A.7.3 Physical
Securing offices, rooms and facilities
Structured attributes from ISO/IEC 27002:2022 — control type · CIA properties · cybersecurity concept · operational capability · security domain. What do these mean?
Mapped NIST 800-53 r5 controls (25)
Our reading (mostly llm_verified) of how this ISO control and each NIST 800-53 control relate. Not an ISO or NIST product.
Direction: ← other covers this;
→ this covers other (F/M/P = full / mostly /
partial). gov = governs / implements (a mandate, not coverage).
Why these map — rationale
- PE-3mostlycovers — A.7.3's objective of preventing unauthorized physical access, damage, and interference to offices/rooms/facilities is addressed by the bulk of PE-3's enforcement, verification, ingress/egress controls, and area restrictions, but PE-3's audit-log maintenance requirement sits outside A.7.3's stated scope.
- PE-18partialcovers — A.7.3's broad physical-protection objective for offices/rooms/facilities addresses a slice of PE-18's siting requirements (minimizing unauthorized-access opportunity and some damage vectors), but leaves the bulk of PE-18's specific component-location tactics and hazard-parameter tailoring uncovered.
- PE-2partialcovers — A.7.3's requirement to prevent unauthorized physical access to offices/rooms/facilities is largely satisfied by PE-2's full process of authorizing, credentialing, reviewing, and removing individuals from the access list; residual exists because A.7.3 also addresses damage and interference beyond just access authorization.
Aligned NIST CSF 2.0 outcomes (9)
NIST CSF 2.0 outcomes this ISO control aligns with — our analysis (mostly llm_verified).
Direction: ← other covers this;
→ this covers other (F/M/P = full / mostly /
partial). gov = governs / implements (a mandate, not coverage).
Why these map — rationale
- PR.AA-06explicit mandateimplements — A.7.3 directly operationalizes physical access management, monitoring and enforcement for facilities and assets, which is exactly the outcome named in PR.AA-06
- PR.IR-02domain mandateimplements — A.7.3 directly operationalizes physical protection of facilities and assets against environmental threats (damage/interference), which sits squarely inside the PR.IR domain even though the CSF outcome does not name physical security explicitly
Related weaknesses / CWE (2)
Weakness classes this ISO control helps prevent or mitigate — our analysis (mostly llm_verified).
Direction: ← other covers this;
→ this covers other (F/M/P = full / mostly /
partial). gov = governs / implements (a mandate, not coverage).
Mitigated MITRE ATT&CK techniques (3118)
Adversary techniques (MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise) this ISO control helps mitigate; links open attack.mitre.org. Our analysis (mostly llm_verified).
Direction: ← other covers this;
→ this covers other (F/M/P = full / mostly /
partial). gov = governs / implements (a mandate, not coverage).
Why these map — rationale
- T1011partialprevents — A.7.3's physical access controls and electromagnetic shielding guidance partially prevent T1011 by limiting who can get close enough for RF/Bluetooth exfiltration and by shielding against some emanation-based channels, but the technique can still execute through WiFi, cellular, or modem channels on systems the adversary has compromised, and insider threats with legitimate access are not addressed.
- T1011.001partialprevents — A.7.3's physical access controls limit who can get within Bluetooth range of devices in secured facilities, addressing the proximity requirement of T1011.001, but the control does not address insiders with authorized access, adversaries who have already bypassed physical security, or longer-range Bluetooth implementations, and it makes no specific provision against wireless exfiltration channels.
- T1040partialprevents — A.7.3 prevents only the physical-access slice of T1040 — an adversary who cannot reach a network port, patch panel, or network device cannot plug in or attach a sniffer there, and electromagnetic shielding in (c) bounds some wireless capture — but the bulk of T1040 (remote sniffing from a compromised host, span-port abuse, cloud traffic mirroring, AiTM relay) is unaffected by physical facility controls.
- T1052partialprevents — A.7.3 prevents unauthorized physical access to facilities, which blocks an outsider from introducing or removing a removable medium, but it does not address the insider/authorized-user variant explicitly named in the technique (a user introducing a USB device on an air-gapped network), so the prevention covers one vector and not the whole technique.
