceiling is `mostly`.
- T1105mostlyresponds — T1105 executes on the estate after initial access — transferred tools, network connections and process activity are observable and give A.5.26 real objects to contain, eradicate, log, communicate about, forensically analyse and close; the ceiling is `mostly` because A.5.26 excludes assessment (A.5.25) and evidence collection (A.5.28), the same named remainder that caps A.5.26 against T1486 and T1566.
- T1110mostlyresponds — Brute force produces a real event on the estate (failed/successful authentication attempts in logs) that A.5.26's procedure can be entered for, and most of the ten activities engage: containment (blocking source IPs, disabling targeted accounts, rate limiting), evidence collection, logging, communication, coordination with authorities, closure, root-cause analysis (why was the account reachable to brute force?), and identifying the control weakness that permitted it; the ceiling is `mostly` by construction because A.5.26 excludes assessment (A.5.25) and evidence collection (A.5.28).
- T1110.001mostlyresponds — Password guessing produces observable events on the estate (failed logins, lockouts, source IPs) that A.5.26's procedure can act on: containment (block source, disable targeted accounts), evidence collection, logging, root cause analysis, and identifying the weak password policies that enabled the technique. The ceiling is `mostly` by construction because A.5.26 excludes assessment (A.5.25) and evidence collection (A.5.28).
- T1110.003mostlyresponds — Password spraying produces observable failed-authentication events on the estate, so A.5.26's procedure engages: containment (block source IPs, disable targeted accounts, force resets), logging, communication, coordination, closure, post-incident root-cause analysis, and identifying the weak-password-policy weakness that enabled it; the ceiling is `mostly` because A.5.26 excludes assessment (A.5.25) and evidence collection/forensics (A.5.28), the same named remainder that caps every A.5.26 `responds` grade.
- T1110.004mostlyresponds — Credential stuffing produces observable events on the estate (failed authentications, lockouts, potentially compromised accounts) that enter A.5.26's procedure, and most of its ten activities engage: containing affected accounts, logging, communicating, closing, forensics on which credentials succeeded, root-cause analysis (password reuse, missing MFA), and identifying the weaknesses that enabled it; the bounded remainder is the clause's own exclusion of assessment (A.5.25) and evidence collection (A.5.28), which is the ceiling the owner declared for A.5.26 across all techniques.
- T1111mostlyresponds — T1111 produces a real incident on the estate — intercepted MFA tokens used for unauthorized access, keyloggers on systems, compromised SMS services — and most of A.5.26's ten activities engage (containment of affected systems, evidence handling, escalation, logging, communication, forensic analysis, root-cause analysis, vulnerability identification); the same ceiling applies as on T1486/T1566, since A.5.26 excludes assessment (A.5.25) and evidence collection (A.5.28).
- T1112mostlyresponds — The incident response procedure contains the affected system and eradicates the malicious registry modifications, but reaches mostly rather than full because the clause explicitly excludes the assessment and evidence collection phases of response.
- T1114mostlyresponds — T1114 touches the estate (mail servers, mail clients, forwarding rules) so there are affected systems to contain, access to revoke, and forwarding rules to remove — the core response activities engage. A.5.26 reaches its declared ceiling of `mostly` because it excludes assessment (A.5.25) and evidence collection (A.5.28), the same remainder that bounds its grade against T1078 and T1486.
- T1114.001mostlyresponds — A.5.26's procedure engages once the local email collection is known: containment of the affected system to stop further access, forensic analysis of what was read, root-cause analysis, vulnerability identification, logging, communication and closure all apply. The grade is `mostly` and not `full` for the same reason as the other A.5.26 anchors: the clause excludes assessment (A.5.25) and evidence collection (A.5.28), so it cannot answer `responds` completely for any technique.
- T1114.002mostlyresponds — A.5.26's response procedure engages against an ongoing email-collection incident: containment (revoking credentials/tokens, isolating the affected mailbox), logging, communication to affected parties, forensic analysis of what was accessed, post-incident root cause, and weakness identification all apply. The ceiling is `mostly` because A.5.26 excludes assessment (A.5.25) and evidence collection (A.5.28), and any email already read before containment cannot be unread.
- T1114.003mostlyresponds — T1114.003 runs on the estate (mailbox rules modified, forwarding active), so A.5.26's procedure has a real event to enter for: containment (disable the rule, revoke credentials, isolate the mailbox), eradication, logging, communication, escalation, closure, post-incident analysis and weakness identification all engage. The ceiling is `mostly` by the same construction as the T1486 anchor — A.5.26 excludes assessment (A.5.25) and evidence/forensic collection (A.5.28), and those exclusions are particularly felt here because determining what was forwarded and to whom is the heart of scoping this incident.
- T1115mostlyresponds — The incident response procedure contains the affected system and eradicates the collection mechanism, but reaches 'mostly' rather than 'full' because the clause explicitly excludes assessment and evidence collection.
- T1119mostlyresponds — T1119 runs on the estate — the adversary is actively collecting data from the organization's systems — so there are real affected systems to contain, evidence to gather, escalation to perform, and root cause to identify, engaging most of A.5.26's ten activities; the same ceiling as the T1486 anchor applies because A.5.26 excludes assessment (A.5.25) and evidence collection (A.5.28).
- T1123mostlyresponds — Audio capture runs on the organization's own systems (microphones, webcams, voice/video apps), so there is a real incident on the estate: affected systems to contain, evidence to collect, vulnerabilities to identify, and post-incident analysis to perform — engaging most of A.5.26's activities. The same ceiling applies as on T1486: A.5.26 excludes assessment (A.5.25) and evidence collection (A.5.28), so it cannot reach `full`.
- T1125mostlyresponds — T1125 runs on the estate (malware on the endpoint capturing video), so containment of the affected system and eradication of the malware are real response actions A.5.26's procedure engages; the ceiling is `mostly` because A.5.26 excludes assessment (A.5.25) and evidence collection (A.5.28) by construction.
- T1127mostlyresponds — T1127 executes on the estate via a trusted developer utility, so the technique has run and A.5.26's response procedure engages: containment of affected systems, logging, communication, coordination, forensic analysis, post-incident root-cause work, and closure all apply. The grade is `mostly` and not `full` because A.5.26 excludes assessment (A.5.25) and evidence collection (A.5.28), which is the declared ceiling on this cell.
- T1127.001mostlyresponds — MSBuild abuse executes on the estate and produces real events (process execution, inline-task artifacts, spawned child processes) that A.5.26's procedure engages with across most response activities — containment of affected systems, evidence collection, logging, communication, forensic analysis, post-incident root-cause analysis, and vulnerability identification. The ceiling is `mostly` by construction: A.5.26 excludes assessment (A.5.25) and evidence collection proper (A.5.28), so no ISO clause reaches `full` on `responds`.
- T1127.002mostlyresponds — T1127.002 executes on the estate (DFSVC.EXE spawns the malicious ClickOnce application), so there are real affected systems to contain, artifacts to eradicate, and a real incident to respond to — the same shape as T1486, which A.5.26 answers `mostly`; the ceiling is `mostly` by construction because A.5.26 excludes assessment (A.5.25) and evidence collection (A.5.28).
- T1127.003mostlyresponds — JamPlus has executed on the estate — a malicious script ran via a legitimate build tool, producing observable process and file activity that triggers the response procedure. A.5.26's containment, logging, communication, coordination, closure, forensic analysis, root-cause analysis and vulnerability-identification activities all engage with this executed technique, but the clause excludes assessment (A.5.25) and evidence collection (A.5.28), so it cannot answer `responds` completely — the same ceiling the owner ruled for T1486, T1078 and T1566.
- T1129mostlyresponds — T1129 executes on the victim's system (DLL/.so/.dylib loaded, payload running), so there is a real incident A.5.26's procedure can engage: containment of affected systems, eradication of the loaded modules, logging, forensic analysis of the shared objects, post-incident root cause, and vulnerability identification all apply. The same ceiling as the T1486/T1078/T1566 anchors holds: A.5.26 excludes assessment (A.5.25) and dedicated evidence collection (A.5.28), so it cannot reach `full`.
- T1132.001mostlyresponds — T1132.001 is a post-compromise technique whose encoded C2 traffic traverses the estate and implies a compromised endpoint; A.5.26's containment, evidence collection, forensic analysis, logging, communication, closure and vulnerability-identification activities all engage against the resulting incident, with the bounded remainder being that the encoding as a method is not directly addressed but is stopped as a consequence of containing the compromised system.
- T1133mostlyresponds — T1133 executes on the estate (VPN/Citrix/RDP gateways, exposed services) so A.5.26's procedure engages broadly: containment of affected gateways and revocation of adversary access, evidence and forensic analysis of the remote service logs, escalation, communication, root-cause analysis, and identification of the weaknesses that allowed the access — the same shape as T1486 and T1566; the bounded remainder is the clause's own exclusions of assessment (A.5.25) and evidence collection (A.5.28), which cap it at `mostly`.
- T1134mostlyresponds — A.5.26's procedure engages once token manipulation is detected on a Windows host: containment of affected systems, eradication of the foothold, forensic analysis of token theft, root-cause analysis, and vulnerability identification all apply. The same ceiling as the other A.5.26 anchors holds here — the clause excludes assessment (A.5.25) and evidence collection (A.5.28), so it cannot reach `full`.
- T1134.001mostlyresponds — T1134.001 executes on the estate (Windows hosts), producing affected systems to contain, evidence to collect, root cause to analyze, and vulnerabilities/weaknesses to identify and manage — engaging most of A.5.26's response activities (a, c, d, e, f, g, h, i, j); the ceiling is `mostly` because A.5.26 excludes assessment/determination of an incident (A.5.25) and evidence collection (A.5.28), the same ceiling that holds for T1486 and T1566.
- T1134.002mostlyresponds — The technique runs on the estate with affected systems to contain, processes to kill, tokens to revoke, root cause to identify, and weaknesses to manage; A.5.26's response engages across most of its activities but excludes assessment (A.5.25) and evidence collection (A.5.28), reaching the same ceiling as T1486.
- T1134.003mostlyresponds — T1134.003 runs on the organization's Windows estate and produces observable events (token creation, logon sessions) that A.5.26's response procedure can act on — containment of affected systems, escalation, logging, communication, coordination, closure, root-cause analysis, and vulnerability management all engage. The grade is `mostly` and not `full` for the same reason as the T1486 anchor: A.5.26 excludes assessment (A.5.25) and evidence collection/forensics (A.5.28), which is the declared ceiling for this clause on any technique that runs on the estate.
- T1134.005mostlyresponds — T1134.005 executes on the estate (AD domain controllers) with clear artifacts (modified SID-History attributes), affected systems to contain, and a root-cause question (how did the adversary obtain DA rights?) that engages most of A.5.26's activities — containment, escalation, logging, communication, closure, post-incident analysis, and vulnerability identification; the `mostly` ceiling applies because A.5.26 excludes assessment (A.5.25) and evidence collection (A.5.28) by construction.
- T1136mostlyresponds — T1136 creates an account on the victim's own estate (local, domain, or cloud tenant), so there is a real event A.5.26's procedure can engage with: containment (disable/delete the malicious account), evidence collection, logging, forensic analysis, root-cause investigation of how the creation privilege was obtained, and vulnerability management. The grade is `mostly` and not `full` because A.5.26 excludes assessment (A.5.25) and evidence collection (A.5.28) by construction, which is the declared ceiling for this clause on `responds`.
- T1136.001mostlyresponds — T1136.001 creates a local account on the estate, producing a real event A.5.26's procedure can be entered for: the affected system can be contained, the malicious account removed (eradication), root cause investigated, and the incident logged and closed. The grade is capped at `mostly` by the owner's ceiling rule — A.5.26 excludes assessment (A.5.25) and evidence collection (A.5.28), so it cannot answer `responds` completely for any technique.
- T1136.002mostlyresponds — Creating a domain account produces an observable event on the organization's AD infrastructure (Event ID 4720 and related logs), giving A.5.26's procedure real objects to act on: the affected system can be contained, the malicious account identified and deleted (eradication), and post-incident analysis performed to identify root cause. The ceiling is `mostly` by construction because A.5.26 excludes assessment (A.5.25) and evidence collection (A.5.28), as the owner ruled on the T1078 and T1486 siblings.
- T1136.003mostlyresponds — The technique has run (a cloud account has been created) and A.5.26's procedure engages with the artifact: the malicious account can be contained/eradicated by revocation or deletion, evidence of creation logged, the incident communicated and closed, root cause analyzed, and the weakness that permitted creation identified. The grade is `mostly` and not `full` for the same reason as the T1486 anchor: A.5.26 excludes assessment (A.5.25) and evidence collection (A.5.28), so it cannot answer `responds` completely by construction.
- T1137mostlyresponds — T1137 persistence executes on the estate (malicious template, add-in, or Outlook rule is in place), so there is a real affected system to contain, an artifact to eradicate, and a full post-incident cycle to run; A.5.26's ceiling of `mostly` applies because the clause excludes assessment (A.5.25) and evidence collection (A.5.28), but containment, logging, communication, coordination, closure, forensics, root-cause analysis and weakness management all engage against this technique.
- T1137.001mostlyresponds — T1137.001 executes on the estate (malicious template on a system, code running on Office startup), so containment, eradication, forensic analysis, root-cause analysis and vulnerability management all engage; A.5.26's ceiling is `mostly` by construction because it excludes assessment (A.5.25) and evidence collection (A.5.28).
- T1137.002mostlyresponds — T1137.002 executes on the estate (registry key added, DLL loading on every Office start), giving A.5.26 real artifacts to contain, eradicate, forensic-analyse, root-cause and follow up on; the same ceiling that applies to T1486 applies here — A.5.26 excludes assessment (A.5.25) and evidence collection (A.5.28), so it cannot reach `full`.
- T1137.003mostlyresponds — T1137.003 is a post-compromise persistence technique that has executed on the estate — the malicious form is in the mailbox and code has run — so A.5.26's procedure engages with real artifacts: containment (remove the form, isolate the mailbox), eradication, logging, communication, closure, forensic analysis, root-cause analysis, and vulnerability management all apply. The grade is `mostly` and not `full` because A.5.26 excludes assessment (A.5.25) and evidence collection (A.5.28), which is the declared ceiling on this cell.
- T1137.004mostlyresponds — T1137.004 executes on the estate (malicious home page set in the user's Outlook profile/mailbox) and is an active persistence mechanism that has run and continues to run, so A.5.26's containment, eradication, root-cause and vulnerability-management activities engage against it; the same exclusions that cap the T1486 anchor apply here -- assessment is A.5.25 and evidence collection is A.5.28 -- so the ceiling is `mostly`.
- T1137.005mostlyresponds — Malicious Outlook rules are artifacts on the estate that A.5.26 can contain, eradicate, forensically analyse, and trace to root cause, so the response procedure engages; the grade is `mostly` and not `full` for the same reason as the T1486 anchor — A.5.26 excludes assessment (A.5.25) and evidence collection (A.5.28), which is the declared ceiling on this cell.
- T1137.006mostlyresponds — A.5.26's response procedure engages with this post-compromise persistence technique: the affected system can be contained, the malicious add-in eradicated, forensic and root-cause analysis performed, weaknesses identified, and the incident closed and recorded. The ceiling is `mostly` for the same reason as the other A.5.26 anchors — the clause excludes assessment (A.5.25) and evidence collection (A.5.28), so it cannot answer `responds` completely.
- T1140mostlyresponds — T1140 runs on the estate and produces observable artifacts (decoded files, process execution), so A.5.26's procedure engages through containment of affected systems, escalation, logging, communication, coordination, closure, post-incident root cause analysis, and vulnerability identification; the bounded remainder is the clause's own exclusion of assessment (A.5.25) and evidence collection/forensics (A.5.28), which are particularly relevant for understanding what was decoded.
- T1176mostlyresponds — T1176 executes on the estate (a malicious extension is installed and running), so there is a real affected system to contain, a real artifact (the extension) to collect as evidence and forensically examine, a real root cause to identify (how the extension was introduced), and real weaknesses to manage (the marketplace gap or social-engineering path). Most of A.5.26's ten activities engage; the ceiling is `mostly` by construction because A.5.26 excludes assessment (A.5.25) and evidence collection (A.5.28).
- T1176.001mostlyresponds — A malicious browser extension is a real event on the estate with affected systems to contain, an artifact (the extension and modified preference files) to eradicate, evidence to collect, root cause to identify, and vulnerabilities to manage — engaging most of A.5.26's ten activities. The ceiling is `mostly` by construction because A.5.26 excludes assessment (A.5.25) and evidence collection (A.5.28), as the owner ruled on the T1486 anchor.
- T1176.002mostlyresponds — The procedure manages the containment of the affected developer machine and eradication of the malicious extension, but reaches mostly rather than full because the clause explicitly excludes assessment and evidence collection.
- T1185mostlyresponds — T1185 is fully on-estate — the hijacked browser, the inherited sessions and the injected process are real affected systems and artifacts A.5.26's procedure can contain, log, forensically analyse, root-cause and close, so the verb engages across most of the clause's scope; the ceiling is `mostly` because A.5.26 excludes assessment (A.5.25) and evidence collection (A.5.28) by construction, the same ceiling the owner ruled for T1486.
- T1189mostlyresponds — Drive-by compromise executes on the user's endpoint, producing a real incident on the estate with affected systems to contain, browser/exploit evidence to collect, and a root cause (the exploited browser/plugin) to identify — engaging activities (a), (c)–(g), (i) and (j); the same ceiling as T1486 applies because A.5.26 excludes assessment (A.5.25) and evidence collection (A.5.28), so it cannot answer `responds` completely.
- T1197mostlyresponds — BITS jobs run on the estate and leave observable, containable artifacts (the BITS job database), so A.5.26's response procedure engages meaningfully: containment of affected systems, eradication of malicious jobs, forensic analysis of the job database, post-incident root-cause analysis, and closure all apply. The ceiling is `mostly` because A.5.26 excludes assessment (A.5.25) and evidence collection (A.5.28), which are named parts of response the clause itself does not perform.
- T1200mostlyresponds — The procedure governs the containment and eradication of the rogue hardware once discovered on the estate, but reaches mostly rather than full because the clause explicitly excludes the assessment and evidence collection phases of response.
- T1202mostlyresponds — The incident response procedure contains the affected systems and eradicates the malicious execution artifacts, but the clause's scope excludes initial assessment and evidence collection.
- T1203mostlyresponds — T1203 executes on the estate (code runs on the victim system), so all ten A.5.26 activities engage: the exploited system can be contained, evidence collected, forensics performed, root cause (the vulnerability) identified, and the weakness managed under (j); the ceiling is `mostly` because A.5.26 excludes assessment (A.5.25) and evidence collection (A.5.28) by construction.
- T1204mostlyresponds — T1204 is a post-compromise event with a real affected system (the endpoint that executed the malicious code), so A.5.26's procedure engages on containment, escalation, logging, communication, coordination, closure, forensics, post-incident root-cause analysis, and vulnerability management; the grade is capped at `mostly` by the clause's own scope, which excludes assessment (A.5.25) and evidence collection (A.5.28).
- T1204.001mostlyresponds — The malicious link has been clicked and code has executed, producing a real incident on the estate with affected systems, evidence to collect, and a foothold to contain; A.5.26's core response activities (containment, logging, communication, forensic analysis, post-incident root cause, vulnerability identification) all engage, reaching the same ceiling as T1566 because A.5.26 excludes assessment (A.5.25) and evidence collection (A.5.28).
- T1204.002mostlyresponds — A malicious file executing on a user's system is a clear incident on the estate with an affected system to contain, evidence to collect, forensic analysis to perform, and root cause to identify — walking A.5.26's activities (a, c–j) engages broadly, and the same ceiling applies as on T1486: A.5.26 excludes assessment (A.5.25) and evidence collection (A.5.28), so it cannot reach `full`.
- T1204.003mostlyresponds — Once a malicious image is deployed, the backdoored instance or container runs on the organization's estate, giving A.5.26 real objects for containment, logging, communication, closure, root-cause analysis and vulnerability management; the same exclusions that bound the T1486 and T1566 anchors apply here -- A.5.26 does not perform assessment (A.5.25) or evidence collection/forensics (A.5.28) -- so the grade reaches the same ceiling of `mostly`.
- T1204.004mostlyresponds — The technique has executed on the estate — the user has run the pasted code and the adversary has a foothold — so A.5.26's procedure engages across containment, logging, communication, forensic analysis, root-cause analysis and vulnerability identification. The ceiling is `mostly` for the same reason as T1566 and T1486: A.5.26 excludes assessment (A.5.25) and evidence collection (A.5.28), so it cannot answer `responds` completely.
- T1204.005mostlyresponds — The malicious library executes on the organization's estate, so there is a real incident to respond to: affected systems can be contained, evidence collected, root cause identified, vulnerabilities managed, and the incident closed — engaging most of A.5.26's activities. The grade is `mostly` and not `full` because A.5.26 structurally excludes assessment (A.5.25) and evidence collection (A.5.28), which is the same ceiling that holds against T1486 and T1566.
- T1205mostlyresponds — Traffic signaling produces observable events on the estate (magic packets arrive, ports open, C2 is established), so containment of the affected system, eradication of the implant, forensic analysis, logging, and vulnerability identification are all real response activities; the remainder is the clause's own exclusion of assessment (A.5.25) and evidence collection (A.5.28), which caps A.5.26 at `mostly` on this verb.
