A.8.13 Technological
Information backup
Structured attributes from ISO/IEC 27002:2022 — control type · CIA properties · cybersecurity concept · operational capability · security domain. What do these mean?
Mapped NIST 800-53 r5 controls (18)
Our reading (mostly llm_verified) of how this ISO control and each NIST 800-53 control relate. Not an ISO or NIST product.
Direction: ← other covers this;
→ this covers other (F/M/P = full / mostly /
partial). gov = governs / implements (a mandate, not coverage).
Why these map — rationale
- CP-10mostlycovers — A.8.13's backup requirement and practices account for the bulk of the recovery/reconstitution capability demanded by CP-10, but a real residual remains (reconstitution procedures, known-good state definitions, and non-backup recovery mechanisms sit outside the backup control).
- CP-9mostlycovers — A.8.13's backup objective and measures account for the core conduct-and-protect requirements of CP-9, but leave a residual on explicit frequency parameters, testing, and storage-location controls that sit outside its text.
Aligned NIST CSF 2.0 outcomes (20)
NIST CSF 2.0 outcomes this ISO control aligns with — our analysis (mostly llm_verified).
Direction: ← other covers this;
→ this covers other (F/M/P = full / mostly /
partial). gov = governs / implements (a mandate, not coverage).
Why these map — rationale
- PR.DS-11fullcovers — The ISO control's comprehensive requirements for creating, protecting, testing, and maintaining backups directly implement the CSF outcome of ensuring data backups exist and remain reliable for recovery.
- PR.IR-03domain mandateimplements — A.8.13's backup mechanisms directly operationalize the resilience mechanisms required by PR.IR-03 within its domain (recovery from loss of data/systems is a core resilience technique), though the CSF outcome does not name backup explicitly.
Related OWASP ASVS 5.0 requirements (6)
Application-security verification requirements (OWASP ASVS 5.0) this ISO control aligns with; links open the ASVS chapter. Our analysis (mostly llm_verified) — many ISO controls have no ASVS counterpart.
Direction: ← other covers this;
→ this covers other (F/M/P = full / mostly /
partial). gov = governs / implements (a mandate, not coverage).
Related weaknesses / CWE (2401)
Weakness classes this ISO control helps prevent or mitigate — our analysis (mostly llm_verified).
Direction: ← other covers this;
→ this covers other (F/M/P = full / mostly /
partial). gov = governs / implements (a mandate, not coverage).
Why these map — rationale
- CWE-530partialblocks — A.8.13 ensures backup copies exist and are recoverable; it does not govern where backup files are stored or who can access them, so an exposed backup file remains fully exploitable.
Mitigated MITRE ATT&CK techniques (1824)
Adversary techniques (MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise) this ISO control helps mitigate; links open attack.mitre.org. Our analysis (mostly llm_verified).
Direction: ← other covers this;
→ this covers other (F/M/P = full / mostly /
partial). gov = governs / implements (a mandate, not coverage).
Why these map — rationale
- T1014mostlyrecovers — Restoring a system from a known-good backup eradicates OS-level rootkits and returns the system to a trusted state, with the bounded remainder being firmware-level rootkits that survive OS restoration and the data window since the last backup.
- T1070.008mostlyrecovers — A.8.13 restores mailbox data that the adversary cleared, including the evidence (emails, metadata, logs) the technique targets; the same remainders as the T1486 anchor apply — data modified or deleted after the last backup, and backups reachable from a compromised environment where the adversary also has access.
- T1080mostlyrecovers — Restoring the shared directory from backup replaces the tainted files with their healthy, pre-compromise versions, with the remainder being any legitimate changes made to the shared content since the last backup.
- T1484.001mostlyrecovers — Restoring Active Directory or the SYSVOL directory from a known-good backup reverts the adversary's malicious modifications to the Group Policy Objects, with the remainder being the unrecoverable window since the last backup.
- T1485mostlyrecovers — A.8.13's backup facilities, stored in a safe remote location per the clause's own guidance, restore data overwritten or deleted by T1485; the same `mostly` ceiling as T1486 applies because data written since the last backup and any backups reachable from the compromised environment are not recoverable.
- T1485.001mostlyrecovers — A.8.13 explicitly addresses cloud backup and requires remote, secure storage of backup copies, which restores data destroyed by lifecycle-policy deletion; the same bounded remainders as the T1486 anchor apply — data written since the last backup, and backups reachable from the compromised cloud environment if the adversary's permissions extend to them.
