A.7.2 Physical
Physical entry
Structured attributes from ISO/IEC 27002:2022 — control type · CIA properties · cybersecurity concept · operational capability · security domain. What do these mean?
Mapped NIST 800-53 r5 controls (18)
Our reading (mostly llm_verified) of how this ISO control and each NIST 800-53 control relate. Not an ISO or NIST product.
Direction: ← other covers this;
→ this covers other (F/M/P = full / mostly /
partial). gov = governs / implements (a mandate, not coverage).
Why these map — rationale
- PE-2mostlycovers — A.7.2's requirement to ensure only authorized physical access is achieved in large part by developing/maintaining an access list, issuing credentials, periodic review, and timely removal — exactly the steps in PE-2 — but a residual of PE-2 (formal approval step and explicit parameter-driven review frequency) sits outside what A.7.2 directly mandates.
- PE-3mostlycovers — Both controls require physical access control mechanisms, visitor management, and monitoring of entry points to prevent unauthorized entry into facilities containing sensitive assets.
- PE-16partialcovers — A.7.2's requirement to ensure authorized physical access to information and assets directly accounts for the 'authorize and control items entering and exiting the facility' slice of PE-16, but does not address maintaining records of system components (the second distinct requirement in PE-16).
Aligned NIST CSF 2.0 outcomes (8)
NIST CSF 2.0 outcomes this ISO control aligns with — our analysis (mostly llm_verified).
Direction: ← other covers this;
→ this covers other (F/M/P = full / mostly /
partial). gov = governs / implements (a mandate, not coverage).
Why these map — rationale
- PR.AA-06fullcovers — The ISO control establishes, monitors, and enforces physical access to facilities and sensitive areas through authentication, logging, visitor controls, and key management, directly satisfying the CSF outcome for managing and monitoring physical access commensurate with risk.
Related weaknesses / CWE (2)
Weakness classes this ISO control helps prevent or mitigate — our analysis (mostly llm_verified).
Direction: ← other covers this;
→ this covers other (F/M/P = full / mostly /
partial). gov = governs / implements (a mandate, not coverage).
Mitigated MITRE ATT&CK techniques (3190)
Adversary techniques (MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise) this ISO control helps mitigate; links open attack.mitre.org. Our analysis (mostly llm_verified).
Direction: ← other covers this;
→ this covers other (F/M/P = full / mostly /
partial). gov = governs / implements (a mandate, not coverage).
Why these map — rationale
- T1200mostlyprevents — Physical access controls and visitor authentication reduce the chance an adversary can physically introduce hardware such as USB devices or rogue peripherals into the facility.
- T1052partialdetects — A.7.2's inspection of personal belongings upon entry and exit (item e) and access logging provide some detection capability for physical media exfiltration, but the inspection is general security screening rather than data-device focused, USB/removable media are small and easily concealed, and authorized personnel (insiders) face lighter scrutiny — so detection is a slice, not the bulk.
- T1052partialprevents — A.7.2 restricts physical entry and explicitly includes inspecting personal belongings on entry/exit, which directly addresses the physical-medium vector for unauthorized persons; however, authorized insiders and supervised visitors can still carry removable media in and out, and the inspection clause is one element among many in a broad physical-entry control, so the technique is constrained but not prevented.
- T1052.001partialprevents — Physical screening and access restrictions at entry/exit points directly impede the covert exfiltration of data over USB.
- T1052.001partialdetects — A.7.2's inspection of personal belongings at entry/exit (item e) and visitor supervision are real mechanisms that could surface USB devices being introduced or removed, but the control's detection is bounded to the entry/exit point and does not address the actual data-transfer act inside the facility, nor USB devices already present on the estate.
- T1059.008partialprevents — A.7.2 restricts physical access to facilities where network devices reside, preventing the direct console-connection vector of T1059.008, but the technique's primary vectors (SSH, telnet) are remote and unaffected by physical entry controls.
- T1091partialprevents — Controlled entry points and inspection of incoming material limit the ability to deliver malware via removable media that is later used for lateral movement.
- T1195partialdetects — A.7.2's delivery-and-loading guidance explicitly requires inspecting incoming deliveries for evidence of tampering (clause g) and hazardous materials (clause d), which detects the shipment-interdiction subset of T1195; the broader technique — source-code, development-environment, and software-update-channel compromise — occurs upstream at vendor infrastructure and is outside any physical-entry vantage point.
- T1195partialprevents — A.7.2's inspection of incoming deliveries for tampering and hazardous materials addresses the shipment-interdiction slice of T1195, but the technique's broader vectors — manipulation of development tools, source code repositories, open-source dependencies, software update channels, and system images at the factory — occur upstream of or outside the physical entry control and are not prevented by it.
- T1200partialdetects — A.7.2 requires monitoring of physical access logs, visitor supervision, inspection of deliveries/belongings, and reporting of anomalies such as unescorted visitors or tampering, which can surface some hardware additions (e.g. via entry logs, inspections, or visible badges); however, it does not instrument or observe the post-introduction abuse (DMA, keystroke injection, network tapping) once the device is inside and operating.
- T1219.003partialprevents — A.7.2 restricts unauthorized physical access to facilities, which prevents the physical installation vector of rogue remote access hardware, but the technique can also be executed using pre-existing legitimate KVM/IP-KVM devices already authorized in the environment, and the core mechanism is network-based C2 that physical entry controls do not reach.
- T1669partialprevents — A.7.2 prevents the physical-proximity vector of T1669 (an adversary positioning themselves near a Wi-Fi AP or accessing dual-homed systems on-site) by restricting building/area access, but does not reach remote attacks, credential-based access to secured Wi-Fi, or compromise of nearby third-party systems that bridge in.
- T1674partialprevents — A.7.2 addresses the physical HID vector of T1674 (malicious USB devices emulating keyboards) by restricting physical access to information processing areas, inspecting personal belongings on entry/exit, and screening incoming deliveries, but it has no effect on the software-based keystroke simulation vector (e.g., BackSwap-style attacks that monitor message loops and inject keystrokes programmatically), which requires no physical presence.
Prevented OWASP Web Top 10 (2025) risks (1)
OWASP Web Top 10 (2025) risk categories this ISO control helps prevent or mitigate — our analysis (mostly llm_verified).
Direction: ← other covers this;
→ this covers other (F/M/P = full / mostly /
partial). gov = governs / implements (a mandate, not coverage).
Control IDs, short titles and the structured attribute table (control type, CIA properties, cybersecurity-concept, operational capability, security domain) are facts from ISO/IEC 27001:2022 Annex A / ISO/IEC 27002:2022. The full implementation guidance prose lives in ISO/IEC 27002:2022 — not reproduced here. Cross-walks to NIST 800-53, NIST CSF 2.0, OWASP ASVS, CWE, MITRE ATT&CK and OWASP Web Top 10 are our own analysis (mostly llm_verified), not an ISO, NIST, MITRE or OWASP product — how ours compare.