- T1207mostlyresponds — T1207 runs on the estate (rogue DC objects created in the AD schema, replication changes observable), so A.5.26's response activities engage: containment (remove the rogue DC registration), closure and recording, post-incident root-cause analysis (how admin/KRBTGT was obtained), and identifying the weaknesses that allowed it. The technique's logging evasion and forensic obstruction do not change that there is a real incident to respond to. The grade is capped at `mostly` by construction because A.5.26 excludes assessment (A.5.25) and evidence collection (A.5.28), the same ceiling that holds for T1486 and T1566.
- T1210mostlyresponds — T1210 is a post-compromise technique on the estate with real affected systems (the exploited host) and real evidence (exploit artifacts, lateral movement traces), so A.5.26's procedure engages on containment of the compromised system, logging, communication, closure, forensics, post-incident root-cause analysis, and identifying the exploited vulnerability — a strong majority of the clause's activities. The grade is capped at `mostly` by the same ceiling that applies to T1486: A.5.26 excludes assessment (A.5.25) and evidence collection (A.5.28), so it cannot answer `responds` completely for any technique.
- T1212mostlyresponds — T1212 has executed on the estate — exploitation has occurred, affected systems exist, evidence is present, and the vulnerability itself is the root cause — so most of A.5.26's activities engage: containment (a), logging (d), communication (e), closure (g), forensics (h), root-cause analysis (i), and vulnerability management (j) which is particularly central here. The grade is capped at `mostly` by the clause's own construction, which excludes assessment (A.5.25) and evidence collection (A.5.28).
- T1213mostlyresponds — T1213 executes on the estate (adversary accesses the organization's own repositories), so A.5.26's procedure engages across containment of further access, evidence collection, communication (especially for PII exposure), post-incident analysis, and weakness remediation; the grade is capped at `mostly` by the clause's own exclusions of assessment (A.5.25) and evidence collection (A.5.28), with the named remainder being data already viewed/exfiltrated that response cannot undo.
- T1213.002mostlyresponds — A.5.26 manages the containment and eradication of the adversary's unauthorized access to SharePoint, but reaches mostly rather than full because the clause explicitly excludes assessment and evidence collection.
- T1213.003mostlyresponds — The incident response procedure contains the compromised access to the code repository and manages the eradication, but reaches mostly rather than full because the clause explicitly excludes incident assessment and evidence collection.
- T1213.004mostlyresponds — CRM data mining is an observable event on the organization's estate (or SaaS tenant) with real impact — unauthorized access to systems holding PII — so A.5.26's procedure engages: containment of affected access, logging, communication to interested parties (especially given PII), coordination with authorities, forensic analysis, post-incident root cause, and weakness identification all apply. The grade is `mostly` and not `full` for the same reason as the T1486 anchor: A.5.26 excludes assessment (A.5.25) and evidence collection (A.5.28), so two parts of response are out of scope by construction. The data already mined is not undone by responding, but that is a `recovers` question, not this verb.
- T1213.005mostlyresponds — T1213.005 produces a real event on the organization's estate (unauthorized access to messaging platforms holding credentials, source code, proprietary data), so most of A.5.26's response activities engage — containment of affected accounts/sessions, escalation, logging, communication, coordination with the platform provider, closure, post-incident root-cause analysis, and vulnerability identification; the named remainder is the same one the T1486 and T1566 anchors carry: A.5.26 excludes evidence collection and forensic analysis, which sit in A.5.28.
- T1213.006mostlyresponds — The technique runs on the estate — the adversary queries databases hosted on or used by the organization, producing observable query logs, access records and potential data egress — so A.5.26's procedure engages on containment (isolate the database, revoke the access path), escalation, logging, communication (especially given PII/financial data and notification obligations), coordination with authorities, closure, post-incident root-cause analysis, and vulnerability identification; the bounded remainder is the clause's own structural exclusion of assessment (A.5.25) and evidence collection/forensics (A.5.28), which caps A.5.26 at `mostly` by construction.
- T1216mostlyresponds — T1216 executes on the estate (signed scripts proxy malicious payloads on the organization's systems), so A.5.26's response activities engage: containment of affected systems, logging, communication, coordination, closure, forensic analysis, post-incident root-cause work, and identifying the weaknesses that let the proxy execution succeed. The grade is capped at `mostly` by the owner's ceiling rule — A.5.26 excludes assessment (A.5.25) and evidence collection (A.5.28), so it cannot answer `responds` completely for any technique.
- T1218mostlyresponds — T1218 executes on the estate — a trusted binary proxies malicious content, producing observable process, file and network artifacts — so A.5.26's procedure is entered for a real incident and most of the ten activities engage (containment of the affected host, evidence handling, logging, forensic analysis of what was proxied, root-cause identification of the abused binary, and weakness management for the missing application-control gap); the grade is capped at `mostly` by the clause's own construction, since A.5.26 excludes assessment (A.5.25) and evidence collection (A.5.28).
- T1218.001mostlyresponds — T1218.001 executes on the estate (hh.exe runs, payloads drop, network connections occur), producing a real incident A.5.26's procedure can be entered for; most of the ten activities engage (containment of the affected system, evidence collection from the CHM and its artifacts, logging, communication, forensic analysis of the file, root-cause work, vulnerability identification). The bounded remainder is the clause's own scope: A.5.26 excludes assessment (A.5.25) and evidence collection (A.5.28), so it cannot answer `responds` completely for any technique — `mostly` is the ceiling this cell reaches.
- T1218.003mostlyresponds — CMSTP abuse executes on the estate (malicious code runs via CMSTP.exe), producing a real incident A.5.26's procedure can engage: containment of the affected system, evidence collection, logging, forensic analysis, post-incident root-cause work, and vulnerability management all apply. The ceiling is `mostly` by construction — A.5.26 excludes assessment/determination of whether an event is an incident (A.5.25) and the detailed evidence-collection process (A.5.28), so no ISO clause reaches `full` on `responds`.
- T1218.004mostlyresponds — InstallUtil proxy execution runs on the estate, so A.5.26's procedure engages with most response activities — containing the affected endpoint, logging, communicating, coordinating, forensic and post-incident analysis, and identifying the application-control weakness that allowed the bypass; the ceiling is `mostly` because A.5.26 excludes assessment (A.5.25) and evidence collection (A.5.28), the same named remainder that caps every post-compromise technique on this clause.
- T1218.005mostlyresponds — mshta.exe executes on the estate, producing a real incident A.5.26's procedure can engage: containment of affected systems, logging, communication, coordination, closure, forensics, post-incident root-cause analysis, and weakness identification all apply. The grade is `mostly` and not `full` for the same reason as the T1486 and T1566 anchors: A.5.26 excludes assessment (A.5.25) and evidence collection (A.5.28), so two parts of response are out of scope by construction.
- T1218.007mostlyresponds — Msiexec abuse executes on the estate, producing a real incident A.5.26's procedure can be entered for: the affected system can be contained, the event logged, escalated, communicated, closed, root-caused, and the application-control weakness that allowed the abuse identified and managed. The bounded remainder is the same one A.5.26 carries against every technique — evidence collection and forensics are excluded to A.5.28 — so the ceiling is `mostly`.
- T1218.008mostlyresponds — T1218.008 executes on the estate (odbcconf.exe runs on a Windows host), so there is a real incident A.5.26's procedure can be entered for; containment, escalation, logging, communication, coordination, closure, root-cause analysis and weakness management all engage. The ceiling is `mostly` because A.5.26 excludes assessment (A.5.25) and evidence collection (A.5.28), the same named remainder that caps A.5.26 against T1486 and T1566.
- T1218.009mostlyresponds — T1218.009 executes code on the endpoint via Regsvcs/Regasm, producing observable artifacts (process execution, registry modifications, file writes) that constitute a real incident on the estate; A.5.26's containment, escalation, logging, communication, forensic analysis, post-incident root cause analysis, and vulnerability management all engage, with the named remainder being assessment (A.5.25) and evidence collection (A.5.28), which the clause itself excludes.
- T1218.010mostlyresponds — Regsvr32 abuse executes on the estate and produces an observable incident; A.5.26's procedure engages for containment, eradication, logging, communication, forensic analysis, post-incident root cause and weakness identification. The ceiling is `mostly` by construction — A.5.26 excludes assessment (A.5.25) and evidence collection (A.5.28), the same remainder that bounds A.5.26 vs T1486.
- T1218.011mostlyresponds — Rundll32 abuse executes on the estate, so A.5.26's response activities engage: the affected endpoint can be contained (a), the incident logged (d), escalated (c), communicated (e), coordinated (f), closed and recorded (g), root-caused (i), and the underlying weaknesses managed (j); the same ceiling as the T1486 and T1566 anchors applies because A.5.26 excludes assessment (A.5.25) and evidence collection/forensics (A.5.28), so it cannot reach `full`.
- T1218.012mostlyresponds — Verclsid proxy execution runs on the estate, so A.5.26's containment (a), logging (d), communication (e), forensics (h), post-incident analysis (i) and weakness identification (j) all engage against a technique that has already executed; the ceiling is `mostly` because the clause excludes assessment (A.5.25) and evidence collection (A.5.28), the same two-part remainder that bounds every A.5.26 `responds` grade.
- T1218.013mostlyresponds — Mavinject runs on the estate with affected processes, so A.5.26's procedure engages: containment of injected processes, logging, escalation, communication, closure, post-incident root-cause analysis, and vulnerability management all apply; the same ceiling as T1486/T1566 holds because A.5.26 excludes assessment (A.5.25) and evidence collection (A.5.28), preventing `full`.
- T1218.014mostlyresponds — T1218.014 executes on the estate (mmc.exe runs, .msc files open, code executes), so there is a real incident for A.5.26's procedure to engage — containment, eradication, logging, communication, closure, forensics, root cause and weakness management all apply; the ceiling is `mostly` by construction because A.5.26 excludes assessment (A.5.25) and evidence collection (A.5.28), the same ceiling that bounds A.5.26 against T1486 and T1566.
- T1218.015mostlyresponds — T1218.015 executes on the estate (child processes, command execution via Electron apps), so containment, eradication, logging, communication, forensic analysis, root-cause analysis and weakness identification are all real response activities A.5.26 engages; the grade is `mostly` and not `full` for the same reason as the T1486 anchor — A.5.26 excludes assessing whether the event is an incident (A.5.25) and excludes evidence collection (A.5.28).
- T1219mostlyresponds — T1219 is a post-compromise technique with active presence on the estate (a remote access tool/session running on a compromised host), so A.5.26's response activities have real objects: containing the affected system, eradicating the remote access tool, closing the C2 channel, forensics, root cause, and weakness identification all engage. The ceiling is `mostly` because A.5.26 excludes assessment (A.5.25) and evidence collection (A.5.28), which prevents `full` on any technique by construction.
- T1219.001mostlyresponds — A.5.26 provides the procedure to contain the compromised system and eradicate the unauthorized IDE tunnel, but reaches mostly rather than full because the clause explicitly excludes assessment and evidence collection.
- T1219.002mostlyresponds — The technique runs on the estate (adversary is actively using remote desktop software on compromised systems), so all ten response activities have real objects: systems to contain, evidence to collect, logs to keep, parties to inform, root cause to find, and vulnerabilities to manage. The grade is `mostly` and not `full` because A.5.26 excludes assessment (A.5.25) and evidence collection (A.5.28) by construction, which is the ceiling the owner ruled for this clause.
- T1219.003mostlyresponds — The technique executes post-compromise with physical hardware installed on the target's estate, so there are real affected systems to contain, a physical artifact (the KVM device) to collect as evidence and eradicate, and weaknesses (peripheral device policy) to identify — engaging most of A.5.26's response activities, with the same ceiling remainder as T1486: assessment/determination-of-incident (A.5.25) and primary evidence collection (A.5.28) are referenced out rather than performed.
- T1220mostlyresponds — A.5.26 provides the procedure to contain the affected systems and eradicate the malicious XSL artifacts once the execution is underway, but reaches mostly because the clause itself excludes the assessment and evidence collection phases of response.
- T1222mostlyresponds — A.5.26 manages the response to the incident, including containing the affected systems and addressing the unauthorized permission changes, but reaches at most mostly because the clause explicitly excludes assessment and evidence collection.
- T1222.001mostlyresponds — T1222.001 runs on the estate (DACLs are modified on Windows systems), producing a real incident A.5.26's procedure can engage: containment by revoking modified permissions and isolating affected systems (a), logging (d), communication (e), closure and recording (g), root cause (i), and identifying the weaknesses that allowed the modification (j). The ceiling is 'mostly' rather than 'full' because A.5.26 excludes assessment (A.5.25) and evidence collection (A.5.28), the same named remainder that caps every A.5.26 'responds' grade.
- T1222.002mostlyresponds — A.5.26 manages the containment of the affected system and the eradication of the adversary's foothold, but reaches only mostly because the clause explicitly excludes the assessment and evidence collection phases of incident response.
- T1484mostlyresponds — T1484 produces real, containable changes on the estate (malicious GPOs, rogue federation trusts, modified trust settings) that A.5.26's core activities — containment (a), eradication, forensics (h), root cause (i), vulnerability management (j), communication (e), coordination (f) — fully engage with; the grade is capped at `mostly` by the clause's own scope, which excludes assessment (A.5.25) and evidence collection (A.5.28).
- T1484.001mostlyresponds — T1484.001 occurs on the estate (AD domain controllers, SYSVOL), so A.5.26's core containment/eradication activities engage — affected DCs can be isolated, malicious GPO changes reverted, and the attacker's delegated write permissions revoked — and the administrative/follow-up half (logging, communication, closure, root cause, vulnerability management of the GPO ACL weakness) also engages; the same two named exclusions apply as on every technique (assessment is A.5.25, evidence collection is A.5.28), keeping this at the declared `mostly` ceiling.
- T1484.002mostlyresponds — Trust modification occurs on the organization's own infrastructure (AD domain controllers, identity provider tenants), so there is a real event on the estate to contain, eradicate, and follow up on — the core of `responds` engages; the ceiling is `mostly` because A.5.26 excludes assessment (A.5.25) and evidence collection (A.5.28) by construction, the same remainder that caps A.5.26 against T1486, T1566 and T1078.
- T1485mostlyresponds — Same ceiling as A.5.26's other impact-technique anchors: the procedure engages containment (especially given T1485's worm-like propagation), escalation, logging, communication, closure, post-incident root-cause analysis and weakness identification, but excludes assessment (A.5.25) and evidence collection/forensics (A.5.28), so it cannot reach `full` by construction.
- T1485.001mostlyresponds — The technique has executed and A.5.26's response engages: containment (removing the malicious lifecycle policy, revoking the adversary's IAM permissions), escalation, logging, communication, coordination with the cloud provider, closure, root-cause analysis (how the adversary obtained PutLifecycleConfiguration), and vulnerability management (the over-privileged access). The grade is `mostly` and not `full` for the same reason as the T1486 anchor: A.5.26 excludes assessment (A.5.25) and evidence collection (A.5.28), so two named parts of response are out of scope by construction.
- T1486mostlyprevents — A.5.26 requires a designated competent team and explicit procedures that include immediate containment (a), escalation/crisis invocation (c), coordination (f), and post-incident root-cause/vulnerability management (i–j); these directly stop ransomware propagation, further encryption, and re-infection, preventing the full technique from completing even though initial encryption may have already occurred.
- T1486mostlyrecovers — A.5.26 explicitly requires invoking business continuity plans, performing post-incident analysis, formally closing the incident, and (via j) identifying/managing the vulnerabilities that enabled the encryption, which together restore availability after the T1486 impact has occurred.
- T1486mostlyresponds — A.5.26 explicitly requires a designated competent team to respond to incidents (including containment, evidence collection, escalation, logging, communication, coordination, closure, forensics, root-cause analysis, and vulnerability management), which directly matches the act of responding once a T1486 ransomware encryption event is underway.
- T1489mostlyresponds — Service Stop is an observable estate event with affected systems, evidence in logs, and a root cause to identify, so A.5.26's procedure engages across containment (if spreading), evidence handling, escalation, logging, communication, coordination, closure, forensics, root-cause analysis and vulnerability management; the grade is held at the clause's declared ceiling of `mostly` because A.5.26 excludes assessment (A.5.25) and evidence collection (A.5.28), and the actual restoration of stopped services belongs to A.5.30 / A.8.14 rather than to this procedure.
- T1490mostlyresponds — T1490 executes on the estate (vssadmin, wmic, wbadmin, bcdedit, cloud backup deletion) and leaves observable artifacts, so A.5.26's procedure engages: containment of affected systems, logging, communication, coordination, closure, forensics, root-cause analysis, and identifying the weaknesses that allowed recovery features to be disabled. The ceiling is `mostly` for the same reason as the T1486 anchor: A.5.26 excludes assessment of whether an event is an incident (A.5.25) and excludes evidence collection (A.5.28), so two named parts of response sit outside the clause.
- T1491mostlyresponds — Defacement produces a real event on the estate (modified content on a web server or internal system) that A.5.26's procedure can be entered for: containment (taking the defaced system offline), eradication (removing the actor's foothold and patching the entry vector), logging, communication, coordination with authorities, forensic analysis, root-cause analysis, and weakness identification all engage. The ceiling is `mostly` for the same reason as the T1486 anchor: A.5.26 excludes assessment (A.5.25) and evidence collection (A.5.28), and the visual impact already realised is restored by A.8.13 backup, not by the response procedure itself.
- T1491.001mostlyresponds — Internal defacement executes on the organization's estate (internal websites, login messages, desktop wallpaper), producing real affected systems to contain, evidence to collect, and artifacts to eradicate — the same shape as T1486, which A.5.26 takes `mostly`. The ceiling is the same: A.5.26 excludes assessment (A.5.25) and evidence collection (A.5.28), so it cannot reach `full`.
- T1491.002mostlyresponds — External defacement touches the organization's estate (externally-facing systems are still the organization's), producing a real incident with affected systems to contain (take down the defaced page, restore from backup), evidence to collect, root cause to find, vulnerabilities to address, and communication obligations — engaging most of A.5.26's response activities. The bounded remainder is that the visible impact (the defacement message already seen by users) cannot be undone by response, plus A.5.26's own exclusions of assessment (A.5.25) and evidence collection (A.5.28).
- T1496mostlyresponds — Resource hijacking runs on the organization's own systems (miners, proxy clients, spam daemons), so there are real affected systems to contain, real artifacts to eradicate, evidence to collect, and an initial-access vulnerability to identify and manage — most of A.5.26's ten activities engage. The ceiling is `mostly` by construction: A.5.26 excludes assessment (A.5.25) and evidence collection (A.5.28), so no ISO clause reaches `full` on `responds`.
- T1496.001mostlyresponds — Compute hijacking executes on the estate with real affected systems consuming resources, real evidence (mining processes, pool connections, dropped binaries), and real artifacts to eradicate, so containment, eradication, logging, communication, closure, root-cause analysis and weakness identification all engage; the same ceiling that bounds A.5.26 against T1486 applies here -- the clause excludes assessment (A.5.25) and evidence collection proper (A.5.28), so `mostly` is the top reachable rung.
- T1496.002mostlyresponds — Bandwidth hijacking runs on compromised systems within the estate, so there are affected systems to contain, malware to eradicate, and root cause to identify — engaging A.5.26's core response activities (a, d, e, g, i, j). The grade is `mostly` and not `full` because A.5.26 excludes assessment (A.5.25) and evidence collection (A.5.28), which is the ceiling the owner ruled for this clause.
- T1496.003mostlyresponds — SMS pumping actively abuses the organization's messaging infrastructure, producing a real incident (anomalous SMS volume, cost spike, channel saturation) that A.5.26's procedure can be entered for: containment (blocking sources, disabling the abused form, rate-limiting), evidence, logging, coordination with the telecom provider (explicitly named in (f)), root-cause analysis, and vulnerability management all apply; the ceiling is `mostly` because A.5.26 excludes assessment (A.5.25) and evidence collection (A.5.28) by construction.
- T1505mostlyresponds — T1505 installs malicious components on the organization's own server applications, so the technique produces a real event on the estate with containable systems and eradicable artifacts, which engages A.5.26's procedure across containment, eradication, logging, communication, closure, forensics, root cause and weakness management; the same ceiling that applies to T1486 applies here, since A.5.26 excludes assessment (A.5.25) and evidence collection (A.5.28) by construction.
- T1505.001mostlyresponds — A.5.26 provides the procedure to contain affected database servers and eradicate malicious stored procedures once the incident is underway, but reaches mostly rather than full because the clause explicitly excludes assessment and evidence collection.
- T1505.002mostlyresponds — The malicious transport agent is installed and running on the Exchange server, so there is a real incident on the estate with affected systems to contain, response activities to log, root cause to identify, and vulnerabilities to manage — engaging most of A.5.26's procedure; the ceiling is `mostly` because A.5.26 excludes assessment (A.5.25) and evidence collection/forensics (A.5.28), the same structural reason that caps A.5.26 against T1486.
- T1505.003mostlyresponds — A web shell is a real artifact on the estate with a system to contain, evidence to collect (the shell file, access logs), forensics to perform, root cause to identify (the upload path), and weaknesses to manage — engaging most of A.5.26's listed activities; the ceiling is `mostly` by construction because A.5.26 excludes assessment (A.5.25) and evidence collection (A.5.28), and crisis-management escalation (c) is unlikely to engage for a single-server foothold.
