A.8.22 Technological
Segregation of networks
Structured attributes from ISO/IEC 27002:2022 — control type · CIA properties · cybersecurity concept · operational capability · security domain. What do these mean?
Mapped NIST 800-53 r5 controls (14)
Our reading (mostly llm_verified) of how this ISO control and each NIST 800-53 control relate. Not an ISO or NIST product.
Direction: ← other covers this;
→ this covers other (F/M/P = full / mostly /
partial). gov = governs / implements (a mandate, not coverage).
Why these map — rationale
- AC-4mostlycovers — A.8.22's network segmentation and boundary traffic control directly implements the core of AC-4's information flow enforcement between connected systems; residual exists in AC-4's intra-system flow rules that network-level segregation reaches only partially.
- SC-32mostlycovers — A.8.22's network segmentation and traffic control based on business needs accounts for the bulk of SC-32's partitioning into separate domains/environments, but leaves a residual of non-network (e.g., application/process/memory) partitioning and non-business criteria (e.g., risk, criticality) uncovered
- SC-7mostlycovers — Both controls require dividing networks into distinct segments with controlled gateways at the boundaries to enforce security policies based on trust levels and information sensitivity.
Aligned NIST CSF 2.0 outcomes (14)
NIST CSF 2.0 outcomes this ISO control aligns with — our analysis (mostly llm_verified).
Direction: ← other covers this;
→ this covers other (F/M/P = full / mostly /
partial). gov = governs / implements (a mandate, not coverage).
Why these map — rationale
- PR.IR-01mostlycovers — Network domain segregation with perimeter gateways directly implements the outcome of protecting networks and environments from unauthorized logical access.
- ID.AM-03domain mandateimplements — A.8.22's technical segregation and traffic-control mechanisms give operational effect to maintaining accurate representations of authorized flows (ID.AM-03) within the asset-management domain, but the CSF outcome does not name segregation specifically.
Related OWASP ASVS 5.0 requirements (10)
Application-security verification requirements (OWASP ASVS 5.0) this ISO control aligns with; links open the ASVS chapter. Our analysis (mostly llm_verified) — many ISO controls have no ASVS counterpart.
Direction: ← other covers this;
→ this covers other (F/M/P = full / mostly /
partial). gov = governs / implements (a mandate, not coverage).
Why these map — rationale
- V13.2.4mostlycovers — Defining perimeters and controlling inter-domain traffic through gateways implements an allow-list of permitted external or internal communication targets.
- V13.2.5mostlycovers — Gateway-enforced access rules between domains equate to configuring the web or application server with an allow-list of resources it may reach.
Related weaknesses / CWE (2508)
Weakness classes this ISO control helps prevent or mitigate — our analysis (mostly llm_verified).
Direction: ← other covers this;
→ this covers other (F/M/P = full / mostly /
partial). gov = governs / implements (a mandate, not coverage).
Why these map — rationale
- CWE-1125partialblocks — Segregation of networks divides the environment into domains and controls traffic between them, which limits the paths an attacker can take to reach an exposed input or output, but it does not reduce the number of input and output points the product itself presents; the attack surface is a property of the product's own design, and the weakness remains fully exploitable within whatever domain the product resides in.
- CWE-1327partialblocks — Network segregation with gateway controls can block traffic from external/untrusted domains from reaching a service bound to 0.0.0.0, but the weakness remains fully exploitable from within the same network domain where the host resides, so the control masks only a portion of the attack surface.
- CWE-1329partialblocks — Network-domain boundaries and gateway filtering can block some unauthorized paths to a non-updateable component, but the component remains exploitable through permitted interfaces or within its own domain.
- CWE-1392partialblocks — Network segregation with gateway controls can block external attackers from reaching the authentication interface of a system that still has default credentials, masking the weakness along that path; the weakness remains fully exploitable from inside the trusted network, via lateral movement, or through any other path the segregation does not close, which is a nameable remainder.
- CWE-1393partialblocks — Network segregation limits external reachability to devices with default credentials by placing them behind gateways, blocking exploitation from outside the domain, but the default password remains fully exploitable from within the network domain or by any attacker who breaches the perimeter.
- CWE-220partialblocks — Network segregation can block exploitation by isolating the FTP server in a domain unreachable from untrusted networks, but the core weakness — insufficient access control on files under the FTP root — remains exploitable by any party that can reach the FTP server, which the FTP service typically requires; the control addresses only the network-level reachability, not the file-access-control defect.
- CWE-259partialblocks — Network segregation can prevent untrusted domains from reaching an inbound authentication interface that uses a hard-coded password, but it leaves the credential exploitable from permitted network paths and does not prevent reuse of outbound hard-coded passwords.
- CWE-288partialblocks — Network segregation can block exploitation of alternate authentication paths when those paths sit in different network domains behind controlled gateways, but the weakness is fundamentally an application-level authentication design flaw, and many alternate paths (same-server CGI scripts, local APIs, debug interfaces) reside within the same network domain where segregation provides no barrier.
