A.7.9 Physical
Security of assets off-premises
Structured attributes from ISO/IEC 27002:2022 — control type · CIA properties · cybersecurity concept · operational capability · security domain. What do these mean?
Mapped NIST 800-53 r5 controls (19)
Our reading (mostly llm_verified) of how this ISO control and each NIST 800-53 control relate. Not an ISO or NIST product.
Direction: ← other covers this;
→ this covers other (F/M/P = full / mostly /
partial). gov = governs / implements (a mandate, not coverage).
Why these map — rationale
- MP-5mostlycovers — A.7.9's broad requirement to prevent loss/damage/theft/compromise of any off-site devices (including media) and operational interruption accounts for the bulk of MP-5's transport protections, accountability, documentation, and authorized-personnel restrictions, but leaves a residual slice of MP-5's media-specific parameter-driven controls and explicit transport documentation uncovered.
Aligned NIST CSF 2.0 outcomes (17)
NIST CSF 2.0 outcomes this ISO control aligns with — our analysis (mostly llm_verified).
Direction: ← other covers this;
→ this covers other (F/M/P = full / mostly /
partial). gov = governs / implements (a mandate, not coverage).
Why these map — rationale
- PR.AA-06domain mandateimplements — A.7.9's technical measures for securing off-premises assets (protection against loss/theft/compromise while outside the facility) directly operationalize the physical-access management outcome named in PR.AA-06 when those assets leave the premises; the link is within the shared physical-protection domain but PR.AA-06 does not name off-premises handling specifically.
Related OWASP ASVS 5.0 requirements (6)
Application-security verification requirements (OWASP ASVS 5.0) this ISO control aligns with; links open the ASVS chapter. Our analysis (mostly llm_verified) — many ISO controls have no ASVS counterpart.
Direction: ← other covers this;
→ this covers other (F/M/P = full / mostly /
partial). gov = governs / implements (a mandate, not coverage).
Mitigated MITRE ATT&CK techniques (3182)
Adversary techniques (MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise) this ISO control helps mitigate; links open attack.mitre.org. Our analysis (mostly llm_verified).
Direction: ← other covers this;
→ this covers other (F/M/P = full / mostly /
partial). gov = governs / implements (a mandate, not coverage).
Why these map — rationale
- T1052partialprevents — A.7.9's remote-wipe capability (f) and authorization/chain-of-custody requirements (c, d) reduce the likelihood that data on a lost, stolen or unauthorized off-premises device can be extracted via physical media, but the control does not prevent the technique from running on-premises, does not block USB/removable-media use on devices in an adversary's hands, and addresses only the off-premises subset of T1052's scenarios.
- T1542.002partialprevents — A.7.9's physical security monitoring, tamper proofing, access controls, and chain-of-custody requirements for off-premises equipment address the physical-access vector that component firmware modification typically requires, but the control does not target firmware integrity directly and does not reach supply-chain or logical vectors for the technique.
- T1674partialprevents — A.7.9 can prevent some physical-HID-based T1674 attacks against off-premises devices via access, tamper-proofing, chain-of-custody and unattended-device controls, but it does not stop software-based keystroke simulation or the technique on devices outside its off-premises scope.
Control IDs, short titles and the structured attribute table (control type, CIA properties, cybersecurity-concept, operational capability, security domain) are facts from ISO/IEC 27001:2022 Annex A / ISO/IEC 27002:2022. The full implementation guidance prose lives in ISO/IEC 27002:2022 — not reproduced here. Cross-walks to NIST 800-53, NIST CSF 2.0, OWASP ASVS, CWE, MITRE ATT&CK and OWASP Web Top 10 are our own analysis (mostly llm_verified), not an ISO, NIST, MITRE or OWASP product — how ours compare.