- T1505.004mostlyresponds — T1505.004 executes on the estate (malicious ISAPI extensions/filters or IIS modules installed on the web server), so there are real affected systems to contain, artifacts to eradicate, and post-incident analysis to perform — A.5.26's procedure applies. The grade is `mostly` and not `full` for the same structural reason as the T1486 anchor: A.5.26 excludes assessment (A.5.25) and evidence collection (A.5.28), so no ISO clause reaches `full` on `responds` by construction.
- T1505.005mostlyresponds — The technique executes on the estate — a modified termsrv.dll and altered ServiceDll registry value are real artifacts with a real affected system to contain and eradicate, so the core of `responds` (containment and eradication once underway) engages; the ceiling is `mostly` by construction because A.5.26 excludes assessment (A.5.25) and evidence collection (A.5.28).
- T1505.006mostlyresponds — The technique executes on the organization's own ESXi estate (malicious VIBs installed on hypervisors with persistent backdoors/firewall rules), giving A.5.26 real systems to contain and artifacts to eradicate; the procedure engages most response activities, with the ceiling at 'mostly' because A.5.26 excludes assessment (A.5.25) and evidence collection (A.5.28).
- T1525mostlyresponds — T1525 implants the malicious image within the victim's own cloud/container registry, so there are real artifacts on the estate to contain, eradicate and forensically analyze, and all of A.5.26's response activities (a–j) have objects; the grade is capped at `mostly` by the owner's structural ruling that A.5.26 excludes assessment (A.5.25) and evidence collection (A.5.28).
- T1528mostlyresponds — Token theft produces a real incident on the estate — a compromised container, pipeline, identity, or user account — so A.5.26's response activities engage: containing the affected system, logging anomalous API/token use, forensic analysis of how the token was stolen, post-incident root cause, revoking/rotating the token via coordination with the identity provider, and closing the incident. The ceiling is `mostly` for the same reason as T1486 and T1566: A.5.26 excludes assessment of whether an event is an incident (A.5.25) and the core evidence-collection work (A.5.28), so no ISO clause reaches `full` on `responds` by construction.
- T1529mostlyresponds — A.5.26's response activities engage against T1529 — the shutdown/reboot is observable, evidence can be collected, escalation, logging, communication, forensic analysis, post-incident root-cause analysis, and vulnerability identification all apply — but the clause excludes assessment (A.5.25) and evidence collection (A.5.28), the same structural ceiling that bounds A.5.26 against T1486.
- T1530mostlyresponds — T1530 fully touches the organization's estate (cloud storage accounts, buckets, SaaS platforms), so every A.5.26 activity has a real object: containment via revoking tokens/credentials and locking down misconfigured buckets, evidence in cloud access/API logs, escalation, breach-notification communication, coordination with authorities when PII is exposed, closure, forensics, root-cause analysis (misconfiguration vs. leaked credentials), and identifying the access-control weakness. The ceiling is A.5.26's own scope: it excludes assessment (A.5.25) and evidence collection (A.5.28), so `mostly` is the top reachable rung, matching T1486 and T1566.
- T1531mostlyresponds — T1531 executes on the estate — accounts are deleted, locked or modified on the organisation's own systems — so there is a real incident A.5.26's procedure engages: containing further spread, collecting evidence of the account changes, escalating, logging, communicating with affected users, forensic analysis, root-cause analysis of how the adversary obtained the access to modify accounts, and identifying the vulnerabilities that allowed it. The ceiling is `mostly` by construction, as A.5.26 excludes assessment (A.5.25) and evidence collection (A.5.28), the same ceiling that holds against T1486.
- T1534mostlyresponds — Internal spearphishing occurs on the estate (compromised account sends emails/messages within the organization), so A.5.26's response activities engage: containing the compromised account, logging, communicating, coordinating, closing, forensic analysis, post-incident root-cause analysis, and identifying the weaknesses that enabled the initial compromise. The ceiling is `mostly` for the same reason as T1566: A.5.26 excludes assessment (A.5.25) and evidence collection (A.5.28), so it cannot answer `responds` completely.
- T1537mostlyresponds — T1537 leaves a real event on the estate — the adversary's access to the cloud account, the API calls, the audit logs — and A.5.26's procedure engages most of its activities against it: containment (revoking the adversary's access, disabling compromised credentials), communication, coordination, root-cause analysis, and vulnerability remediation. The ceiling is `mostly` by construction because A.5.26 excludes assessment (A.5.25) and evidence collection (A.5.28), the same ceiling that holds for T1486.
- T1539mostlyresponds — Cookie theft produces an observable event on the estate (access to cookie stores, exfiltration traffic, injected script), so A.5.26's procedure engages: containment (invalidate sessions, isolate affected systems), eradication (remove the stealing malware/tool), logging, communication, forensic analysis, root cause and weakness identification. The same ceiling as T1486/T1566 applies — A.5.26 excludes assessment (A.5.25) and evidence collection (A.5.28), so it cannot reach `full` by construction.
- T1542mostlyresponds — Pre-OS boot persistence is on the estate — firmware/boot mechanisms have been modified, so there are affected systems to contain, evidence to collect, root cause to identify, and weaknesses to manage; all ten A.5.26 activities can engage, but the clause excludes assessment (A.5.25) and evidence collection (A.5.28), which caps the grade at `mostly` per the same ceiling that holds for T1486 and T1566.
- T1542.001mostlyresponds — Firmware modification happens on the estate and produces a real incident with affected systems to contain, evidence to collect, and artifacts to eradicate, so A.5.26's response activities (a, c–g, h–j) engage broadly; the grade is held at the clause's `mostly` ceiling because A.5.26 excludes assessment (A.5.25) and evidence collection (A.5.28).
- T1542.003mostlyresponds — A bootkit executes on the estate (MBR/VBR/ESP modified, malicious code running below the OS), so there are real systems to contain, evidence to collect, forensic analysis to perform, root cause to identify, and vulnerabilities to manage — activities (a), (b), (d), (g), (h), (i), (j) all engage, and the technique description itself notes remediation requires suspecting and acting on it, which is exactly the response lane. The grade is `mostly` and not `full` for the same construction reason as the T1486 and T1078 anchors: A.5.26 excludes assessment (A.5.25) and evidence collection (A.5.28), so no ISO clause reaches `full` on `responds` by design.
- T1542.005mostlyresponds — T1542.005 produces a real event on the organization's estate — a network device running an unauthorized image loaded via TFTP — so A.5.26's procedure can be entered for containment (isolate the device), eradication (remove the malicious image, restore proper boot configuration), logging, communication, coordination, closure, root-cause analysis, and vulnerability identification; the grade is 'mostly' rather than 'full' because A.5.26 excludes assessment (A.5.25) and evidence collection/forensics (A.5.28), which are real parts of responding to a compromised network device.
- T1543mostlyresponds — T1543 runs on the estate (malicious services/daemons/agents are real artifacts on real systems), so A.5.26's procedure engages: containment of affected systems (a), eradication of the malicious service, logging (d), communication (e), coordination (f), closure (g), post-incident root-cause analysis (i), and weakness identification (j) all apply. The ceiling is `mostly` and not `full` for the same reason as the T1486 anchor: A.5.26 excludes assessment (A.5.25) and evidence collection/forensics (A.5.28), so two named parts of response are not performed by this clause.
- T1543.001mostlyresponds — The launch agent has been placed on the estate and is observable, so A.5.26's procedure engages: containment (isolate the macOS host, remove the .plist), eradication (delete the malicious agent and any dropped payloads), logging, communication, forensic analysis of the plist, root-cause analysis, and vulnerability management all apply. The same ceiling as T1486 holds: A.5.26 excludes assessment (A.5.25) and evidence collection (A.5.28), so it cannot reach `full`.
- T1543.002mostlyresponds — The technique executes on the estate — malicious .service files are written, the persistence mechanism runs, and there are real affected systems to contain, evidence to collect, and artifacts to eradicate. Most of A.5.26's ten activities engage (containment, logging, communication, closure, forensics, root cause, weakness identification), and the ceiling is `mostly` because A.5.26 excludes assessment/determining-an-event-is-an-incident (A.5.25) and evidence collection (A.5.28), the same ceiling that holds for T1486 and T1566.
- T1543.003mostlyresponds — The technique executes on the estate — a Windows service is installed and running on a system the organization owns — so there is a real system to contain and a real artifact (the service, its registry entries, the binary) to eradicate, engaging the core of A.5.26's response activities (a, d, e, g, i, j). The grade is `mostly` and not `full` for the same reason as the T1486 anchor: A.5.26 excludes assessment (A.5.25) and evidence collection/forensics (A.5.28), so it cannot answer `responds` completely.
- T1543.004mostlyresponds — The Launch Daemon is running on the estate, so A.5.26's procedure engages with most response activities — containment of the affected macOS system, eradication of the malicious plist, logging, communication, closure, forensic analysis, post-incident root cause, and vulnerability management — with the same ceiling as the T1486 anchor: A.5.26 excludes assessment (A.5.25) and evidence collection (A.5.28), so it cannot reach `full` by construction.
- T1543.005mostlyresponds — T1543.005 executes on the estate — the adversary modifies container services (Docker, Podman, kubelet, DaemonSets) on the organization's hosts to establish persistence — so there is a real incident A.5.26's procedure can be entered for: affected systems to contain, malicious container/service configurations to eradicate, evidence to collect, root cause to identify, and vulnerabilities that allowed the modification to be addressed. The grade is `mostly` and not `full` for the same reason as the T1486 anchor: A.5.26 excludes assessment (A.5.25) and evidence collection (A.5.28), so no ISO clause reaches `full` on `responds` by construction.
- T1546mostlyresponds — T1546 executes on the estate (a trigger is created/modified on a system), so there is a real event A.5.26's procedure can be entered for: the affected system can be contained, the trigger eradicated, the response logged, communicated, and closed. The ceiling is the same as T1486/T1566 — A.5.26 excludes assessment (A.5.25) and evidence collection/forensics (A.5.28), so it cannot answer `responds` completely.
- T1546.001mostlyresponds — The procedure manages the containment of affected systems and the eradication of the malicious registry modifications once underway, but reaches mostly rather than full because the clause explicitly excludes the assessment and evidence collection phases of response.
- T1546.002mostlyresponds — T1546.002 is an on-estate persistence technique with clear artifacts (registry keys, malicious .scr file) that A.5.26's procedure can contain, eradicate, log, forensically analyse, and conduct root-cause review on; the same A.5.25/A.5.28 exclusions that cap the T1486 anchor at mostly apply here.
- T1546.003mostlyresponds — The WMI subscription is an artifact on the estate that A.5.26's procedure can contain and eradicate once discovered, with root-cause analysis and weakness identification also engaged; the same ceiling as the T1486 and T1566 anchors applies because A.5.26 excludes assessment (A.5.25) and evidence collection (A.5.28).
- T1546.004mostlyresponds — The technique has executed (malicious shell config files are in place and will trigger on shell launch), producing real artifacts on the estate that A.5.26's procedure can contain (isolate the system), eradicate (remove malicious lines from .bashrc/.profile/etc.), log, communicate, forensically analyse, and trace to root cause and contributing weaknesses — engaging activities (a), (c)–(e), (g)–(j). The same ceiling as the T1486 anchor applies: A.5.26 excludes assessment (A.5.25) and evidence collection (A.5.28), so it cannot reach `full`.
- T1546.005mostlyresponds — T1546.005 is post-compromise persistence on the estate, so A.5.26's response procedure engages: containment of the affected system, eradication of the trap, logging, communication, closure, forensic analysis, post-incident root-cause analysis, and vulnerability identification all apply. The grade is `mostly` and not `full` for the same reason as the T1486 and T1566 anchors -- A.5.26 excludes assessment of whether the event is an incident (A.5.25) and evidence collection (A.5.28), so it cannot answer `responds` completely.
- T1546.006mostlyresponds — T1546.006 is a post-compromise persistence technique that runs on the estate (modified Mach-O binaries, loaded dylibs), giving A.5.26 real systems to contain, evidence to collect, persistence to eradicate, and root cause to analyze; the ceiling is `mostly` because A.5.26 excludes assessment (A.5.25) and evidence collection (A.5.28) by construction.
- T1546.007mostlyresponds — The persistence technique has executed on the estate (registry modification, DLL on disk, netsh.exe execution), so A.5.26's response activities engage: containment of affected systems, eradication of the malicious helper DLL and registry entry, logging, communication, post-incident root-cause analysis, and identifying the weaknesses that allowed it. `mostly` and not `full` because A.5.26 excludes assessment/determining whether an event is an incident (A.5.25) and evidence collection (A.5.28), the same ceiling the owner ruled for T1486 and T1566.
- T1546.008mostlyresponds — T1546.008 executes on the estate (binary replacement, registry modification) producing a real incident A.5.26's procedure can engage with: containment of affected systems, evidence collection, escalation, logging, communication, forensic analysis, post-incident root-cause analysis, and identifying the weaknesses that allowed the abuse — the core of `responds` is engaged. The ceiling is `mostly` because A.5.26 excludes assessment (A.5.25) and evidence collection (A.5.28), so the procedure cannot answer the verb completely for any technique.
- T1546.009mostlyresponds — The technique has executed on the estate — the AppCertDLLs registry value is set and the malicious DLL is loaded into processes — so containment, eradication (removing the registry key and DLL), forensic analysis, root-cause analysis and vulnerability identification all engage, mirroring the T1486 anchor; the same ceiling applies because A.5.26 excludes assessment (A.5.25) and evidence collection (A.5.28), capping the grade at `mostly`.
- T1546.010mostlyresponds — A.5.26's procedure engages once the AppInit DLL persistence is known: containment (removing the registry value, isolating affected hosts), logging, communication, coordination, closure/recording, post-incident root-cause analysis, and identifying the weakness that permitted the persistence all apply. The ceiling is `mostly` because A.5.26 excludes assessment (A.5.25) and evidence collection/forensics (A.5.28), which it only references.
- T1546.011mostlyresponds — Application shimming installs artifacts on the estate (shim databases, registry entries) that A.5.26's procedure can contain, eradicate, forensically analyze, and close — the technique has executed and there is a real affected system and real evidence to act on, engaging most of the response activities. The ceiling is `mostly` by construction: A.5.26 excludes assessment (A.5.25) and evidence collection (A.5.28), so it cannot answer `responds` completely for any technique.
- T1546.012mostlyresponds — T1546.012 executes on the estate (registry modifications establishing persistence/privilege escalation), so A.5.26's procedure engages: containment of affected systems, eradication of IFEO registry artifacts, forensic analysis, post-incident root cause, and vulnerability management all apply. The ceiling is `mostly` because A.5.26 excludes assessment (A.5.25) and evidence collection (A.5.28), per the owner's ruling on this clause.
- T1546.013mostlyresponds — A.5.26's containment and eradication activities engage against the malicious PowerShell profile: affected systems can be isolated, the modified profile.ps1 can be removed and the original restored, and post-incident analysis identifies how the profile was tampered with. The grade is `mostly` and not `full` for the same reason as the T1486 anchor: A.5.26 excludes assessment (A.5.25) and evidence collection (A.5.28), so two parts of response are performed elsewhere.
- T1546.014mostlyresponds — The emond persistence has executed on the estate — there is a system to contain, rule files in /etc/emond.d/rules/ to eradicate and use as evidence, and a root cause to analyse — so most of A.5.26's response activities engage; the ceiling is `mostly` by construction because A.5.26 excludes assessment (A.5.25) and the core of evidence collection (A.5.28).
- T1546.015mostlyresponds — COM hijacking executes on the estate (Registry modification, persistence established), so there is a real artifact to contain and eradicate and most of A.5.26's activities engage; the named remainder is the same as on T1486 — A.5.26 excludes assessment (A.5.25) and evidence collection (A.5.28), so it cannot answer `responds` completely.
- T1546.016mostlyresponds — T1546.016 executes on the estate (installer runs, persistence is established via Launch Daemon or similar), producing a real incident A.5.26's procedure can engage with — containment of affected systems, eradication of the malicious installer/persistence mechanism, forensic analysis, root-cause work, and vulnerability identification all apply. The grade is `mostly` rather than `full` because A.5.26 excludes assessment (A.5.25) and evidence collection (A.5.28), which is the declared ceiling for this clause on any technique.
- T1546.017mostlyresponds — The technique has executed and left artifacts on the estate (malicious udev rule files in /etc/udev/rules.d/ etc.), so there are real systems to contain, real artifacts to eradicate, and real evidence to collect — A.5.26's procedure engages across containment, logging, communication, closure, forensics, root-cause analysis, and weakness management; the same ceiling that caps T1486 and T1566 applies here, since A.5.26 excludes assessment (A.5.25) and evidence collection (A.5.28), preventing `full`.
- T1546.018mostlyresponds — The persistence is established on the estate with real artifacts (malicious .pth files, sitecustomize.py) that A.5.26's procedure can contain, eradicate, log, perform forensics on, and trace to root cause — but the clause excludes assessment (A.5.25) and evidence collection (A.5.28), so the ceiling is `mostly` by construction, as with T1486.
- T1547mostlyresponds — T1547 persistence executes on the estate (registry keys, startup folders, scheduled tasks) and A.5.26's procedure engages most response activities — containment of affected systems, eradication of the autostart mechanism, logging, communication, coordination, closure, post-incident root-cause analysis, and vulnerability management — with the bounded remainder being the two parts the clause excludes by reference: assessment (A.5.25) and evidence collection/forensics (A.5.28), which is the same ceiling that holds for T1486.
- T1547.001mostlyresponds — The persistence mechanism (registry run keys, startup folder entries) lives on the estate, so A.5.26's procedure has real objects to act on: containment of affected systems, eradication of the persistence entry, logging, communication, closure, forensic analysis, root-cause analysis, and weakness identification all engage. The grade is `mostly` and not `full` for the same reason as the T1486 and T1566 anchors: A.5.26 excludes assessment of whether an event is an incident (A.5.25) and excludes evidence collection (A.5.28), so two named parts of response are performed by other clauses.
- T1547.002mostlyresponds — The authentication package DLL has executed on the estate and is observable (registry key, file on disk, LSA loading it at boot), so containment, eradication, logging, communication, forensic analysis, root-cause analysis and vulnerability management all engage against this technique; the ceiling is `mostly` because A.5.26 excludes assessment (A.5.25) and evidence collection (A.5.28) by construction, the same ceiling that holds against T1486.
- T1547.003mostlyresponds — T1547.003 is a persistence technique that has executed and is running on the estate (malicious DLL registered and loaded by W32Time), so A.5.26's procedure has a real event to act on: containment of the affected system, eradication of the malicious registry entry and DLL, logging, communication, closure, root-cause analysis, and vulnerability management all engage; the ceiling is `mostly` because A.5.26 excludes assessment (A.5.25) and evidence collection (A.5.28) by construction, per the owner's ruling on this clause.
- T1547.004mostlyresponds — The technique has executed on the estate — registry keys are modified, DLLs are loaded on Windows hosts — so there are real affected systems to contain, real artifacts (malicious DLLs, registry entries) to eradicate, and real evidence to collect; A.5.26's procedure engages across all ten activities, but the clause excludes assessment (A.5.25) and evidence collection (A.5.28), so the ceiling is `mostly` by construction, the same as T1486 and T1566.
- T1547.005mostlyresponds — The technique executes on the estate (registry modified, malicious SSP loaded into LSA), so containment, escalation, logging, communication, coordination, closure, post-incident root-cause analysis and vulnerability identification all engage; the bounded remainder is the same one the owner named for A.5.26 generally — assessment (A.5.25) and evidence collection / forensics (A.5.28) are referenced but not performed by this clause, which caps the response at `mostly`.
- T1547.006mostlyresponds — A malicious kernel module loaded on the estate is a real incident A.5.26's procedure engages with — containment of the affected system, logging, communication, forensic analysis, root-cause analysis, and identifying the vulnerability that permitted loading are all available response activities. The grade is `mostly` and not `full` because A.5.26 excludes assessment (A.5.25) and evidence collection (A.5.28), which is the declared ceiling for ISO on `responds`.
- T1547.007mostlyresponds — The incident response procedure directs the containment of the affected system and the eradication of the malicious plist entry, but reaches mostly rather than full because the clause explicitly excludes assessment and evidence collection.
- T1547.008mostlyresponds — The malicious LSASS driver has already been installed and is executing, producing a real incident A.5.26's procedure can be entered for: containment of the affected system, eradication of the driver, forensic analysis, post-incident root-cause work, and vulnerability identification all apply. The ceiling is `mostly` by construction because A.5.26 excludes assessment (A.5.25) and evidence collection (A.5.28), the same ceiling the owner ruled for T1486 and T1566.
- T1547.009mostlyresponds — T1547.009 executes on the estate (shortcuts written to startup folders), so A.5.26's response activities engage: containment of the affected system, eradication of the malicious shortcut, logging, forensic analysis, post-incident root-cause work, and identifying the weaknesses that let the shortcut land. The ceiling is `mostly` by construction — A.5.26 excludes assessment (A.5.25) and evidence collection (A.5.28), the same named remainder that caps A.5.26 against T1486.
- T1547.010mostlyresponds — Port Monitors persistence runs on the estate (DLL loaded by spoolsv.exe, registry entries under HKLM\...\Print\Monitors), so A.5.26's response activities engage: containment of affected systems, logging, forensic analysis of the DLL, post-incident root cause, vulnerability identification, and closure. The ceiling is `mostly` because A.5.26 excludes assessment (A.5.25) and evidence collection (A.5.28), the same named remainder that caps the T1486 and T1566 anchors.
