A.7.10 Physical
Storage media
Structured attributes from ISO/IEC 27002:2022 — control type · CIA properties · cybersecurity concept · operational capability · security domain. What do these mean?
Mapped NIST 800-53 r5 controls (24)
Our reading (mostly llm_verified) of how this ISO control and each NIST 800-53 control relate. Not an ISO or NIST product.
Direction: ← other covers this;
→ this covers other (F/M/P = full / mostly /
partial). gov = governs / implements (a mandate, not coverage).
Why these map — rationale
- MP-4mostlycovers — A.7.10's focus on preventing unauthorized disclosure/modification/removal/destruction of information on media directly accounts for the bulk of MP-4's secure storage and protection requirements, but leaves a residual on MP-4's physical-control and approved-destruction/sanitization procedures that sit outside A.7.10's explicit scope.
- MP-6mostlycovers — A.7.10's requirement to protect storage media against unauthorized disclosure/modification/removal/destruction (including through sanitization before release/reuse) accounts for the bulk of MP-6's sanitization mandate and strength requirements, but leaves a residual on explicit procedural steps for different media types and formal tracking of sanitization actions that 27002 places in A.7.11 instead.
- MP-7partialcovers — A.7.10's focus on protecting storage media against unauthorized disclosure/modification/removal/destruction addresses only a slice of mp-7's broader requirements to restrict/limit/prohibit media use (including by type, on systems, and with no identifiable owner); most of mp-7 sits outside A.7.10.
Aligned NIST CSF 2.0 outcomes (24)
NIST CSF 2.0 outcomes this ISO control aligns with — our analysis (mostly llm_verified).
Direction: ← other covers this;
→ this covers other (F/M/P = full / mostly /
partial). gov = governs / implements (a mandate, not coverage).
Why these map — rationale
- PR.DS-01domain mandateimplements — A.7.10 operationalizes protection of data-at-rest (via media handling that directly serves confidentiality and integrity) within the PR.DS domain, but the outcome does not name media controls specifically
Related OWASP ASVS 5.0 requirements (4)
Application-security verification requirements (OWASP ASVS 5.0) this ISO control aligns with; links open the ASVS chapter. Our analysis (mostly llm_verified) — many ISO controls have no ASVS counterpart.
Direction: ← other covers this;
→ this covers other (F/M/P = full / mostly /
partial). gov = governs / implements (a mandate, not coverage).
Related weaknesses / CWE (3235)
Weakness classes this ISO control helps prevent or mitigate — our analysis (mostly llm_verified).
Direction: ← other covers this;
→ this covers other (F/M/P = full / mostly /
partial). gov = governs / implements (a mandate, not coverage).
Why these map — rationale
- CWE-1266mostlyblocks — A.7.10's secure reuse and disposal procedures (secure deletion before reuse, physical destruction/shredding for disposal, logging, risk assessment for damaged devices) work around the product's missing scrubbing capability by removing or destroying the sensitive data through organizational means, so the weakness in the product remains but its exploitation is blocked in most decommissioning scenarios; the remainder is devices that leave the organization's control without the disposal procedure being applied.
- CWE-312partialremoves — A.7.10(d) requires cryptographic protection of information on removable storage media when confidentiality matters, so applying the clause to a system that previously stored sensitive data in cleartext on such media removes that subset of CWE-312 instances; the remainder is the broader class of cleartext storage in databases, cookies, memory, config files, and other non-storage-media resources that A.7.10 does not reach.
- CWE-312partialblocks — A.7.10 item (d) requires cryptographic techniques to protect information on removable storage media, which blocks exploitation of cleartext storage on that media; however, CWE-312 also arises in cookies, databases, configuration files, memory, registry keys, log files, and cloud storage — resource types outside A.7.10's storage-media scope — so only a portion of instances are blocked.
- CWE-509partialblocks — A.7.10 restricts removable storage media ports and monitors transfers, which can block some virus/worm propagation through USB/SD media, but it does not stop the malicious code's network-based replication or execution, so only a minority of CWE-509 exploitation is covered.
- CWE-921partialblocks — A.7.10(d) calls for cryptographic protection of information on removable storage media when confidentiality or integrity matter, which blocks exploitation of the missing-access-control weakness for that subset; the remainder is bounded and nameable -- non-removable storage mechanisms without access control (file systems, fixed devices) are outside the clause's scope, and the encryption guidance is conditional rather than mandatory.