- CWE-290partialblocks — Network segregation blocks external attackers and attackers on other network domains from reaching the authentication endpoint, and makes IP spoofing harder by preventing the attacker from being on the same subnet to sniff responses, but the weakness remains present in the authentication code and is fully exploitable by anyone who can reach the endpoint (insider, compromised host on the same domain, or misconfigured gateway).
- CWE-291partialblocks — Network segregation with gateway filtering limits which sources can reach the authenticating service and makes cross-segment IP spoofing harder, but the application's IP-based authentication logic remains exploitable by any attacker who can route a packet to the service (including from within an allowed segment), so the weakness is still exploitable and only partially blocked.
- CWE-306partialblocks — Network segregation with gateway controls can block external network-based exploitation of unauthenticated critical functions (e.g., unauthenticated REST APIs, PLC protocols, cloud storage endpoints), but the weakness remains present and reachable via local/physical access (UART debug ports, Bluetooth), internal network segments, and any path the gateway permits — a nameable remainder that keeps this below `mostly`.
- CWE-312partialblocks — Network segregation can block external or cross-domain network access to systems holding cleartext data, but it does not stop same-segment, local, application-level, or exposed-cloud access to the stored sensitive information.
- CWE-319partialblocks — Network segregation limits who can be on the network segment where cleartext traffic flows, denying attackers on other domains (guest WiFi, public internet, less-trusted segments) the position to sniff it; but the data remains in cleartext and any actor already on the same domain — or with a foothold inside it — can still sniff the transmission, so the weakness stays exploitable for a large class of attackers.
- CWE-40partialblocks — Network segregation can block exploitation by restricting cross-domain UNC/SMB traffic to unintended shares, but it does not stop traversal to shares within the same domain or along business-approved paths.
- CWE-419partialblocks — Network segregation can place the unprotected admin channel on a management domain behind gateway controls, blocking external and cross-domain attackers from reaching it, but the channel itself remains unprotected — anyone who can route to it (insiders, attackers who breach the perimeter, compromised endpoints on the management VLAN) can still exploit it, leaving a nameable remainder.
- CWE-420partialblocks — Network segregation can block alternate channels that traverse a different network domain (e.g., a management interface on a separate network path), but the weakness is fundamentally about the application's failure to apply consistent protection across all channels — mirror registers, named pipes, same-domain APIs, and hardware buses are unaffected by network-domain boundaries, so only a minority of instances are blocked.
- CWE-509partialblocks — Well-implemented network segregation blocks malicious code from spreading across domain boundaries through controlled gateways, but it does not stop replication among systems within the same domain or over allowed cross-domain paths, so only a portion of the exploit potential is covered.
- CWE-552partialblocks — Network segregation can block external or cross-domain actors from reaching internal file shares, denying exploitation of a subset of CWE-552 instances, but the weakness's primary manifestations — public-facing web/FTP servers with overly broad document roots and cloud storage misconfigurations — are reachable by design and not stopped by gateway controls between network domains.
- CWE-611partialblocks — Network segregation with egress filtering at domain gateways can block the outbound HTTP/HTTPS requests that XXE makes to external servers (one exploitation path), but it does not block local file disclosure via file:// URIs, internal-network requests, or DoS via resource consumption — the weakness remains exploitable through those paths, so only a portion of exploitation is stopped.
- CWE-8partialblocks — Network-domain gateways can prevent less-trusted networks from reaching a remote entity bean, but the exposed bean remains exploitable by clients that are permitted through or already within the trusted domain.
- CWE-918partialblocks — Network segregation with gateway controls blocks SSRF exploitation against internal network resources (internal admin panels, cross-domain port scanning, internal services), which is a major portion of the weakness's damage surface, but the weakness remains exploitable for external destinations, localhost services, and cloud metadata endpoints that the segregation does not reach.
- CWE-940partialblocks — Network segregation can block some exploitation paths by limiting which networks can reach a service that fails to verify source (e.g., restricting who can send DNS updates), but the core weakness is at the application layer and many CWE-940 vectors — Android intents, WebView URL schemes, intra-application channels — are not addressable by network boundaries at all, so the weakness remains exploitable from within permitted segments.
- CWE-941partialblocks — Network segregation with egress filtering at gateways can block some exploitation paths of CWE-941 — particularly SSRF attempts to reach internal resources the attacker cannot reach directly, and misconfigured destinations pointing at unauthorized external hosts — but the underlying application-level defect (incorrectly specified destination) remains, and other manifestations such as UDP source-spoofing amplification are not meaningfully blocked by domain segregation.
- CWE-98partialblocks — Network segregation can block the remote file inclusion vector by preventing the web server from making outbound connections to attacker-controlled hosts, but it does not block local file inclusion (which uses files already on the server) and leaves the underlying code defect intact.
Mitigated MITRE ATT&CK techniques (3536)
Adversary techniques (MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise) this ISO control helps mitigate; links open attack.mitre.org. Our analysis (mostly llm_verified).
Direction: ← other covers this;
→ this covers other (F/M/P = full / mostly /
partial). gov = governs / implements (a mandate, not coverage).
