A.7.1 Physical
Physical security perimeters
Structured attributes from ISO/IEC 27002:2022 — control type · CIA properties · cybersecurity concept · operational capability · security domain. What do these mean?
Mapped NIST 800-53 r5 controls (13)
Our reading (mostly llm_verified) of how this ISO control and each NIST 800-53 control relate. Not an ISO or NIST product.
Direction: ← other covers this;
→ this covers other (F/M/P = full / mostly /
partial). gov = governs / implements (a mandate, not coverage).
Why these map — rationale
- PE-3mostlycovers — Both controls require physical barriers and entry controls around areas housing information assets, with the ISO guidance on perimeter strength and locking directly supporting the NIST requirement to enforce physical access authorization at defined boundaries.
- PE-4partialcovers — A.7.1's broad physical-perimeter mandate reaches the slice of transmission-medium physical access inside facilities but leaves the bulk of PE-4's specific transmission-focused requirements (e.g., exact media types, parameters, and controls) uncovered.
Aligned NIST CSF 2.0 outcomes (14)
NIST CSF 2.0 outcomes this ISO control aligns with — our analysis (mostly llm_verified).
Direction: ← other covers this;
→ this covers other (F/M/P = full / mostly /
partial). gov = governs / implements (a mandate, not coverage).
Why these map — rationale
- PR.IR-02fullcovers — The ISO control's focus on constructing and maintaining physically sound perimeters directly implements the CSF outcome of protecting technology assets from environmental threats.
- PR.AA-06mostlycovers — By specifying perimeter strength, access controls on doors/windows, and monitoring of fire doors, the ISO control satisfies the CSF requirement to manage, monitor, and enforce physical access commensurate with risk.
Related weaknesses / CWE (3)
Weakness classes this ISO control helps prevent or mitigate — our analysis (mostly llm_verified).
Direction: ← other covers this;
→ this covers other (F/M/P = full / mostly /
partial). gov = governs / implements (a mandate, not coverage).
Mitigated MITRE ATT&CK techniques (3129)
Adversary techniques (MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise) this ISO control helps mitigate; links open attack.mitre.org. Our analysis (mostly llm_verified).
Direction: ← other covers this;
→ this covers other (F/M/P = full / mostly /
partial). gov = governs / implements (a mandate, not coverage).
Why these map — rationale
- T1200mostlyprevents — Physical perimeters with locked doors, solid construction, and alarms directly impede an adversary's ability to introduce unauthorized hardware into the facility.
- T1011.001partialprevents — A.7.1's physical perimeters (walls, doors, locks) limit external adversaries' ability to gain the proximity T1011.001 requires, but the control does not address the Bluetooth radio channel itself, leaves insiders and tailgaters already inside the perimeter able to use Bluetooth, and Bluetooth signals can penetrate walls to reach adjacent spaces — so the prevention covers one vector (external physical access) with named, non-trivial gaps.
- T1052.001partialprevents — A.7.1's physical perimeters (walls, doors, locks, alarms) prevent unauthorized physical access, which blocks the outsider-walks-in-and-plugs-in-USB vector, but the technique explicitly includes authorized users introducing USB devices on air-gapped networks and does not require unauthorized entry, so the control addresses only one of several vectors.
- T1091partialprevents — Strong physical barriers and access controls reduce the likelihood that malware can be introduced or spread via removable media brought into the premises.
- T1092partialprevents — A.7.1 prevents unauthorized physical access, which blocks an outsider from inserting removable media to relay commands, but the technique is designed for environments where some physical access exists (authorized users, insiders, or already-bypassed perimeters), so perimeter security reduces rather than eliminates the attack surface.
- T1219.003partialprevents — Physical security perimeters prevent unauthorized physical access, which blocks the physical installation of rogue remote access hardware by an outsider; however, the technique explicitly notes these devices may be legitimately present and allowed by peripheral device policy, and once installed (whether legitimately or via a prior compromise) the perimeter does nothing to prevent their network-level use, leaving a substantial remainder.
- T1669partialprevents — A.7.1's solid construction, locked doors/windows and defined perimeters make physical positioning near access points harder and attenuate signals somewhat, but Wi-Fi is designed to extend beyond walls, the control does not address RF containment specifically, and the remote dual-homed-bridge variant bypasses the physical perimeter entirely.
- T1674partialprevents — A.7.1's perimeter controls block external physical access needed to plug in malicious USB HIDs, but the technique's software-based vector (e.g., BackSwap-style tooling that simulates keystrokes via the Windows message loop) requires no physical access at all, and insiders with legitimate access are unaffected by perimeter controls.
Control IDs, short titles and the structured attribute table (control type, CIA properties, cybersecurity-concept, operational capability, security domain) are facts from ISO/IEC 27001:2022 Annex A / ISO/IEC 27002:2022. The full implementation guidance prose lives in ISO/IEC 27002:2022 — not reproduced here. Cross-walks to NIST 800-53, NIST CSF 2.0, OWASP ASVS, CWE, MITRE ATT&CK and OWASP Web Top 10 are our own analysis (mostly llm_verified), not an ISO, NIST, MITRE or OWASP product — how ours compare.