Mitigated MITRE ATT&CK techniques (3236)
Adversary techniques (MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise) this ISO control helps mitigate; links open attack.mitre.org. Our analysis (mostly llm_verified).
Direction: ← other covers this;
→ this covers other (F/M/P = full / mostly /
partial). gov = governs / implements (a mandate, not coverage).
Why these map — rationale
- T1052mostlyprevents — Requiring authorization, logging, and port disabling for removable media directly limits an adversary's ability to physically exfiltrate data via USB or other external devices.
- T1025partialprevents — A.7.10(h) disabling removable-media ports is a direct prevention mechanism that stops the technique where it can be applied, but the technique explicitly covers multiple media types (optical disk drives, USB, etc.), some of which cannot be disabled (built-in optical drives), and media already connected at the time of compromise remains readable; the control's port restrictions are conditional on organizational need, so what is prevented is a slice rather than the bulk.
- T1052partialdetects — A.7.10 item (i) requires monitoring the transfer of information to removable media, which can surface exfiltration events, but the control's scope is limited to transfers the organization can observe and does not mandate host-level instrumentation, leaving transfers on unmonitored systems or via unregistered media undetected.
- T1052.001partialprevents — A.7.10(h) directly enables disabling USB ports, which prevents the technique from running where applied, and (b)/(d) constrain it further; but the control explicitly permits USB ports when there is an organizational reason, and T1052.001 can still execute in those legitimate-use scenarios, so what is prevented is a slice rather than the bulk.
- T1091partialdetects — A.7.10(i) requires monitoring the transfer of information to removable storage media where there is organizational need, which can surface the data-write portion of T1091 (copying malware to media), but the clause is conditional, its primary purpose is data-at-rest protection rather than threat detection, and it does not address the execution-via-Autorun, mobile-device/USB-cable infection, or firmware-modification vectors that complete the technique.
- T1091partialprevents — A.7.10 disables removable media ports unless there is an organizational reason (h) and requires authorization and monitoring for media that is used (b, i), which blocks the Autorun-based execution path for unapproved media, but the technique can still succeed through approved media, firmware-level manipulation, or mobile device vectors that the control does not fully close.
- T1092partialdetects — A.7.10(i) requires monitoring transfers of information TO removable media where there is organizational need, which would surface the write-side of T1092 (data staged onto media for relay to the disconnected host); however, monitoring is conditional on need-to-use, covers only outbound transfers not reads from media placed by another compromised host, and the technique is designed to be covert, so detection is a slice rather than coverage of the activity.
- T1092partialprevents — A.7.10(h) directly disables removable media ports where there is no organizational reason for their use, which removes the mechanism T1092 requires; however, the control explicitly permits ports to remain enabled when legitimate use exists, and T1092 specifically operates in environments where removable media is already in use (both endpoints must already be compromised via T1091), so where removable media is functionally required the technique can still run.
- T1200partialprevents — A.7.10's clause (h) requires removable-media ports (USB, SD) to be enabled only with organizational reason, which prevents USB-borne hardware additions such as keystroke-injection devices; the rest of T1200 — rogue wireless access points, network taps, DMA via PCIe/Thunderbolt, and other non-USB vectors — sits outside the clause's scope, so what is prevented is a slice of the technique rather than the bulk.
- T1674partialprevents — A.7.10(h) restricts enabling removable storage media ports (including USB) to organizational need, which directly blocks the physical HID/USB keystroke-injection vector of T1674 (e.g., malicious USB devices emulating keystrokes), but the control does not address the software-based input injection vector (e.g., monitoring the Windows message loop to simulate keystrokes programmatically), so only one of the technique's two main vectors is prevented.
Prevented OWASP Web Top 10 (2025) risks (1)
OWASP Web Top 10 (2025) risk categories this ISO control helps prevent or mitigate — our analysis (mostly llm_verified).
Direction: ← other covers this;
→ this covers other (F/M/P = full / mostly /
partial). gov = governs / implements (a mandate, not coverage).
Control IDs, short titles and the structured attribute table (control type, CIA properties, cybersecurity-concept, operational capability, security domain) are facts from ISO/IEC 27001:2022 Annex A / ISO/IEC 27002:2022. The full implementation guidance prose lives in ISO/IEC 27002:2022 — not reproduced here. Cross-walks to NIST 800-53, NIST CSF 2.0, OWASP ASVS, CWE, MITRE ATT&CK and OWASP Web Top 10 are our own analysis (mostly llm_verified), not an ISO, NIST, MITRE or OWASP product — how ours compare.