Raw vector
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:P/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:XCVSS and EPSS are reproduced from their sources (NVD, FIRST EPSS). Risk Priority is our own derived reading, not an NVD score.
Summary
CVE-2026-27146 is a high-severity CSRF (CWE-352) vulnerability in Getsimple-Ce Getsimple Cms. Its CVSS base score is 7.1 (High).
Operationally, exploitation aligns with the MITRE ATT&CK technique Exploit Public-Facing Application (T1190); ranked at the 7th percentile by exploit likelihood (below the median); it is not currently listed in the CISA KEV catalog; a public proof-of-concept is referenced.
The strongest mitigations our analysis identified map to SI-3 (Malicious Code Protection) and AC-3 (Access Enforcement) — see the control section below for these in your framework.
OWASP Top 10 for Web (2025)
EU & UK References
- 🇪🇺 ENISA EUVD: EUVD-2026-7752
Vulnerability Data
GetSimple CMS is a content management system. All versions of GetSimple CMS do not implement CSRF protection on the administrative file upload endpoint. As a result, an attacker can craft a malicious web page that silently triggers a file upload…
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request from an authenticated victim’s browser. The request is accepted without requiring a CSRF token or origin validation. This allows an attacker to upload arbitrary files to the application without the victim’s knowledge or consent. In order to exploit this vulnerability, the victim must be authenticated to GetSimple CMS (e.g., admin user), and visit an attacker-controlled webpage. This issue does not have a fix at the time of publication.
- CWE(s)
Related Threats
MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise Techniques
CVEs Like This One
Affected Assets
Mitigating Controls
Control response
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V3.3.2V3.5.1V10.2.1V5.1.1
Mitigating Controls (NIST 800-53 r5) AI
Malicious-code protection at entry points blocks dangerous file types from being accepted and executed.
Access enforcement requires verifying that state-changing requests originate from the authenticated user rather than a forged cross-site source.
Least functionality restricts the file types and automatic processing capabilities the system will accept.
Mobile-code controls define, authorize, and block unacceptable uploaded code before automatic processing occurs.
Protecting session authenticity prevents attackers from replaying or forging authenticated requests via the victim's browser.
Mitigating Controls (NIST CSF 2.0) AI
Derived directly from the weakness types (CWEs) cited in the NVD entry via our AI-authored CWE→CSF cross-walk (authority under review) — links open the control.
Restricting execution of unauthorized software directly blocks dangerous uploaded files from running.
Secure SDLC practices directly require anti-CSRF controls such as tokens or SameSite attributes.
Hardened configuration baselines can enforce allowed file types and processing rules.
Mitigating Controls (ISO/IEC 27001:2022 Annex A) AI
Derived directly from the weakness types (CWEs) cited in the NVD entry via our AI-authored CWE→ISO cross-walk (authority under review) — links open the control.
Configuration and acceptance testing verify that file-upload handling enforces allowed types and does not permit dangerous content to be stored or executed.
By denying access to phishing or malicious sites, the control lowers the likelihood that a user will be tricked into submitting a forged request that performs an unintended action on another site.
Secure-coding guidelines and security testing explicitly address restrictions on allowed file types and upload handling, reducing the risk that dangerous file uploads are accepted without validation.
Mandated testing for malicious content and known vulnerabilities reduces the likelihood that an outsourced component will contain or accept dangerous file types that could later be uploaded or executed.
Application allow-listing and pre-use scanning of received files directly blocks the introduction of executable content that has not been vetted, eliminating the primary vector for unrestricted dangerous file uploads.