Why these map — rationale
- T1190mostlyprevents — Placing public-facing systems in isolated domains with controlled gateways limits the impact of an exploit against an internet-accessible application by preventing direct access to internal resources.
- T1003.006partialprevents — Network segregation can prevent DCSync by isolating domain controllers in a restricted network domain and controlling which systems can reach them via gateway filters, but DCSync typically requires already-compromised high-privilege credentials (Domain Admin, Enterprise Admin) whose holders usually operate from systems inside the same trust domain as the DC, so the control blocks cross-domain reach while leaving in-domain execution untouched.
- T1008partialprevents — Network segregation constrains fallback C2 by controlling egress through gateways and limiting which domains can reach external infrastructure, but it cannot prevent the adversary from using any allowed outbound channel (e.g., HTTPS) as a fallback, so the technique is reduced rather than eliminated.
- T1018partialprevents — Network segregation blocks cross-domain discovery traffic (ping, ARP, CDP, NetBIOS enumeration) at gateway perimeters, so an adversary in one segment cannot enumerate systems in another; however, the technique still runs and succeeds within the adversary's own domain using local host files, ARP cache, and broadcast-based discovery, so what is prevented is the cross-boundary slice rather than the technique itself.
- T1020partialprevents — Network segregation can block the outbound path that automated exfiltration requires by isolating sensitive domains from the internet and channelling traffic through controlled gateways, but it does not prevent the automation itself, leaves any segment with permitted egress reachable, and does not address channels (T1041, T1048, physical media) that bypass the gateway — a shape consistent with the A.8.12 vs T1048 `prevents` partial anchor.
- T1021partialprevents — Network segregation blocks cross-domain remote service access by requiring traffic to traverse controlled gateways, preventing lateral movement between segments, but within a single domain or where gateways permit remote service traffic for business needs, T1021 still operates unimpeded.
- T1021.001partialprevents — Network segregation can block RDP traffic between security domains at the gateway, preventing cross-segment lateral movement via port 3389, but within a single domain RDP is not constrained, and where business needs require RDP between segments the gateway will permit it — the control shapes traffic flow rather than universally blocking the protocol.
- T1021.002partialprevents — Network segregation with gateway controls can block SMB traffic (ports 445/139) between security domains, preventing cross-segment lateral movement via admin shares, but within a single domain the control does nothing, and where business needs require SMB between segments it is permitted through.
- T1021.003partialprevents — Network segregation with gateway filtering can block DCOM's RPC traffic (port 135 and dynamic high ports) from crossing security domain boundaries, preventing cross-segment lateral movement via DCOM, but it does not stop DCOM between machines within the same network domain where the technique is also commonly used.
- T1021.004partialprevents — A.8.22 can block SSH between network domains at the gateway, preventing cross-segment lateral movement via SSH, but it does not prevent SSH within a single domain and typically must permit administrative SSH through gateways, leaving a substantial slice of the technique reachable.
- T1021.005partialprevents — Network segregation with gateway controls can block VNC traffic from crossing security domain boundaries, preventing VNC-based lateral movement between segments, but it does not prevent VNC from operating within a single domain or where it is explicitly permitted at the gateway, so the technique is constrained rather than stopped.
- T1021.006partialprevents — Network segregation with gateway controls can block WinRM traffic (ports 5985/5986) from crossing security boundaries between domains, but it does not prevent WinRM from operating within a single network domain where the adversary already has a foothold, and the clause requires controls based on business needs rather than mandating WinRM-specific blocking.
- T1021.007partialprevents — Segregation can block or gateway network paths from low-trust domains to cloud service endpoints, but it does not invalidate valid accounts or stop logins where cloud access is required, so only instances reliant on disallowed network paths are prevented.
- T1039partialprevents — Network segregation can prevent cross-domain access to file shares by blocking traffic between security domains at the gateway, but the technique specifically targets shares 'accessible from the current system' — shares within the same domain, and shares the compromised host is already permitted to reach, remain reachable regardless of segregation.
- T1040partialprevents — Network segregation limits cross-domain traffic and constrains where an adversary can position a sniffer, preventing sniffing across properly enforced boundaries, but within a domain the technique still runs and captures all traffic on that segment — the control does not encrypt traffic or stop sniffing at the host/segment level.
- T1041partialprevents — Network segregation can prevent the adversary from reaching data in segregated domains by limiting lateral movement across trust boundaries, but it does not prevent the C2 channel itself or the exfiltration over it — the technique still runs and can exfiltrate whatever data the compromised host can access, since outbound C2 traffic is typically permitted for business reasons.
- T1046partialprevents — Network segregation prevents cross-segment scanning by blocking probe traffic at gateways, but the technique still runs within any segment the adversary reaches and against any service the gateway permits, so what is prevented is the scope of discovery rather than the technique itself.
- T1047partialprevents — Network segregation can block remote WMI lateral movement by filtering DCOM (port 135) and WinRM (5985/5986) at domain gateways, but it cannot prevent local WMI abuse (no network involved) and WMI is an administration feature whose cross-domain traffic is typically permitted for legitimate management, so the technique remains reachable over allowed admin channels.
