A.5.3 Organizational
Segregation of duties
Structured attributes from ISO/IEC 27002:2022 — control type · CIA properties · cybersecurity concept · operational capability · security domain. What do these mean?
Mapped NIST 800-53 r5 controls (12)
Our reading (mostly llm_verified) of how this ISO control and each NIST 800-53 control relate. Not an ISO or NIST product.
Direction: ← other covers this;
→ this covers other (F/M/P = full / mostly /
partial). gov = governs / implements (a mandate, not coverage).
Why these map — rationale
- AC-5fullcovers — Both controls require the explicit separation of duties that could enable a single individual to subvert security controls or commit fraud.
Aligned NIST CSF 2.0 outcomes (15)
NIST CSF 2.0 outcomes this ISO control aligns with — our analysis (mostly llm_verified).
Direction: ← other covers this;
→ this covers other (F/M/P = full / mostly /
partial). gov = governs / implements (a mandate, not coverage).
Why these map — rationale
- PR.AA-05explicit mandateimplements — A.5.3 directly operationalizes the separation-of-duties principle that PR.AA-05 explicitly names and requires as part of how access permissions are managed and enforced
Related OWASP ASVS 5.0 requirements (10)
Application-security verification requirements (OWASP ASVS 5.0) this ISO control aligns with; links open the ASVS chapter. Our analysis (mostly llm_verified) — many ISO controls have no ASVS counterpart.
Direction: ← other covers this;
→ this covers other (F/M/P = full / mostly /
partial). gov = governs / implements (a mandate, not coverage).
Related weaknesses / CWE (3234)
Weakness classes this ISO control helps prevent or mitigate — our analysis (mostly llm_verified).
Direction: ← other covers this;
→ this covers other (F/M/P = full / mostly /
partial). gov = governs / implements (a mandate, not coverage).
Why these map — rationale
- CWE-268partialblocks — Segregation of duties prevents a single individual from holding conflicting privileges that could be chained, but it does not block the exploitation of privilege chaining that already exists in a system's design or code.
- CWE-268partialremoves — A.5.3 mandates that roles be designed without conflicting combinations and explicitly calls for using automated tools to identify conflicts and facilitate their removal, so applying it to a system with existing role-based privilege chaining (e.g., the OPERATOR-resets-ADMIN-password pattern in CWE-268's demonstrative example) requires redesigning roles to remove the chaining; however, A.5.3 is a governance/design control whose reach is segregation of duties between individuals, so it does not address CWE-268 instances that arise from application self-assignment of permissions (CVE-2005-1973), alternate-channel chaining (CVE-2002-1772), or other non-role-based privilege combinations, leaving a nameable remainder.
- CWE-268partialprevents — A.5.3 mandates segregation of conflicting duties and explicitly requires that role-based access control systems not grant persons conflicting roles, which directly addresses the organizational/design surface where privilege chains arise; however, the actual prevention in code (e.g., the OPERATOR-resets-Admin-password flaw in CWE-268's demonstrative example) is implemented by other controls (access management, secure coding, testing), and the clause itself acknowledges that small organizations cannot fully segregate and that collusion remains possible, so a minority of instances are prevented.
- CWE-510partialprevents — Segregation of duties, particularly separating code design/implementation from review (item c) and development from production administration (item d), reduces the risk of a single developer inserting a trapdoor by requiring collusion between the writer and the reviewer/deployer; however, the clause itself acknowledges collusion as a limitation, a subtle trapdoor can pass review by a separate person, and the clause does not inspect code — it only separates who does what, leaving a nameable remainder.
- CWE-842partialprevents — A.5.3's example (b) — segregating requesting, approving and implementing access rights — directly addresses the human/administrator path where a single person places a user into an incorrect group, so that slice of the weakness is kept from arising; but the product-level causes (bugs that auto-assign group membership, configuration errors, and collusion, which the clause itself names as a residual) are not reached by separating duties, leaving a nameable remainder.
Mitigated MITRE ATT&CK techniques (3295)
Adversary techniques (MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise) this ISO control helps mitigate; links open attack.mitre.org. Our analysis (mostly llm_verified).
