Raw vector
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:U/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:XSummary
CVE-2025-62603 is a low-severity Out-of-bounds Read (CWE-125) vulnerability in Eprosima Fast Dds. Its CVSS base score is 1.7 (Low).
Operationally, exploitation aligns with the MITRE ATT&CK technique Exploitation for Privilege Escalation (T1068); ranked at the 40th percentile by exploit likelihood (below the median); it is not currently listed in the CISA KEV catalog.
The strongest mitigations our analysis identified map to SA-11 (Developer Testing and Evaluation) and SA-8 (Security and Privacy Engineering Principles) — see the control section below for these in your framework.
Deeper analysis AI-assisted summary
Synthesised by an AI model from the NVD description and linked references — a reading aid, not an authoritative source.
CVE-2025-62603 is a denial-of-service vulnerability in Fast DDS, an open-source C++ implementation of the OMG Data Distribution Service (DDS) standard. The issue resides in the parsing of ParticipantGenericMessage, a DDS Security control-message container used for handshakes and ongoing security traffic like crypto-token exchanges. Upon receipt, the CDR parser deserializes the message_data field, specifically the DataHolderSeq, by reading a sequence count followed by class_id strings, string properties, and binary properties for each holder. Due to RTPS protocol allowances for duplicates, delays, and retransmissions, the stateless parser fully unfolds potentially malformed structures without higher-layer state awareness, leading to excessive memory allocation and an out-of-memory condition that terminates the process. This affects Fast DDS versions prior to 3.4.1, 3.3.1, and 2.6.11.
The vulnerability carries a CVSS v3.1 base score of 7.5 (AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H), indicating network-accessible exploitation with low complexity and no required privileges or user interaction. Any unauthenticated remote attacker capable of sending RTPS traffic to a vulnerable Fast DDS participant can craft a malicious ParticipantGenericMessage with a large or malformed DataHolderSeq, triggering the full parsing path and causing memory exhaustion. Successful exploitation results in remote process termination, disrupting service availability for DDS-based applications relying on Fast DDS for real-time pub-sub communication.
Patches addressing this issue are available in Fast DDS versions 3.4.1, 3.3.1, and 2.6.11, as detailed in upstream GitHub commits such as 354218514d32beac963ff5c306f1cf159ee37c5f, a726e6a5daba660418d1f7c05b6f203c17747d2b, and ced3b6a5d928af1eae77d5fe889878128ad421a. Security practitioners should upgrade to these fixed releases. Debian's security tracker also documents the CVE for affected packages.
EU & UK References
- 🇪🇺 ENISA EUVD: EUVD-2025-206665
Vulnerability Data
Fast DDS is a C++ implementation of the DDS (Data Distribution Service) standard of the OMG (Object Management Group ). ParticipantGenericMessage is the DDS Security control-message container that carries not only the handshake but also on going security-control traffic after…
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the handshake, such as crypto-token exchange, rekeying, re-authentication, and token delivery for newly appearing endpoints. On receive, the CDR parser is invoked first and deserializes the `message_data` (i .e., the `DataHolderSeq`) via the `readParticipantGenericMessage → readDataHolderSeq` path. The `DataHolderSeq` is parsed sequentially: a sequence count (`uint32`), and for each DataHolder the `class_id` string (e.g. `DDS:Auth:PKI-DH:1.0+Req`), string properties (a sequence of key/value pairs), and binary properties (a name plus an octet-vector). The parser operat es at a stateless level and does not know higher-layer state (for example, whether the handshake has already completed), s o it fully unfolds the structure before distinguishing legitimate from malformed traffic. Because RTPS permits duplicates, delays, and retransmissions, a receiver must perform at least minimal structural parsing to check identity and sequence n umbers before discarding or processing a message; the current implementation, however, does not "peek" only at a minimal header and instead parses the entire `DataHolderSeq`. As a result, prior to versions 3.4.1, 3.3.1, and 2.6.11, this parsi ng behavior can trigger an out-of-memory condition and remotely terminate the process. Versions 3.4.1, 3.3.1, and 2.6.11 p atch the issue.
- CWE(s)
Related Threats
MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise Techniques
CVEs Like This One
Affected Assets
Mitigating Controls
Mitigating Controls (NIST 800-53 r5) AI
Developer testing and evaluation directly finds out-of-bounds read flaws through static analysis, fuzzing, and dynamic bounds checks.
Secure engineering principles require bounds checking and memory-safe constructs that stop out-of-bounds reads from being introduced.
Process isolation confines the effects of an out-of-bounds read to the compromised process.
Input validation rejects malformed indices or lengths that would otherwise cause reads outside buffer bounds.
Mitigating Controls (NIST CSF 2.0) AI
Derived directly from the weakness types (CWEs) cited in the NVD entry via our AI-authored CWE→CSF cross-walk (authority under review) — links open the control.
Secure-development practices such as bounds checking and memory-safe languages directly prevent out-of-bounds reads.
Vulnerability scanning and recording can discover instances of out-of-bounds reads after code is deployed.
Routine patching replaces vulnerable code containing out-of-bounds read flaws.
Mitigating Controls (ISO/IEC 27001:2022 Annex A) AI
Derived directly from the weakness types (CWEs) cited in the NVD entry via our AI-authored CWE→ISO cross-walk (authority under review) — links open the control.
Security testing in development and acceptance includes fuzzing and static analysis that detect out-of-bounds read defects before release.
Logging can record evidence of an out-of-bounds read but does not prevent the weakness itself.
Secure development life cycle mandates input validation and bounds checking that directly prevent out-of-bounds reads.
Application security requirements include explicit bounds and memory-safety specifications that mitigate buffer over-reads.
Secure system architecture and engineering principles require memory-safe design patterns and runtime protections against out-of-bounds access.
Secure coding standards explicitly forbid unsafe pointer arithmetic and mandate bounds-checked reads, eliminating CWE-125.