- T1048partialprevents — Network segregation constrains T1048 by blocking non-business protocols at domain gateways and isolating sensitive domains, but the technique deliberately uses common allowed protocols (HTTPS, DNS, SMB) and SaaS/IaaS APIs that gateways must permit for business operations, so a meaningful slice of exfiltration channels survives any segregation policy.
- T1048.001partialprevents — Network segregation constrains egress paths and forces traffic through controlled gateways, which blocks some exfiltration attempts (e.g., from restricted segments with no internet path), but the symmetric encryption defeats content inspection at those gateways and the technique can ride any allowed outbound protocol (HTTPS, DNS, etc.), so the technique still runs in many configurations.
- T1048.002partialprevents — Network segregation constrains exfiltration paths by blocking direct egress from sensitive segments, forcing traffic through controlled gateways, and restricting destinations, but cannot prevent exfiltration over allowed HTTPS/TLS to permitted destinations since the asymmetric encryption hides content from gateway inspection without separate TLS-interception controls.
- T1048.003partialprevents — Network segregation with gateway controls limits egress paths and channels traffic through controlled boundaries, reducing the systems and routes available for exfiltration, but it cannot prevent data from being encoded within protocols (HTTP, DNS, FTP) that must be allowed for business operations — content inspection is not what this control does.
- T1059.008partialprevents — Network segregation can constrain remote access paths to network device CLIs (e.g., segregating a management plane from user/data planes, restricting which domains may reach SSH/telnet on devices), but it cannot prevent the technique: the CLI is the device's primary interface and remains available to anyone with authenticated access, direct console access bypasses network controls entirely, and A.8.22 governs inter-domain traffic rather than mandating management-plane segregation or removing the CLI itself.
- T1059.013partialprevents — Network segregation can prevent unauthorized network paths to container management APIs (Docker daemon, Kubernetes API server) by isolating the management plane from user and public networks, but it cannot prevent the technique from running where the adversary already has a foothold in an authorized segment with CLI/API access, since the container tooling is required for the platform to function.
- T1071partialprevents — Network segmentation can block specific application-layer protocols at domain boundaries and isolate systems from external networks, but T1071 deliberately uses business-required protocols (HTTP/S, DNS, SMTP) that must traverse gateways, and within an allowed segment the technique operates freely; segmentation controls where traffic flows, not whether the protocol is used for C2.
- T1071.001partialprevents — Network segregation can prevent the technique in segments that have no business need for outbound web traffic (e.g., isolated server domains, OT segments), but for any domain that legitimately requires HTTP/S, the technique is designed to blend in with allowed traffic and a gateway cannot stop it without additional inspection; the control constrains where the technique can run, not whether it can run.
- T1071.002partialprevents — Network segregation with gateway controls can block or restrict file transfer protocols (SMB, FTP, TFTP) from crossing security boundaries between domains, but the technique is designed to blend in with legitimate traffic and operates freely within permitted network flows where these protocols are required for business, so it constrains rather than eliminates the technique.
- T1071.003partialprevents — Network segregation can constrain mail protocol traffic between domains and force it through controlled gateways (e.g., blocking direct SMTP from compromised desktops to external servers, requiring mail relay), but cannot prevent the technique because SMTP/S, POP3/S and IMAP are essential business traffic that must traverse the boundary, and the technique is explicitly designed to blend in with that legitimate traffic.
- T1071.005partialprevents — Network segregation with gateway controls can block outbound traffic to unauthorized pub/sub brokers and restrict which protocols traverse boundaries, but T1071.005 is explicitly designed to evade filtering by blending with legitimate traffic, and pub/sub traffic can be tunneled over allowed ports (e.g., 443) or permitted where the organization uses these protocols for legitimate purposes.
- T1072partialprevents — Network segregation can constrain the blast radius of an abused deployment tool by restricting which domains it can reach, but the tool's legitimate function requires cross-domain reach to the endpoints it manages, so the gateway must permit that traffic and the technique runs on systems within the tool's authorized scope.
- T1074.002partialprevents — Network segregation prevents cross-domain data consolidation by blocking traffic between security domains at gateways, but cannot prevent staging within a single compromised network segment, which is the technique's most common operating pattern.
- T1078.002partialprevents — Network segregation constrains lateral movement of a compromised domain account across security boundaries via gateway controls, but does not prevent the initial credential compromise nor use of the account within its authorized network segment, so it bounds rather than eliminates the technique.
- T1080partialprevents — Network segregation limits lateral spread of tainted shared content across security domains by controlling which segments can reach shared storage, but it does not prevent the initial tainting within a domain where the adversary already has a foothold with write access to the share.
- T1087.002partialprevents — Network segregation can prevent domain account enumeration from segments that lack a permitted path to the domain controller (e.g., guest networks, public-facing zones, or isolated OT segments), but a domain-joined workstation inherently needs to reach the DC for normal operation, so the technique still runs from the typical execution context — the clause constrains reachability rather than blocking the enumeration itself.