- T1547.012mostlyresponds — The technique has executed (malicious print processor registered and will load on spooler restart), so A.5.26's response procedure engages: containment of the affected system, eradication by removing the registry key and DLL, logging, communication, forensic analysis, root-cause analysis, and managing the underlying weakness. The grade is `mostly` and not `full` for the same reason as the T1486 and T1078 anchors: A.5.26 excludes assessment of whether the event is an incident (A.5.25) and excludes evidence collection (A.5.28), so two named parts of response are out of scope by construction.
- T1547.013mostlyresponds — A.5.26's response procedure engages meaningfully against this persistence technique: containment of affected systems, eradication of the malicious .desktop entries, forensic analysis of the autostart files, root-cause analysis of how the entry was added, logging, communication, closure and vulnerability management all apply. The grade is capped at `mostly` by the owner's ceiling rule — A.5.26 excludes assessment (A.5.25) and evidence collection (A.5.28), so it cannot answer `responds` completely for any technique.
- T1547.014mostlyresponds — Active Setup persistence is a post-compromise technique that produces observable artifacts (registry modifications, logon executions) on the estate, so A.5.26's procedure engages: containment of the affected system, eradication of the registry key, forensic analysis, post-incident root cause, and weakness management all apply. The ceiling is `mostly` by construction because A.5.26 excludes assessment (A.5.25) and evidence collection (A.5.28), which the owner ruled on 2026-10-02.
- T1547.015mostlyresponds — Login items persistence executes on the macOS estate, so A.5.26's procedure has real objects to act on — containing affected systems, eradicating the login item entries, forensic analysis of the .btm file and launchd plists, root-cause analysis of how the item was added, and managing the underlying weakness. The grade is `mostly` and not `full` because A.5.26 excludes assessment (A.5.25) and evidence collection (A.5.28), which is the declared ceiling on this clause for any technique.
- T1548mostlyresponds — A.5.26 manages the containment and eradication of the privilege escalation incident once underway, but reaches 'mostly' rather than 'full' because the clause explicitly excludes the assessment and evidence collection phases of response.
- T1548.002mostlyresponds — A.5.26's response procedure engages for a UAC bypass incident — containment of the affected system, logging, communication, closure, forensic analysis, root-cause analysis, and managing the UAC configuration weakness that enabled it — but the clause excludes assessment (A.5.25) and evidence collection (A.5.28), the same ceiling that bounds its grade against T1486.
- T1548.003mostlyresponds — T1548.003 executes on the estate and leaves observable artifacts (sudoers modifications, /var/db/sudo timestamps, privilege escalation events) that A.5.26's procedure engages with — containment of affected systems, forensic analysis, root-cause identification, and managing the sudoers weakness that enabled the abuse. The grade is `mostly` and not `full` because A.5.26 excludes assessment (A.5.25) and evidence collection (A.5.28), the same ceiling the owner ruled for A.5.26 against other post-compromise techniques.
- T1548.004mostlyresponds — The technique executes on the victim's macOS estate (user prompted, credentials entered, root obtained), so all ten A.5.26 activities engage — containment of the affected system, logging, escalation, communication, closure, forensics on the modified program, root-cause analysis, and vulnerability management around the deprecated API. The ceiling is `mostly` because A.5.26 excludes assessment (A.5.25) and evidence collection (A.5.28), the same structural remainder that caps A.5.26 against T1486.
- T1548.005mostlyresponds — The technique produces a real event on the estate (elevated cloud access being abused), so A.5.26's procedure engages: containment (revoking the elevated access, disabling the compromised account), logging, communication, post-incident root-cause analysis of the misconfigured permissions, and weakness management. The grade is capped at `mostly` by the ceiling rule — A.5.26 excludes assessment (A.5.25) and evidence collection (A.5.28), so it cannot answer `responds` completely for any technique.
- T1548.006mostlyresponds — T1548.006 executes on the estate (TCC database manipulated, malicious permissions granted, code running under trusted apps), so containment of the affected macOS system and eradication of the malicious TCC entries are real response actions A.5.26's procedure engages; the ceiling is `mostly` because A.5.26 excludes assessment (A.5.25) and evidence collection (A.5.28), the same named remainder that caps every ISO `responds` grade.
- T1550mostlyresponds — T1550 is a post-compromise lateral movement technique that produces real events on the estate (systems accessed via stolen material, tickets used, tokens replayed), so A.5.26's procedure engages across containment, logging, communication, forensic analysis, root-cause analysis and vulnerability identification; the grade is `mostly` and not `full` because A.5.26 excludes assessment (A.5.25) and evidence collection (A.5.28), which is the declared ceiling for this clause on every technique.
- T1550.001mostlyresponds — T1550.001 is a post-compromise technique with clear on-estate objects: stolen tokens are actively used against the organization's APIs and SaaS, so containment (revoking tokens, disabling accounts, blocking API access), forensic analysis of how the token was obtained, post-incident root cause, and vulnerability identification all engage. The grade is `mostly` and not `full` because A.5.26 excludes assessment of whether an event is an incident (A.5.25) and evidence collection (A.5.28), which is the declared ceiling for this clause on any technique.
- T1550.002mostlyresponds — Pass the Hash produces authentication events on the estate that A.5.26's procedure can act on: containment (disable compromised accounts, isolate affected systems), eradication (password resets, krbtgt rotation to invalidate stolen material), evidence handling, root-cause analysis, and vulnerability identification all engage; the only remainder is the clause's own exclusion of assessment (A.5.25) and evidence collection proper (A.5.28), which caps the grade at `mostly` by construction.
- T1550.003mostlyresponds — A.5.26's response activities engage against Pass the Ticket once underway: containment of affected systems, ticket revocation via password resets and KRBTGT rotation, forensic analysis of Kerberos logs, post-incident root-cause analysis, and vulnerability management all apply; the ceiling is `mostly` because A.5.26 excludes assessment (A.5.25) and evidence collection (A.5.28) by construction.
- T1550.004mostlyresponds — The technique produces an observable event on the estate (the adversary's session activity against the organization's web application), and most of A.5.26's activities engage: containment by revoking the session and forcing re-authentication, logging, communication, closure, post-incident root-cause analysis, and identifying the weaknesses that let the cookie be stolen. The ceiling is `mostly` by construction because A.5.26 excludes assessment (A.5.25) and evidence collection (A.5.28), and the technique's bypass of MFA means the containment action is real but the underlying access path may persist until the cookie theft vector is closed.
- T1552mostlyresponds — T1552 executes on the estate — the adversary reads files, registry and other artifacts on compromised systems — so there is a real incident A.5.26's procedure can be entered for: containing the affected system, logging the response, communicating per need-to-know, forensic analysis of credential access, root-cause analysis of how access was gained, and identifying the unsecured credential storage as a weakness to manage. The ceiling is `mostly` for the same reason as the T1486 and T1566 anchors: A.5.26 excludes assessment of whether an event is an incident (A.5.25) and evidence collection (A.5.28), so it cannot answer `responds` completely.
- T1552.001mostlyresponds — T1552.001 leaves observable artifacts on the estate (file access, credential reads, downstream use), so A.5.26's procedure engages across containment of affected systems, evidence handling, logging, communication, forensic analysis, root-cause analysis (why credentials were stored insecurely), and vulnerability management (the insecure storage itself); the grade sits at the A.5.26 ceiling because the clause excludes assessment (A.5.25) and evidence collection (A.5.28).
- T1552.002mostlyresponds — A.5.26 manages the containment of the compromised system and the eradication of the adversary performing the registry queries, but reaches only mostly because the clause explicitly excludes the assessment and evidence collection phases of response.
- T1552.003mostlyresponds — T1552.003 is post-compromise (adversary already on the system reading shell history), so A.5.26's procedure engages: containment of the affected system (a), logging (d), communicating (e), closing (g), post-incident root-cause analysis (i), and identifying the vulnerability of storing credentials in shell history (j). The named remainder is the clause's own exclusion of assessment (A.5.25) and evidence collection/forensics (A.5.28), which caps the grade at `mostly` per the owner's ceiling on this cell.
- T1552.004mostlyresponds — The incident response procedure contains the compromised system where the keys are being sought and manages the incident, but reaches 'mostly' rather than 'full' because the clause explicitly excludes assessment and evidence collection.
- T1552.006mostlyresponds — T1552.006 accesses SYSVOL on the organization's domain controller, producing a real on-estate event with logs, exposed credentials, and a containable spread. A.5.26 engages across most activities: (a) containment via credential rotation and SYSVOL access restriction, (b) evidence from file-access logs, (d) logging, (e) communicating, (g) closing and recording, (h) forensic analysis of the access path, (i) root cause (why credentials were embedded in GPP), and (j) managing the underlying weakness. Only (c) crisis-management escalation is clearly empty, and the ceiling on A.5.26 is `mostly` by construction since it excludes assessment (A.5.25) and evidence collection proper (A.5.28).
- T1553mostlyresponds — T1553 subverts trust controls on the estate (file/registry modifications, stolen or rogue code-signing certificates deployed on target systems), producing a real incident A.5.26's procedure can be entered for; all ten response activities engage, but the clause excludes assessment (A.5.25) and evidence collection (A.5.28), so the ceiling is `mostly`.
- T1553.001mostlyresponds — A.5.26 manages the incident once the bypass is detected, containing the affected macOS endpoint and eradicating the subverted application, but reaches only mostly because the clause explicitly excludes the assessment and evidence collection phases of response.
- T1553.003mostlyresponds — The technique produces real artifacts on the estate (modified registry values, malicious DLLs on disk) that A.5.26's procedure can be entered for, and the response activities engage: containment of affected systems, eradication of the hijacked components and restoration of legitimate SIP/trust provider DLLs, logging, communication, closure, forensic analysis of the registry/DLL modifications, root-cause analysis, and managing the weaknesses that enabled the hijack; the ceiling is `mostly` because A.5.26 excludes assessment (A.5.25) and evidence collection (A.5.28), the same named remainder that caps every A.5.26 `responds` grade on this cell.
- T1553.004mostlyresponds — The incident response procedure contains the compromised system and eradicates the malicious root certificate, but the clause excludes assessment and evidence collection, limiting its completeness.
- T1553.005mostlyresponds — The technique results in code execution on the estate (payload runs without MOTW protections after container extraction/mounting), producing an incident A.5.26's procedure engages for: containment of affected systems, evidence collection, escalation, logging, communication, coordination, closure, forensics, root cause analysis, and weakness identification — the same shape that earns T1566 (phishing) its `mostly`, since the bypass is the delivery mechanism and the incident is the resulting execution.
- T1553.006mostlyresponds — The technique produces a real event on the estate (policy modification with observable artifacts like registry changes, command execution, or kernel memory writes), so A.5.26's procedure engages meaningfully: containment of the affected system, eradication by reverting the policy, forensic analysis of the modification vector, root-cause analysis of how the privileges were obtained, and identifying weaknesses that allowed it. The grade is capped at `mostly` by the same ceiling that applies to T1486: A.5.26 excludes assessment (A.5.25) and evidence collection (A.5.28), so it cannot answer `responds` completely for any technique.
- T1554mostlyresponds — T1554 is a post-compromise technique with clear on-estate artifacts (modified binaries), so A.5.26's containment, eradication, logging, communication, forensic analysis, post-incident root-cause work, and vulnerability identification all engage; the ceiling is `mostly` because A.5.26 excludes assessment (A.5.25) and evidence collection (A.5.28) by construction.
- T1555mostlyresponds — T1555 executes on the organization's estate — credential stores are accessed locally, so there are real affected systems to contain, real eradication work (credential rotation, session revocation, isolating compromised hosts), and the full response procedure engages across containment, escalation, logging, communication, closure, root-cause analysis and weakness identification. A.5.26's ceiling is `mostly` by construction (it excludes A.5.25 assessment and A.5.28 evidence collection/forensics), and T1555 reaches that ceiling the same way T1486, T1078 and T1566 do.
- T1555.001mostlyresponds — A.5.26's procedure engages with a keychain credential theft once detected: containment of the affected macOS host, forensic analysis of how the keychain was accessed, root-cause analysis, credential revocation/reset, and vulnerability identification are all real response activities against this technique. The grade is `mostly` and not `full` for the same reason as the T1078 and T1566 anchors: A.5.26 excludes assessment (A.5.25) and evidence collection (A.5.28), so it cannot answer `responds` completely.
- T1555.002mostlyresponds — A.5.26's containment (a), eradication via credential reset and root-access removal, communication (e), closure (g), forensic handoff (h), root-cause analysis (i), and weakness identification (j) all engage against a credential-extraction incident that has already executed; the ceiling is `mostly` because A.5.26 excludes assessment (A.5.25) and evidence collection (A.5.28), the same named remainder that caps every A.5.26 `responds` grade.
- T1555.003mostlyresponds — The technique runs on the estate — the adversary reads browser credential stores, executes queries and calls Windows APIs on the victim's system — so there are affected systems to contain, evidence to collect, forensics to conduct, and root cause to identify, engaging most of A.5.26's activities; the same named remainder as the T1486 anchor applies, since A.5.26 excludes assessment (A.5.25) and evidence collection proper (A.5.28).
- T1555.004mostlyresponds — T1555.004 has executed — credentials have been read from the Credential Manager — so there is a real incident with affected systems (those whose credentials were taken), evidence to collect, and vulnerabilities to identify; A.5.26's containment, eradication, logging, communication, root-cause and weakness-identification activities all engage, but the clause excludes assessment (A.5.25) and evidence collection (A.5.28), which caps the grade at `mostly` by construction.
- T1555.005mostlyresponds — T1555.005 executes on the estate (memory extraction, password manager database access) producing a real incident with affected systems to contain, evidence to log, escalation needs, communication obligations, forensic analysis (referenced via 5.28), root-cause work and vulnerability identification — most of A.5.26's activities engage; the bounded remainder is the clause's own exclusion of assessment (5.25) and evidence collection (5.28), which is the ceiling this control reaches on any post-compromise technique.
- T1555.006mostlyresponds — The technique has executed (credentials retrieved via API calls logged in cloud audit trails), producing a real event A.5.26's procedure can engage: containment by revoking the adversary's IAM permissions and rotating exposed secrets, logging, communication, closure, forensic analysis of what was accessed, root-cause analysis of how privileges were obtained, and vulnerability management. The ceiling is `mostly` because A.5.26 excludes assessment (A.5.25) and evidence collection (A.5.28), the same structural reason that caps A.5.26 against T1486.
- T1556mostlyresponds — T1556 is a post-compromise technique that modifies authentication mechanisms on the estate (LSASS, PAM, identity provider configs), producing affected systems to contain, evidence and artifacts to collect and eradicate, and root-cause vulnerabilities to identify — A.5.26's procedure engages across nearly all ten activities, reaching the same `mostly` ceiling as T1486, T1566 and T1078 because the clause excludes assessment (A.5.25) and evidence collection (A.5.28).
- T1556.001mostlyresponds — Skeleton Key is a post-compromise technique that lands squarely on the estate: a domain controller is patched, there are affected systems to contain (isolate/reboot the DC, which erases the in-memory key), evidence to collect (LSASS patch, malware), forensic analysis to conduct, root cause to identify, vulnerabilities to manage, and communication/escalation needs. A.5.26's ten activities engage broadly; the ceiling is `mostly` because the clause structurally excludes assessment (A.5.25) and formal evidence collection (A.5.28), not because of any gap specific to this technique.
- T1556.002mostlyresponds — The malicious password filter DLL is registered on the estate and actively harvesting credentials, so there is a real, ongoing incident A.5.26's procedure can be entered for: containment (isolate the DC/host, remove the DLL), eradication, logging, communication, coordination, forensic analysis of the DLL, root-cause analysis of how it was registered, and vulnerability management all engage. The grade is capped at `mostly` by the clause's own scope: A.5.26 excludes assessment of whether the event is an incident (A.5.25) and evidence collection (A.5.28), so no ISO clause reaches `full` on `responds` by construction.
- T1556.003mostlyresponds — T1556.003 executes on the estate (modified PAM files, backdoored authentication) so A.5.26's procedure has a real event to act on: containment of affected systems, eradication of the malicious PAM components, communication, escalation, closure, root-cause analysis, and vulnerability management all engage. The ceiling is `mostly` because A.5.26 excludes assessment (A.5.25) and evidence collection/forensics (A.5.28), the same named remainder that caps this clause against every post-compromise technique.
- T1556.004mostlyresponds — A.5.26 manages the containment and eradication of the compromised network device image once the incident is declared, but reaches mostly rather than full because the clause explicitly excludes the assessment and evidence collection phases of response.
- T1556.005mostlyresponds — The technique produces observable events on the estate (AD property changes, DC access to read userParameters, credential compromise) that A.5.26's procedure can engage with: containment via disabling the property and isolating affected systems, escalation, logging, communication, coordination, closure, forensics, root-cause analysis, and vulnerability management. The same named remainder as the T1486 anchor applies — A.5.26 excludes assessment (A.5.25) and evidence collection (A.5.28) — so the grade reaches the same ceiling of `mostly`.
- T1556.006mostlyresponds — T1556.006 modifies MFA mechanisms on the organization's own estate (Azure AD, Windows hosts file, MFA configuration), so there is a real incident A.5.26's procedure can be entered for: containment (revoke modified settings, disable compromised accounts), eradication (restore proper MFA configuration, remove adversary access), logging, communication, forensic analysis, root-cause analysis, and identifying the weaknesses that allowed the modification all engage. The same ceiling as the T1486/T1566 anchors applies: A.5.26 excludes assessment (A.5.25) and evidence collection (A.5.28), so it cannot reach `full`.
- T1556.008mostlyresponds — The malicious DLL is installed on the estate and credentials are captured in flight, so A.5.26's procedure engages with containment of the affected system, eradication of the DLL, logging, communication, forensic analysis, root-cause work and vulnerability management; the ceiling is `mostly` because A.5.26 excludes assessment (A.5.25) and evidence collection (A.5.28) by construction.
- T1556.009mostlyresponds — The technique has executed (adversary modified conditional access policies on the IdP), producing a clear incident the response procedure engages with: containing affected identity systems, escalation, logging, communication, coordination, closure, post-incident root-cause analysis, and identifying the weaknesses that allowed the modification. The ceiling is `mostly` because A.5.26 excludes assessment (A.5.25) and evidence/forensic collection (A.5.28), the same named remainder that caps every A.5.26 `responds` grade.
- T1557mostlyresponds — T1557 establishes a position on the organization's own network — rogue ARP/DNS entries, an attacker's foothold between devices, and affected systems — so the core of A.5.26's response engages: containment (isolate affected systems, remove the rogue device), eradication (clear spoofed entries, restore proper configurations), forensics, root-cause analysis, and weakness identification. The bounded remainder is the same one A.5.26 carries on every technique: it excludes assessment (A.5.25) and evidence collection (A.5.28), so it cannot reach `full` by construction.
- T1557.002mostlyresponds — ARP cache poisoning produces a real event on the organization's own estate — affected systems with poisoned caches that can be contained (network isolation, port shutdown) and eradicated (clearing ARP entries, removing the attacker's foothold), engaging the core of A.5.26's response; the named remainder is the same one the owner ruled for T1486, namely that A.5.26 excludes assessment (A.5.25) and evidence collection (A.5.28), capping the grade at `mostly`.
- T1558mostlyresponds — T1558 executes on the estate (KDC interaction, ticket theft from endpoints), giving A.5.26 real response work — containing affected systems, logging, communicating, forensic analysis, root cause, and identifying the weaknesses that enabled the theft; the ceiling is `mostly` because A.5.26 excludes assessment (A.5.25) and evidence collection (A.5.28) by construction, the same remainder that bounds the T1486 anchor.
- T1558.001mostlyresponds — A.5.26's response procedure engages against an active golden ticket incident: containment (isolate domain controllers, reset KRBTGT twice), eradication (remove adversary foothold), logging, communication, forensic analysis, and post-incident root-cause work all apply. The grade is `mostly` and not `full` because A.5.26 excludes assessment (A.5.25) and evidence collection (A.5.28), the same ceiling the owner ruled for A.5.26 against T1078 and T1566.
- T1558.002mostlyresponds — Silver ticket forgery produces an event on the estate when the forged TGS is presented to a service, so A.5.26's procedure engages: containment by rotating the compromised service account password, logging, escalation, communication, coordination, closure, root-cause analysis, and vulnerability identification all apply; the ceiling is `mostly` because A.5.26 excludes assessment (A.5.25) and evidence collection/forensics (A.5.28), which are real parts of responding to a credential-theft-driven forgery.
- T1558.003mostlyresponds — Kerberoasting produces observable events on the estate (TGS requests to the DC) and a real foothold (cracked service account credentials) that A.5.26's procedure can contain by resetting passwords and eradicating by revoking the compromised access; the grade is `mostly` rather than `full` for the same reason as the T1486 and T1566 anchors — A.5.26 excludes assessment (A.5.25) and evidence collection (A.5.28), and the cracked credentials may already have been used for lateral movement before containment, which is the boundary with `recovers` rather than a deficiency in the response itself.
- T1559mostlyresponds — T1559 runs on the local estate and produces observable artifacts (process behavior, IPC channels, potential network connections), so A.5.26's procedure has real objects to engage with — containment of affected systems, logging, forensic analysis, post-incident root cause, and vulnerability identification all apply; the same ceiling as T1486 holds because A.5.26 excludes assessment (A.5.25) and evidence collection (A.5.28).