Direction: ← other covers this;
→ this covers other (F/M/P = full / mostly /
partial). gov = governs / implements (a mandate, not coverage).
Why these map — rationale
- T1072partialprevents — A.5.3's segregation of conflicting duties (e.g., separating designing from administering production, or initiating from approving changes) constrains who can use deployment tools and how, preventing a single insider from unilaterally abusing them; however, the technique remains executable by external adversaries who compromise an account with deployment access, by colluding insiders (explicitly named in the clause), and by anyone holding a legitimate role on the tool, so the technique is constrained rather than prevented.
- T1098partialprevents — A.5.3 directly addresses account-related duties (requesting/approving/implementing access rights) and prevents a single insider from executing conflicting account actions alone, but T1098 is broader and is most often performed by an external adversary operating with a compromised account's permissions, against whom segregation of duties provides no barrier.
- T1098.003partialprevents — Segregation of duties directly addresses the conflict in access-rights management (example b: requesting, approving and implementing access rights), so a properly segregated role-granting function cannot be exercised by the same individual who would receive the added role; however, the technique explicitly describes adversaries operating from a compromised account that already holds sufficient permissions, and from adversary-controlled accounts outside the victim tenant, neither of which segregation constrains.
- T1195.002partialprevents — Segregation of duties separates the roles that design, implement, and review code, making it harder for a single malicious insider to inject a compromise undetected, but it does not prevent an external adversary from compromising the upstream source or distribution mechanism.
- T1484partialprevents — Segregation of duties can prevent some instances of T1484 by requiring that policy modifications be initiated, approved, and implemented by different individuals (matching the clause's example of 'initiating, approving and executing a change'), which blocks single-actor insider abuse of domain/tenant policy. However, it cannot prevent external adversaries who have compromised an account with policy-modification rights, and the clause itself names collusion as a limitation, so what is prevented is a slice rather than the bulk.
- T1484.002partialprevents — Segregation of duties can prevent a single compromised account from initiating, approving, and executing trust modifications, but the technique can still run via collusion, multiple compromised identities, or where the organization has not specifically segregated trust-modification duties; the clause is a general organizational control, not a mechanism aimed at this technique.
- T1548.005partialprevents — Segregation of duties addresses access-rights approval (example b: requesting, approving and implementing access rights) and role-conflict detection, which constrains some paths to temporary elevation, but it does not prevent misconfigured cloud permissions, compromise of a sufficiently privileged account, or abuse of legitimate features like JIT access, impersonation, or PassRole by a single user with valid permissions.
- T1556.006partialprevents — Segregation of duties can prevent some instances of MFA modification by separating conflicting duties (e.g., requesting vs. approving vs. implementing MFA configuration changes), forcing an adversary to compromise multiple accounts to disable MFA; however, it does not address user-level attacks like self-registering a new MFA method on one's own account, and it does not stop an adversary who has compromised multiple segregated accounts from executing the technique.
- T1556.009partialprevents — Segregation of duties can prevent a single individual from both holding policy-modification rights and the accounts those policies protect, aligning with example (b) on access rights, but it does not stop an adversary who compromises multiple accounts (collusion is explicitly named in A.5.3) and does not prevent the initial compromise that enables the policy modification.
- T1565partialprevents — Segregation of duties prevents the single-insider scenario where one person can both manipulate data and hide that manipulation (e.g., by also controlling audit or review of that data), but it does not prevent data manipulation by external attackers with write access, by colluding insiders, or by any actor whose role legitimately includes data modification without conflicting review duties — the technique still runs in those cases.
- T1565.001partialprevents — Segregation of duties prevents stored data manipulation where the manipulation requires combining conflicting duties (e.g., using an application and administering its database, or designing and reviewing code that handles stored data), but it does not prevent external attackers, collusion (explicitly named in the guidance), or manipulation within a single role's legitimate scope, so it addresses a slice of the threat rather than the bulk.
- T1578partialprevents — Segregation of duties can prevent unilateral modification of cloud compute infrastructure by requiring that the person requesting a change is not the same person approving or executing it (mirroring examples a, b, d, e, f in the clause), but it does not reach `mostly` because the clause itself names collusion as a bypass, service accounts and automation in IaaS often operate outside the segregation matrix, and the organization must have applied segregation specifically to cloud infrastructure modification roles for the control to engage at all.
