Raw vector
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:HCVSS and EPSS are reproduced from their sources (NVD, FIRST EPSS). Risk Priority is our own derived reading, not an NVD score.
Summary
CVE-2023-53333 is a high-severity Out-of-bounds Read (CWE-125) vulnerability in Linux Linux Kernel. Its CVSS base score is 8.2 (High).
Operationally, exploitation aligns with the MITRE ATT&CK technique Exploitation for Privilege Escalation (T1068); ranked at the 20th percentile by exploit likelihood (below the median); it is not currently listed in the CISA KEV catalog.
The strongest mitigations our analysis identified map to SA-11 (Developer Testing and Evaluation) and SA-8 (Security and Privacy Engineering Principles) — see the control section below for these in your framework.
EU & UK References
- 🇪🇺 ENISA EUVD: EUVD-2023-59928
Vulnerability Data
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: netfilter: conntrack: dccp: copy entire header to stack buffer, not just basic one Eric Dumazet says: nf_conntrack_dccp_packet() has an unique: dh = skb_header_pointer(skb, dataoff, sizeof(_dh), &_dh); And nothing more is…
more
'pulled' from the packet, depending on the content. dh->dccph_doff, and/or dh->dccph_x ...) So dccp_ack_seq() is happily reading stuff past the _dh buffer. BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in nf_conntrack_dccp_packet+0x1134/0x11c0 Read of size 4 at addr ffff000128f66e0c by task syz-executor.2/29371 [..] Fix this by increasing the stack buffer to also include room for the extra sequence numbers and all the known dccp packet type headers, then pull again after the initial validation of the basic header. While at it, mark packets invalid that lack 48bit sequence bit but where RFC says the type MUST use them. Compile tested only. v2: first skb_header_pointer() now needs to adjust the size to only pull the generic header. (Eric) Heads-up: I intend to remove dccp conntrack support later this year.
- CWE(s)
Related Threats
MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise Techniques
CVEs Like This One
Affected Assets
Mitigating Controls
Mitigating Controls (NIST 800-53 r5) AI
Developer testing and evaluation directly finds out-of-bounds read flaws through static analysis, fuzzing, and dynamic bounds checks.
Secure engineering principles require bounds checking and memory-safe constructs that stop out-of-bounds reads from being introduced.
Process isolation confines the effects of an out-of-bounds read to the compromised process.
Input validation rejects malformed indices or lengths that would otherwise cause reads outside buffer bounds.
Mitigating Controls (NIST CSF 2.0) AI
Derived directly from the weakness types (CWEs) cited in the NVD entry via our AI-authored CWE→CSF cross-walk (authority under review) — links open the control.
Secure-development practices such as bounds checking and memory-safe languages directly prevent out-of-bounds reads.
Vulnerability scanning and recording can discover instances of out-of-bounds reads after code is deployed.
Routine patching replaces vulnerable code containing out-of-bounds read flaws.
Mitigating Controls (ISO/IEC 27001:2022 Annex A) AI
Derived directly from the weakness types (CWEs) cited in the NVD entry via our AI-authored CWE→ISO cross-walk (authority under review) — links open the control.
Security testing in development and acceptance includes fuzzing and static analysis that detect out-of-bounds read defects before release.
Logging can record evidence of an out-of-bounds read but does not prevent the weakness itself.
Secure development life cycle mandates input validation and bounds checking that directly prevent out-of-bounds reads.
Application security requirements include explicit bounds and memory-safety specifications that mitigate buffer over-reads.
Secure system architecture and engineering principles require memory-safe design patterns and runtime protections against out-of-bounds access.
Secure coding standards explicitly forbid unsafe pointer arithmetic and mandate bounds-checked reads, eliminating CWE-125.