- T1559.001mostlyresponds — T1559.001 executes on the local system and leaves observable artifacts, so A.5.26's procedure engages: containment of the affected system, eradication of malicious COM objects, logging, communication, forensic analysis, root-cause work, and weakness identification. The grade is capped at `mostly` by the clause's own scope — A.5.26 excludes assessment (A.5.25) and evidence collection (A.5.28), which is the same ceiling the owner ruled for T1486, T1566 and T1078.
- T1559.002mostlyresponds — DDE execution produces a real event on the estate — a process spawns, registry keys change, and the endpoint is affected — so A.5.26's procedure is entered and most of its ten activities engage (containment, logging, communication, forensic analysis, post-incident root-cause, vulnerability identification). The grade is `mostly` and not `full` for the same reason as T1486 and T1566: A.5.26 excludes assessment (A.5.25) and evidence collection (A.5.28), which is the declared ceiling on this cell.
- T1560.001mostlyresponds — T1560.001 runs on the victim's estate (utilities like tar/zip/7-Zip executing, archive files being created), so there are real affected systems to contain, evidence to collect, and artifacts to eradicate — A.5.26's procedure engages. The ceiling is `mostly` by construction: A.5.26 excludes assessment (A.5.25) and evidence collection (A.5.28), the same named remainder that caps its grade against T1486.
- T1560.002mostlyresponds — The technique executes on the estate (library calls, archive file creation, process activity), so A.5.26's procedure has a real event to enter for: containment of the still-active adversary, logging, communication, closure, root-cause analysis and vulnerability identification all engage, and the ceiling is `mostly` because A.5.26 excludes assessment (A.5.25) and evidence collection (A.5.28) by construction.
- T1560.003mostlyresponds — The custom archival code runs on the estate, leaving systems to contain (a), evidence to collect (b, h), vulnerabilities to identify (j), and root cause to analyze (i); A.5.26's ceiling of `mostly` applies because the clause excludes assessment (A.5.25) and evidence collection (A.5.28).
- T1561mostlyresponds — Disk wipe with worm-like propagation is exactly the case where A.5.26's containment (a) is the core response action, and the administrative/follow-up half (c, d, e, f, g, i, j) also engages; the ceiling is `mostly` because A.5.26 excludes assessment (A.5.25) and evidence collection/forensics (A.5.28), as on every ISO `responds` cell.
- T1561.001mostlyresponds — Same ceiling as the T1486 anchor: A.5.26's procedure engages for containment (the worm-like propagation makes (a) real), escalation, logging, communication, coordination, closure, root-cause analysis and vulnerability management, but excludes evidence collection and forensic analysis (A.5.28) and assessment (A.5.25), so by construction it cannot reach `full`.
- T1561.002mostlyresponds — Disk Structure Wipe is a post-compromise impact technique with affected systems on the estate, so A.5.26's containment, evidence collection, forensics, escalation, communication, root-cause analysis and vulnerability management all engage meaningfully — but the clause's own ceiling is `mostly` because it excludes assessment (A.5.25) and evidence collection (A.5.28) by construction, so no ISO clause reaches `full` on `responds`.
- T1563mostlyresponds — T1563 executes on the estate (a hijacked SSH/RDP/telnet session is observable, containable, and forensically analysable), so A.5.26's procedure engages most response activities — containment of the affected system, logging, communication, coordination, closure, forensics, root cause, and vulnerability management — but the clause excludes assessment (A.5.25) and evidence collection (A.5.28), which is the same ceiling that holds T1078 and T1566 at `mostly`.
- T1563.001mostlyresponds — SSH hijacking executes on the estate — a session is compromised, lateral movement occurs, and there are real affected systems to contain, evidence to collect, and a root cause to identify — so the core of `responds` (containment and eradication) engages alongside the administrative half; the grade is held at `mostly` rather than `full` by the A.5.26 ceiling, which excludes assessment (A.5.25) and evidence collection (A.5.28) by construction.
- T1563.002mostlyresponds — RDP hijacking produces a real event on the estate (a hijacked session, lateral movement) that A.5.26's procedure can be entered for, and containment (terminate the session, isolate the affected system) plus eradication (remove the foothold, reset credentials) engage against the technique once underway; the grade is the same ceiling as T1486 because A.5.26 excludes assessment (A.5.25) and evidence collection (A.5.28), so no ISO clause reaches `full` on `responds` by construction.
- T1564.002mostlyresponds — The procedure manages the containment of the affected system and the eradication of the hidden user account once discovered, but reaches mostly rather than full because the clause explicitly excludes the assessment and evidence collection phases of response.
- T1564.003mostlyresponds — A.5.26 manages the containment of affected systems and the eradication of the malicious processes or configurations hiding the windows, but reaches only mostly because the clause explicitly excludes the assessment and evidence collection phases of incident response.
- T1564.006mostlyresponds — The technique executes on the estate (a VM runs on a compromised host with files, configs and processes that can be contained, shut down, and eradicated), so A.5.26's containment, eradication, forensic analysis, post-incident root-cause work and vulnerability identification all engage; the same ceiling as T1486 applies because A.5.26 excludes assessment (A.5.25) and evidence collection (A.5.28).
- T1564.008mostlyresponds — Once the malicious inbox rules are known, A.5.26's procedure engages: containment (removing the rules, suspending the compromised mailbox), forensic analysis, post-incident root-cause work, and identifying the credential weakness that allowed the rules to be created. The ceiling is `mostly` because A.5.26 excludes assessment (A.5.25) and evidence collection (A.5.28), so two named parts of response sit outside this clause.
- T1564.011mostlyresponds — T1564.011 executes on the estate (a process running with nohup or -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue), producing an observable incident A.5.26's procedure can engage with: containment (a) requires stronger measures like network isolation or force-kill since normal interrupts are evaded, but containment is still performed; evidence collection (b), logging (d), communication (e), closure (g), forensics (h), root cause (i), and weakness identification (j) all apply. The ceiling is the same as T1486/T1566: A.5.26 excludes assessment (A.5.25) and evidence collection proper (A.5.28), so it cannot reach `full`.
- T1565mostlyresponds — Data manipulation executes on the estate and produces a real incident A.5.26's procedure engages with — containment of ongoing manipulation, logging, communication, coordination, closure, post-incident root-cause analysis, and identifying the weaknesses that allowed it. The ceiling rule from the T1486 anchor applies: A.5.26 excludes assessment (A.5.25) and evidence collection/forensics (A.5.28), so it cannot reach `full` against any technique by construction, and `mostly` is the top reachable rung.
- T1565.001mostlyresponds — Stored data manipulation produces a real event on the estate (altered data is observable), so A.5.26's procedure engages: containment of affected systems, logging, escalation, communication, closure, root-cause analysis and vulnerability management all apply. The ceiling is `mostly` for the same reason as T1486 and T1566 — A.5.26 excludes assessment (A.5.25) and evidence collection/forensics (A.5.28), so two parts of response are out of scope by construction.
- T1565.002mostlyresponds — T1565.002 executes on the estate — the manipulation tool runs on an organizational system and the corrupted data is the organization's, so there are affected systems to contain, a tool/actor foothold to eradicate, evidence to collect, and the full response procedure engages; the `mostly` ceiling is the same one A.5.26 carries against T1486, because the clause excludes assessment (5.25) and evidence collection (5.28).
- T1565.003mostlyresponds — Runtime data manipulation executes on the estate — the adversary has modified systems/applications to alter data in flight — so there is a real incident A.5.26's procedure can engage: containment of the affected systems, logging, communication, forensic analysis, root-cause work, and vulnerability management all apply. The grade is `mostly` and not `full` for the same reason as the T1486 and T1566 anchors: A.5.26 excludes assessment of whether an event is an incident (A.5.25) and evidence collection (A.5.28), so by construction no ISO clause reaches `full` on `responds`.
- T1566mostlyprevents — A.5.26's designated competent team and explicit procedures for containing spread (a), coordinating to minimize consequences (f), and managing vulnerabilities/weaknesses that failed to prevent the incident (j) stop most phishing deliveries from achieving initial access or further impact once the first instance is underway, though the technique can still succeed against unaware recipients before any response triggers.
- T1566mostlyresponds — A.5.26 explicitly requires a designated competent team to respond to information security incidents (including containment, evidence collection, escalation, logging, communication, coordination, closure, forensics, root-cause analysis, and vulnerability management once the incident is underway), which directly matches the act of responding to a realized phishing incident per the event-lane definition.
- T1566.001mostlyresponds — Same clause, same verb, same denominator as the T1566 anchor: A.5.26's response activities engage against a spearphishing attachment that has executed (containment, escalation, logging, communication, closure, root cause, weakness identification), but the clause excludes assessment (A.5.25) and evidence collection/forensics (A.5.28), so it cannot answer `responds` completely.
- T1566.002mostlyresponds — Spearphishing link produces a real event on the estate (clicked link, possibly compromised account or endpoint) that A.5.26's procedure engages: containment of affected systems, logging, communication, coordination with authorities, forensic analysis, root-cause analysis, and identifying the email-filtering/training weaknesses that let it through. The remainder is the same one the owner named for the T1566 anchor — A.5.26 excludes assessment (A.5.25) and evidence collection (A.5.28), so it cannot answer `responds` completely.
- T1566.003mostlyresponds — Same clause, same verb, same ceiling as the T1566 anchor: once the third-party-service-delivered payload executes on a work system the incident is on the estate and A.5.26's procedure engages for containment, logging, communication, closure, root-cause and weakness identification; the `mostly` (not `full`) remainder is the structural one the owner named — A.5.26 excludes assessment (A.5.25) and evidence collection (A.5.28), so no ISO clause reaches `full` on `responds` by construction.
- T1566.004mostlyresponds — Same clause and verb as the A.5.26 vs T1566 anchor at `mostly`: once the vishing call succeeds and produces an incident (credentials divulged, RMM installed, MFA prompt accepted), A.5.26's procedure engages on containment, escalation, logging, communication, closure, root cause and weakness identification; the ceiling is `mostly` because A.5.26 excludes assessment (A.5.25) and the actual evidence-collection work (A.5.28).
- T1567mostlyresponds — Exfiltration over a web service produces a real event on the estate — outbound traffic to a legitimate service carrying the organization's data — that A.5.26's procedure is entered for; containment of the affected host, evidence collection from network and proxy logs, escalation, communication (including breach-notification assessment under A.5.5), coordination, forensic analysis, root-cause work and vulnerability management all engage, mirroring the T1486 pattern; the ceiling is `mostly` because A.5.26 excludes assessment (A.5.25) and detailed evidence collection (A.5.28), and the data already exfiltrated is not undone by responding.
- T1567.001mostlyresponds — The exfiltration has executed on the estate — there are affected systems to contain (to stop further uploads), evidence to collect from logs and endpoints, escalation, communication, coordination with authorities (especially under breach-notification law), forensic analysis, root-cause work, and vulnerability management — so most of A.5.26's ten activities engage; the ceiling is the same one A.5.26 carries against T1486, namely that assessment (A.5.25) and evidence collection (A.5.28) are excluded by the clause itself.
- T1567.002mostlyresponds — T1567.002 has executed on the estate (data egressed to a cloud service), producing a real event A.5.26's procedure can be entered for: containment of the exfiltrating host and blocking the cloud service, escalation, logging, communication to stakeholders and possibly regulators, coordination with the cloud provider, forensic analysis, root-cause work, and vulnerability management all engage. The grade is `mostly` and not `full` because A.5.26 excludes assessment (A.5.25) and evidence collection (A.5.28) by construction, which is the ceiling this clause reaches on every technique.
- T1567.003mostlyresponds — A.5.26's containment (a) can stop further exfiltration by isolating affected systems, eradication removes the foothold, and activities (b)-(j) all engage against this technique; the bounded remainder is the same as the T1486 anchor — A.5.26 excludes assessment (A.5.25) and evidence collection (A.5.28), and data already transmitted to the text storage site is not recoverable through response.
- T1567.004mostlyresponds — A.5.26's procedure engages once the exfiltration is observed: containment of the system sending data to the webhook, escalation, logging, communication, coordination (potentially with the SaaS provider hosting the webhook), closure, forensic handoff, root-cause analysis, and vulnerability management all apply. The grade is `mostly` and not `full` for the same reason as the T1486 anchor: A.5.26 excludes assessment/determination of incident (A.5.25) and evidence collection (A.5.28), so two parts of response are out of scope by construction.
- T1568.002mostlyresponds — The incident response procedure contains the compromised system executing the domain generation algorithm and eradicates the malware generating the traffic, reaching the 'mostly' ceiling for this control because it excludes assessment and evidence collection.
- T1569mostlyresponds — T1569 produces observable estate effects (malicious services running, processes executing) that A.5.26's procedure engages with across most activities—containment of affected systems, eradication of the malicious service, forensic analysis, root cause, and vulnerability identification—reaching the declared ISO ceiling of `mostly` because A.5.26 excludes assessment (A.5.25) and evidence collection (A.5.28).
- T1569.002mostlyresponds — T1569.002 executes on the estate via the service control manager, producing observable events, affected systems to contain, evidence to collect, and artifacts to forensically analyze — A.5.26's procedure engages most of its response activities (containment, logging, communication, coordination, closure, root cause, vulnerability identification); the ceiling is `mostly` by construction because A.5.26 excludes assessment (A.5.25) and evidence collection (A.5.28).
- T1569.003mostlyresponds — T1569.003 executes on the estate (systemctl runs on compromised Linux systems, leaving systemd/journal logs and a malicious service unit to deal with), so A.5.26's procedure engages with containment of the affected host, eradication of the rogue service, logging, communication, closure, forensics, root-cause analysis and weakness identification; the bounded remainder is the same one the T1486 anchor names — A.5.26 excludes assessment (A.5.25) and the core of evidence collection (A.5.28), so it cannot reach `full`.
- T1570mostlyresponds — Lateral tool transfer is an active technique on the estate with real systems to contain and tools to eradicate, so A.5.26's containment, logging, communication, post-incident analysis and vulnerability-identification activities all engage; the `mostly` ceiling is the same one the owner ruled for T1486 and T1078, because A.5.26 excludes assessment (5.25) and evidence collection (5.28).
- T1572mostlyresponds — T1572 runs through the organization's network and compromised endpoints, so there is a real incident on the estate to respond to: the tunneling system can be contained, the C2 channel disrupted, evidence collected from network and endpoint, and root cause analysed — engaging the core of A.5.26's procedure. The grade is capped at `mostly` by the clause's own construction, which excludes assessment (A.5.25) and evidence collection (A.5.28).
- T1573mostlyresponds — The incident response procedure contains the affected systems and eradicates the malware generating the encrypted channel, but reaches 'mostly' rather than 'full' because the clause explicitly excludes assessment and evidence collection.
- T1574mostlyresponds — T1574 executes on the estate (DLL hijacking, path interception, registry poisoning all leave affected systems, evidence, and a hijacked process to contain), so all ten A.5.26 activities engage -- containment of the affected process, evidence handling, escalation, logging, communication, coordination, closure, forensics, root-cause analysis, and identifying the weakness that allowed the hijack. The grade is `mostly` and not `full` for the same reason as the T1486 and T1566 anchors: A.5.26 excludes assessment (A.5.25) and the actual performance of evidence collection (A.5.28), so the clause cannot answer `responds` completely by construction.
- T1574.001mostlyresponds — DLL hijacking runs on the estate with real artifacts (malicious DLLs, affected processes, persistence mechanisms), so A.5.26's procedure engages with most response activities — containment of affected systems, escalation, logging, communication, closure, root-cause analysis, and vulnerability identification all apply. The same exclusions that bound T1486 and T1566 at `mostly` apply here: A.5.26 excludes assessment (A.5.25) and evidence collection/forensics (A.5.28), so the verb cannot reach `full`.
- T1574.004mostlyresponds — Dylib hijacking executes on the estate — a malicious dylib runs inside a legitimate process, so there are real systems to contain, a real artifact (the dylib) to eradicate, and a real root cause (the search-path/weak-linking weakness) to identify and manage under (a), (g), (i), (j). The grade is `mostly` and not `full` for the same structural reason as the T1486 anchor: A.5.26 excludes assessment of whether the event is an incident (A.5.25) and excludes evidence collection (A.5.28), so the procedure cannot answer `responds` completely regardless of how thoroughly containment and eradication are performed.
- T1574.005mostlyresponds — The technique produces a real event on the estate — a replaced binary executes, leaving observable artifacts (file system changes, process execution, privilege escalation) — so A.5.26's procedure engages across most of its ten activities: containment of the affected system, escalation, logging, communication, closure, forensic analysis, root cause identification, and managing the underlying permissions weakness. The grade is `mostly` and not `full` because A.5.26 excludes assessment (A.5.25) and evidence collection (A.5.28) by construction, which is the declared ceiling for this clause on any technique.
- T1574.006mostlyresponds — Dynamic linker hijacking executes on the victim's Linux/macOS estate, producing observable artifacts (malicious library files, environment variable changes, hooked process behavior) that A.5.26's procedure can act upon: containment of affected systems, eradication of the malicious library, forensic analysis of how LD_PRELOAD/DYLD_INSERT_LIBRARIES was set, root-cause analysis, and post-incident vulnerability management all engage. The ceiling is `mostly` by construction because A.5.26 excludes assessment (A.5.25) and evidence collection (A.5.28), the same named remainder that bounds every A.5.26 `responds` grade.
- T1574.007mostlyresponds — T1574.007 executes on the estate with observable artifacts (malicious binary in a PATH directory, modified PATH variable), so A.5.26's containment, eradication, forensic analysis, root-cause analysis and vulnerability-identification activities all engage; the ceiling is `mostly` because A.5.26 excludes assessment (A.5.25) and evidence collection (A.5.28), the same named remainder that caps A.5.26 against T1486.
- T1574.008mostlyresponds — The technique executes on the estate — a malicious file is placed and runs — producing a real incident A.5.26's procedure can engage with across containment, eradication, forensic analysis, root-cause and vulnerability management; the ceiling is `mostly` because A.5.26 excludes assessment (A.5.25) and evidence collection (A.5.28), the same structural remainder that caps every A.5.26 `responds` grade.
- T1574.009mostlyresponds — The technique executes on the estate — a malicious binary is placed and runs, establishing persistence or elevated execution — so A.5.26's procedure engages with real objects: the affected system can be contained, the planted binary and registry/service artifacts collected as evidence, the foothold eradicated, and the unquoted-path weakness identified and managed under (j). The bounded remainder is the same one A.5.26 always carries: it excludes assessment of whether the event is an incident (A.5.25) and the detailed evidence-collection function (A.5.28), so it cannot reach `full` by construction.
- T1574.010mostlyresponds — T1574.010 is a post-compromise technique that has executed on the estate (a malicious binary is running in place of a legitimate service), so A.5.26's procedure can be entered for it: containment (stopping the service, isolating the host), escalation, logging, communication, coordination, closure, root-cause analysis, and — directly relevant — identifying the permission weakness that caused the incident (clause j). The same ceiling as the T1486 anchor applies: A.5.26 excludes assessment (A.5.25) and the substantive evidence collection and forensic analysis (A.5.28), so it cannot answer `responds` completely.
- T1574.011mostlyresponds — T1574.011 produces a real on-estate event (tampered service registry keys, malicious DLL/service execution) that A.5.26's procedure can engage with across most activities: containment of affected systems, eradication by removing malicious registry entries and restoring correct binPath/ImagePath values, forensic analysis of the registry tree, root-cause analysis, logging, communication, closure, and (j) identifying and managing the permissions weakness that enabled the hijack — which is exactly the kind of contributing control weakness (j) names. The ceiling is `mostly` because A.5.26 excludes assessment (A.5.25) and evidence collection (A.5.28), and escalation to crisis/BCP is unlikely to engage for this technique.
- T1574.013mostlyresponds — The technique runs on the estate (a Windows process is hijacked via modified KernelCallbackTable), so there are real response objects: the affected process to contain, the malicious payload to eradicate, post-incident root-cause analysis, vulnerability identification, and closure. A.5.26 reaches the same ceiling as on T1486 and T1566 — `mostly` and not `full` because the clause excludes assessment (A.5.25) and evidence collection (A.5.28), two named parts of response it does not perform.
- T1574.014mostlyresponds — AppDomainManager injection runs on the estate and produces observable artifacts (process behavior, .NET config tampering, custom AppDomain creation), so A.5.26's procedure engages for containment, eradication, logging, communication, escalation, closure, forensics, post-incident analysis and weakness identification; the ceiling is `mostly` because the clause excludes assessment (A.5.25) and evidence collection (A.5.28), which is the same construction that bounds every A.5.26 `responds` grade.
- T1578mostlyresponds — T1578 executes on the organization's own IaaS estate, leaving real artifacts (modified compute instances, snapshots, API traces) that A.5.26's procedure can engage on: containment of affected cloud resources, logging, escalation, communication, coordination, closure, root-cause analysis, and weakness identification all apply; the ceiling is `mostly` because A.5.26 excludes assessment (A.5.25) and evidence collection/forensics (A.5.28), which are real parts of responding to a cloud-infrastructure modification.
- T1578.003mostlyresponds — A.5.26's procedure directly engages the incident lifecycle for a deleted cloud instance—containment (a), evidence collection (b), logging (d), communication (e), coordination (f), closure (g), forensic analysis (h), root cause analysis (i), and vulnerability management (j)—with the only bounded remainder being the pre-deletion state of the instance itself, which is a recovery concern outside the scope of response.