- T1090partialprevents — Network segregation constrains proxy use by limiting outbound paths to gateways and restricting which internal systems can reach external networks, but the proxy itself is external and reachable over any allowed business channel (HTTPS to allowlisted domains, CDNs, cloud services), so the technique still runs over permitted traffic.
- T1090.001partialprevents — Network segregation with gateway controls can prevent cross-domain internal proxying by blocking C2 traffic between compromised systems in different trust zones, but it cannot prevent proxying between systems within the same domain — which is the technique's core operating mode, often using trusted peer-to-peer paths like SMB — so the prevention is a slice rather than a closure.
- T1090.003partialprevents — Network segregation with gateway controls and egress filtering can constrain multi-hop proxy abuse — limiting internal proxy chaining between segments and blocking egress to known proxy networks — but it does not stop the technique itself: traffic from external multi-hop proxies still traverses the perimeter, and the source remains disguised regardless of internal segmentation.
- T1095partialprevents — Network segregation with gateway filtering can block cross-domain C2 using non-application layer protocols (ICMP, UDP, SOCKS tunneling between zones), but cannot prevent same-domain use, cannot block ICMP entirely (required for IP operation), and the source prose explicitly notes VMCI bypasses segmentation regardless of firewall rules.
- T1102.001partialprevents — Network segregation with gateway-based egress filtering can constrain which segments reach which external services and force traffic through inspection points, but the technique is specifically designed to use legitimate, commonly-allowed web services (Google, Twitter, etc.) that business-need policies will permit, so the control reduces rather than eliminates the attack surface.
- T1102.002partialprevents — A.8.22's gateway controls at domain perimeters can include egress filtering that restricts some outbound traffic to web services, but T1102.002 is specifically designed to use legitimate, commonly-allowed services (Google, Twitter, GitHub) over encrypted TLS, so blocking it would require denying normal web access — the technique blends into expected noise and survives the segregation the clause primarily mandates (internal domain separation).
- T1102.003partialprevents — A.8.22's gateway control can block outbound traffic to unauthorized web services, constraining which external destinations a compromised host can reach, but T1102.003 is explicitly designed to use popular services (Google, Twitter, social media) that hosts are already communicating with and that gateways typically permit, so the segregation mechanism reduces the available C2 channels without eliminating the technique.
- T1104partialprevents — Network segregation with gateway controls can block some C2 paths between stages by restricting outbound traffic from compromised segments, but T1104 is explicitly designed to operate within constrained networks via multiple stages, fallback channels, and infrastructure hosted on paths the gateway permits; the technique still runs and uses whatever egress is allowed.
- T1105partialprevents — Network segregation with controlled gateways blocks unauthorized external ingress paths and constrains lateral tool transfer between domains, but cannot prevent transfers over allowed protocols (HTTPS, DNS), via permitted web services, or lateral movement within a single compromised domain — the technique's breadth leaves a substantial remainder.
- T1110partialprevents — Network segregation prevents brute force against authentication services placed in protected domains unreachable from compromised segments or the public network, but does not address brute force attempts against services that must remain reachable (e.g., remote access, externally-exposed auth), nor does it implement account lockout, rate-limiting, or MFA — those belong to A.8.5.
- T1110.001partialprevents — Network segregation hides internal authentication services (SSH, SMB, LDAP, Kerberos, databases) from external reachability, preventing password guessing against them, but services that must remain externally accessible (webmail, VPN, RDP, cloud SSO) and internal services reachable from compromised endpoints stay guessable, and the control does nothing to the authentication mechanism itself.
- T1110.003partialprevents — Network segregation limits which authentication endpoints are reachable from untrusted networks by placing them behind controlled gateways, preventing external password spraying against properly segregated services; however, services that must remain reachable for business use (RDP, SSH, webmail, cloud SSO) stay exposed, and the technique can still be executed against them or from any foothold inside a domain.
- T1110.004partialprevents — Network segregation hides internal-only authentication services from external reach, preventing credential stuffing against them, but the technique's primary targets (web apps, VPN, RDP, cloud/SSO, Office 365) are by design externally reachable, so the control cannot prevent stuffing against services that must be exposed for legitimate use.
- T1114.002partialprevents — Network segregation can isolate Exchange servers into protected domains, preventing direct network access from compromised endpoints in other segments, but it does not prevent credential-based access from endpoints that legitimately need email access, and it is largely irrelevant to cloud-hosted services (Office 365, Google Workspace) accessed over the internet with valid credentials.
- T1133partialprevents — A.8.22 does not stop the remote service from being reachable or from being used with valid credentials — the technique still runs and the adversary still gains a foothold — but proper segregation places the remote service gateway in a DMZ or restricted domain, preventing the adversary from reaching internal systems, which is the bulk of what the technique aims to achieve; the partial remainder is the foothold itself and any systems co-located in the same segregated zone.
- T1135partialprevents — Network segregation blocks SMB and similar share-discovery traffic across security boundaries, preventing the adversary from enumerating shares in other domains, but the technique still runs within the segment where the adversary has a foothold, so within-segment share discovery is unaffected.