- T1578.005partialprevents — Segregation of duties prevents a single compromised account from unilaterally modifying cloud compute configurations by separating requesting, approving, and implementing changes, but the control itself acknowledges collusion as a bypass, and cloud-provider-level or automated API changes may fall outside organizational SoD enforcement.
- T1657partialprevents — Segregation of duties directly addresses insider fraud mechanisms (initiating/approving/executing financial transactions, requesting/implementing access rights) which is one slice of T1657, but the technique's bulk — ransomware extortion, BEC social engineering, external bank hacking, cryptocurrency network exploitation — involves external actors or deception of authorized personnel where duty separation has no purchase.
- T1666partialprevents — Segregation of duties can be applied to cloud resource hierarchy management (e.g., requiring dual authorization for subscription creation, organization membership changes, or resource group modifications), which would prevent a single individual from executing these changes on their own. However, the technique specifically involves adversaries who have already gained access to privileged accounts (e.g., Global Administrator), and segregation of duties does not prevent an adversary from using a compromised account — it constrains legitimate single-actor abuse, not post-compromise API use. Implementation varies and the control is procedural rather than technical.
- T1671partialprevents — Segregation of duties can prevent the insider-abuse variant of T1671 by requiring that the person creating/registering an OAuth application integration is different from the person granting high-privilege consent (analogous to the 'requesting, approving and implementing access rights' example), but it does not prevent the post-compromise variant where an adversary has already seized a high-privileged account and acts as a single user with all necessary privileges, nor the persistence mechanism where integrations survive account disablement, and small organisations often cannot achieve the segregation in practice.
- T1677partialprevents — Segregation of duties addresses some insider vectors of T1677 — separating who can modify CI configuration from who can approve or execute builds, and separating code authoring from build administration — but it does not reach the Public Pipeline Execution scenario where an external actor submits a malicious pull request from a fork, nor the Indirect Pipeline Execution where malicious code is injected into files referenced by the CI config; the technique's external-attacker and trusted-input vectors sit outside what duty separation can constrain.
- T1684partialprevents — Segregation of duties prevents social engineering from completing sensitive actions that require a single deceived user to both initiate and approve (e.g., access grants, change approvals), but it does not prevent the social engineering act itself, does not address disclosure of information or execution of adversary-supplied payloads on a user's own system, and can be circumvented through collusion or by deceiving multiple parties across the segregated roles.
- T1686.001partialprevents — A.5.3's segregation of initiating/approving/executing changes applies to firewall modifications, so a single compromised account cannot unilaterally approve and implement rule changes that require dual control; however, many cloud firewall changes (e.g., creating new security groups, modifying existing rules within delegated scope) do not require separate approval, collusion or multi-account compromise defeats the control, and the clause itself acknowledges small organizations cannot fully achieve segregation.
Prevented OWASP Web Top 10 (2025) risks (2)
OWASP Web Top 10 (2025) risk categories this ISO control helps prevent or mitigate — our analysis (mostly llm_verified).
Direction: ← other covers this;
→ this covers other (F/M/P = full / mostly /
partial). gov = governs / implements (a mandate, not coverage).
Why these map — rationale
- A01partialblocks — A.5.3 directly prevents the authorization-decision slice of A01 (e.g., conflicting roles for requesting/approving access rights or initiating/executing changes) by mandating separation that stops one person from bypassing controls; it leaves the remainder (path traversal, CSRF, IDOR, missing function-level checks) untouched.
Control IDs, short titles and the structured attribute table (control type, CIA properties, cybersecurity-concept, operational capability, security domain) are facts from ISO/IEC 27001:2022 Annex A / ISO/IEC 27002:2022. The full implementation guidance prose lives in ISO/IEC 27002:2022 — not reproduced here. Cross-walks to NIST 800-53, NIST CSF 2.0, OWASP ASVS, CWE, MITRE ATT&CK and OWASP Web Top 10 are our own analysis (mostly llm_verified), not an ISO, NIST, MITRE or OWASP product — how ours compare.