Raw vector
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:NSummary
CVE-2013-5223 is a medium-severity Cross-site Scripting (CWE-79) vulnerability in Dlink Dsl-2760U Firmware. Its CVSS base score is 5.4 (Medium).
Operationally, exploitation aligns with the MITRE ATT&CK technique Browser Session Hijacking (T1185); ranked in the top 2% of CVEs by exploit likelihood; CISA has added it to the Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog; a public proof-of-concept is referenced.
Deeper analysis AI-assisted summary
Synthesised by an AI model from the NVD description and linked references — a reading aid, not an authoritative source.
The vulnerability consists of multiple cross-site scripting flaws, tracked as CVE-2013-5223, that affect the D-Link DSL-2760U Gateway running firmware revision E1. These issues are instances of CWE-79 and are rated at CVSS 5.4. They reside in numerous administrative CGI and CMD endpoints, including sntpcfg.cgi, ddnsmngr.cmd, todmngr.tod, urlfilter.cmd, scprttrg.cmd, scoutflt.cmd, portmapcfg.cmd, snmpconfig.cgi, scinflt.cmd, prmngr.cmd, ippcfg.cmd, samba.cgi, and wlcfg.wl, where unsanitized parameters such as ntpServer1, username, TodUrlAdd, appName, fltName, groupName, snmpRoCommunity, PolicyName, ippName, smbNetBiosName, and wlSsid are accepted.
Remote authenticated users can exploit the flaws by supplying crafted values in HTTP requests to the listed endpoints. Successful injection results in arbitrary web script or HTML being stored and later rendered in the browsers of other authenticated administrators, allowing theft of session tokens or other client-side actions within the gateway's management interface.
No vendor advisories, firmware updates, or mitigation guidance are referenced in the supplied OSVDB entries.
OWASP Top 10 for Web (2025)
EU & UK References
- 🇪🇺 ENISA EUVD: EUVD-2013-5063
Vulnerability Data
Multiple cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerabilities in D-Link DSL-2760U Gateway (Rev. E1) allow remote authenticated users to inject arbitrary web script or HTML via the (1) ntpServer1 parameter to sntpcfg.cgi, username parameter to (2) ddnsmngr.cmd or (3) todmngr.tod, (4) TodUrlAdd parameter…
more
to urlfilter.cmd, (5) appName parameter to scprttrg.cmd, (6) fltName in an add action or (7) rmLst parameter in a remove action to scoutflt.cmd, (8) groupName parameter to portmapcfg.cmd, (9) snmpRoCommunity parameter to snmpconfig.cgi, (10) fltName parameter to scinflt.cmd, (11) PolicyName in an add action or (12) rmLst parameter in a remove action to prmngr.cmd, (13) ippName parameter to ippcfg.cmd, (14) smbNetBiosName or (15) smbDirName parameter to samba.cgi, or (16) wlSsid parameter to wlcfg.wl.
- CWE(s)
- KEV Date Added
- 25 March 2022
Related Threats
MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise Techniques
CVEs Like This One
Affected Assets
Mitigating Controls
Control response
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V1.1.2V1.3.2
Likely Mitigating Controls AI
Per-CVE control mapping for this CVE has not run yet; the list below is derived from the weakness types (CWEs) cited in the NVD entry.
Penetration testing submits XSS payloads to web applications, detecting cross-site scripting flaws for subsequent remediation.
Validates web inputs to reject script-related content that could produce XSS.
Output validation against expected content can reject or sanitize script content in generated web pages, reducing XSS exploitability.
Mitigating Controls (NIST CSF 2.0) AI
Derived directly from the weakness types (CWEs) cited in the NVD entry via our AI-authored CWE→CSF cross-walk (authority under review) — links open the control.
Secure SDLC practices directly target introduction of XSS via coding standards/testing (mostly), yet the single broad outcome leaves many specific neutralization vectors unaddressed (partial).
Patching and EOL replacement can remediate known XSS instances in libraries or frameworks (partial) but do nothing to enforce input neutralization in application code (none).
Mitigating Controls (ISO/IEC 27001:2022 Annex A) AI
Derived directly from the weakness types (CWEs) cited in the NVD entry via our AI-authored CWE→ISO cross-walk (authority under review) — links open the control.
Secure-coding testing and automated code-analysis tools are applied to detect improper neutralization of script-related content during web-page generation.
Knowledge exchange on emerging attack techniques and patches reduces the likelihood that cross-site scripting flaws remain unaddressed in deployed applications.
Operational indicators of compromise for web-application attacks can be incorporated into WAF or input-filtering rules, lowering the likelihood that unsanitized data reaches the browser.
Requiring language-specific secure-coding standards and automated scanning during the SDLC catches missing output encoding or improper neutralization of untrusted data before the software reaches production.
Secure-coding standards, SAST scans and removal of insecure code samples together eliminate the failure to neutralize script content that produces cross-site scripting flaws.
Webpage malware scanning and block-listing of known malicious sites reduce the likelihood that reflected or stored script payloads reach a user’s browser.