- T1052.001partialprevents — A.7.3 prevents unauthorized physical access to facilities, which blocks the unauthorized-person vector for plugging in a USB device, but it does not stop authorized insiders or users with legitimate access from introducing a USB device — the air-gapped scenario the technique describes typically relies on such a user.
- T1091partialprevents — A.7.3 prevents unauthorized physical access to facilities, which blocks the outsider vector for plugging in removable media, but it does not address insiders, pre-infected media entering through legitimate channels, social engineering of authorized users, or mobile devices/USB cables — and the technique is specifically designed to traverse air-gapped environments where physical access is already controlled.
- T1092partialprevents — A.7.3's physical access controls restrict who can approach and handle systems, which constrains the ability of an unauthorized person to insert removable media to relay commands between compromised hosts; however, the technique can still proceed via compromised insiders with legitimate access, and the clause's guidance addresses facility siting and visibility rather than removable-media handling specifically, leaving a named remainder.
- T1200partialprevents — A.7.3's purpose statement explicitly targets preventing unauthorized physical access, which is the prerequisite for T1200, but the enumerated guidance items (a–d) address siting, building unobtrusiveness, visual/audible shielding, and not publishing locations rather than the access-control mechanisms (locks, badges, mantraps) that actually stop someone from plugging in a device — those live in A.7.1/A.7.2 — and authorized insiders can still introduce hardware, so what is prevented is a slice, not the bulk.
- T1219.003partialprevents — A.7.3 prevents unauthorized physical access to offices, rooms and facilities, which directly blocks the physical installation of remote access hardware by external adversaries; however, it cannot prevent installation by insiders with legitimate physical access, nor devices already present in the environment, leaving a meaningful remainder.
- T1591partialprevents — A.7.3's guidance (b), (c) and (d) directly prevent an adversary from learning about the organization's facilities and operations through physical observation, signage, directories, or external eavesdropping, which is a slice of T1591; the bulk of the technique — gathering org details from social media, websites, phishing, and other digital sources — is untouched by physical-security controls.
- T1591.001partialprevents — A.7.3's guidance (no obvious signs, no readily available directories/maps identifying confidential facilities) directly stops some public/online exposure vectors for physical location details that the technique relies on, but leaves open elicitation, social media, and non-facility data sources named in the T1591.001 prose.
- T1593.002partialprevents — A.7.3's guidance on unobtrusive facilities with no obvious signs of information processing activities, and on not making directories/maps identifying locations of confidential facilities readily available, directly reduces what an adversary can harvest via search engines about the physical estate; however, T1593.002's broader scope — network details, credentials, spillages, general organizational information — sits outside the clause's physical-security remit, so only a slice is prevented.
- T1669partialprevents — A.7.3's physical siting, unobtrusive building design, and control of external visibility address the physical-proximity vector of T1669 (an adversary positioning themselves near a Wi-Fi access point), but the clause does not mandate Wi-Fi encryption, authentication, or network segmentation, and the remote dual-homed-system vector is entirely outside its scope.
- T1674partialprevents — A.7.3's physical access controls can prevent the physical HID/USB vector of T1674 by blocking unauthorized persons from reaching machines to plug in devices, but it does not address the software-based input injection vector (e.g., BackSwap-style malware monitoring the Windows message loop) which requires no physical access, and authorized insiders with facility access remain unconstrained.
Control IDs, short titles and the structured attribute table (control type, CIA properties, cybersecurity-concept, operational capability, security domain) are facts from ISO/IEC 27001:2022 Annex A / ISO/IEC 27002:2022. The full implementation guidance prose lives in ISO/IEC 27002:2022 — not reproduced here. Cross-walks to NIST 800-53, NIST CSF 2.0, OWASP ASVS, CWE, MITRE ATT&CK and OWASP Web Top 10 are our own analysis (mostly llm_verified), not an ISO, NIST, MITRE or OWASP product — how ours compare.