- T1187partialprevents — Network segregation with egress filtering can block outbound SMB (port 445) to adversary-controlled servers, preventing the credential hash from leaving the network in the SMB variant; however, WebDAV-based forced authentication uses ports 80/443 which are typically permitted, and internal forced authentication (e.g., EfsRpcOpenFileRaw to an attacker already on the network) is unaffected by perimeter segregation.
- T1199partialprevents — A.8.22 directly addresses the technique's core network-level weakness — third parties sitting on the same network as the enterprise — by placing them in a segregated domain with gateway-controlled access limited to their intended scope, but it cannot prevent the third party from being compromised in the first place, cannot stop the adversary from using the third party's access within its authorized scope, and does not reach identity-level relationships such as Office 365 delegated administration that bypass network controls entirely.
- T1205partialprevents — Network segregation with gateway filtering can block cross-domain traffic-signaling attempts (e.g., external port-knocking probes to internal hosts, magic packets crossing trust boundaries), but the technique fundamentally operates at the host level — a compromised host's own software or host firewall responds to the magic sequence within its own domain — so segregation does not reach the mechanism that makes the technique work.
- T1207partialprevents — Network segregation can isolate Domain Controllers into a restricted management domain, preventing direct access from compromised workstations, but the technique requires Administrator privileges or KRBTGT hash which can be obtained through other means that bypass network boundaries.
- T1210partialprevents — Network segregation constrains lateral movement by controlling which systems can reach remote services across security domains via gateways, but exploitation within a single network domain and against services that must remain reachable across segments for business reasons is not prevented by this control.
- T1213partialprevents — Network segregation prevents some attack paths to information repositories — external direct access, lateral movement between segments, and uncontrolled wireless reach — but cannot prevent the technique when the adversary operates from within a permitted network segment with legitimate credentials, since repositories must remain reachable to authorized users and cloud/SaaS repositories are designed to be accessible.
- T1213.002partialprevents — Network segregation can prevent direct lateral movement from compromised endpoints in other domains to SharePoint servers, but the technique typically runs through legitimate web access paths with valid credentials, which controlled gateways permit; the prevention is a slice of the access surface, not the bulk.
- T1213.003partialprevents — Network segregation can prevent an adversary in a less-privileged segment from reaching an internal code repository by placing it in a separate domain with gateway-controlled access, but it does not stop the technique when the repository is a SaaS service reachable with valid credentials, when the adversary is already positioned inside the repository's domain, or when access is gained via stolen credentials at the application layer.
- T1213.006partialprevents — Network segregation prevents some unauthorized network paths to databases (e.g., direct internet access to internal database servers, lateral movement from less-trusted segments), but cannot prevent the technique when the adversary holds valid credentials, has compromised an authorized account, or accesses cloud/SaaS databases that sit outside the on-premises segregation perimeter — the data-access layer is above the network-layer control.
- T1219partialprevents — Network segregation can block external remote access attempts and constrain lateral movement between segments, but T1219 fundamentally abuses legitimate remote access tools that the organization typically permits through its own gateways, and reverse connections originate from inside the perimeter, so the control constrains the technique's reach without preventing it from running.
- T1219.001partialprevents — Network segregation constrains lateral movement via the IDE tunnel (the technique explicitly uses compromised machines as jump hosts), but cannot prevent the tunnel itself from being established to a legitimate external IDE service like GitHub, since the outbound connection blends with normal developer traffic and is typically permitted by gateway policy.
- T1219.002partialprevents — Network segregation can prevent remote desktop software from traversing between segregated domains via gateway controls, but cannot prevent its use within a domain or when the traffic is allowed for legitimate business purposes—which is the common case for these tools, as the technique explicitly notes they 'may be allowed by application control within a target environment.'
- T1219.003partialprevents — Network segregation can block external paths to remote access hardware and prevent the hardware from reaching external C2 infrastructure across domain boundaries, but the technique explicitly involves hardware already physically installed inside the network and used post-compromise as an alternate channel — internal use of such hardware is not reachable by gateway controls between domains.
- T1485partialprevents — Network segregation limits the worm-like lateral propagation of data-destruction malware across domains by constraining traffic at gateways, but it does not prevent local destruction on a system the adversary already accesses, nor destruction via cloud-provider APIs or other channels that bypass the segregated network.
- T1496.002partialprevents — Network segregation with egress filtering at domain gateways can constrain where a compromised system's bandwidth goes (blocking arbitrary outbound destinations used for DDoS, proxyjacking, or scanning), but it does not prevent the technique in general: systems typically retain some outbound connectivity for legitimate purposes, the technique can operate within allowed paths, and the control does not address the underlying compromise that enables bandwidth abuse.
- T1499partialprevents — Network segregation with gateway filtering can block some attack traffic from untrusted domains before it reaches endpoints, but T1499 specifically targets endpoint resources (CPU, memory, application stack) without saturating the network, so traffic that passes the gateway can still exhaust the endpoint; the control reduces attack surface but does not address the core mechanism of endpoint resource exhaustion.