- T1599mostlyresponds — T1599 executes on the estate — a perimeter or segmentation device is under adversary control — so A.5.26's procedure has real objects to act on: containing the compromised device (a), collecting device logs and configuration evidence (b, h), escalation given the trust-boundary breach (c), logging (d), communicating (e), coordinating (f), closing (g), root-cause analysis (i), and identifying the weakness that allowed the compromise (j). The ceiling is `mostly` and not `full` for the same reason as T1486: A.5.26 excludes assessment (A.5.25) and evidence collection (A.5.28), so it cannot answer `responds` completely against any technique.
- T1599.001mostlyresponds — T1599.001 involves actual unauthorized modification of network device configuration on the organization's estate, producing a real incident with affected systems to contain, evidence to collect, forensic analysis to perform, and root cause to investigate — engaging most of A.5.26's response activities; the ceiling is `mostly` by construction because A.5.26 excludes assessment (A.5.25) and evidence collection (A.5.28).
- T1600mostlyresponds — T1600 executes on the estate (network devices are compromised), so A.5.26's procedure has real objects to act on: containing the affected devices, collecting evidence, forensic analysis of the manipulated system image, root-cause analysis of how the encryption capability was weakened, and managing the vulnerabilities that allowed it. The grade is `mostly` and not `full` because A.5.26 excludes assessment (A.5.25) and evidence collection (A.5.28) by construction, which is the declared ceiling for this clause on any technique.
- T1600.001mostlyresponds — A.5.26 manages the containment and eradication of the compromised network device once the incident is underway, but reaches mostly rather than full because the clause explicitly excludes assessment and evidence collection.
- T1600.002mostlyresponds — The incident response procedure contains the compromised network device and eradicates the adversary's foothold, but reaches mostly rather than full because the clause explicitly excludes the assessment and evidence collection phases of response.
- T1601mostlyresponds — T1601 executes on the estate (network device system image modified), engaging most of A.5.26's response activities — containment of the affected device, logging, communication, forensic analysis of the modified image, root-cause analysis, and vulnerability management; the ceiling is `mostly` because A.5.26 excludes assessment (A.5.25) and evidence collection (A.5.28) by construction.
- T1601.001mostlyresponds — The technique has executed on a network device that is part of the estate, producing a real event the response procedure can engage with: containment (isolate/take the device offline), eradication (reimage with clean OS), forensic analysis of the modified image, root-cause analysis, vulnerability identification, logging, communication, and closure all apply. The same ceiling as the T1486 anchor holds — A.5.26 excludes assessment (A.5.25) and evidence collection (A.5.28), so it cannot reach `full`.
- T1606.001mostlyresponds — Forged cookie use produces a real incident on the estate (unauthorized access to web applications), and A.5.26's procedure engages for containment (revoking sessions, rotating compromised secrets), escalation, logging, communication, coordination, closure, forensics, root-cause analysis, and vulnerability management; the ceiling is `mostly` because A.5.26 excludes assessment (A.5.25) and evidence collection (A.5.28), mirroring the T1486 anchor.
- T1606.002mostlyresponds — Forged SAML token use produces a real incident on the estate — a compromised token-signing certificate, anomalous token issuance, federation trust changes — and A.5.26's procedure engages on containment (revoke cert, invalidate tokens, block adversary access), escalation, logging, communication, coordination with the identity provider and authorities, forensics on how the cert was obtained, root cause, and vulnerability management; the same exclusions that bound the T1486 anchor apply here (assessment is A.5.25, evidence collection is A.5.28), so `mostly` and not `full`.
- T1609mostlyresponds — T1609 executes on the organization's estate (containers, orchestration infrastructure), producing real affected systems to contain, evidence to collect (docker/kubelet/API logs), and artifacts to eradicate (adversary access, malicious images); A.5.26's procedure engages across containment, eradication, logging, communication, forensics, root-cause and vulnerability management, but the clause excludes assessment (A.5.25) and evidence collection (A.5.28), so it cannot reach `full` by construction.
- T1610mostlyresponds — A container deployed by an adversary is a real event on the estate with a containable system (the container/node) and an eradicable artifact (the container, its deployment, image), so the core of `responds` — containment and eradication — engages; the remainder is the same one A.5.26 carries against T1486, namely that the clause excludes assessment (A.5.25) and evidence collection (A.5.28).
- T1611mostlyresponds — T1611 runs on the estate — the container/VM and host are the organization's infrastructure, so the escape produces real events A.5.26's procedure can engage: containing the affected container and host, logging response, forensic analysis, post-incident root cause, and identifying the misconfiguration or vulnerability that enabled escape. The same ceiling as T1486 applies: A.5.26 excludes assessment (A.5.25) and evidence collection (A.5.28), so it cannot reach `full`.
- T1620mostlyresponds — Reflective code loading executes on the estate — a process is running injected code in memory — so there is a real event A.5.26's procedure engages for: containing the affected system, logging, communicating, forensic analysis, post-incident root-cause work, and identifying the weaknesses that let it run. The ceiling is the same as the T1486 anchor: A.5.26 excludes assessment (A.5.25) and evidence collection (A.5.28), so it cannot reach `full` by construction.
- T1647mostlyresponds — Plist modification runs on the estate and leaves artifacts (modified files, timestamps, related processes), so most of A.5.26's ten activities engage: containment of affected macOS systems, evidence handling, logging, forensic analysis, root-cause analysis, and identifying the weaknesses that permitted the modification. The grade is `mostly` and not `full` because A.5.26 excludes assessment of whether the event is an incident (A.5.25) and the detailed evidence-collection procedures (A.5.28), which is the declared ceiling for this clause on any technique.
- T1648mostlyresponds — Serverless execution runs on the organization's own cloud estate (Lambda in the AWS account, Power Automate in the M365 tenant, Apps Script in Google Workspace), so there is a real event with affected systems to contain, artifacts to eradicate, and post-incident analysis to perform — engaging most of A.5.26's activities; the ceiling is `mostly` because A.5.26 excludes assessment (A.5.25) and evidence collection (A.5.28) by construction, the same remainder that caps its grade against T1486.
- T1649mostlyresponds — T1649 happens on the estate (stolen certificates from Registry/files/certificate stores, CA key compromise, AD CS misconfigurations), so A.5.26's procedure engages across containment of affected systems, revocation, evidence handling, escalation, communication, forensic analysis, root cause and weakness identification; the ceiling is `mostly` because A.5.26 excludes assessment (A.5.25) and evidence collection (A.5.28) by construction.
- T1651mostlyresponds — T1651 is a post-compromise technique that runs on the estate (cloud admin commands executing in VMs), so A.5.26's procedure engages: containment by revoking compromised admin credentials and disabling the abused cloud management service, evidence collection from CloudTrail/Azure Activity logs, forensic analysis, post-incident root cause, and vulnerability identification all apply. The ceiling is `mostly` by construction because A.5.26 excludes assessment (A.5.25) and evidence collection (A.5.28), which are separate clauses.
- T1653mostlyresponds — T1653 modifies system settings on the estate, producing an observable event with affected systems that can be contained and where power settings can be restored (eradication); most of A.5.26's ten activities engage, with the named remainder being the clause's own exclusions of assessment (A.5.25) and evidence collection (A.5.28), which cap any A.5.26 response at `mostly` by construction.
- T1667mostlyresponds — Email bombing produces a real, observable event on the organization's estate (flooded inbox disrupting operations and burying legitimate mail) that triggers A.5.26's procedure, and most of the ten response activities engage meaningfully—containment via filtering and sender blocking, communication with users and the email provider, coordination with authorities, forensic analysis of email patterns, post-incident root cause analysis, and formal closure; the grade is capped at `mostly` by the clause's structural exclusion of assessment (A.5.25) and formal evidence collection (A.5.28).
- T1668mostlyresponds — A.5.26 manages the containment of the affected systems and the eradication of the adversary's foothold, but reaches mostly rather than full because the clause explicitly excludes incident assessment and evidence collection.
- T1674mostlyresponds — Input injection is an active on-estate technique that performs actions on the victim's system, so A.5.26's procedure engages across most response activities — containment of the affected system, logging, communication, coordination, closure, post-incident root-cause analysis, and vulnerability management — but the clause cannot reach `full` by construction because it excludes assessment (A.5.25) and evidence collection (A.5.28), which it references but does not perform.
- T1675mostlyresponds — T1675 is a post-compromise technique that runs on the estate (ESXi host and guest VMs), producing affected systems that can be contained, eradicated, logged, communicated, and closed — engaging the bulk of A.5.26's response activities; the ceiling is `mostly` because A.5.26 excludes assessment (A.5.25) and evidence collection (A.5.28), the same named remainder that caps every ISO `responds` grade.
- T1679mostlyresponds — T1679 is a sub-technique of T1486 (Data Encrypted for Impact) describing the adversary's selective exclusion behavior during ransomware execution on the estate; A.5.26's response procedure engages the same activities (a)-(j) against the broader ransomware incident of which selective exclusion is a part — containment of affected systems, evidence collection on the exclusion pattern, logging, communication, coordination, closure, forensic analysis, root-cause analysis, and weakness identification all apply, with the same named remainder as the T1486 anchor (A.5.26 excludes assessment per A.5.25 and evidence collection per A.5.28).
- T1684mostlyresponds — Successful social engineering produces an incident on the estate (unauthorized access, disclosure, account takeover, fraudulent transaction) that A.5.26's procedure can be entered for, and most of the ten response activities engage — containment of compromised accounts, evidence collection from email/voice logs, escalation, communication, coordination with authorities, forensics, root-cause analysis, and identifying the human/process weaknesses that enabled it. The same ceiling as the T1566 anchor applies: A.5.26 excludes assessment (A.5.25) and evidence collection (A.5.28), so it cannot answer `responds` completely.
- T1684.001mostlyrecovers — A.5.26's post-incident analysis, root-cause documentation, vulnerability/weakness management (including failed controls), and formal closure directly restore organizational state after the impersonation technique has run and caused impact (e.g., fraud or data loss), matching the recovers verb; the named remainder is that financial theft or divulged information already realized before response cannot always be undone.
- T1685mostlyresponds — T1685 has executed and produces observable events (service stops, config/registry changes, telemetry gaps, logging disruption) that enter A.5.26's procedure; containment, escalation, logging of response activities, communication, coordination, closure, root-cause analysis and vulnerability identification all engage, while the clause's own scope excludes assessment (A.5.25) and evidence collection (A.5.28), placing this at the same ceiling the owner ruled for A.5.26 against other post-compromise techniques.
- T1685.001mostlyresponds — The technique operates entirely on the estate (registry, services, audit policy on Windows systems), so A.5.26's procedure engages with containment, escalation, communication, closure, forensics on remaining artifacts, root-cause analysis, and weakness identification; the ceiling is `mostly` because A.5.26 structurally excludes assessment (A.5.25) and evidence collection (A.5.28), and the technique's specific aim of suppressing logs further narrows what forensics can recover.
- T1685.002mostlyresponds — The technique executes on the organization's cloud estate (logging configuration is modified), producing a real event A.5.26's procedure can engage: containing the affected identity/account, re-enabling logging, eradicating the adversary's foothold, collecting evidence of the modification (often logged in a separate trail), and post-incident analysis. The bounded remainder is the activity the adversary conducted while logs were disabled, which is an investigation/recovery concern rather than a response gap.
- T1685.003mostlyresponds — The technique operates on the estate (UI spoofing happens on the organization's systems), so once detected there is a real event A.5.26's procedure can engage — containing affected systems, collecting evidence of the tampering, forensic analysis to determine what was actually disabled, and post-incident analysis to identify what the adversary accomplished while visibility was degraded; the ceiling is the same as T1486/T1566 because A.5.26 excludes assessment (A.5.25) and evidence collection (A.5.28), and the technique's purpose of delaying response is a property of the technique, not a remainder that lowers the grade below the clause's own ceiling.
- T1685.004mostlyresponds — The technique runs on the estate (auditd disabled or rules modified on a Linux host), producing a real event A.5.26's procedure can act on — containment, re-enabling audit, forensic analysis of what was hidden, root-cause analysis, and weakness management all engage; the ceiling is `mostly` because A.5.26 excludes assessment (A.5.25) and evidence collection (A.5.28), the same ceiling that caps A.5.26 against T1486 and T1566.
- T1686mostlyresponds — A.5.26's response procedure engages substantially: the firewall modification is an event on the estate with affected systems to contain, malicious rules to eradicate, forensic artifacts to analyse, root cause to identify, and the underlying vulnerability to manage. The grade is `mostly` and not `full` for the same reason as the T1486 anchor: A.5.26 excludes assessment (A.5.25) and evidence collection (A.5.28), so no ISO clause reaches `full` on `responds` by construction.
- T1686.001mostlyresponds — The technique produces a real event on the estate (cloud audit logs record the firewall modification), so A.5.26's procedure engages: containment (isolate affected instances, revoke compromised credentials), eradication (restore correct firewall rules, remove malicious ones), evidence collection, logging, communication, forensic analysis, root-cause analysis, and weakness identification. The grade is `mostly` and not `full` because A.5.26 excludes assessment (A.5.25) and formal evidence collection (A.5.28), which is the declared ceiling for this clause on every technique.
- T1686.002mostlyresponds — The technique has run on the estate — firewall rules have been modified on a network device — so containment, eradication, logging, communication, coordination, closure, forensics, root cause and vulnerability management all engage, matching the T1486/T1078/T1566 pattern; the ceiling is `mostly` because A.5.26 excludes assessment (A.5.25) and evidence collection (A.5.28) by construction.
- T1686.003mostlyresponds — The technique executes on the estate and produces an observable event with affected systems, evidence (registry/firewall logs), and a nameable weakness (disabled/modified firewall), so A.5.26's procedure engages across containment, evidence handling, logging, communication, root-cause analysis and weakness management; the ceiling is `mostly` because A.5.26 excludes assessment (A.5.25) and evidence collection (A.5.28), which the owner ruled prevents any ISO clause from reaching `full` on `responds`.
- T1687mostlyresponds — T1687 is a post-compromise technique where exploitation of defensive tools has already occurred, producing a real event on the estate with affected systems (the compromised security tools), evidence to collect, and vulnerabilities to identify and manage — A.5.26's procedure engages on containment, escalation, logging, communication, coordination, closure, forensics, post-incident analysis, and vulnerability management (items a, c–j). It cannot reach `full` because A.5.26 excludes assessment/determining whether an event is an incident (A.5.25) and evidence collection (A.5.28), the same ceiling that caps A.5.26's `responds` grade on every post-compromise technique.
- T1688mostlyresponds — The technique executes on the estate (BCD modifications, registry changes, safe mode boot) producing real affected systems and forensic artifacts, so most of A.5.26's ten activities engage: containment of the affected host, logging, escalation, communication, closure, forensic analysis of BCD/registry, root-cause analysis of how BCD access was obtained, and vulnerability management. The ceiling is `mostly` by construction because A.5.26 excludes assessment (A.5.25) and evidence collection (A.5.28), and the damage done while defenses were disabled is not undone by responding.
- T1689mostlyresponds — A downgrade attack produces observable events on the estate (protocol changes, use of older tool versions, boot manager changes) that the response procedure can be entered for, and the core response activities engage — containment of systems being downgraded, escalation, logging, communication, closure, and post-incident vulnerability identification all apply; the ceiling is `mostly` by construction because A.5.26 excludes assessment (A.5.25) and evidence collection/forensics (A.5.28).
- T1690mostlyresponds — T1690 is a post-compromise action on an affected system, so A.5.26's procedure has a real incident to engage: containment (a), escalation (c), logging (d), communication (e), coordination (f), closure (g), root-cause analysis (i), and weakness identification (j) all proceed; the bounded remainder is the evidence-collection (b) and forensic-analysis (h) activities specifically for command history, which the technique targets, though other evidence sources (network, process, file) remain available.
- T1697mostlyresponds — T1697 produces observable events on the estate (ASP creation, usage, account access) that A.5.26's procedure can be entered for, and most of the ten activities engage — containment (revoking ASPs/accounts), evidence, logging, communication, closure, forensics, root cause, and vulnerability identification — with the same ceiling as the T1078 and T1566 anchors: A.5.26 excludes assessment (A.5.25) and evidence collection (A.5.28), so `full` is unreachable by construction.
- T1698mostlyresponds — A.5.26 provides the procedure to contain the affected LLM and eradicate the malicious prompt once the injection is underway, reaching mostly rather than full because the clause explicitly excludes assessment and evidence collection.
- T1700mostlyresponds — The procedure contains the compromised AI agent and eradicates the exfiltration activity once underway, but reaches mostly rather than full because the clause explicitly excludes the assessment and evidence collection phases of response.
- T1001.003partialresponds — T1001.003 produces C2 traffic that traverses the estate, so there is a real incident to respond to: a compromised system to contain, network evidence to collect, an implant to eradicate, and root cause to identify. However, the technique is specifically about disguising the C2 channel to evade analysis, and the response addresses the underlying compromise rather than the obfuscation mechanism itself; activities like crisis escalation and authority coordination are typically not engaged for a single C2 channel, leaving a slice of the procedure active rather than the bulk.
- T1008partialresponds — The fallback channel operates from a compromised system on the estate, so there is a real event A.5.26's procedure can be entered for: the affected system can be contained (cutting off the current channel), evidence and logs collected, the channel blocked at the network perimeter, and post-incident analysis performed. But the technique is specifically designed to survive exactly this kind of response — the adversary's C2 resilience through alternate channels is a property of their infrastructure, not the current channel being observed, so containing one fallback does not contain the technique as a whole.
- T1010partialresponds — T1010 runs on an already-compromised endpoint, so it touches the estate and leaves observable evidence that A.5.26's procedure can engage with: evidence collection (b), logging (d), forensic analysis (h), root-cause analysis (i), and identifying the weaknesses that allowed the compromise (j) all apply. However, window discovery itself does not spread and is a symptom of an underlying compromise rather than the incident A.5.26 contains; containment (a) addresses the compromise, not T1010 specifically, and escalation (c), external communication (e), and authority coordination (f) are not typically warranted for discovery alone — matching the partial shape seen at T1595.002.
- T1011.001partialresponds — A.5.26's designated competent team and enumerated activities (contain spread, collect/analyze evidence, log, communicate, coordinate, close, forensics, root-cause, manage weaknesses) engage once exfiltration is underway on the Bluetooth channel, with the named remainder being the data already exfiltrated before response begins.
- T1018partialresponds — A.5.26 manages the containment of the compromised system performing the discovery and the eradication of the adversary's foothold, but reaches 'mostly' rather than 'full' because the clause explicitly delegates incident assessment and evidence collection to other controls.
- T1027.003partialresponds — Steganography leaves artifacts on the estate (images/files containing hidden payloads) that A.5.26 can engage with through evidence collection (b), forensic analysis (h), post-incident root-cause analysis (i), and identifying the detection weaknesses (j) that allowed the concealment. However, the core of `responds` -- containment and eradication -- is limited because steganography is a completed concealment action, not an ongoing process that spreads; the hidden content has already been embedded and the technique does not continue to execute on its own, so the response reaches the artifacts rather than the technique itself.
- T1027.005partialresponds — A.5.26's procedure engages the observable artifact (the detected tool) through containment, evidence collection, and post-incident analysis, but the adversary's modification and redeployment of the tool occurs outside the organization's control, leaving the response to the specific incident rather than the campaign.
- T1027.007partialresponds — Dynamic API resolution is an obfuscation characteristic of malware executing on the estate, so incident response engages for the analytical and follow-up activities (evidence collection, forensic deobfuscation, post-incident analysis, identifying weaknesses, logging, communication, closure), but the core containment and crisis-escalation activities are weakly applicable because the obfuscation itself does not produce a spreading incident requiring isolation or BCP invocation.
- T1027.009partialresponds — A.5.26's response activities (containment, evidence collection, logging, forensics, root-cause analysis, vulnerability management) engage once an embedded-payload technique has executed and left detectable artifacts or consequences on the estate, but the pre-execution concealment itself and many delivery vectors leave no incident surface for the designated team to contain or eradicate.
- T1027.011partialresponds — A.5.26's response activities (contain, eradicate, log, analyze, close) engage once fileless storage is discovered as part of an incident, but most of the technique's core mechanics (storing/obfuscating in Registry, WMI, /dev/shm, etc.) leave no incident-triggering event for the team to contain or eradicate
- T1027.012partialresponds — A.5.26's response activities (containment, evidence collection, logging, communication, coordination, closure, forensics, root-cause analysis, and managing related vulnerabilities) engage once the LNK-smuggled payload has executed and delivered malware, but several core steps have an empty object because the technique itself is pre-compromise delivery that leaves no affected system until invocation occurs.
- T1027.013partialresponds — A.5.26's response activities (containment, evidence collection, logging, forensic analysis, root-cause, vulnerability management) engage once an encrypted/encoded artifact is already present and used in an intrusion, but many of its core steps (e.g. system containment, crisis escalation, business continuity invocation) have no object when the technique is only static obfuscation of a file that has not yet executed or spread
- T1027.015partialresponds — A.5.26's response activities (containment, evidence collection, logging, communication, coordination, closure, forensics, root-cause analysis, and managing related weaknesses) engage once compression has occurred in an incident, but many uses (e.g., pre-delivery obfuscation in spearphishing attachments or self-extracting archives) leave no on-estate artifact or spread to contain until a later technique executes, so only a slice of the technique triggers real response actions.