- T1486mostlyrecovers — A.8.13's defined purpose and mechanisms (backups, tested restoration procedures, RPO/RTO alignment) directly restore data and systems after ransomware encryption has rendered them unavailable, matching the recovers verb; mostly because the remainder (data written after the last backup) is explicitly named in the clause and in the event-lane anchor.
- T1486mostlyresponds — A.8.13's backup regime (with tested restoration procedures) is explicitly invoked by the control to meet incident-response and business-continuity objectives once ransomware encryption has occurred; the technique has already run and produced its impact, which responding then contains/addresses via recovery.
- T1490mostlyrecovers — A.8.13's core purpose and guidance are to provide, test and retain backup facilities so that essential information, software and systems can be restored after loss/failure/disaster, directly addressing the post-impact recovery that T1490 seeks to block.
- T1491mostlyrecovers — A.8.13's backup of pre-defacement content enables restoration of the original visual content after the integrity loss, with the same bounded remainder as the T1486 anchor: changes made since the last backup, and backups reachable from a system the defacer also compromised.
- T1491.001mostlyrecovers — Defacement replaces original content (websites, login banners, wallpaper, system images) with adversary-controlled material, effectively losing the original data; A.8.13's backup of information and software restores that original state, with the same named remainders as the T1486 anchor — data modified since the last backup and backups reachable from the compromised environment.
- T1491.002mostlyrecovers — A.8.13 backup of the externally-facing website's content and configuration enables restoration of the pre-defacement state, which is the recovery action against T1491.002; the remainder is the standard one — content modified between the last backup and detection, and any defacement that reached the backup store itself.
- T1505.006mostlyrecovers — Restoring the ESXi hypervisor from a known-good backup removes the malicious vSphere Installation Bundle and returns the system to a clean state, with the remainder being any configuration changes made since the last backup.
- T1531mostlyrecovers — A.8.13 restores essential information and software from backup, which directly recovers the accounts and permissions that T1531 removed, with the remainder being the unrecoverable window since the last backup.
- T1542.003mostlyrecovers — A.8.13's backup and restoration procedures can recover the system to a pre-bootkit state from clean backups, but the remainder is the recovery gap since the last clean backup and the risk that the bootkit itself was backed up and restored.
- T1554mostlyrecovers — A.8.13 provides the capability to restore the original, clean software binary from a backup taken before the adversary's modification, which is the core recovery action against T1554; the named remainders are binaries modified before the most recent backup (the backup is already tainted), binaries outside the backup scope, and the need to identify all compromised binaries — none of which A.8.13 itself addresses.
- T1561mostlyrecovers — A.8.13's purpose is explicitly to enable recovery from loss of data or systems, and disk wipe is the canonical loss-of-data event; backup restores the wiped data after impact is realised, which is `recovers` and never `prevents`. `mostly` and not `full` for the same named remainders as the T1486 anchor: data written since the last backup and backups reachable from the compromised environment, both visible in the clause's own guidance.
- T1561.001mostlyrecovers — A.8.13's purpose is to enable recovery from loss of data or systems, and disk content wipe destroys data on storage devices that backups can restore; the same named remainder as the T1486 anchor applies — data written since the last backup and backups reachable from the compromised environment are not restored.
- T1561.002mostlyrecovers — A.8.13's backup of complete system information (including MBR/partition table for critical systems) genuinely restores the disk structures the technique destroyed, with the same named remainders as the T1486 anchor: data written since the last backup, and backups reachable from the compromised environment.
- T1565mostlyrecovers — A.8.13's backup copies taken before manipulation enable restoration of correct data once the integrity violation is known, acting after the event in the same shape as against T1486; the remainder is the standard backup window (data written/modified since the last good copy) and backups that may themselves have been compromised if the adversary had prior access.
- T1565.001mostlyrecovers — A.8.13 provides backup and restoration procedures that can recover data to its pre-manipulation state, but recovery is limited to the last clean backup and data written since then remains lost.
- T1565.003mostlyrecovers — A.8.13 provides backup and restoration procedures that can recover the original, unmanipulated data from a point before the runtime manipulation occurred, though any data created or modified between the last backup and the manipulation is lost.
