Raw vector
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:NSummary
CVE-2026-56185 is a medium-severity Code Injection (CWE-94) vulnerability in Microsoft Windows Admin Center. Its CVSS base score is 6.5 (Medium).
Operationally, exploitation aligns with the MITRE ATT&CK technique Exploit Public-Facing Application (T1190); ranked at the 45th percentile by exploit likelihood (below the median); it is not currently listed in the CISA KEV catalog.
The strongest mitigations our analysis identified map to AC-3 (Access Enforcement) and IA-2 (Identification and Authentication (Organizational Users)) — see the control section below for these in your framework.
OWASP Top 10 for Web (2025)
EU & UK References
- 🇪🇺 ENISA EUVD: EUVD-2026-43757
Vulnerability Data
Improper authentication in Windows Admin Center allows an authorized attacker to disclose information over a network.
- CWE(s)
Related Threats
MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise TechniquesAI
Why these techniques?
Improper authentication (CWE-287) combined with code injection (CWE-94) in the Windows Admin Center remote management interface directly enables exploitation of a public-facing or external remote service for unauthorized information disclosure.
CVEs Like This One
Affected Assets
Mitigating Controls
Control response
Mitigating Controls (NIST 800-53 r5) AI
Directly enforces authentication and authorization decisions before granting access to Windows Admin Center resources, blocking the improper-auth path to information disclosure.
Requires unique identification and authentication of organizational users before any network access to the admin interface, addressing the CWE-287 weakness.
Limits privileges of already-authenticated users so that even a successful bypass yields minimal additional information from the admin center.
Mitigating Controls (NIST CSF 2.0) AI
Derived directly from the weakness types (CWEs) cited in the NVD entry via our AI-authored CWE→CSF cross-walk (authority under review) — links open the control.
PR.AA-03 directly enforces authentication mechanisms that eliminate most improper-authentication defects, yet CWE-287 spans additional vectors (missing checks, flawed protocols, session handling) that one control does not fully close.
PR.AA-04 directly enables verification of identity assertions (mostly preventing CWE-287 in that scope) yet leaves many other authentication failure modes unaddressed (only partial prevention overall).
PR.PS-06's SDLC practices directly target injection flaws via secure coding and testing (mostly), yet as a single broad outcome it leaves many code-generation specifics unaddressed (partial).
PR.AA-01 supplies and governs credentials/tokens that authentication relies on, removing some weak-credential cases, yet leaves verification logic, missing checks, and protocol flaws untouched.
PR.AA-02 ensures valid enrollment and unique credential binding, which reduces some improper-auth risks at issuance time but leaves runtime claim verification untouched, so each direction only partially addresses the other.
PR.PS-01 can enforce auth-related settings via hardened baselines and default reviews, blocking some config-based instances of CWE-287, yet leaves code-level auth flaws untouched so neither direction reaches mostly.
Mitigating Controls (ISO/IEC 27001:2022 Annex A) AI
Derived directly from the weakness types (CWEs) cited in the NVD entry via our AI-authored CWE→ISO cross-walk (authority under review) — links open the control.
Requiring authentication methods whose strength matches the sensitivity of the data and mandating multi-factor authentication directly blocks attempts to access resources without proving identity.
Verifying user identity before issuing replacement credentials and forcing changes after compromise reduces the likelihood that authentication bypass can be achieved through stolen or weak credentials.
Mandating segregated approval and oversight for non-human identities reduces the chance that weak or orphaned credentials can be exploited for unauthorized authentication.
Requiring authentication mechanisms and technical parameters for secure connections ensures that network services verify user identity before granting access, preventing exploitation of missing or weak authentication.
Security requirements specified early and verified through testing drive the consistent implementation of authentication mechanisms, decreasing the likelihood that authentication steps are omitted or incorrectly applied.
Defining the required level of trust in entity identity and the authentication mechanisms to achieve it ensures that authentication is explicitly addressed rather than omitted.