- T1499.001partialprevents — Network segregation with gateway controls (firewalls, filtering routers) can drop or rate-limit the malformed TCP traffic that drives SYN and ACK floods before it reaches the OS, but cannot prevent attacks originating inside the segregated domain or those that ride on traffic patterns the gateway must permit, leaving a named remainder of OS-resource exhaustion the control does not reach.
- T1499.004partialprevents — Network segregation prevents exploitation of systems isolated from untrusted networks (e.g., internal server domains shielded from the internet), but cannot prevent exploitation of systems that must remain reachable to serve their function, where the exploit still runs against the application layer regardless of network boundaries.
- T1542.005partialprevents — Network segregation can isolate the management VLAN where TFTP boot configuration resides from the user-access plane, but the technique still runs if the adversary reaches the management interface or the TFTP server itself, so the prevention is a slice rather than a closure.
- T1550partialprevents — Network segregation constrains lateral movement with stolen hashes, tickets and tokens by restricting which domains can communicate, but the technique still executes within a permitted domain and against systems reachable through approved gateways, so the prevention is bounded rather than complete.
- T1550.002partialprevents — Network segregation constrains the lateral movement scope of PtH by restricting which network segments can communicate, but the technique itself — authenticating with a stolen hash via NTLM/Kerberos — still executes within any permitted path, and gateways must typically allow these authentication protocols for business operations.
- T1550.003partialprevents — Network segregation can block lateral movement via Pass the Ticket across security domain boundaries by controlling traffic at gateways, but within a domain or where gateway rules permit the traffic, valid Kerberos tickets still authenticate successfully — the technique's mechanism (Kerberos authentication) is unaffected by network topology, so only cross-domain lateral movement is prevented.
- T1557partialprevents — Network segregation constrains AiTM by forcing cross-domain traffic through controlled gateways and limiting broadcast domains where ARP/LLMNR poisoning operate, but the technique still runs within a single network segment where segregation does not reach.
- T1557.001partialprevents — Network segregation prevents cross-segment poisoning (e.g., guest or public-access domains reaching internal server/personnel domains via LLMNR/NBT-NS/mDNS), but the attack's core mechanism — responding to local-link multicast traffic on the same segment — is unaffected by domain boundaries, and the control does not disable the vulnerable protocols themselves.
- T1557.002partialprevents — Network segregation prevents ARP cache poisoning from crossing security boundaries between domains (an attacker on one segment cannot ARP-poison devices on another through a properly configured gateway), but does nothing to prevent the technique within a single broadcast domain where the attacker and victim share Layer 2 connectivity.
- T1563.002partialprevents — Network segregation can restrict RDP traffic to specific domains, but RDP hijacking targets an existing legitimate session within an allowed domain, so the control constrains lateral movement rather than preventing the technique entirely.
- T1565.002partialprevents — Network segregation constrains transmitted data manipulation by limiting cross-domain paths and forcing traffic through controlled gateways, but it does not prevent the technique: an adversary with a foothold can still intercept and alter data in transit within a compromised domain, and gateways control access rather than validate the integrity of permitted traffic.
- T1567partialprevents — Network segregation can constrain egress from sensitive domains and restrict which networks reach which external services, but T1567 is specifically designed to use legitimate, commonly-allowed web services over HTTPS, and the technique itself notes that firewall rules typically already permit such traffic — so the control reduces the attack surface without closing it.
- T1567.001partialprevents — Network segregation provides gateways that can be configured to block egress to code repositories, but the control does not mandate blocking such services and many implementations allow HTTPS to GitHub/GitLab for legitimate developer use, so the technique is constrained rather than prevented.
- T1567.002partialprevents — Network segregation with gateway controls can block egress to unauthorized cloud storage services, but the technique explicitly notes that cover is provided when hosts already communicate with the service — and most organizations allow at least some cloud storage traffic for legitimate business, so exfiltration to those allowed services is not stopped by the perimeter.
- T1567.003partialprevents — A.8.22 can prevent T1567.003 for systems placed in network domains fully segregated from the public internet (the clause explicitly contemplates separating domains from the internet), but the technique uses standard HTTPS to legitimate web services, which most domains with any business need for internet access will permit; the clause mandates domain separation and gateway-based traffic control, not URL- or destination-specific egress filtering, so the prevention holds only for the slice of systems placed in air-gapped or internet-isolated domains.
- T1569partialprevents — Network segregation blocks remote access to service endpoints (SMB, RPC, SSH, RDP, etc.) from untrusted networks, preventing the remote-execution variant of T1569, but it does not stop local abuse of services/daemons by an adversary already on a host, nor creation/modification of services for persistence, so only a slice of the technique is prevented.
- T1571partialprevents — Network segregation with gateway controls can prevent non-standard port usage when gateways inspect protocols rather than only port numbers, but T1571 is specifically designed to bypass the port-based filtering that A.8.22's gateways typically implement, so the technique defeats the common implementation while remaining catchable by protocol-aware configurations the clause does not mandate.