- T1578.004mostlyrecovers — A.8.13's remote backup storage (clause c) is specifically designed to survive damage at the main site, and an adversary reverting a cloud instance effectively destroys data on that instance — the backup enables recovery of the pre-revert state, with the standard remainder of data written since the last backup.
- T1601mostlyrecovers — A.8.13 covers backup of 'software' and 'systems' which can include network device system images, and for critical systems explicitly addresses recovering the complete system; however, the guidance is general and does not specifically address embedded network device firmware backup practices, so recovery depends on whether such backups are in place and whether they predate the modification.
- T1059.008partialrecovers — Restoring a network device from backup reverts persistent malicious configuration changes made via the CLI, though it cannot recover intercepted traffic or undo transient command execution.
- T1176.001partialrecovers — Restoring a system or user profile from a clean backup removes the local malicious browser extension and reverts the system to its pre-compromise state, though extensions synced to a cloud browser profile may be automatically re-downloaded upon login.
- T1207partialrecovers — A.8.13 backup of AD data (System State) can restore manipulated directory objects, schemas and credentials to a known-good point, but the technique specifically registers a rogue DC, establishes persistence backdoors (SID-History, account/ACL/schema changes), and is designed to obstruct forensic analysis — so data restoration alone does not remove the rogue DC, reset KRBTGT, or catch every backdoor, and the window since last backup plus the technique's anti-forensic design bound what backup recovers.
- T1499.004partialrecovers — A.8.13 can restore a crashed application or system from backup, but the underlying vulnerability that T1499.004 exploits typically persists in the restored image, so the same exploit can immediately re-crash the system — the technique description explicitly notes a 'persistent denial of service condition' is likely, meaning what is restored does not survive the still-present attack vector.
- T1525partialrecovers — Restoring from a known-good backup replaces the compromised cloud or container image with a clean version, removing the adversary's persistence mechanism, with the remainder being any legitimate changes made since the last backup.
- T1542partialrecovers — A.8.13 can restore the operating system and data from a clean backup after a Pre-OS Boot compromise, but the backup process itself does not address the compromised firmware or bootloader, which will re-infect the restored system unless separately remediated.
- T1542.004partialrecovers — A.8.13 backs up 'software' which can include network device firmware images, so a known-good ROMMON backup could in principle be restored to recover from the compromise; however, network device firmware backup is not the standard application of this clause, the technique specifically targets the boot loader to make recovery difficult, and restoring ROMMON often requires specialized procedures beyond typical backup restoration, leaving a substantial remainder.
- T1578partialrecovers — A.8.13's cloud backup guidance covers recovery of deleted compute instances and snapshots, which are explicit components of T1578; however, the technique's primary purpose is defense evasion through unauthorized modification and creation of infrastructure, which backup does not address — restoration to a prior state removes some adversary changes but does not recover from created resources or remove the adversary's underlying access.
- T1601.001partialrecovers — A.8.13's scope includes backup of 'software,' which can encompass network device OS images, so a stored backup of the original image enables restoration after a storage-based patch; however, the technique can persist in the boot loader (ROMMONkit), can be performed in memory only (not surviving reboot but also not addressed by backup), and A.8.13 does not specifically mandate network device image backup, leaving the recovery coverage bounded.
- T1685partialrecovers — A.8.13 restores data and systems from backup after an incident, so it can recover the state of a tool that was disabled or modified, but it does not address the adversary's ongoing access that enabled the tampering.
Prevented OWASP Web Top 10 (2025) risks (2)
OWASP Web Top 10 (2025) risk categories this ISO control helps prevent or mitigate — our analysis (mostly llm_verified).
Direction: ← other covers this;
→ this covers other (F/M/P = full / mostly /
partial). gov = governs / implements (a mandate, not coverage).
Control IDs, short titles and the structured attribute table (control type, CIA properties, cybersecurity-concept, operational capability, security domain) are facts from ISO/IEC 27001:2022 Annex A / ISO/IEC 27002:2022. The full implementation guidance prose lives in ISO/IEC 27002:2022 — not reproduced here. Cross-walks to NIST 800-53, NIST CSF 2.0, OWASP ASVS, CWE, MITRE ATT&CK and OWASP Web Top 10 are our own analysis (mostly llm_verified), not an ISO, NIST, MITRE or OWASP product — how ours compare.