CVE-2026-48100
Raw vector
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:XCVSS and EPSS are reproduced from their sources (NVD, FIRST EPSS). Risk Priority is our own derived reading, not an NVD score.
Summary
CVE-2026-48100 is a high-severity Acceptance of Extraneous Untrusted Data With Trusted Data (CWE-349) vulnerability. Its CVSS base score is 8.7 (High).
Operationally, exploitation aligns with the MITRE ATT&CK technique Subvert Trust Controls (T1553); ranked at the 7th percentile by exploit likelihood (below the median); it is not currently listed in the CISA KEV catalog.
The strongest mitigations our analysis identified map to AC-4 (Information Flow Enforcement) and SC-16 (Transmission of Security and Privacy Attributes) — see the control section below for these in your framework.
EU & UK References
- 🇪🇺 ENISA EUVD: EUVD-2026-88359
Vulnerability Data
Payy is an Ethereum L2 zk-rollup for privacy preserving and regulatory compliant transactions. Prior to version 1.3.0, agg_agg forwards the compacted message stream from its inner proofs into a public messages: [Field; 1000] array, but it never checks that the…
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unused tail of the outer array is zero. A registered prover can build a valid agg_final proof for an approved rollup block while inserting an extra burn message after the real messages. RollupV1.verifyRollup() then parses that public input as a normal burn and transfers USDC from the rollup contract to the attacker. This is a severe circuit soundness failure: the proof system accepts a public statement whose messages array is not fully derived from the verified inner proofs. On the current deployment, verifyRollup() is restricted to the existing allowlisted prover, so a fresh public caller cannot submit the invalid proof directly. That gate limits who can reach L1 today; it does not make the circuit statement sound. The issue becomes permissionless under the prover model described in the Payy whitepaper. Section 3.3.2 states: "To join as a prover, the prover is required to submit a small stake", and Section 3.3.1 states that if a prover fails to submit, "other nodes can submit the block proof instead." In that model, an attacker only needs to become a registered prover and use public validator approval data for an already approved block. This issue has been patched in version 1.3.0.
- CWE(s)
Related Threats
MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise Techniques
CVEs Like This One
Affected Assets
Mitigating Controls
Control response
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- 5 hardening rules · 2 OS baselines
V1.2.2V10.4.7V3.7.3V5.3.1
Mitigating Controls (NIST 800-53 r5) AI
Information flow enforcement can block untrusted data from being accepted or processed as if it were trusted.
Associating security attributes with data allows the system to distinguish and reject extraneous untrusted portions.
Input validation directly stops acceptance of untrusted data mixed into trusted inputs.
Mitigating Controls (NIST CSF 2.0) AI
Derived directly from the weakness types (CWEs) cited in the NVD entry via our AI-authored CWE→CSF cross-walk (authority under review) — links open the control.
Cryptographic integrity checks on data-at-rest can detect tampering or substitution of untrusted content mixed with trusted data.
Cryptographic integrity mechanisms on data-in-transit can prevent acceptance of extraneous untrusted data by validating origin and detecting modification.
Secure SDLC practices directly address proper trust-boundary enforcement and input validation, preventing this class of weakness during development.
Mitigating Controls (ISO/IEC 27001:2022 Annex A) AI
Derived directly from the weakness types (CWEs) cited in the NVD entry via our AI-authored CWE→ISO cross-walk (authority under review) — links open the control.
Secure development lifecycle mandates input validation and trust-boundary enforcement that directly prevents acceptance of untrusted data alongside trusted data.
Application security requirements explicitly call for strict separation and validation of trusted versus untrusted data sources.
A.8.27 mandates security-by-design principles including distrust-external-input, data validation/sanitization, least privilege and security-oriented design reviews that can stop extraneous untrusted data from being treated as trusted, but this is only one slice of a weakness whose dominant causes sit in implementation and in specific input-handling code that the high-level engineering principles do not themselves enforce.
Secure coding standards mandate input sanitization and provenance checks that prevent acceptance of extraneous untrusted data.
Security testing can detect the weakness but does not itself implement preventive controls.
Hardening callouts derived
Configuration rules from DISA STIG baselines that bear on weaknesses of the type cited by this CVE. Each rule is shown with the relationship its mapping actually records, against the CWE it was authored against. Derived via CVE→CWE over `controls_xwalks` (higher-evidence rows only; rows rated `none` are excluded).
Oracle Linux 8 (1 rule)
- V-248574 YUM must be configured to prevent the installation of patches, service packs, device drivers, or OL 8 system components that have not been digitally signed using a certificate that is recognized and approved by the organization. prevents CWE-349