- T1027.018partialresponds — T1027.018 produces artifacts on the estate (files containing invisible Unicode characters, execution traces) that A.5.26's procedure can engage with — evidence collection, forensic analysis, containment of affected systems, post-incident root-cause work, and closure all apply — but the technique is fundamentally an obfuscation/evasion technique whose real impact is downstream in the payload it conceals, so the core containment-and-eradication half of `responds` reaches the artifact rather than the full incident the technique enables.
- T1030partialresponds — A.5.26's response activities (contain spread, collect/analyze evidence, log, communicate, coordinate, close, forensics, root-cause, manage weaknesses) engage once exfiltration is underway; the technique runs and is responded to, with the named remainder being the already-exfiltrated data slice that cannot be un-sent.
- T1036partialresponds — Masquerading leaves artifacts on the estate (renamed files, services, metadata) that A.5.26's procedure can collect as evidence, eradicate, forensically analyze and use for root-cause work, so the response engages — but the technique is fundamentally evasion-focused: by the time the masquerading is detected the underlying attack it concealed has typically already executed, containment of the masquerading artifacts does not contain the damage they enabled, and the core 'contain affected systems' activity is weak because nothing is spreading in the incident-response sense.
- T1036.006partialresponds — A.5.26 manages the containment and eradication of the malicious file and affected system once the technique is underway, but reaches mostly rather than full because the clause explicitly excludes assessment and evidence collection.
- T1036.008partialresponds — The masqueraded file lands on the estate and, if detected as suspicious (mismatched header/extension, flagged by validation or analysis), becomes an incident A.5.26 can respond to: evidence collection (the file itself), forensic analysis revealing the masquerading, post-incident root-cause work, and weakness identification (why validation failed) all engage. But containment is thin because the masquerading itself does not spread — the file is a static artifact whose harm requires a downstream execution step, so the core contain/eradicate half of the verb is limited, in the same shape as T1595.002's `partial`.
- T1036.009partialresponds — The technique runs on the endpoint and produces a process-tree anomaly that can enter A.5.26's procedure, engaging containment, eradication, forensic analysis, root-cause and weakness-identification activities; however, the technique is specifically designed to evade detection by breaking parent-child relationships, so the observable event is narrow and the response scope is limited compared to a loud technique like ransomware.
- T1036.010partialresponds — A.5.26's procedure engages the administrative and follow-up response tasks (logging, communication, post-incident analysis, vulnerability management) once the masqueraded account is discovered, but the core containment and eradication tasks are empty because the technique itself is a deceptive naming action that leaves no spread to contain and no artifact to eradicate beyond the account itself, which is addressed by a separate account management process.
- T1036.011partialresponds — The technique happens on the estate (a Linux process modifying its own argv memory) and produces observable artifacts — modified /proc/<PID>/cmdline, anomalous memory patterns — so an event enters A.5.26's procedure and several activities engage: evidence collection (b), logging (d), forensic analysis (h), root cause (i), and vulnerability identification (j). But the technique is a defense-evasion act whose purpose is to HIDE other activity, not to spread consequences; containment (a) is bounded to the single process/system rather than to spreading impact, escalation (c) and external coordination (f) are largely empty, and the response engages primarily with the observable artifact rather than with a spreading incident — the same shape that puts T1595.002 at `partial`.
- T1046partialresponds — A.5.26's response activities (evidence collection, logging, communication, coordination, root-cause analysis, vulnerability management) engage once discovery scanning is detected on the estate, but core containment/eradication steps have no object since the technique is non-destructive reconnaissance that leaves no persistent artifact to eradicate.
- T1057partialresponds — Process discovery runs on the estate and is observable, so A.5.26's procedure can be entered for the underlying compromise: the affected system can be contained, the activity logged, post-incident analysis performed, and vulnerabilities identified. However, the discovery activity itself is a minor slice of a larger intrusion — containment and eradication target the compromise that enabled it, not the enumeration — and A.5.26 excludes evidence collection and forensic analysis (both A.5.28), leaving a named remainder.
- T1069.002partialresponds — Domain group enumeration queries hit the organization's domain controllers, leaving logs and creating a real event on the estate that A.5.26's procedure can engage: evidence collection (b), logging (d), communication (e), coordination (f), closure and recording (g), root-cause analysis (i), and weakness identification (j) all apply. However, the core containment/eradication half is thin — the 'consequences' are information disclosure rather than spread, so (a) containing affected systems is limited to the source host and (c) crisis/continuity escalation is generally not warranted, mirroring the T1595.002 anchor's reasoning.
- T1069.003partialresponds — Cloud group enumeration hits the organization's cloud tenant via authenticated API calls, leaving evidence in Azure AD / CloudTrail / GCP audit logs that A.5.26's procedure can collect, log, analyze for root cause, and use to identify weaknesses — but the core containment/eradication is limited because discovery is a read operation that does not spread or persist, and what has been enumerated cannot be un-enumerated; containment reduces to revoking the credentials that enabled the queries, which is a slice of the verb rather than its bulk.
- T1070.006partialresponds — A.5.26's procedure engages the post-incident forensic and root-cause analysis tasks (h, i) that would examine timestomped artifacts, but the core containment and eradication tasks (a) are empty because timestomping is an anti-forensic technique that leaves no active threat to contain.
- T1070.007partialresponds — A.5.26's procedure engages the containment, evidence collection, logging, and post-incident analysis steps against an active incident, but the technique's purpose is to remove the very evidence the procedure depends on, so the response reaches what remains rather than the full scope of the adversary's activity.
- T1070.009partialresponds — A.5.26's procedure engages the containment, evidence collection, and post-incident analysis tasks against the artifacts the adversary is clearing, but the clearing itself is an anti-forensic action that reduces what evidence remains to be collected, so the response reaches the incident but not the full scope of what was removed.
- T1071partialresponds — A.5.26's response activities (containment, evidence collection, logging, communication, coordination, closure, forensics, root-cause analysis, and managing the vulnerabilities that enabled the incident) engage once C2 traffic is detected on the estate; the technique has already run and produced observable artifacts, but pre-compromise outbound blending leaves no affected system to contain or eradicate in most cases.
- T1071.001partialresponds — A.5.26's ten activities (contain, evidence, escalate, log, communicate, coordinate, close, forensics, root-cause, remediate weaknesses) engage once T1071.001 C2 is underway on the victim's estate; the technique runs and is then bounded/eradicated by the designated competent team.
- T1071.005partialresponds — A.5.26's designated competent team and enumerated activities (contain affected systems, collect/analyze evidence, eradicate artifacts, close/record, root-cause, manage related weaknesses) act on an in-progress or realized pub/sub C2 channel once it is detected on the estate, which is exactly what `responds` names; the named remainder is pre-compromise adversary infrastructure (brokers, topics) outside the organization that cannot be contained or eradicated by these response steps.
- T1074partialresponds — A.5.26's procedure engages the post-incident analysis and vulnerability management tasks (i, j) once staging is discovered, but the core containment and eradication tasks (a, h) are empty because data staging is a passive preparatory step that leaves no active threat to contain and no forensic artifact beyond the staged data itself.
- T1087partialresponds — The incident response procedure manages containment and eradication of the compromised account or system performing the discovery, but reaches 'mostly' rather than 'full' because the clause explicitly excludes assessment and evidence collection.
- T1087.001partialresponds — A.5.26 provides the procedure to contain the compromised system and eradicate the adversary's foothold once local account enumeration is detected, reaching mostly rather than full because the clause explicitly excludes the assessment and evidence collection phases of response.
- T1090.002partialresponds — The compromised system communicates with the external proxy, leaving observable events on the estate (C2 traffic, logs, proxy indicators), so evidence collection, logging, post-incident analysis, vulnerability identification and closure engage — but the proxy itself sits on external infrastructure the procedure cannot contain or eradicate, leaving the core of the verb empty in the same shape as T1595.002.
- T1090.003partialresponds — The traffic enters the estate through the last-hop proxy, so there is a real event A.5.26's procedure can engage with: logging the proxy connections, collecting evidence, communicating, escalating, post-incident analysis, and identifying weaknesses that allowed the C2 to succeed. However, the core of `responds` -- containment and eradication -- is bounded by the technique's own mechanics: the multi-hop chain obscures the original source, the 'affected systems' are merely those communicating with the last-hop proxy rather than a foothold that can be eradicated, and no incident-response procedure reaches the upstream proxies or the actor behind them. The response reaches the contact, not the campaign.
- T1095partialresponds — A.5.26's designated team and enumerated activities (contain spread, collect/analyze evidence, log, communicate, coordinate, close, forensics, root-cause, manage weaknesses) engage once T1095 C2 or lateral traffic is underway on the estate, exactly as the verb requires; the named remainder is pre-compromise reconnaissance or traffic that never reaches monitored organizational assets.
- T1102.001partialresponds — A.5.26's response activities (a-j) engage once the dead-drop resolver is already in use by infected victims: evidence collection, logging, communication, coordination, forensic analysis, root-cause identification, and managing the enabling vulnerabilities/weaknesses all apply to an event underway on the estate, but containment/escalation/closure have limited or no object because the technique itself never touches organizational systems.
- T1104partialresponds — A.5.26's designated competent team and enumerated activities (contain spread, collect/analyze evidence, log, escalate, communicate, coordinate, close, perform root-cause and manage resulting weaknesses) directly engage an already-underway multi-stage C2 channel once any stage is detected on the estate, bounding its effects and eradicating footholds; the named remainder is that early undetected stages can complete their redirect before response begins.
- T1113partialresponds — A.5.26's procedure engages the administrative and follow-up tasks (logging, communication, closure, root cause, vulnerability management) but the core containment and eradication tasks have no meaningful object against a screen capture that has already executed and exfiltrated data, leaving only a partial response.
- T1132.002partialresponds — A.5.26's designated team and enumerated activities (contain spread, collect/analyze evidence, log, communicate, coordinate, close, forensics, root-cause, manage weaknesses) engage once a non-standard C2 encoding technique is already running and observable in traffic or artifacts, exactly as the verb `responds` requires; the named remainder is pre-detection stealth where the encoding evades initial notice entirely.
- T1134.004partialresponds — A.5.26's response activities (contain, eradicate, log, analyze root cause, manage related weaknesses) engage once PPID-spoofing is detected in flight on the estate, but the core technique (API call to CreateProcess) has no artifact that is contained or eradicated by response, leaving most of the verb's protective weight on post-fact administrative/follow-up steps only
- T1135partialresponds — The incident response procedure dictates the containment of the compromised system performing the discovery and the eradication of the actor's foothold, but reaches mostly rather than full because the clause explicitly excludes assessment and evidence collection.
- T1187partialresponds — The technique touches the estate (the victim's system makes an outbound SMB/WebDAV auth attempt to an adversary server, leaving logs and network artifacts), so A.5.26's procedure has a real event to engage on: evidence collection, logging, communication, root-cause analysis, and identifying the weakness that allowed it. However, the credential material has already been transmitted by the time response begins, so the core contain/eradicate is bounded — the response can block the channel and rotate credentials, but cannot undo the hash capture, which limits the grade below `mostly`.
- T1190partialresponds — A.5.26's response activities (contain, evidence, log, communicate, coordinate, close, forensics, root-cause, manage weaknesses) engage once an exploit has occurred on the organization's estate, but many T1190 cases (e.g., initial access via edge appliances, cloud metadata, or non-owned public apps) leave no affected internal system or artifact for the core contain/eradicate steps to act on.
- T1195partialresponds — A.5.26's response activities (containment, evidence collection, logging, communication, coordination, closure, forensics, root-cause analysis, and managing related vulnerabilities) engage once a supply-chain compromise reaches the organization, but several pre-receipt or second-order stages (e.g., factory-infected media, compromised open-source dependencies before integration, or upstream distribution manipulation) leave no affected internal system, artifact, or evidence for the designated team to act on.
- T1195.001partialresponds — A.5.26's response activities (containment, evidence collection, logging, coordination, root-cause analysis, vulnerability management) engage once a supply-chain compromise reaches an affected build pipeline, repo or runtime environment on the organization's estate, but the pre-receipt and distributed nature of the technique leaves many instances with no reachable affected system or artifact for core containment/eradication.
- T1195.002partialresponds — A.5.26's response activities (contain, eradicate, log, communicate, root-cause, manage weaknesses) engage once a supply-chain compromise reaches the organization, but several core mechanics (pre-receipt manipulation of source, updates, or builds) leave no on-premises artifact, affected system, or evidence for containment/eradication/forensics, making the verb's core only a slice.
- T1195.003partialresponds — A.5.26 provides the procedure to contain the compromised hardware and coordinate with suppliers once discovered on the estate, but holds at mostly because the clause structurally excludes the assessment and evidence collection phases of response.
- T1199partialresponds — A.5.26's response activities (containment, evidence collection, logging, communication, coordination, closure, root-cause analysis, vulnerability management) engage once a trusted-relationship breach has occurred on the victim's estate, but several core scenario elements (e.g. compromise of an external partner's account or delegated admin offer before it reaches the victim) sit outside the victim's observable incident surface and cannot be contained or eradicated by them.
- T1201partialresponds — T1201 queries the organization's own systems (domain controllers, cloud APIs, network devices), so there is a real event on the estate with logs to collect, a root cause to analyze (how the adversary gained query access), and weaknesses to identify in the access path that allowed the discovery. However, the core of `responds` -- containment and eradication -- is largely empty: the information is already disclosed, no system is compromised in a way that 'spreads', and there is no forensic artifact in the traditional sense. This matches the T1595.002 pattern (reconnaissance that touches the estate) rather than the T1596.002 pattern (reconnaissance entirely off-estate).
- T1205.001partialresponds — A.5.26's procedure can contain an affected system and collect evidence once the covert channel is identified, but the technique's design to evade observation means the response is triggered late or not at all, leaving a substantial slice of the response tasks unreachable.
- T1205.002partialresponds — A.5.26's designated competent team and enumerated activities (contain spread, collect/analyze evidence, log, escalate, communicate, coordinate, close/record, forensics, root-cause, manage resulting weaknesses) engage once the filter is present and the triggering packet arrives, acting on the realized backdoor/persistence/C2 event.
- T1211partialresponds — T1211 involves exploitation on a system within the estate, so post-incident root cause analysis (i) and vulnerability/weakness management (j) apply if the exploitation is discovered, and partial evidence/logging activities (b, d) may engage where traces survive the evasion attempt; however, the technique is specifically designed to suppress telemetry and avoid generating observable events, so the core containment and eradication activities (a, h) are largely empty — there is no spreading incident to contain and no artifact to forensically examine when the evasion succeeds.
- T1213.001partialresponds — A.5.26's designated team and enumerated activities (contain, evidence, log, communicate, coordinate, close, forensics, root-cause, manage weaknesses) engage once an adversary is already mining Confluence for information; the technique has run and response bounds its spread and eradicates footholds.
- T1216.001partialresponds — A.5.26's response activities (containment, evidence collection, logging, coordination, root-cause analysis, vulnerability management) engage once a PubPrn proxy-execution incident is underway on the estate, but several core steps (e.g. containing spread, crisis escalation, forensics) have limited or no object when the technique is a local signed-script abuse that does not spread or leave obvious artifacts
- T1216.002partialresponds — A.5.26's designated competent team and enumerated activities (contain spread, collect/analyze evidence, log, communicate, coordinate, close/record, root-cause, manage related weaknesses) engage once the SyncAppvPublishingServer.vbs abuse is underway on the estate; the named remainder is that the pre-compromise delivery step itself is outside response scope.
- T1218.002partialresponds — A.5.26's designated competent team and enumerated activities (contain spread, collect/analyze evidence, log, communicate, coordinate, close/record, root-cause, manage related weaknesses) directly address a realized T1218.002 execution on the estate once underway, with the named remainder being pre-compromise delivery (e.g. the phishing vector) that falls to other verbs.
- T1221partialresponds — A.5.26's response activities (contain, evidence, log, communicate, coordinate, close, forensics, root-cause, manage weaknesses) engage once a delivered template-injected document is opened and the technique runs on the victim's system, but several core steps (a containment, h forensics, j weakness management) have no named artifact or system when the payload is fetched remotely via URL, leaving a large slice of the technique's mechanics untouched.
- T1480.001partialresponds — A.5.26's response activities (containment, evidence collection, logging, forensics, root-cause analysis, vulnerability management) engage once an environmentally keyed payload executes and is detected on the estate, but the technique's core purpose is pre-execution concealment that slows or prevents discovery, leaving most of the verb's object (the incident itself) unrealized or invisible.
- T1495partialresponds — A.5.26's procedure engages for containment, evidence collection, escalation, logging, communication, coordination, closure, forensics, root-cause analysis, and vulnerability management, but the technique's impact—rendering a device unbootable—is not reversed by response actions, leaving recovery outside the verb's scope.
- T1496.004partialresponds — A.5.26's procedure engages for containment (a), evidence collection (b), escalation (c), logging (d), communication (e), coordination (f), closure (g), forensics (h), root cause (i), and vulnerability management (j) once the hijacked SaaS activity is detected, but the response reaches only the compromised account and its usage, not the adversary's external infrastructure or the financial costs already incurred.
- T1497.001partialresponds — The malware executing system checks is running on the victim's estate, so there is a real event A.5.26's procedure can engage: containment of the affected system, evidence collection, forensic analysis, post-incident root-cause work, and identifying the weaknesses that let the implant in. But the technique's specific behaviour — the adversary's environment checks and the decision to disengage or conceal — is not what the response reaches; the procedure responds to the malware's presence, not to the checking logic itself, and the core containment/eradication target is the implant rather than the evasion behaviour.
- T1498partialresponds — A.5.26's procedure engages on most response activities for a DoS — evidence collection from attack traffic, logging, communication, coordination with ISPs and authorities, closure, post-incident root-cause analysis, and weakness identification — but the core containment (a) is weak because the attack originates outside the estate and cannot be contained by isolating affected systems, and forensic analysis (h) is limited; the administrative and follow-up half engages while the contain/eradicate core does not, in the same shape as the T1595.002 anchor.
- T1498.001partialresponds — A.5.26's procedure engages for the observable flood event on the estate, but containment of a volumetric DDoS is limited to local filtering and traffic management while the attack continues from external infrastructure the organization cannot contain.
- T1498.002partialresponds — A.5.26's response activities (containment, evidence collection, logging, communication, coordination, closure, forensics, root-cause analysis, and vulnerability management) engage against the realized DoS impact on the organization's own systems or network, but the pre-attack reflector/amplifier probing and spoofed-packet generation occur entirely outside the organization and therefore trigger none of those activities.
- T1499partialresponds — A.5.26's response activities (containment, evidence collection, logging, communication, coordination, closure, forensics, root-cause analysis, and managing resulting weaknesses) engage once an Endpoint DoS is underway on the organization's estate, but core containment/eradication is empty for pure availability attacks that do not spread or leave persistent artifacts, leaving only the administrative/follow-up slice
- T1499.001partialresponds — A.5.26's response activities (containment, evidence collection, logging, communication, coordination, closure, forensics, root-cause analysis, and managing related weaknesses) engage against an in-progress OS-exhaustion flood on the organization's estate, but core containment/eradication is empty for a non-persistent flood that ends when the attacker stops, leaving only the administrative/follow-up slice
- T1499.002partialresponds — A.5.26's response activities (containment, evidence collection, logging, communication, coordination, closure, forensics, root-cause analysis, and managing weaknesses) engage against a realized service-exhaustion flood on the organization's estate, but core containment/eradication is empty for a non-persistent volumetric attack that ends when the flood stops, leaving only the administrative/follow-up slice
- T1499.003partialresponds — A.5.26's response activities (containment, evidence, logging, communication, coordination, closure, forensics, root cause, vulnerability management) engage on the realized exhaustion event and its artifacts, but capacity-based DoS vectors often leave no containable compromise or eradicable foothold once underway, limiting the core respond verb to a slice per the A.8.14 contrast anchor.
- T1499.004partialresponds — A.5.26's response activities (containment, evidence, logging, communication, coordination, closure, forensics, root-cause, vulnerability management) engage on the realized DoS event and its side-effects, but core containment/eradication is empty for a non-persistent exploitation that has already succeeded and whose impact (crash/DoS) is not undone by response procedures.
- T1518.001partialresponds — A.5.26's response activities (evidence collection, logging, communication, coordination, root-cause analysis, vulnerability management) engage once discovery occurs and is noticed, but core containment/eradication steps have no object since the technique is non-destructive reconnaissance that leaves no artifact or spread to contain.
- T1535partialresponds — A.5.26's response activities (contain, eradicate, log, communicate, forensics, root-cause, close) engage once an unused-region instance is discovered on the estate, but most of the technique's mechanics (account compromise, region creation, crypto mining) sit pre-compromise or outside the monitored estate, leaving the core response surface a minority slice
- T1538partialresponds — A.5.26's response activities (containment, evidence collection, logging, communication, coordination, closure, forensics, root-cause analysis, and managing resulting weaknesses) engage once the adversary is using stolen credentials in the dashboard; however, the core technique (viewing information via GUI) produces no spreading consequence to contain, no artifact to eradicate, and no system impact to bound, leaving most of the verb's protective substance empty while the administrative/follow-up half still applies.
- T1542.002partialresponds — A.5.26's procedure engages for containment, evidence collection, logging, communication, closure, root-cause analysis, and vulnerability management once the incident is known, but the response reaches the compromised system and not the firmware itself, which persists through re-imaging and requires a hardware-level remedy outside the procedure's scope.