- T1572partialprevents — Network segregation with gateway controls can block some tunneling attempts by restricting protocols at boundaries and making systems unreachable without tunneling, but cannot prevent tunneling that uses allowed or encrypted protocols (HTTPS, DNS, SSH) since the technique is explicitly designed to evade network filtering — the gateway sees legitimate-looking traffic it is configured to permit.
- T1590.004partialprevents — Network segregation and perimeter gateways directly limit what topology details (especially internal domains, trust boundaries, and non-public gateways) an adversary can discover from outside or via exposed data sets, but do not stop all collection methods such as phishing, active scanning of exposed surfaces, or public data exposure.
- T1592partialprevents — Network segregation hides internal hosts from direct external scanning and enumeration, but T1592 explicitly draws on multiple vectors outside the network's control — social media, victim-owned websites, phishing for information, and user-agent headers — none of which are affected by domain segmentation.
- T1592.002partialprevents — Network segregation hides internal hosts behind gateways, preventing direct active scanning of internal software from external networks, but cannot prevent passive reconnaissance from public sources (job postings, metadata on victim-owned websites, phishing for information) which constitute the bulk of the technique's vectors.
- T1595partialprevents — Network segregation with gateway controls does not stop the adversary from probing the perimeter — active scan traffic still reaches the boundary and still yields information about exposed services — but it prevents the bulk of what the technique seeks: internal network topology, internal services, and cross-domain reachability are hidden behind the gateways, so the scan runs and only partially succeeds.
- T1595.001partialprevents — Network segregation with gateway controls at perimeters can hide internal IP ranges from external view, filter responses that reveal host information, and block certain probe types, but public-facing IPs remain scannable and the scan itself still occurs against the organization's external footprint.
- T1595.002partialprevents — Network segregation hides internal domains behind gateways so scanners cannot reach them directly, but the technique still runs against any exposed perimeter systems and public-facing services, so what is prevented is a slice of the scan surface rather than the scan itself.
- T1602partialprevents — Network segregation can isolate management/configuration repository networks from less-trusted segments, preventing cross-segment reach to SNMP and other configuration protocols, but once an adversary has a foothold in the management segment the control does not stop them from querying the repositories themselves.
- T1602.002partialprevents — Segregating network device management planes into a high-trust domain and controlling gateway traffic can prevent an adversary on a user or less-trusted segment from reaching SNMP/SMI services on network devices, but the technique still succeeds if the adversary is already in the management domain, holds valid credentials, or compromises a management station, and the control does not address device hardening or credential protection directly.
- T1609partialprevents — Network segregation can restrict access to container administration services (Docker daemon, Kubernetes API server, kubelet) by placing them in a controlled network domain with gateway filtering, but it cannot prevent abuse by actors already inside the management network, by compromised credentials, or by lateral movement from within the cluster where the administration service is reachable.
- T1610partialprevents — Network segregation can prevent an external or cross-domain adversary from reaching the container orchestration API (Kubernetes, Docker daemon) by placing it in a domain unreachable from the attacker's vantage point, but once the adversary is already inside the orchestration domain — which is the technique's stated premise of operating within an environment to evade defenses — A.8.22 does not stop the container from being deployed; it only constrains where that container can reach.
- T1669partialprevents — A.8.22 segregates wireless networks from internal ones and requires gateway controls before internal access is granted, which prevents an adversary on the Wi-Fi from reaching the internal estate, but it does not prevent the adversary from connecting to the wireless network itself or from attacking other devices on that same wireless segment.
- T1700partialprevents — Network segregation with controlled egress can block the data-transfer paths the weaponized AI agent would use to exfiltrate, but it does nothing about the prompt-injection vector that weaponizes the agent in the first place — the AI remains compromised and could still move data within permitted domains or abuse any sanctioned tool connection that traverses an allowed gateway.
Prevented OWASP Web Top 10 (2025) risks (3)
OWASP Web Top 10 (2025) risk categories this ISO control helps prevent or mitigate — our analysis (mostly llm_verified).
Direction: ← other covers this;
→ this covers other (F/M/P = full / mostly /
partial). gov = governs / implements (a mandate, not coverage).
Why these map — rationale
- A01partialblocks — A.8.22's network-domain segregation and perimeter gateways (firewalls) directly prevent several A01 members whose payoff crosses a trust boundary (CWE-22 path traversal to protected resources, CWE-918 SSRF, certain IDOR/exposure cases), but do not prevent the dominant in-band authorization failures (CWE-284 improper access control, CWE-862/863 missing/incorrect authorization checks, CWE-352 CSRF) that occur inside a permitted domain.
Control IDs, short titles and the structured attribute table (control type, CIA properties, cybersecurity-concept, operational capability, security domain) are facts from ISO/IEC 27001:2022 Annex A / ISO/IEC 27002:2022. The full implementation guidance prose lives in ISO/IEC 27002:2022 — not reproduced here. Cross-walks to NIST 800-53, NIST CSF 2.0, OWASP ASVS, CWE, MITRE ATT&CK and OWASP Web Top 10 are our own analysis (mostly llm_verified), not an ISO, NIST, MITRE or OWASP product — how ours compare.