- T1542.004partialresponds — A.5.26's procedure engages for containment, evidence collection, logging, communication, coordination, closure, root-cause analysis, and vulnerability management once the compromised ROMMON is discovered, but the technique's persistence in firmware makes complete eradication difficult and the response cannot undo the initial compromise.
- T1552.005partialresponds — A.5.26's procedure can contain the affected instance and collect evidence from it, but the credential theft itself has already occurred and the response cannot undo the adversary's possession of the stolen secrets.
- T1552.007partialresponds — A.5.26's procedure engages for the incident the credential access enables, but the access itself is a pre-compromise reconnaissance-like step where containment and eradication have no object on the estate, leaving only the administrative and follow-up half of the response tasks.
- T1552.008partialresponds — A.5.26's response procedure can contain affected systems and collect evidence once the incident is known, but the technique's core action—credentials exposed in chat messages—has already occurred and the response cannot un-expose them, leaving containment and eradication as a partial slice of the full response task set.
- T1556.007partialresponds — A.5.26's designated competent team and enumerated activities (contain spread, collect/analyze evidence, log, escalate, communicate, coordinate, close/record, forensics, root-cause, manage resulting weaknesses) engage once the hybrid-identity backdoor is present and in use, with the named remainder being pre-compromise discovery or purely cloud-side registration that leaves no on-premises artifact for the response team to contain or eradicate.
- T1557.001partialresponds — A.5.26's procedure can contain affected systems and collect evidence once the relay is detected, but the response reaches the contact on the estate, not the adversary's infrastructure or the offline hash cracking, leaving a named remainder.
- T1557.003partialresponds — A.5.26's procedure engages for the containment, evidence collection, logging, communication, and post-incident analysis tasks when DHCP spoofing is detected on the network, but the response is limited to the affected broadcast domain and cannot reach the adversary's infrastructure or prevent the initial spoofed OFFER/ACK from being sent.
- T1557.004partialresponds — A.5.26's designated competent team and enumerated activities (contain spread, collect/analyze evidence, log, communicate, coordinate, close, root-cause, manage related weaknesses) engage once an evil-twin network is deployed and victims connect, exactly matching the `responds` rung for an already-underway technique.
- T1558.005partialresponds — A.5.26's designated competent team and enumerated activities (contain affected systems, collect/analyze evidence and logs, perform forensics, close/record the incident, identify root cause and manage related weaknesses) directly engage an in-progress or just-completed credential-theft event on Linux/macOS systems where ccache files were accessed or exfiltrated.
- T1559.003partialresponds — A.5.26's response activities (contain, eradicate via j, forensics, root-cause, close) engage once an XPC-abuse incident is underway on the estate, but several core steps (a,c,h) have limited or conditional applicability to this local macOS privilege-escalation technique.
- T1560partialresponds — A.5.26's procedure engages for containment (a), evidence collection (b), logging (d), communication (e), coordination (f), closure (g), forensic analysis (h), root-cause analysis (i), and vulnerability management (j) once the incident is known, but the archiving itself is a preparatory step that leaves no immediate observable impact to contain and the response acts on the downstream exfiltration or the upstream collection, not on the compression/encryption act in isolation.
- T1564.001partialresponds — Hidden files constitute a real event on the estate — evidence to collect, forensics to perform, a system to contain, root cause and contributing vulnerabilities to identify — but the technique is evasion-oriented with limited active spread, so the core containment/eradication half of A.5.26 engages only against the affected host while the broader response activities (logging, communication, closure, post-incident analysis) carry the procedure; this is the same shape as T1595.002's `partial`, with the difference that hidden files leave more forensic material than a scan.
- T1564.004partialresponds — The technique touches the estate (ADS entries exist on the organization's NTFS volumes), so once discovered the response procedure engages for evidence collection, forensics, logging, communication, closure, post-incident root-cause analysis, and weakness identification — but the core of `responds` (containment and eradication of a spreading incident) is limited because T1564.004 is a single evasion action that does not spread, and by the time the hidden payload is found the harm it was hiding has typically already executed.
- T1564.009partialresponds — The technique places malicious content on a macOS estate, so A.5.26's procedure has real objects to act on — evidence collection (b), logging (d), communication (e), closure (g), forensics (h), root cause (i), and weakness identification (j) all engage against a discovered resource fork. But the technique is concealment rather than active damage: containment (a) is limited because nothing is spreading in the way ransomware spreads, and crisis escalation (c) is unlikely. The administrative and follow-up half of the procedure engages while the core contain/eradicate half is thin, which is the shape `partial` describes.
- T1564.010partialresponds — A.5.26's procedure can contain the affected system and collect evidence once the incident is detected, but the technique's evasion of process-based monitoring means the incident may not be observed at all, leaving the response procedure unentered for that slice of occurrences.
- T1564.013partialresponds — The bind mount operation touches the estate and leaves artifacts (mount table entries, audit logs of mount syscalls) that A.5.26's procedure can engage with — containment by isolating the system and unmounting, evidence collection, forensic analysis of the mount, root-cause investigation into how sudo was obtained, and weakness identification all apply; however, the technique's purpose is concealment, so the response is bounded by what is discoverable, the hidden malicious process and its underlying activity may continue unobserved, and the procedure's effectiveness depends on detection capabilities A.5.26 does not itself provide.
- T1564.014partialresponds — A.5.26's designated team and enumerated activities (contain spread, collect/analyze evidence, log, communicate, coordinate, close/record, forensics, root-cause, manage related weaknesses) directly engage an in-progress or realized T1564.014 event on the organization's estate, performing the core containment/eradication/follow-up that `responds` names; the named remainder is pre-compromise discovery-only uses of xattrs that never trigger an incident.
- T1568.001partialresponds — A.5.26's response activities (containment, evidence collection, logging, communication, coordination, closure, forensics, root-cause analysis, and managing related weaknesses) engage once a Fast Flux C2 channel is detected on the organization's estate, but the core technique (external DNS fluxing of attacker-controlled IPs) has no internal system/artifact for containment or eradication, leaving most of the verb's protective half empty while administrative/follow-up steps still apply.
- T1569.001partialresponds — A.5.26's ten activities (contain, evidence, escalate, log, communicate, coordinate, close, forensics, root-cause, fix weaknesses) engage once the launchctl technique has run on the victim's macOS estate; the only real remainder is that some pre-compromise reconnaissance uses of launchctl fall outside the post-incident response window.
- T1571partialresponds — A.5.26's response activities (containment, evidence collection, logging, communication, coordination, closure, forensics, root-cause analysis, and vulnerability management) engage once a non-standard port C2 channel is detected on the estate, but several core response steps (a, c, h) have limited or empty objects against this stealth technique that avoids triggering boundary or anomaly controls in the first place.
- T1574.012partialresponds — A.5.26's designated competent team and enumerated activities (contain spread, collect/analyze evidence and logs, perform forensics, eradicate via vuln/weakness management in (j), close/record) directly address a realized in-memory or registry-based COR_PROFILER hijack on Windows once underway, with the named remainder being pre-compromise persistence that has not yet produced observable incident artifacts.
- T1578.001partialresponds — The snapshot is created within the organization's cloud account, so it is an artifact on the estate that A.5.26's procedure can be entered for: the snapshot can be identified and deleted, the permissions used to create it revoked, cloud logs collected as evidence, root cause investigated, and IAM weaknesses addressed. However, the technique is a discrete action rather than an actively spreading event, so the core containment/eradication half of the verb is bounded — there is no spreading infection to contain, only a single artifact to remove and access to revoke — placing it below the T1486 `mostly` rung and in line with the T1595.002 `partial` pattern.
- T1578.002partialresponds — Unlike T1583 (acquire infrastructure off-estate, `none`), T1578.002 occurs within the organization's own cloud account, so there is a real event on the estate: the new instance can be contained (terminated), cloud audit logs yield evidence, and root-cause analysis can identify how credentials were obtained. However, the technique is bounded (a single instance creation for evasion) and the adversary's damage from the new instance may already be realised before response begins, so the response engages a slice of A.5.26's activities rather than the full set seen against widespread-impact techniques like T1486.
- T1578.004partialresponds — The revert action is observable on the organization's own cloud estate (CloudTrail/Azure Activity Log records the API call), so containment of the cloud account/credentials, escalation, logging, communication, closure, root-cause analysis and vulnerability identification all engage. But the technique's stated purpose is to remove evidence of prior malicious activity, which directly empties the evidence-collection (b) and forensic-analysis (h) activities and weakens containment (a) since the damage — erasure of the attacker's footprint — is already realised by the time the response procedure enters.
- T1584.001partialresponds — A.5.26's response activities (containment, evidence collection, logging, communication, coordination, closure, forensics, root-cause analysis, and managing related weaknesses) engage against a realized domain hijacking on the organization's estate, but several core steps (a containment, c escalation/continuity, h forensics) have empty objects when the hijack is purely pre-compromise reconnaissance or external subdomain takeover with no internal system affected.
- T1584.008partialresponds — A.5.26's response activities (contain, eradicate, log, analyze root cause, manage related weaknesses) engage once an incident is underway on the organization's estate, but this pre-compromise technique against third-party devices leaves no affected organizational system, evidence, or artifact for most of those activities to act on.
- T1589partialresponds — Gathering identity information via active means like phishing or probing authentication services touches the estate and creates an observable event the incident response procedure can act upon, though the response reaches only the contact and not the adversary's broader reconnaissance campaign.
- T1590partialresponds — Gathering network information can involve direct interaction with the organization's infrastructure, creating an observable event that triggers incident response activities like IP blocking and logging, though off-estate gathering remains out of reach.
- T1590.002partialresponds — DNS zone transfers and direct queries to authoritative name servers touch the organization's DNS infrastructure and leave observable evidence (logs of AXFR attempts, unusual query patterns), so A.5.26's procedure can engage for logging, evidence collection, root-cause analysis and identifying the misconfiguration that permitted the transfer; however, the bulk of T1590.002 — passive DNS databases, public record lookups, third-party SaaS enumeration — never produces an event on the estate, and there is no system to contain or artifact to eradicate since nothing is compromised.
- T1590.004partialresponds — Gathering network topology often involves direct contact with the estate via scanning or phishing, creating an observable event that incident response procedures can act upon (such as blocking IPs or quarantining emails), though the response cannot reach the adversary's off-estate reconnaissance.
- T1590.006partialresponds — Active scanning to identify network security appliances touches the estate and produces observable events (scan traffic, banner grabs) that A.5.26's procedure can engage with — logging, evidence collection, root-cause analysis, identifying exposed weaknesses, and potentially IP blocking — but the core containment/eradication activities are empty because nothing is compromised and the adversary's broader reconnaissance continues off-estate regardless.
- T1592partialresponds — Because this technique includes direct collection actions that touch the estate (such as active scanning or phishing for information), an incident response procedure can act on the observable events, though it cannot reach the adversary's off-estate data gathering.
- T1592.001partialresponds — While passive collection of hardware details from public sources leaves no artifacts on the estate, gathering methods like active scanning or phishing generate observable events that the incident response procedure can act upon by blocking sources or removing emails.
- T1592.002partialresponds — T1592.002 includes methods that touch the estate (active scanning for software versions, phishing for information, metadata extraction from victim-owned files), producing observable events A.5.26's procedure can engage — evidence collection, logging, communication, closure, root cause and weakness identification all apply. Containment, crisis escalation and forensics are empty because nothing is compromised or spreading, and a substantial share of the technique's methods (job postings, public databases, third-party sites) never touch the estate at all.
- T1592.004partialresponds — While off-estate collection of client configurations cannot be addressed, direct collection methods like scanning or phishing touch the organization's estate, allowing incident response procedures to engage and block the interaction.
- T1595.001partialresponds — A.5.26's response activities (evidence collection, logging, communication, coordination, root-cause analysis, vulnerability management) engage once the scan produces observable artifacts on the organization's estate; containment/escalation/forensics are empty because the pre-compromise scan has no affected system or realized impact, leaving a genuine but minority slice of the verb.
- T1595.002partialresponds — OWNER RULING 2026-09-14, per-item. The scan reaches the organization's hosts and harvests banners and listening ports, so unlike the WHOIS pair there is a real event on the estate and real evidence in the logs. Engaged: evidence, logging, communication, coordination, closure, root cause, and managing the weaknesses the scan exposed. Empty: containment (nothing spread), escalation to crisis management, forensics (no artifact). The core of the verb as the lane defines it -- contain and eradicate once underway -- is empty while the administrative half engages. OWNER ADDED, and it is why this is `partial` not `none`: A.5.26 does not enumerate them, but response to a scan can include deceptive measures and automated IP blocking, which under the faithful-implementation baseline are available and are genuine response actions. This row is now an ANCHOR (EVENT_LANE_ANCHORS, v1.38).
- T1595.003partialresponds — A.5.26's response activities (evidence collection, logging, communication, coordination, root-cause analysis, vulnerability management) engage on the organization's estate when its servers answer the scan, but core containment/eradication is empty as no compromise has occurred.
- T1598.001partialresponds — A.5.26's response activities (evidence collection, logging, communication, coordination, root-cause analysis, vulnerability management) engage once the spearphishing message has been sent and received, but core containment/escalation/forensics steps have no object because the technique ends at the pre-compromise delivery surface with no compromised system or artifact inside the organization.
- T1598.002partialresponds — A.5.26's response activities (a-j) engage once the spearphishing attachment reaches the recipient and is acted on (evidence collection, logging, communication, coordination, root-cause analysis, vulnerability management), but pre-compromise delivery and most social-engineering steps have no affected system/artifact inside the organization to contain or eradicate, leaving a large empty slice of the technique.
- T1598.003partialresponds — A.5.26's response activities (evidence collection, logging, communication, coordination, root-cause analysis, vulnerability management) engage once the spearphishing link is received or clicked and information is elicited, but core containment/escalation/forensics are empty because no organizational system is compromised at this pre-compromise stage.
- T1598.004partialresponds — A.5.26's response activities (contain, evidence, log, communicate, coordinate, close, forensics, root-cause, manage weaknesses) engage once a vishing call has occurred and information is elicited on the victim's side; partial because pre-compromise reconnaissance, spoofing and the call delivery itself have no affected system/artifact inside the organization to contain/eradicate, leaving only the administrative/follow-up slice (as in the T1595.002 anchor).
- T1602partialresponds — T1602 is a pre-compromise discovery technique that never touches the organization; no affected system exists to contain, no artifact to eradicate, and none of A.5.26's ten response activities have an object, exactly as ruled for the identical control against the pre-compromise T1596.002 anchor
- T1602.002partialresponds — The technique produces an observable event on the estate (accessing a configuration file), so A.5.26's procedure can be entered for containment, evidence collection, and post-incident analysis, but the response reaches the contact and not the campaign, and the core of the verb—containing and eradicating an ongoing compromise—is empty because the technique is reconnaissance, not an active intrusion.
- T1608.005partialresponds — A.5.26's response activities (evidence collection, logging, communication, coordination, root-cause analysis, vulnerability management) engage once a spearphishing link target is used against the organization, but core containment/eradication steps have no object because the pre-compromise setup occurs entirely outside the organization's estate.
- T1608.006partialresponds — A.5.26's response activities (containment, evidence collection, logging, communication, coordination, closure, forensics, root-cause analysis, and managing related weaknesses) engage once an incident is underway on the organization's estate; however, the pre-compromise T1608.006 poisoning of external search results or in-site developer searches has no affected internal system to contain/eradicate and only a thin slice (post-click victim-side incident or supply-chain follow-on) triggers real response actions.
- T1612partialresponds — A.5.26's response activities (a-j) engage once a build-image event is underway on the estate: evidence collection, logging, communication, coordination, forensic analysis, root-cause, and managing the resulting vulnerable image/weakness all apply, but containment/escalation/closing have limited or no object when the build itself is the initial undetected step.
- T1621partialresponds — A.5.26's procedure can contain the affected account and coordinate the response once the MFA fatigue attack is reported, but the attack's core mechanism—bombarding a user with push notifications—occurs outside the organization's systems and the response cannot stop the notifications from being generated.
- T1654partialresponds — A.5.26's response activities (containment, evidence collection, logging, forensics, root-cause analysis, vulnerability management) engage once enumeration is underway and can bound its spread or remove artifacts/footholds, but the core technique (querying logs for discovery) often completes before response begins and many instances (e.g., real-time monitoring of IR itself or bulk export to adversary infrastructure) leave no containable system or eradicable artifact on the estate.
- T1657partialresponds — Financial theft produces observable events on the estate — compromised mailboxes, fraudulent transaction logs, encrypted hosts — so evidence collection, coordination with authorities and banks, logging, post-incident analysis and vulnerability identification all engage; however, the core of `responds` (containment and eradication of the loss itself) is largely outside A.5.26's reach, since the monetary transfer has already occurred and recovering funds is not a response task the clause performs.
- T1659partialresponds — A.5.26's response activities (containment, evidence collection, logging, communication, coordination, closure, forensics, root-cause analysis, and managing related weaknesses) engage once content injection is underway on the victim's systems, but several core response steps (e.g., containing spread, crisis escalation, business continuity invocation) have limited or no object when the technique is upstream ISP-level or pre-compromise channel manipulation rather than an on-premises incident.
- T1666partialresponds — A.5.26's response activities (containment, evidence collection, logging, coordination, root-cause analysis, vulnerability management) engage once hierarchy modification is detected on the victim's estate, but several core mechanics (e.g. subscription hijacking to an external tenant or LeaveOrganization severing policies) leave little or no affected system/artifact inside the organization to contain or eradicate.
- T1671partialresponds — A.5.26's ten activities (contain, evidence, escalate, log, communicate, coordinate, close/record, forensics, root-cause, manage weaknesses) engage once the malicious OAuth integration is present and in use; the technique has already run to achieve persistence/exfiltration, and response bounds spread, eradicates the integration, and addresses root causes.
- T1677partialresponds — A.5.26's response activities (contain, eradicate via j, forensics, root-cause, close) engage once a poisoned pipeline runs and produces an incident on the estate (e.g. credential exfil, lateral movement, or malicious artifact shipped), but the pre-compromise Public Pipeline Execution vector (malicious PR from fork) and many indirect cases leave no on-estate artifact until downstream impact, mirroring the partial split in the T1595.002 anchor.
- T1683.002partialresponds — A.5.26's response activities (containment, evidence collection, logging, communication, coordination, closure, forensics, root-cause analysis, and managing related weaknesses) engage once an incident using fabricated audio-visual content is underway on the organization's estate, but many pre-compromise uses (e.g., external phishing lures or account establishment) leave no affected system or artifact for the team to contain or eradicate.
- T1684.002partialresponds — Email spoofing touches the estate (spoofed messages arrive at the organization's mail server, and the organization may be the spoofed entity), so A.5.26's procedure engages for evidence collection, logging, communication with internal/external parties, coordination with authorities, root cause analysis, and identifying weaknesses such as DMARC misconfigurations. However, the core containment/eradication is bounded: the adversary's spoofing infrastructure is elsewhere and cannot be contained, and the response reaches the contact but not the campaign — the same shape as the T1595 anchor.
- T1685.005partialresponds — A.5.26's procedure engages with the incident the log clearing is part of, but the clearing itself is an anti-forensic action that the response procedure's containment and evidence-collection steps address only after the fact, not the act of deletion itself.
- T1685.006partialresponds — A.5.26's procedure engages with the aftermath of log clearing—collecting remaining evidence, containing affected systems, and performing post-incident analysis—but the core of the technique (deletion) has already occurred and the response cannot restore the lost logs, only address the intrusion they were meant to hide.
- T1696partialresponds — The technique touches the estate — the adversary is making requests against the organization's web pages and the bypass leaves observable artifacts (logs, traffic patterns, anomalous solve rates) — so several of A.5.26's activities engage: evidence collection (b), logging (d), communicating (e), closing and recording (g), root-cause analysis (i), and identifying the weakness that allowed the bypass (j). The core containment/eradication half is empty: no system is 'affected' in the sense A.5.26(a) requires, no forensic artifact to examine (h), and no crisis escalation needed (c). The same shape as T1595.002 — administrative and follow-up activities engage, the containment core does not.
Prevented OWASP Web Top 10 (2025) risks (12)
OWASP Web Top 10 (2025) risk categories this ISO control helps prevent or mitigate — our analysis (mostly llm_verified).
Direction: ← other covers this;
→ this covers other (F/M/P = full / mostly /
partial). gov = governs / implements (a mandate, not coverage).
Why these map — rationale
- A03partialremoves — A.5.26(j) explicitly requires identifying and managing (i.e. correcting) vulnerabilities/weaknesses that caused/contributed/failed to prevent the incident, which directly removes supply-chain failures once they have materialized as an incident; the remainder of the control is incident handling that does not itself remove the underlying dependency or pipeline defect.
Control IDs, short titles and the structured attribute table (control type, CIA properties, cybersecurity-concept, operational capability, security domain) are facts from ISO/IEC 27001:2022 Annex A / ISO/IEC 27002:2022. The full implementation guidance prose lives in ISO/IEC 27002:2022 — not reproduced here. Cross-walks to NIST 800-53, NIST CSF 2.0, OWASP ASVS, CWE, MITRE ATT&CK and OWASP Web Top 10 are our own analysis (mostly llm_verified), not an ISO, NIST, MITRE or OWASP product — how ours compare.